Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 1145 Kant
Judgement Date : 18 July, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF JULY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.2103 OF 2007 (INJ)
C/W
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.2109 OF 2007 (PAR)
IN RSA NO.2103/2007:
BETWEEN:
1. N CHANDRAPPA @ CHANDRAPPA REDDY,
S/O LATE K NARAYANAA REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
RESIDING AT KAMBALIPURA,
ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE DISTRICT.
2. K N NAGARAJA REDDY,
SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRS
2(a) SHANTHAMMA T,
WIFE OF LATE K N NAGARAJA REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
RESIDING AT KAMBALIPURA,
ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE DISTRICT.
DIED ON 03.10.2022
REPRESENTED BY 2(b) to 2(d)
2(b) MAMATHA N,
WIFE OF LATE NANJAREDDY,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.334/1,
GULLAREDDY LAYOUT, 2ND CROSS,
ANEKAL ROAD, CHANDAPURA,
BANGALORE - 560 099.
2
2(c) AMRUTHA N,
WIFE OF SUBRAMANI,
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.1515,
GOVT. SCHOOL ROAD,
OPP. TO PATALAMMA TEMPLE,
ALLASANDRA VILLAGE, YELAHANKA POST,
BANGALORE - 560 065.
2(d) NAVEEN N,
SON OF LATE K N NAGARAJA REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS,
RESIDING AT KAMBALIPURA,
ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE DISTRICT.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI SREEVASTA, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W
SMT UDITA RAMESH, ADVOCATE FOR APPELLANT NO.1
AND A2(B-D),
V/O/DT 05.04.2023 A2(B-D) ARE THE LR'S OF
DECEASED A2(A))
AND:
1. T VENKATASWAMY REDDY,
SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRS
1(a) V NARAYANAA REDDY,
S/O LATE T VENKATASWAMY REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
1(b) V MUNIREDDY,
S/O LATE T VENKATASWAMY REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS,
1(c) V THIMMA REDDY,
S/O LATE T VENKATASWAMY REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
1(d) V SHANTHAMMA
S/O LATE T VENKATASWAMY REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS,
3
RESPONDENTS 1(a) to 1(d) ARE
RESIDENTS OF BANDAPURA, KASABA HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK, BANGALORE DISTRICT.
(AMENDMENT CARRIED OUT VIDER ORDER DATED 05.04.2023) ...RESPONDENTS (BY SRI VARADARAJAN M S, ADVOCATE A/W SRI SANTHOSH, ADVOCATE FOR R1(A-D))
THIS RSA IS FILED U/S 100 OF CPC AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT AND DECREE DT.24.03.2007 PASSED IN RA.NO.6/1993 ON THE FILE OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER, FAST TRACK COURT-II, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT, BANGALORE, DISMISSING THE APPEAL AND CONFIRMING THE JUDGEMENT AND DECREE DT.18.12.1992 PASSED IN OS.NO.01/1987 ON THE FILE OF THE PRL.CIVIL JUDGE, BANGALORE.
IN RSA NO.2109/2007:
1. N CHANDRAPPA @ CHANDRAPPA REDDY, S/O LATE K NARAYANAA REDDY, AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS, RESIDING AT KAMBALIPURA, ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK, BANGALORE DISTRICT.
2. K N NAGARAJA REDDY, SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRS
2(a) SHANTHAMMA T, WIFE OF LATE K N NAGARAJA REDDY, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, RESIDING AT KAMBALIPURA, ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK, BANGALORE DISTRICT.
DIED ON 03.10.2022 REPRESENTED BY 2(b) to 2(d)
2(b) MAMATHA N, WIFE OF LATE NANJAREDDY, AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.334/1,
GULLAREDDY LAYOUT, 2ND CROSS, ANEKAL ROAD, CHANDAPURA, BANGALORE - 560 099.
