Karnataka High Court
Padma vs N. Vinod on 26 June, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
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CRP No. 373 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 26TH DAY OF JUNE, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO. 373 OF 2025 (IO-)
BETWEEN:
1. PADMA
W/O LATE THYAGRAJ
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS
2. JAGADEESH
S/O LATE THYAGRAJ
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
3. MAHESH
S/O LATE THYAGRAJ
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
ALL ARE RESIDING AT
Digitally
signed by NO. 287, JAGADISHNAGAR
NAGAVENI NEW THIPPASANDRA POST
Location:
High Court of BENGALURU - 560 075.
Karnataka ...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI Y.R.SADASIVA REDDY, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI RAHUL S.REDDY, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. N.VINOD
S/O LATE NARAYANSWAMY
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS
R/AT G.M.PALYA, BYRASANDRA
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NEW THIPPASANDRA POST
BENGALURU.
2. DHANALAKSMI
W/O LATE NARAYANSWAMY
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
3. PRAVEEN
S/O LATE NARAYANSWAMY
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS
RESPONDENT NO.2 AND 3
RESIDING AT NO. 172/126
G.M.PALYA, NEW THIPPASANDRA POST
BENGALURU - 560 075.
4. KRISHNAPPA
S/O LATE SOONAPPA
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
R/AT NO. 109/1, G.M.PALYA
NEW THIPPASANDRA
BENGALURU - 560 075.
5. RATHNAMMA
D/O LATE SONNAPPA
AGED ABOUT MAJOR
R/AT THINDALU VILLAGE
SARJAPURA HOBLI
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT
BENGALURU.
6. D.CHANDRA BABU
S/O NARIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
R/AT NO. 60, 1ST MAIN
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4TH CROSS, JAGADISHNAGAR
NEW THIPPASANDRA POST
BENGALURU.
7. KONDAIAH
S/O MALAKONDAIAH
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
R/AT NO.M-141, NELLURPURAM
NEW THIPPASANDRA
BENGALURU - 560 075.
8. S.N.SREENVASAN MURTHY
S/O S.NARASIMHA MURTHY
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS
R/AT NO. A-81/1, JEEVAN BHIMANAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 075.
9. M.R.VITTAL KUMAR
S/O M.RADHAKRISHNAIAH SETTY
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
R/AT NO.1, ANANDA NILAYA
YARSAIAHNAPALYA, RAMAMURTHY NAGAR
DOORAVANINAGAR, BENGALURU - 560 006.
10. VAIDEHI
W/O S.G.SAMPATH IYENGAR
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
R/AT NO. NB-PO-1047/17C
VIDYARANAYAPURA
MYSORE - 560 016.
11. M.V.SUVARNA
W/O M.R.VITTAL KUMAR
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
R/AT YARAIAHNAPALYA
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RAMAMURTHYNAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 016.
12. M.CLARA
W/O R.ANTHONY DASS
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
R/AT NO. 28, 4TH CROSS
JAGADISHNAGAR
NEW THIPPASANDRA
BENGALURU - 560 075.
13. R.PADMAMA
W/O SANJEEVAIAH
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
R/A NO. 402, NELLAREPURAM
NEW THIPPASANDRA
BENGALURU - 560 075.
14. P.R.MUNIRAJ
S/O P.T.RAMACHANDRAPPA
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
R/AT NO. 147, 4TH 'A' MAIN ROAD
JAGADISHNAGAR, NEW THIPPASANDRA
BENGALURU - 560 075.
15. S.KANDHAN
S/O N.SUBRAMANI
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
R/AT NO. 889, 'C' STREET
11TH CROSS, 3RD MAIN
HOYSALANAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 075.
16. R.PADMANABHAN
S/O RAJANGAM PILLAI
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AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
R/AT NO. 20, 10TH CROSS
2ND BLOCK, AKSHAYANAGAR
RAMMURTHYNAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 016.
17. R.VENKTASWAMY
S/O V.RAMESH
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
R/AT NO.33, MUNESHWARA NILAYA
5TH CROSS, OLD UCO BANK ROAD
RAMAMURTHYNAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 016.
18. E.NANDAKUMAR
S/O ELUMALAI
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
19. E.DHANDAPANI
S/O ELUMALAI
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS
RESPONDENT 18 AND 19 ARE
RESIDING AT NO. 416(36/1)
GOWDANAPALYA, 8TH CROSS
SUBRAMANYAPURA MAIN ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 061.
