iii. Pass appropriate order deems fit to the circumstances
of the case on hand and to meet the interest of justice.
NC: 2025:KHC:22394
HC-KAR
2. Though respondent No.2 is served, she has remained
unrepresented.
3. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the petitioner
is the husband of late Smt.Raziya Sulathana, who is none other
than the daughter of respondent No.2. The said Raziya
Sulthana is alleged to have committed suicide on 14.01.2024
pursuant to which respondent No.2-defacto complainant filed
the instant complaint which is registered in FIR No.37/2024
against the petitioner for the alleged offence punishable under
Sections 498-A and 306 of IPC which is currently pending in
SC No.113/2024 before the trial court.
4. In this context, it is necessary to extract the impugned
complaint which reads as under:
"ರವ ೆ ¢£ÁAPÀ: 14.01.2024
ೕ ಸ ಇ ೆಕ
ಾದ ಾಯಕನಹ , ೕ ಾ ೆ
ೆಂಗಳ$ರು &'ೆ(
ಇಂದ,
ನ) ಾ *ಾ+ ,ೊಂ ಅನ/ 0ಾ , 53 ವಷ2,
ಮು)(ಂ ಜ ಾಂಗ, ಗೃ67, 8ಾಸ ಆ .ಎಂ.« 2 ೇ ಹಂತ
ಭೂಪಸಂದ>, ೆಂಗಳ$ರು
ªÉƨÉÊ¯ï £ÀA: 8296172521,
NC: 2025:KHC:22394
HC-KAR
ಾನ?@ೆ,
ಾನು AೕಲCಂಡ EFಾಸದ ( 8ಾಸ8ಾGರು*ೆHೕ ೆ. ನನ ೆ 6 ಜನ ಗಂಡು ಮಕCಳI
ಮತುH 4 ಜನ JೆಣುL ಮಕC ರು*ಾH@ೆ, 7 ೇ ಮಗFಾದ ರ&Mಾ ಸು'ಾH ಎಂ ಾ,ೆಯನುN
ಈ ೆP 5 ವಷ2ಗಳ 6ಂQೆ *ಾವ@ೆ,ೆ@ೆ 8ಾ), ಅRೕ ಾಷ ರವರ ಮಗ ಾದ ನ8ಾ+ ಾಷ
ಎಂಬುವ ೆ ನಮT ಸಂಪ>Qಾಯದಂ*ೆ ಮದು8ೆ ಾU,ೊV ರು*ೆHೕ8ೆ, ಇವ@ೆ ೆ ಈಗ 5
ವಷ2ದ EWಾX ಾಷ 3 ವಷ2ದ 6Yಾ ಎಂಬ ಇಬZರು ಮಕC ರು*ಾH@ೆ,
ಮದು8ೆMಾದG[ಂದಲೂ ನ8ಾ+ ಾಷ ನನN ಮಗFೆ$ ಂ\ ೆ ಅ ೊNೕನ?8ಾGರQೆ ಜಗಳ
ಾಡು*ಾH *ೊಂದ@ೆ ,ೊಡು]Hದ^ನು, 2023 ರ ( ನನN ಮಗಳI Jೆ ಾZಳ ೕ ಾ ೆಯ (
ಗಂಡ ನ8ಾ ಾಷನ Aೕ'ೆ ದೂರು [ೕUದು^ ,ೇಸು Qಾಖ'ಾGರುತHQೆ, Jಾಗೂ ನಮT
ಜ ಾಂಗದ ಮುಖಂಡರು ಮ)ೕ\ಯ ( ] ಾ2ನ ಾU ಈತ[ ೆ ಬು\^8ಾದ Jೇ ದ^ರು
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`ಕC ೊಲ(ರಹV ಯ ನಂಜಪa ರವರ ಮ ೆಯ ( 8ಾಸ8ಾGದ^ರು. ನನN ಮಗಳI ಪ>] \ನ
ನನ ೆ ೕ ಾU ನ8ಾ+ ಾಷನು bರುಕುಳ ,ೊಡು]Hದ^ EcಾರವನುN ] ಸು]Hದ^ಳI.