2(c) AMRUTHA N, WIFE OF SUBRAMANI, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.1515, GOVT. SCHOOL ROAD, OPP. TO PATALAMMA TEMPLE, ALLASANDRA VILLAGE, YELAHANKA POST, BANGALORE - 560 065.
2(d) NAVEEN N, SON OF LATE K N NAGARAJA REDDY AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS, RESIDING AT KAMBALIPURA, ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK, BANGALORE DISTRICT.
(AMENDMENT CARRIED OUT VIDE ORDER DATED 05.04.2023) ...APPELLANTS (BY SRI SREEVASTA, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W SMT UDITA RAMESH, ADVOCATE FOR APPELLANT NO.1 AND A2(B-D), V/O/DT 05.04.2023 A2(B-D) ARE THE LR'S OF DECEASED A2(A)) AND:
1. T VENKATASWAMY REDDY, SINCE DEAD BY HIS LR'S
1(a) V NARAYANAA REDDY, S/O LATE T VENKATASWAMY REDDY, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
1(b) V MUNIREDDY, S/O LATE T VENKATASWAMY REDDY, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS,
1(c) V THIMMA REDDY, S/O LATE T VENKATASWAMY REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
1(d) V SHANTHAMMA S/O LATE T VENKATASWAMY REDDY, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS,
RESPONDENTS 1(a) to 1(d) ARE RESIDENTS OF BANDAPURA, KASABA HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK, BANGALORE DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENTS (BY SRI VARADARAJAN M S, ADVOCATE A/W SRI SANTHOSH, ADVOCATE FOR R1(A to D))
THIS RSA IS FILED U/S 100 OF CPC AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT AND DECREE DT.24.03.2007 PASSED IN RA.NO.5/1993 ON THE FILE OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER, FAST TRACK COURT-II, BANGALOE RURAL DISTRICT, BANGALORE, DISMISSING THE APPEAL AND CONFIRMING THE JUDGEMENT AND DECREE DT.18.12.1992 PASSED IN OS.NO.40/1981 ON THE FILE OF THE PRL.CIVIL JUDGE, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT, BANGALORE.
THESE APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 27TH JUNE, 2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE
CAV ORDER
RSA No.2103/2007 is filed against the judgment and
decree in O.S.No.1/1987 on the file of the Principal Civil
Judge, Bangalore and the judgment and decree in
R.A.No.6/1993 on the file of Fast Track -II, Bangalore Rural
District, Bangalore.
2. The said suit is one for bare injunction in respect
of the properties bearing Sy.Nos.165/2 and 197 of Madiwala
village, Taluk:Anekal. Suit is decreed. Defendants' First
Appeal is dismissed. Hence, defendants are before this Court
in this RSA No.2103/2007.
3. RSA No.2109/2007 is filed against the judgment
and decree passed in O.S.No.40/1981 on the file of Principal
Civil Judge, Bangalore and judgment and decree passed in
R.A.No.5/1993 on the file of Fast Track Court - II, Bangalore
Rural District, Bangalore.
4. The said suit is for declaration and partition. The
plaintiffs sought a declaration that they are entitled to half
share and prayed for partition and separate possession of
half share. The said suit is dismissed and First Appeal filed by
the plaintiffs is also dismissed. Hence, the present RSA
No.2109/2007.
5. Both suits were clubbed together and disposed by
a common judgment and both appeals before First Appellate
Court were disposed of by a common judgment.
6. This Court vide order dated 03.07.2012 has
admitted the appeals to consider the following substantial
questions of law:
(i) Whether the father can release the right of his sons (coparceners) in favour of another coparcener?
(ii) Whether the plea of 'Adverse possession' is available in respect of coparcenary property?
7. The appellants in RSA No.2103/2007 are sons of
Narayana Reddy. Venkataswamy Reddy (defendant in the
suit for partition) is the brother of appellants' father
Narayana Reddy.
8. The appellants in RSA No.2103/2007 who are
plaintiffs in O.S.No.40/1981 have claimed partition on the
premise that the registered release deed dated 05.10.1948 is
got executed by defendant - Venkataswamy Reddy is
outcome of fraud and does not bind them and does not affect
their share. The plaintiffs contend their father, defendant
and the plaintiffs constituted a joint family.