20. J.KOTTEESWARAN
S/O KAYASEELAN
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
21. KUBENDIRAN
S/O JAYASEELAN
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
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RESPONDENT NOS. 20 AND 21 ARE
RESIDING AT NO.21, 2ND MAIN ROAD
2ND CROSS, SUBRAMANI LAYOUT
VIJINAPURA, RAMAMURTHYNAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 016.
22. M.R.VITAL KUMAR
S/O MR. RADHAKRISHNAIAH
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
23. M.V.SUVARANA
W/O M.R.VITTAL KUMAR
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO.22 AND 23 ARE
RESIDING AT NO.1, ANANDA NILAYA
YERAIHNAPALYA, RAMAMURTHYNAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 016.
24. VENKATESH
S/O LATE VENKATAIAH
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS
R/AT NO.333, NELLURUPURAM
NEW THIPPASANDRA
BENGALURU - 560 075.
25. M.MADHESHWARAN
S/O K.MUTHUSWAMY GOUNDER
AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS
26. N.VIJAYA
W/O M.MADHESWARAN
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
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RESPONDENT NO.25 AND 26 ARE
RESIDING AT NO. 458/D
10TH CROSS, 1ST MAIN
JAGADISHNAGAR, NEW THIPPASANDRA
BENGALURU - 560 075.
27. T.THIRUPATHAIAH
S/O KONDAIAH
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS
R/AT NO. 403, NELLURUPURAM
NEW THIPPASANDRA POST
BENGALURU - 560 075.
28. KANNAN
S/O KRISHNAN
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
R/AT 13TH CROSS, JAGADISHNAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 075.
29. DEBJYOTI CHOWDHURI
S/O TAPAN KUMAR CHOWDHRI
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
R/AT NO. 285, 1ST MAIN
JAGADISHNAGAR
NEW THIPPASANDRA POST
BENGALURU - 560 075.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI M.B.CHANDRACHOODA, ADVOCATE FOR R1)
THIS CRP IS FILED UNDER SEC.115 OF CPC., AGAINST
THE ORDER DATED 01.04.2025 PASSED ON IA NO.VI IN OS
NO.938/2021 ON THE FILE OF LXXV ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL
AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU., DISMISSING THE IA
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NO.VI FILED UNDER ORDER VII RULE 11(d) R/W SEC.151 OF
CPC., FOR REJECTION OF PLAINT.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioners - defendants in O.S.No.938/2021 is
before this Court calling in question the rejection of an
application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 ('the CPC' for short).
2. Heard Shri Y.R. Sadasiva Reddy, learned Senior
counsel for Shri Rahul S. Reddy, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner and Shri M.B. Chandrachooda learned counsel
appearing for respondent No. 1.
3. Facts in brief germane are as follows:
The first respondent - plaintiff institutes a suit in
O.S.No.938/2021 against the petitioners seeking a declaration
to declare that the registered partition deed dated 29.08.2025
is now binding on the plaintiff and further seeks partition in
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respect of the suit schedule properties. The petitioners enter
appearance and file their written statement stating that the
plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the suit. After filing of
the written statement, file an application under Order VII Rule
11(d) of the CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on the score
that it is barred by limitation. The said application comes to be
rejected. The rejection of which is called in question before this
Court in the subject petition.
4. Shri Y.R. Sadasiva Reddy, learned Senior counsel
takes this Court through the plaint averments to contend that
there is no cause of action to have instituted the said suit in the
light of the registered partition having come about long ago in
terms of O.S.Nos.7398/1995 and 339/2012, which had ended
in compromise. He would submit that the application ought to
have been allowed, as the plaintiff has no right to seek partition
of the property, which stood complete long ago.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent - plaintiff would vehemently refute the submission
in contending that the concerned Court as on cogent reasons
rejected the application seeking rejection of the plaint. He
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would submit that the concerned Court clearly notices that for
consideration of an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of
the CPC, what is to be looked into is the plaint averment. The
plaint averments in the case at hand does disclose a cause of
action. He would seek dismissal of the petition.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have
pursued the available material on record.
7. The suit being for the aforesaid relief is a matter of
record. the petitioners - defendant file application under Order
VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC. The concerned Court rejects the
application by the following order:
"16. Having regard to the Order VII Rule 11 of
C.P.C., the documents filed along with the plaint are
required to be taken into consideration for deciding the
application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. When
a document referred to in the plaint forms the basis of
the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.