ತನN ಗಂಡ [ೕನು ಏ ಾದರೂ ಾU,ೊಂಡು ಸತುH Jೋಗು ಇರ ೇಡ ಎಂದು ಾನ)ಕ8ಾG
6ಂfೆ [ೕಡು]Hದ^ Ecಾರ ನನ ೆ ಆ ಾ ೆP ] ಸು]Hದ^ಳI, \ ಾಂಕ 14/01/2024 ರಂದು ೆ ೆP
ಸು ಾರು 7-00 ಗಂgೆಯ ( ನನN ಅ ಯ ನನ ೆ ೕ ಾU ರ&Mಾ ಸ'ಾT ೇಣು
Jಾb,ೊಂಡು ಸತುHJೋGರು*ಾHF ೆ, ಎಂದು ] )ದನು. ಾನು ಕೂಡ'ೇ
ಸಂಬಂ\ಕ@ೊಂ\ ೆ, `ಕC ೊಲ(ರಹV ಯ (ರುವ ನನN ಮಗಳ ಮ ೆ ೆ ಬಂದು ೋಡ'ಾG
ಮ ೆಯ ( ೆಲದ Aೕ'ೆ cಾ ೆ Jಾ) ನನN ಮಗಳ ಶವವನುN ಮಲG)ದ^ರು, Ecಾರ
] ಯ'ಾG ೆಳGನ Yಾವ 5-00 ಗಂgೆಯ ( ನಮT ಅ ಯ ನ8ಾ+ ಾಷ ಾಂಸದ
ಅಂಗU ೆ ,ೆಲಸ,ೆC JೋGದು^ ೆ ೆP 6-30 ಗಂgೆ ೆ 8ಾಪ ಮ ೆ ೆ ಬಂದು ೋಡ'ಾG
ಮ ೆಯ ಮುಂ ಾಗದ ಾGಲು ಒಳG[ಂದ ೋj Jಾbದು^ ಅನು ಾನ ಬಂದು ಅಕC
ಪಕCದವರನುN ಕೂG ಕ@ೆದು ಾGಲು ಮು ದು ೋಡ'ಾG ನನN ಮಗಳI ರ&Mಾ ಸು'ಾHನ,
ರವರು ಮ ೆಯ ರೂRನ ( )ೕ ಂk lಾ?[ ೆ 8ೇj[ಂದ ೇಣು Jಾb,ೊಂUರುವmದು
ಕಂಡು ಬಂ\ದು^ &ೕವ ಇರಬಹುQೆಂದು ಕೂಡ'ೇ ,ೆಳ ೆ ಇ ) ೋಡ'ಾG ಮೃತಪV ರುವmದು
ೊ*ಾHnತು, ನನN ಮಗಳI ಆ,ೆಯ ಗಂಡ ನ8ಾ+ ಾಷ ರವರು [ೕಡು]Hದ^ ಾನ)ಕ 6ಂfೆ
ಮತುH zÀĵÉàçÃgÀuÉ nಂದ ೊಂದು \ ಾಂಕ 14/01/2024 ರಂದು ೆಳGನ Yಾವ 5-00
ಗಂgೆnಂಧ 6-30 ಗಂgೆpಳ ೆ ಮ ೆಯ ( ೇಣುJಾb,ೊಂಡು ಮೃತಪV ರು*ಾHF ೆ ನನN
ಮಗಳ fಾE ೆ ನನ£ÀÄß ಅ ಯ ನ8ಾ+ ಾಷ ೇ ,ಾರಣ ಾGದು^ ಆತನ Aೕ'ೆ ,ಾನೂನು
ೕ] ಕ>ಮ ಜರೂGಸ ೇ,ೆಂದು ,ೋರು*ೆHೕ ೆ, ನನN ಮಗಳ ಮೃತ QೇಹವನುN ೆಲಮಂಗಲ
ಸ,ಾ2 ಆಸa*ೆ> ೆ fಾG)ರು*ೆHೕ8ೆ."