9. Defendant - Venkataswamy denied the joint
family status with the plaintiffs. Defendant contended that
the plaintiffs' father Narayana Reddy was fostered from the
age of 4 by uncle Nanja Reddy, and since then Narayana
Reddy never lived with his father. Defendant also urged that
registered release deed dated 05.10.1948 is executed for a
valid consideration of Rs.4,000/-. The plaintiffs' father who
executed the deed in 1948 died on 01.09.1979 did not
question the said release deed dated 05.10.1948 and his
right to question the release deed had extinguished by the
time he died in the year 1979 and the plaintiffs did not
inherit the right to assail the said registered deed dated
05.10.1948.
10. The plaintiffs also contended that there was a
partition in the family on 16.08.1967 between Naga Reddy
and other family members comprising plaintiffs' father and
defendant - Venkataswamy. The plaintiffs contend that only
Naga Reddy separated from the family and the plaintiffs,
their father and defendant - Venkataswamy lived together.
11. O.S.No.1/1987 is filed by the Venkataswamy, the
defendant in O.S.No.40/1981, for injunction in respect of two
properties. In the said suit, Venkataswamy contended that
ever since execution of release deed dated 05.10.1948, he is
in possession of the properties covered under the said
release deed. And the defendants in the said suit, (plaintiffs
in O.S.No.40/1981) disputed the validity of the release
deed dated 05.10.1948 and prayed for dismissal of the suit.
12. Both suits were clubbed together and the Trial
Court dismissed O.S.No.40/1981 and decreed O.S.No.1/
1987.
13. As already noticed, two appeals are filed against
aforementioned judgments and decrees and both the appeals
are dismissed.
14. Heard Sri Srivatsa, the learned Senior counsel
appearing for the appellants and Sri Varadarajan, learned
counsel appearing for the respondents.
15. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the
appellants raised the following contentions:
The properties in question are said to have been
transferred under registered release deed dated
05.10.1948 marked at Ex.D.1. The properties are the
coparcenary properties. When the deed was executed
in 1948, the plaintiffs were born. They being the
coparceners, had acquired right in the properties by
birth in the family. Thus, Narayana Reddy, their father
had no right to alienate or release the plaintiffs'
undivided share.
Even if it is considered as a valid release, then also the
release has to be for the benefit of the remaining
coparceners viz., the plaintiffs and Venkataswamy
alone cannot claim exclusive right over the properties
covered under the release deed as the plaintiffs had
already acquired right in the properties by reason of the
birth in the family.
The release is permissible only in favour of person who
does possess a joint right or interest in the property
covered by release deed. The release has the effect of
augmenting the share of remaining co-owners when
one co-owner releases the property in favour of
another. Thus, even if release deed is executed in
favour of one coparcener by another coparcener, the
benefit of release would be to all other coparceners who
have a joint right in the property even before the
release deed is executed.
The Apex Court in Arshnoor Singh vs Harpal Kaur
and Others1 has held that in case the property is
inherited by a male Hindu from his father before 1956,
such property would acquire the characteristic of a
coparcenary property. The properties in the hands of
Narayana Reddy were coparcenary properties and when
he executed a release deed, his two sons were already
born and those two sons had acquired right in the
property being coparceners in the family. Plaintiffs'
right is not released in favour of defendant.
Narayana Reddy could not have transferred the share
of his two minors (plaintiffs) as there was no legal
necessity as such the plaintiffs' right in the properties
remained with the plaintiffs and defendant did not
acquire the plaintiffs' share under the release deed
properties and the plaintiffs' right over the properties
covered under the release deed is not extinguished.
Even if the release deed is said to be valid and confers
exclusive right in favour of defendant, said right can
only be in respect of the share held by plaintiffs' father
(2020) 14 SCC 436
Narayana Reddy and not the share of the plaintiffs as
the release deed does not indicate that the plaintiffs'
share is also conveyed by Narayana Reddy acting as
family manager.