17. I would like to refer the decision reported in
2020 (7) Supreme Court cases, 366 in cases of
Dahiben Vs - Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali
(Gajra), Dead through Legal Representatives and
others. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held in para 23.2
that:
"The remedy under Order 7 Rule
11 is an independent and special
remedy, wherein the Court is
empowered to summarily dismiss a suit
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at the threshold, without proceeding to
record evidence, and conducting a trial,
on the basis of the evidence adduced, if
it is satisfied the action should be
terminated on any of the grounds
contained in this provision."
The ratio mentioned in the above dictum is also
applicable to the case in hand. Hence, this Court has to
see the plaint averments and documents attached with
the plaint and none other.
18. On perusal of the plaint and plaint documents,
this Court did not find any reasons to reject the plaint as
per the application filed by the defendant No.1 to 3. This
Issue involves mixture of facts and laws which should be
decided after evidence and on deciding merits of the
case and documents produced by both the parties. The
defendant No.1 to 3 has not made out grounds to allow
J.A.No.VI. Hence, I answer Point No.1 in the
Negative.
19. POINT NO.2: For the foregoing reasons, I
proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
I.A.No.VI filed U/O.VII Rule 11(d)
R/w/Sec.151 of CPC by the defendant
No.1 to 3 is hereby dismissed.
No order as to costs."
The concerned Court rejects the application on the
ground that the plaint discloses bundle of facts, which are all to
be tried in evidence. There is no warrant to summarily dismiss
the suit without recording evidence.
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8. The Apex Court in the case of
P. KUMARAKURUBARAN Vs. P. NARAYANAN, reported in
2025 SCC ONLINE SC 975, has held as follows:
12. In the present case, the appellant has specifically
averred in the plaint that upon becoming aware of
registration of documents allegedly carried out among the
defendants in relation to the suit property, he immediately
approached the Additional Commissioner of Police, Chennai
and lodged a land grabbing complaint on 09.12.2011
against the family of Defendant No. 1. Subsequently, he
applied for patta in his favour on 24.02.2012, and raised
objections on 05.03.2012 to Defendant No. 4 stating that
the suit property belonged to the plaintiff and that no
registration concerning the same should be carried out. He
has also submitted an objection petition to Defendant No. 5
requesting that no planning permit be granted to anybody
except the appellant in respect of the suit property.
Thereafter, the appellant instituted the suit on 03.12.2014
seeking a declaration and consequential reliefs. On the
other hand, the respondents/defendants stated in their
application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC that the
appellant had knowledge of the execution of the sale deed
by his father in favour of Defendant No. 1 at the earliest
point of time and hence, the suit instituted by the appellant
was barred by limitation. While the trial Court rejected the
said application holding that the issue of limitation involved
a mixed question of law and fact, the High Court in revision,
took a contrary view and allowed the application filed under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC and rejected the plaint solely on the
ground that the suit was barred by limitation.
12.1. However, we are of the considered view that
the issue as to whether the appellant had prior notice
or reason to be aware of the transaction at an earlier
point of time, or whether the plea regarding the date
of knowledge is credible, are matters that necessarily
require appreciation of evidence. At this preliminary
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stage, the averments made in the plaint must be
taken at their face value and assumed to be true.
Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded
and forms the basis of the cause of action, the issue
of limitation cannot be decided summarily. It
becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which
cannot be adjudicated at the threshold stage under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the
plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting
the parties to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable.
(Emphasis supplied)
12.2. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the
following decisions of this Court, which have consistently
held that when the question of limitation involves disputed
facts or hinges on the date of knowledge, such issues
cannot be decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC:
(i) Daliben Valjibhai v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai7
"10. The First Appellate Court came to the
conclusion that the defendants made an
application for correcting the revenue records only
in the year 2017 and on the said application the
Deputy Collector issued notice to the plaintiffs in
March 2017 and that was the time when the
plaintiffs came to know about the execution of the
sale deed. It is under these circumstances that the
suit was instituted in the year 2017. While the
High Court came to the correct conclusion that
under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, a suit can
be instituted within 3 years of the knowledge, it
proceeded to return a finding that in cases where
the document is registered, the knowledge must
be presumed from the date of registration.