NC: 2025:KHC:22394
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5. The charge sheet which was filed in pursuance of the
said complaint also would reiterate the very same allegations
but the statement of witnesses do not indicate that aforesaid
deceased Raziya Sulthana committed suicide due to
instigation/incitement on the part of the petitioner as required
in law in the absence of which, it cannot be said that petitioner
is guilty of abetment of suicide as contemplated under Section
306 read with 107 of IPC. In support of his submissions, he
placed reliance on two judgments of the Apex Court.
6. In the case of Ayub Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh1 it is
held as under:
"14. At the outset itself, we notice certain disturbing and
peculiar features that obtain in this case. The first
appellant who lost his son, lodged the first complaint on
02.11.2022 at 19:15 hrs. By the said time the body was in
the mortuary. It transpires from the first information
report lodged on 03.11.2022 at 17:07 hrs by the
respondent no. 2 that Tanu had committed suicide at
around 10:30 am to 11:00 am on 02.11.2022. Regarding
the death of Tanu, it was mentioned in the application for
quash that the G.D. entry at the behest of the ward boy of
the hospital was registered on 02.11.2022 at 01:14 pm. It
was also mentioned that an inquest was held in the
hospital on the said day. Admittedly, the post-mortem of
Tanu was also held at 05:00 pm on 02.11.2022. However,
the FIR came to be registered only on 03.11.2022 at 17:07
hrs.
2025 INSC 168
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15. It is intriguing that the police authorities, merely by
recording the statements of the complainant Vijay, Sunesh
W/o Janeshwar and Sushil who have simply parroted the
contents of the FIR, proceeded to file the charge- sheet
against the appellants. On our repeated queries to the
counsel for the State as to whether any investigation to
explore any other angle was pursued, we were met only
with a stoic silence.
16. We are today left with the one sided version of the
complainant R-2. Was there anything more sinister? Even
if it was suicide what was the real cause? Was the
deceased Tanu distraught with what happened to her
friend Ziaul Rahman? Considering the under-currents and
the disapproval of the relationship, was there any
instigation for the suicide from any other quarter? Did the
deceased Tanu resort to the extreme action of taking away
her own life due to the ugly turn of the events and due to
the fact that her family members were suspected to be
involved? We have no answers today. Only an
independent, thorough and comprehensive investigation
will bring to light the true story. The charge-sheet, as it
stands, appears to have proceeded in an unidimensional
manner by accepting the version of the complainant (R-2)
and his family members as the gospel truth.
17. We find that based on the charge-sheet filed by the
police on 02.05.2023 and the cryptic order of cognizance
dated 17.06.2023, the proceedings cannot be allowed to
be carried on against the appellants. Even taking the
allegation on a demurrer, on the facts of the case, an
offence under Section 306 IPC cannot be said to be made
out against the appellants. The law on Section 306 IPC is
well settled.
18. In Swamy Prahaladdas vs. State of M.P. and Another,
(1995 Supp (3) SCC 438), the appellant remarked to the
deceased that 'go and die' and the deceased thereafter
committed suicide. This Court held that :-
".... Those words are casual nature which are often
employed in the heat of moment between quarrelling
people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter.
The said act does not reflect the requisite means rea on
NC: 2025:KHC:22394
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the assumption that these words would be carried out in all
events...."
19. By a long line of judgments, this Court has reiterated
that in order to make out an offence under Section
306 IPC, specific abetment as contemplated by Section
107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to
bring about the suicide of the person concerned as a result
of that abetment is required. It has been further held that
the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or to abet
the deceased to commit suicide is a must for
attracting Section 306 IPC [See Madan Mohan Singh vs.
State of Gujarat and Another, (2010) 8 SCC 628]. Further,
the alleged harassment meted out should have left the
victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her
life and that in cases of abetment of suicide there must be
proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to commit
suicide [See Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West
Bengal, (2010) 1 SCC 707 and M. Mohan vs. State, (2011)
3 SCC 626 and Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh,
(2001) 9 SCC 618].
20. These principles have been reiterated recently by this
Court in Mahendra Awase vs. The State of Madhya
Pradesh, 2025 INSC 76.