The Trial Court and First Appellate Court have
committed an error in not appreciating the ratio laid
down in Krishan Chander Vs Board Of Revenue For
Rajasthan2 and the judgment of co-ordinate bench of
this Court in Halappa & Others Vs Ranganna &
Others3.
16. Learned Senior counsel for the appellants placed
reliance on the following judgments:
(i) Thamma Venkata Subbamma vs Thamma Rattamma & Others4
(ii) Kuppuswami Chettiar vs A.S.P.A. Arumugam Chettiar and Another5
(iii) Tripta Kaushik vs Sub Registrar VI-A and Another6
(iv) Smt.Balwant Kaur and Others vs State of U.P. 7
1972 RLW 473
1968 (2) Mys.L.J.,597
(1987)3 SCC 294
1966 SCC Online SC 125
2020 SCC Online Del 2748
1983 SCC Online All 700
(v) Nathuni Mishra and Others vs Mahesh Misra and Others 8
(vi) Balbir Singh vs State of U.P. & Others 9
(vii) Govind Das and Others vs Board Of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow 10
17. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents
raised the following contentions:
There is no pleading and evidence that the properties
in the hands of Narayana Reddy are coparcenary
properties;
Two properties were transferred by Narayana Reddy in
favour of his brother-defendant under a registered
released deed dated 05.10.1948 for a valid
consideration of Rs.4000/-. Since, the properties are
released for a consideration, it is nothing but a sale in
favour of defendant.
Assuming that the properties were coparcenary
properties, the transfer is for the benefit of the
1962 SCC Online Pat 58
2012 SCC Online All 478
1971 SCC Online All 90
Narayana Reddy's family comprising the plaintiffs and
same is permissible as Narayana Reddy as a
kartha/guardian can transfer the properties of his
minor children. There is no pleading in the plaint that
the properties are transferred without legal necessity.
The contention in this regard cannot be raised without
pleading.
The plaintiffs cannot question the release deed of
1948, which was not questioned by their father-the
executant who died in 1979.
The suit of the plaintiffs is barred by limitation even
assuming that the properties are the ancestral
properties, as the suit is filed beyond 12 years from
the date of attaining majority.
18. Learned counsel for the respondents placed
reliance on the following judgments:
(i) Thayyil Mammo and Another vs Kottiath Ramunni and Others11
(ii) Pandurang Mahadeo Kabade and Others vs Annaji Balwant Bokil and Others12
AIR 1966 SC 337
(iii) Sukhbiri Devi and Ors. vs Union Of India and Ors. 13
19. Certain facts need to be stated are as under:
The father of the appellants - Narayana Reddy was
fostered by his uncle when he was aged 4 years and he was
staying with his uncle in Kambalipura. The fostered parents
executed registered Gift Deed in favour Narayana Reddy
prior to the execution of the release deed dated 05.10.1948.
Even Narayana Reddy has executed a Gift Deed describing
himself as the son of his fostered father and not as a son of
his biological father.
20. There is a vague reference in the plaint that the
release deed dated 05.10.1948 is the outcome of fraud. The
necessary plea relating to fraud as required under Order VI
Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure is not forthcoming. It is
also relevant to notice that Narayana Reddy who died in the
year 1979 did not question the validity of the release deed
dated 05.10.1948. Thus, the said plea cannot be considered.
Moreover, there is no evidence to hold the plea of fraud.
AIR 1971 SC 2228
2022 SCC Online SC 1322
21. The registered release deed dated 05.10.1948 is
not questioned for want of legal necessity for Narayana
Reddy to transfer the undivided shares of his children. There
is no plea or evidence in this behalf.