12. Further, in Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai
Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar where again a suit for
cancellation of sale deed was opposed through an
application under Order 7 Rule 11, on ground of
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limitation, this Court specifically held that
limitation in all such cases will arise from date of
knowledge. The relevant portion is as follows:
"15. What is relevant for answering the
matter in issue in the context of the
application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, is
to examine the averments in the plaint. The
plaint is required to be read as a whole. The
defence available to the defendants or the
plea taken by them in the written statement
or any application filed by them, cannot be
the basis to decide the application under
Order 7 Rule 11(d). Only the averments in
the plaint are germane. It is common ground
that the registered sale deed is dated 18-10-1996.
The limitation to challenge the registered sale
deed ordinarily would start running from the date
on which the sale deed was registered. However,
the specific case of the appellant-plaintiffs is that
until 2013 they had no knowledge whatsoever
regarding execution of such sale deed by their
brothers, original Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of
Jaikrishnabhai Prabhudas Thakkar or Defendants 3
to 6. They acquired that knowledge on 26-12-
2012 and immediately took steps to obtain a
certified copy of the registered sale deed and on
receipt thereof they realised the fraud played on
them by their brothers concerning the ancestral
property and two days prior to the filing of the
suit, had approached their brothers (original
Defendants 1 and 2) calling upon them to stop
interfering with their possession and to partition
the property and provide exclusive possession of
half (½) portion of the land so designated towards
their share. However, when they realised that the
original Defendants 1 and 2 would not pay any
heed to their request, they had no other option
but to approach the court of law and filed the
subject suit within two days therefrom. According
to the appellants, the suit has been filed within
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time after acquiring the knowledge about the
execution of the registered sale deed. In this
context, the trial court opined that it was a triable
issue and declined to accept the application filed
by Respondent 1-Defendant 5 for rejection of the
plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That view
commends to us.
...
(Emphasis supplied)
19. In the present case, we find that the
appellant-plaintiffs have asserted that the suit was
filed immediately after getting knowledge about
the fraudulent sale deed executed by original
Defendants 1 and 2 by keeping them in the dark
about such execution and within two days from
the refusal by the original Defendants 1 and 2 to
refrain from obstructing the peaceful enjoyment of
use and possession of the ancestral property of
the appellants. We affirm the view taken by
the trial court that the issue regarding the
suit being barred by limitation in the facts of
the present case, is a triable issue and for
which reason the plaint cannot be rejected at
the threshold in exercise of the power under
Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. In view of the above, there was no
justification for the High Court in allowing
the application under Order 7 Rule 11, on
issues that were not evident from the plaint
averments itself. The High Court was also not
justified in holding that the limitation period
commences from the date of registration
itself. In this view of the matter the
judgment of the High Court is
unsustainable."
(Emphasis supplied)
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(ii) Salim D. Agboatwala v. Shamalji Oddhavji
Thakkar
"11. As observed by this Court in P.V.
Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha
Reddy [(2015) 8 SCC 331 : (2015) 4 SCC
(Civ) 100], the rejection of plaint under
Order 7 Rule 11 is a drastic power conferred
on the court to terminate a civil action at the
threshold. Therefore, the conditions
precedent to the exercise of the power are
stringent and it is especially so when
rejection of plaint is sought on the ground of
limitation. When a plaintiff claims that he
gained knowledge of the essential facts
giving rise to the cause of action only at a
particular point of time, the same has to be
accepted at the stage of considering the
application under Order 7 Rule 11.
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Again as pointed out by a three-Judge
Bench of this Court in Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai
Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar [(2018) 6 SCC
422 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 524], the plea regarding
the date on which the plaintiffs gained knowledge
of the essential facts, is crucial for deciding the
question whether the suit is barred by limitation or
not. It becomes a triable issue and hence the suit
cannot be thrown out at the threshold.
13...
14. But a defendant in a suit cannot pick
up a few sentences here and there from the
plaint and contend that the plaintiffs had
constructive notice of the proceedings and
that therefore limitation started running
from the date of constructive notice. In fact,
the plea of constructive notice is raised by
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the respondents, after asserting positively
that the plaintiffs had real knowledge as well
as actual notice of the proceedings. In any
case, the plea of constructive notice appears
to be a subsequent invention."
(Emphasis supplied)
(iii) Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of
India9
"6. The central question is : whether the plaint
as filed by the appellant could have been rejected
by invoking Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC?