21. We find none of the ingredients required in law to
make out a case under Section 306 IPC to be even
remotely mentioned in the charge-sheet or are being borne
out from the material on record. The utterance attributed
to the appellants assuming it to be true cannot be said to
be of such a nature as to leave the deceased Tanu with no
other alternative but to put an end to her life. The
surrounding circumstances, particularly the prior lodgment
of the FIR by the first appellant against the family of Tanu
for the death of his son Ziaul Rahman, does indicate an
element of desperation on the part of
NC: 2025:KHC:22394
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the respondent no. 2 to somehow implicate the appellants.
Reliance of the statements recorded under Section
161 Cr.P.C. belatedly on 07.11.2022, 08.11.2022 and
22.11.2022, only reinforces out suspicion viz. one-sided,
partial and inimical investigation. Under these
circumstances, proceeding with the trial against the
appellants in the charge-sheet as filed will be a gross
abuse of process.
22. As pointed out earlier, the case has several disturbing
features which call for a reinvestigation, which we propose
to order based on the observations made hereinabove. The
Director General of Police, Law and Order, State of Uttar
Pradesh is directed to constitute a Special Investigation
Team headed by an officer of the level of Deputy Inspector
General of Police to investigate the unnatural death of
Tanu D/o Janeshwar R/o Rampur Maniharan, District
Saharanpur. We authorize the Special Investigation Team
to treat the first information report registered in crime no.
367 of 2022 at PS Rampur Maniharan, District Saharanpur
as one of unnatural death. We further grant them liberty to
re-register the FIR if they deem it appropriate. We direct
that the reinvestigation report shall be placed before this
Court in a sealed cover within a period of two months from
today.
23. We make it clear that the observations in the present
judgment are only for the purpose of quashing the
proceedings against the appellants, and the reinvestigation
on other aspects indicated above, will be carried out
independently. We are not to be taken, to have expressed
any view, one way or the other.
24. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The
proceedings in Case No. 2843 of 2023 pending before the
Court of Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur (arising out of
Crime No. 367 of 2022 Police Station Rampur Maniharan,
District Saharanpur) are quashed. Let the matter be listed
on 15.04.2025 for further directions and for consideration
of the report of the Special Investigation Team."
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7. In the case of Mahendra Awase Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh2 it is held as under:
"19. Applying the above principle to the facts of the
present case, we are convinced that there are no grounds
to frame charges under Section 306 IPC against the
appellant. This is so even if we take the prosecution's case
on a demurrer and at its highest. A reading of the suicide
note reveals that the appellant was asking the deceased
to repay the loan guaranteed by the deceased and
advanced to Ritesh Malakar. It could not be said that the
appellant by performing his duty of realising outstanding
loans at the behest of his employer can be said to have
instigated the deceased to commit suicide. Equally so, with
the transcripts, including the portions emphasised
hereinabove. Even taken literally, it could not be said that
the appellant intended to instigate the commission of
suicide. It could certainly not be said that the appellant by
his acts created circumstances which left the deceased
with no other option except to commit suicide. Viewed
from the armchair of the appellant, the exchanges with the
deceased, albeit heated, are not with intent to leave the
deceased with no other option but to commit suicide. This
is the conclusion we draw taking a realistic approach,
keeping the context and the situation in mind.
Strangely, the FIR has also been lodged after a delay of
two months and twenty days.
20. This Court has, over the last several decades,
repeatedly reiterated the higher threshold, mandated by
law for Section 306 IPC [Now Section 108 read
with Section 45 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023] to
be attracted. They however seem to have followed
2025 INSC 76
- 10 -
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more in the breach. Section 306 IPC appears to be casually
and too readily resorted to by the police. While the persons
involved in genuine cases where the threshold is met
should not be spared, the provision should not be deployed
against individuals, only to assuage the immediate feelings
of the distraught family of the deceased. The conduct of
the proposed accused and the deceased, their interactions
and conversations preceding the unfortunate death of the
deceased should be approached from a practical point of
view and not divorced from day-to-day realities of life.
Hyperboles employed in exchanges should not, without
anything more, be glorified as an instigation to commit
suicide. It is time the investigating agencies are sensitised
to the law laid down by this Court under Section 306 so
that persons are not subjected to the abuse of process of a
totally untenable prosecution. The trial courts also should
exercise great caution and circumspection and should not
adopt a play it safe syndrome by mechanically framing
charges, even if the investigating agencies in a given case
have shown utter disregard for the ingredients of Section
306."