22. Both Courts have concurrently held that the
execution of release deed dated 05.10.1948 is proved. This
Court is also of the view that the question as to the proof of
execution of release deed dated 05.10.1948 does not arise in
these Second Appeals as there is no plea and evidence to
hold that the release deed dated 05.10.1948 was not
executed by Narayana Reddy. Thus, the Court has to
proceed on the premise that the release deed dated
05.10.1948 is executed for a consideration of Rs.4,000/-.
23. It is also relevant to notice that the
plaintiffs/appellants have not raised a contention that
consideration of Rs.4,000/- paid under the release deed
dated 05.10.1948 does not represent adequate consideration
for transfer of the interest in the two properties covered by
the release deed.
24. Since the release is for valuable consideration,
the Court has to consider whether the release deed dated
05.10.1948 is a sale for consideration in favour of defendant.
25. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Thayyil Mammo And
Anr. supra, has held that the proposition that, the release
cannot be treated as a conveyance is not a proposition
having universal application. It has been also held that a
registered instrument styled as a release deed releasing the
right, title and interest of the executant in any property in
favour of the releasee for valuable consideration may
operate as a conveyance if the document clearly discloses
the intention to effect a transfer.
26. Thus, the Court has to consider whether there
was any intention on the part of a releasor to release the
entire property in favour of the releasee.
27. As already noticed, the Court has to proceed on
the premise that two properties are released or conveyed for
a consideration of Rs.4,000/-. The Trial Court has extracted
the relevant portion of the release deed in its judgment at
paragraph No.20. The said portion of the release deed
reveals that the father of the appellants Narayana Reddy
transferred his entire right in favour of his brother and the
recital would also indicate that his successors also will not
have any right over the said property.
28. The initial part of the release deed would also
recite the fact that Narayana Reddy was residing with his
fostered parents away from his brother Venkataswamy
Reddy. It has also come in the evidence that Narayana
Reddy was fostered when he was aged 4 to 5 years and his
marriage was performed by his fostered parents and it is not
the case of the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs were residing with
defendant Venkataswamy Reddy -their uncle.
29. There is no recital in the deed dated 05.101948
that plaintiffs father Narayana Reddy is releasing only his
undivided share and the undivided share of his minor
children is not part of the transaction. As already noticed,
Narayana Reddy had stayed with his fostered parents since
he was aged four or five years. It is nobody's case that his
children continued to live with their uncle Venkataswamy.
These circumstances suggest that the transfer of the
properties covered under the deed dated 05.10.1948 is in
respect of half share and remaining half share was with
releasee/transferee - Venkataswamy. Thus, the intention is
very much apparent from the circumstances, that Narayana
Reddy wanted to convey his entire interest in the property in
favour of his brother with whom he did not live jointly as he
was raised by his fostered parents.
30. It is also relevant to notice that the High Court of
Delhi in case of Tripta Kaushik supra, has summarised the
law on the point and in paragraph No.30(f) of the said
judgment, held as under:
"Where the relinquishment of the right by the co-owner is only in favour of one of the co-owner and not against all, the document would be one of Gift/Conveyance and not of "release".
31. As can be noticed from the recital in the release
deed dated 05.10.1948, it can be safely concluded that the
release deed was executed in favour of Venkataswamy
Reddy and not in favour of the plaintiffs who are the children
of executant Narayana Reddy. As already noticed, the
registered release deed of 1948 is for a consideration of
Rs.4,000/- which itself is a huge amount in those days. The
properties conveyed under the said deed are only two
properties bearing Sy.No.165/2 measuring 5 acres in
Madiwala village, Taluk:Anekal and Sy.No.197 measuring 2
acres 20 guntas in Madiwala village, Taluk:Anekal. As
already noticed, it is not the case of the plaintiffs that the
consideration amount is inadequate. The suit was filed only
on the premise that deed was outcome of fraud committed
on their father.
32. It is already held by this Court that Narayana
Reddy has received Rs.4,000/- in 1948. It is not the case
of the plaintiffs that the said amount is not utilized by
Narayana Reddy for the benefit of the family. That
contention is not available to them as they filed the suit on
the premise that the transaction is outcome of fraud. This
Court has recorded a finding that the transaction is valid
and consideration is passed in favour of Narayana Reddy.