7. Indeed, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC gives ample
power to the court to reject the plaint, if from the
averments in the plaint, it is evident that the suit
is barred by any law including the law of
limitation. This position is no more res integra. We
may usefully refer to the decision of this Court
in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar
Gupta [(2007) 10 SCC 59]. In paras 13 to 20, the
Court observed as follows : (SCC pp. 65-66)
"13. As per Order 7 Rule 11, the plaint is liable
to be rejected in the following cases:
'(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and
the plaintiff, on being required by the court to
correct the valuation within a time to be fixed
by the court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but
the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently
stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required
by the court to supply the requisite stamp
paper within a time to be fixed by the court,
fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in
the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
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(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the
provisions of Rule 9;'
14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra
[Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, [(2003) 1
SCC 557] it was held with reference to Order 7
Rule 11 of the Code that:
'9. ... the relevant facts which need to
be looked into for deciding an application
thereunder are the averments in the
plaint. The trial court can exercise the
power ... at any stage of the suit -- before
registering the plaint or after issuing
summons to the defendant at any time
before the conclusion of the trial. For the
purposes of deciding an application under
clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order
7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are
germane; the pleas taken by the
defendant in the written statement would
be wholly irrelevant at that stage....' (SCC
p. 560, para 9).
(Emphasis supplied)
15. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate
Tribunal [ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate
Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the
basic question to be decided while dealing with an
application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code
is whether a real cause of action has been set out
in the plaint or something purely illusory has been
stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of
the Code.
16. "The trial court must remember that if
on a meaningful--not formal--reading of the
plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless
in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to
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sue, it should exercise its power under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that
the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If
clever drafting has created the illusion of a
cause of action, [it has to be nipped] in the
bud at the first hearing by examining the
party searchingly under Order 10 CPC."
(See T. Arivandandam v. T.V.
Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467], SCC p. 468.)
(Emphasis supplied)
17. It is trite law that not any particular plea
has to be considered, and the whole plaint has to
be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop
Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC
487], only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected
and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as
a whole must be rejected.
18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh
Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that
the averments in the plaint as a whole have to be
seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11
Order 7 was applicable.
19. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity
Commr. [(2004) 3 SCC 137] this Court held thus :
(SCC pp. 146-47, para 15)
'15. There cannot be any
compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and
inversions of the language of various paragraphs
in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would
run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation
according to which a pleading has to be read as a
whole to ascertain its true import. It is not
permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage
and to read it out of the context in isolation.
Although it is the substance and not merely the
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form that has to be looked into, the pleading has
to be construed as it stands without addition or
subtraction or words or change of its apparent
grammatical sense. The intention of the party
concerned is to be gathered primarily from the
tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole.
At the same time it should be borne in mind that
no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat
justice on hair-splitting technicalities.'
20. For our purpose, clause (d) is relevant. It
makes it clear that if the plaint does not contain
necessary averments relating to limitation, the
same is liable to be rejected. For the said purpose,
it is the duty of the person who files such an
application to satisfy the court that the plaint does
not disclose how the same is in time. In order to
answer the said question, it is incumbent on the
part of the court to verify the entire plaint. Order
7 Rule 12 mandates where a plaint is rejected, the
court has to record the order to that effect with
the reasons for such order."
8. On the same lines, this Court in Church of
Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable
Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust [(2012)
8 SCC 706 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612], observed as
follows : (SCC pp. 713-15, paras 10-12)
"10. ... It is clear from the above that where
the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the
relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected
within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently
stamped and not rectified within the time fixed by
the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the
required copies and the plaintiff fails to comply
with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no
other option except to reject the same. A reading
of the above provision also makes it clear that
power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be
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exercised at any stage of the suit either before
registering the plaint or after the issuance of
summons to the defendants or at any time before
the conclusion of the trial.
11. This position was explained by this Court
in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1
SCC 557], in which, while considering Order 7
Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under : (SCC
p. 560, para 9)
'9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it
clear that the relevant facts which need to be
looked into for deciding an application thereunder
are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can
exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at
any stage of the suit -- before registering the
plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant
at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For
the purposes of deciding an application under
clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the
averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas
taken by the defendant in the written statement
would be wholly irrelevant at that stage,
therefore, a direction to file the written statement
without deciding the application under Order 7
Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity
touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial
court.'
It is clear that in order to consider Order 7
Rule 11, the court has to look into the
averments in the plaint and the same can be
exercised by the trial court at any stage of
the suit. It is also clear that the averments in
the written statement are immaterial and it
is the duty of the court to scrutinise the
averments/pleas in the plaint. In other
words, what needs to be looked into in
deciding such an application are the
averments in the plaint. At that stage, the
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pleas taken by the defendant in the written
statement are wholly irrelevant and the
matter is to be decided only on the plaint
averments. These principles have been
reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co.
Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184]
and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune
Express [(2006) 3 SCC 100].
(Emphasis supplied)
12. It is also useful to refer the judgment in T.
Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC
467], wherein while considering the very same
provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the
trial court in considering such application, this
Court has reminded the trial Judges with the
following observation : (SCC p. 470, para 5)
'5. ... The learned Munsif must remember
that if on a meaningful -- not formal --
reading of the plaint it is manifestly
vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not
disclosing a clear right to sue, he should
exercise his power under Order 7 Rule
11 CPC taking care to see that the ground
mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever
drafting has created the illusion of a cause of
action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by
examining the party searchingly under Order
10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to
irresponsible law suits. The trial courts
would insist imperatively on examining the
party at the first hearing so that bogus
litigation can be shot down at the earliest
stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful
enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI) and
must be triggered against them.'
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It is clear that if the allegations are
vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a
clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty
of the trial Judge to exercise his power under
Order 7 Rule 11. If clever drafting has
created the illusion of a cause of action as
observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in the
abovereferred decision [T.
Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC
467], it should be nipped in the bud at the
first hearing by examining the parties under
Order 10 of the Code."
14. All these events have been reiterated
in Para 28 of the plaint, dealing with the
cause of action for filing of the suit. Indeed,
the said para opens with the expression "the
cause of action to file the suit accrued in
favour of the plaintiff and against the
defendants when the illegal recoveries were
noticed and letter dated 21-7-2000 was sent
to the defendants to clarify as to how the
interest was being calculated". This
averment cannot be read in isolation.
....
22. It is well-established position that the
cause of action for filing a suit would consist
of bundle of facts. Further, the factum of the
suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily,
would be a mixed question of fact and law.
Even for that reason, invoking Order 7 Rule
11 CPC is ruled out. In the present case, the
assertion in the plaint is that the appellant
verily believed that its claim was being
processed by the regional office and the
regional office would be taking appropriate
decision at the earliest. That belief was
shaken after receipt of letter from the Senior
Manager of the Bank, dated 8-5-2002
followed by another letter dated 19-9-2002
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to the effect that the action taken by the
Bank was in accordance with the rules and
the appellant need not correspond with the
Bank in that regard any further. This firm
response from the respondent Bank could
trigger the right of the appellant to sue the
respondent Bank. Moreover, the fact that the
appellant had eventually sent a legal notice
on 28-11-2003 and again on 7-1-2005 and
then filed the suit on 23-2-2005, is also
invoked as giving rise to cause of action.
Whether this plea taken by the appellant is
genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed
question of fact and law, depending on the
response of the respondents."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court in
reversing the well-reasoned order of the trial Court warrants
interference. The trial Court had rightly held that the issue
of limitation necessitated adjudication upon evidence,
particularly in view of the appellant's assertion that the
Power of Attorney executed by him did not confer any
authority upon his father to alienate the suit property and
that the impugned transaction came to his knowledge only
at a much later point in time. In such circumstances, the
determination of limitation involved disputed questions of
fact that could not be summarily decided without the benefit
of trial. The High Court, however, proceeded to reject the
plaint solely on a prima facie assumption that the suit was
barred by limitation, without undertaking any examination
as to whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge was
demonstrably false or inherently improbable in light of the
record. In the opinion of this Court, such an approach
amounts to an error of law and constitutes a misapplication
of the well-established principles governing the exercise of
power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same reasons,
the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the
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respondents are inapplicable, being factually
distinguishable.
14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has
categorically averred in the plaint that he executed
the registered power of attorney in favour of his
father solely for the limited purpose of constructing a
house and carrying out related activities. There is no
express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit
property to any person without the appellant's
consent and knowledge. Yet, the appellant's father
executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter,
going beyond the scope of the power of attorney,
which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority
and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be
rejected in the application under Order VII Rule
11 CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the
plaint discloses a cause of action which cannot be
shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted
within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint
and in holding that the matter ought to proceed to
trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional
jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have
interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or
perversity in the trial court's order. Rejecting the
plaint where substantial factual disputes exist
concerning limitation and the scope of authority
under the Power of Attorney, is legally
unsustainable."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the facts obtaining in the case at hand, the
order passed and the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
P. KUMARAKURUBARAN (supra), I do not find any warrant to
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interfere with the order, as the plaint does make out a cause of
action. Petition lacking in merit stands dismissed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
JY
CT:SS