8. As stated supra, a perusal of the complaint, FIR,
charge sheet material, statement of witnesses, documents etc.
would indicate that the commission of the alleged offence of
abetment of suicide by the petitioner is conspicuously absent
and not forthcoming form the material on record. It is further
relevant to state that there is no material whatsoever to
establish that the petitioner was guilty of offence punishable
under Section 498-A of IPC also.
- 11 -
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9. The Apex Court in the case of Ghanshyam Soni v.
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.3 has held as under:
"11. As regards the Appellant, the purportedly
specific allegations levelled against him are also obscure in
nature. Even if the allegations and the case of the
prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from the bald
allegations without any specifics of time, date or place,
there is no incriminating material found by the prosecution
or rather produced by the complainant to substantiate the
ingredients of "cruelty" under section 498A IPC, as recently
observed in the case of Jaydedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda
& Ors. v. State of Gujarat3 and Rajesh Chaddha v. State of
Uttar Pradesh.4 The Complainant has admittedly failed to
produce any medical records or injury reports, x-ray
reports, or any witnesses to substantiate her allegations.
We cannot ignore the fact that the Complainant 2 (2018)
14 SCC 452. even withdrew her second Complaint dt.
06.12.1999 six days later on 12.12.1999. There is also no
evidence to substantiate the purported demand for dowry
allegedly made by the Appellant or his family and the
investigative agencies in their own prudence have not
added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to
the chargesheet.
12. In this respect, the Sessions Court has applied
its judicial mind to the allegations in the FIR & the material
on record, and has rightly discharged the Appellants of the
offences under section 498A & 34 IPC. Notwithstanding the
said observation by the Sessions Court that the possibility
of false implication cannot be ruled out, the discharge of
the Appellant merely because the Complainant is a police
officer is erroneous and reflects poorly on the judicial
decision making, which must be strictly based on
application of judicial principles to the merits of the case.
On the other hand, the High Court vide the Impugned
Order has traversed one step further and overtly
emphasised that simply because the Complainant is a
police officer, it cannot be assumed that she could not
have been a victim of cruelty at the hands of her husband
2025 INSC 803
- 12 -
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and in-laws. We agree with the sensitive approach adopted
by the High Court in adjudicating the present case,
however a judicial decision cannot be blurred to the actual
facts and circumstances of a case. In this debate, it is only
reasonable to re-iterate that the Sessions Court in exercise
of its revisionary jurisdiction and the High Court in exercise
of its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC, must
delve into the material on record to assess what the
Complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made
out even if the allegations are accepted in to. In the
present case, such scrutiny of the allegations in the FIR
and the material on record reveals that no prima facie is
made out against the Appellant or his family. It is also
borne from the record that the divorce decree of their
marriage, has already been passed, and the same has
never been challenged by the Complainant wife, and hence
has attained finality. Upon consideration of the relevant
circumstances and that the alleged incidents pertain to the
year 1999 and since then the parties have moved on with
their respective lives, it would be unjust and unfair if the
Appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a
trial.
13. It is rather unfortunate that the Complainant being
an officer of the State has initiated criminal machinery in
such a manner, where the aged parents-in-law, five sisters
and one tailor have been arrayed as an accused.
Notwithstanding the possibility of truth behind the
allegations of cruelty, this growing tendency to misuse
legal provisions has time and again been condemned by
this Court. The observations in Dara Lakshmi Narayana &
Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr.5, 5 2024 INSC 953."
10. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that
continuation of the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner
would amount to abuse of process of law warranting
interference in the present petition.
- 13 -
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11. In the result, I pass the following:
ORDER
(i) Petition is hereby allowed;
(ii) The entire proceedings in S.C.No.113/2024 arising
out of registration of FIR in Crime No.37/2024 registered
by the 1st respondent - Police, pending on the file of the
Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bangalore Rural, for
the offences punishable under Sections 498(A), 306 of
IPC, are hereby quashed.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR)
JUDGE
YN
CT: BHK