The Court has to presume, in the absence of any other
allegation that amount is not utilized for the benefit of
minors, that amount of Rs.4,000/- received in 1948, which
is a substantial amount for two properties covered under
the said transaction also represented the value of
plaintiff's share in the properties, and must have been
utilized for the benefit of the family.
33. This being the position, applying the ratio laid
down in the aforementioned judgment of the Hon'ble Apex
Court as well as the Delhi High Court, it can be safely
concluded that the plaintiffs' father Narayana Reddy
executed a document as conveyance though it is styled as
released deed.
34. It is also well-settled position of law that the
nomenclature of the document is not necessarily a guide to
the nature of the transaction covered under the document.
The nature of the transaction has to be gathered from the
recital in the document and other attending circumstances.
35. At this juncture, it is necessary to refer to the
judgments referred by the learned Senior counsel for the
appellants:
(i) In Thamma Venkata Subbamma supra, the
Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down a law that gift of an
undivided share without the consent of co-owners is
impermissible and void. In the said judgment referring to
the document in question, the Court concluded that the
document in question in the said case was a relinquishment
deed and not a gift deed. In the said case, it was
relinquishment in favour of a family member without any
consideration. In the instant case, this Court has concluded
that the transaction is a conveyance for consideration.
Hence, the judgment in Thamma Venkata Subbamma
supra does not assist the appellants.
(ii) In Krishan Chander supra, the Court has
considered the case of one co-parcener renunciating the
right of another coparcener.
(iii) In Tripta Kaushik supra, the Court has
considered the question relating to the stamp duty payable
on a relinquishment deed executed by son in favour of the
father.
(iv) In Balawant Kaur supra, the Court has held the
relinquishment or renouncement of claim by one
co-owner in favour of another co-owner results in remaining
co-owners' rights augmented.
(v) In Halappa supra, the Court dealt with a
question as to whether a person who was not born when his
father executed a release deed could question the release
deed on the premise that the release deed was not executed
at all by his father.
(vi) In Nathuni Mishra supra, the Court was dealing
with the question of sale of the property by the father of
minor children.
(vii) In Govind Das and Balbir Singh supra, the
Court was dealing with the interpretation of a transaction
between the partners of a partnership firm.
36. Above cited judgments by the learned Senior
counsel do not support the appellants' contention inasmuch
as the Court has come to the conclusion that the transaction
dated 05.10.1948 is a conveyance for consideration and not
a simple release by one coparcener in favour of another
coparcener or in co-owner in favour of another co-owner.
37. The fact that the father of the plaintiffs received
Rs.4,000/- from his brother, the fact that he was fostered by
his uncle and that he was residing away from his brother in
unmistakable terms would lead to the conclusion that the
transaction was a conveyance and not mere release.
38. Though learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellants would place reliance on the judgment of High
Court of Allahabad in Smt.Balavant Kaur supra and
referring to paragraph No.9 of the judgment would urge that
merely because the intention of the executant can be better
achieved by executing an instrument of a different nature,
the instrument executed should not be construed differently
from what emerges from the plain reading. This Court has
perused the said judgment.
39. The said observation by the High Court of
Allahabad cannot be construed as having laid down a law
having universal application. The said observation is, or may
be apt, in the facts and circumstances obtained in the said
case.
40. From the very same judgment, it is also possible
to hold that merely because Narayana Reddy could have
executed a sale deed in favour of his brother defendant for
having received Rs.4,000/- as a consideration for
transferring the properties in favour of defendant, to
achieve his objective of transferring the properties, the
transferor's act of not executing a sale deed and executing a
release deed does not by itself mean that the transaction is
not a sale, if other circumstances suggest that the
transaction is a sale.
41. This Court has already noticed the circumstances
which suggest that the transaction was a sale. In addition, it
is also to be noticed that if the transaction was not a sale or
a conveyance conveying entire right, title and interest in
favour of his brother, then the transferor could not have
executed the release deed by incorporating a recital that
none of his successors will have any right over the properties
covered under the said deed.
42. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the
view that the release deed dated 05.10.1948 should be
construed as a conveyance transferring the entire 1/2 share
in the two properties in favour of Venkataswamy Reddy who
had already possessed the remaining share.
43. The contention whether the transaction was for
legal necessity or not, whether the transaction binds the
plaintiffs who were minors when the transaction took place in
the year 1948 do not arise for consideration as the plaintiffs
have not raised contention in the plaint pleading want of
legal necessity to transfer the properties, which essentially
prevented the defendant from raising a defence that said
transfer was for legal necessity. This being the position, the
reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Arshnoor
Singh supra, which lays down a law that burden of proving
family necessity is on alienee is misplaced as the plaintiffs
have not raised a contention that the transaction is not for
legal necessity.
44. At this juncture, it is also necessary to refer the
judgment of the Apex Court in Pandurang Mahdeo Kabade
supra, wherein the Apex Court has held that in the absence
of a plea that the sale transaction is not for legal necessity, it
is not necessary for the purchaser to establish that the
transaction was for legal necessity.
45. Assuming that the plaintiffs could have raised the
plea challenging the alienation on the premise that it is not
for legal necessity, or assuming that such a plea is raised in
the plaint, then also the suit is time barred under Article 108
of the Limitation Act, 1963, as the records would reveal that
defendant has taken possession in 1948. The plaintiffs' then
were required to file a suit within three years after attaining
majority. Even if it is taken as twelve years after attaining
majority, then also the suit is time barred.
46. Plaintiffs' father Narayana Reddy died in the year
1979 and he did not challenge the deed of 1948. Two years
after the demise of executant Narayana Reddy-the plaintiffs'
father, suit is filed on the premise that the transaction is
invalid.
47. The contention of the learned Senior counsel that
the release by one co-owner or coparcener in favour of
another co-owner or coparcener, will not confer absolute
right in favour of the person to whom it is released and it
would also enure to the benefit of remaining co-owners or
coparceners, cannot be accepted with reference to the
release deed dated 05.10.1948 as the said document when
viewed from the attending circumstances, has all the
trappings of a conveyance for consideration.
48. Since, the plaintiffs have not raised a contention
that the transfer of right, title and interest under the
registered release deed dated 05.10.1948 is for the benefit
of remaining coparceners namely the plaintiffs, the
defendant was prevented from raising a defence that the
release deed dated 05.10.1948 is also representing the
interest of the plaintiffs or for the benefit of the plaintiffs.
49. Nevertheless the defendant has led evidence
narrating the circumstances under the which the release
deed came to be executed. From the facts already noticed,
Narayana Reddy was fostered when he was aged about 4 to
5 years and he stayed away from his brother Venkataswamy
Reddy (defendant) and later after attaining majority, he
transferred the property in the year 1948 when he had two
children aged around 3 and 5 years.
50. Under these circumstances, first substantial
question of law, "whether the father can release the right of
his sons (coparceners) in favour of another coparcener?" has
to be answered by holding that in the present case, the
transaction dated 05.10.1948 is a conveyance and Narayana
Reddy being the plaintiffs' father and kartha was competent
to transfer the properties. The sale by a coparcener
representing his sons' share who are also coparceners is well
recognised subject to fulfilling the conditions of legal
necessity. The validity of the transaction for want of legal
necessity is not raised before the Trial Court. Thus, the Court
would presume that the transaction is for legal necessity.
51. Second substantial question of law "Whether the
plea of 'Adverse possession' is available in respect of
coparcenary property?" need not be answered as the suit is
not decided based on the said plea.
52. For the aforementioned reasons, this Court is of
the view that no grounds are made out to interfere in the
concurrent finding recorded by the Trial Court and First
Appellate Court.
53. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed.
54. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE) JUDGE
brn
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