Karnataka High Court
Sri Mallikarjun vs The Deputy Commissioner on 15 July, 2025
Author: Mohammad Nawaz
Bench: Mohammad Nawaz
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
KALABURAGI BENCH
DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF JULY, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD NAWAZ
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K S HEMALEKHA
WRIT APPEAL NO.200125 OF 2025 (S-RES)
BETWEEN:
SRI MALLIKARJUN
S/O PRADHAM JAMAKANDI,
AGE: 42 YEARS,
W/AS: LIBRARIAN SUPERVISOR,
GRAM PANCHAYATH, YALAGOD,
TQ: YADRAMI, DIST:KALABURAGI - 585 325.
R/O: YALAGOD, TQ: YADRAMI
DIST: KALABURAGI - 585 325.
...APPELLANT
Digitally signed
by
BASALINGAPPA
SHIVARAJ
(BY SRI MAHESH PATIL, ADVOCATE)
DHUTTARGAON
Location: HIGH
COURT OF AND:
KARNATAKA
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
MINI VIDHAN SOUDHA,
KALABURAGI - 585 102.
2. THE CHIEF LIBRARIAN OFFICER,
DISTRICT CENTRAL LIBRARY,
MINI VIDHAN SOUDHA,
3RD FLOOR, ROOM NO.26,
KALABURAGI-585 102.
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3. THE LIBRARIAN OFFICER,
TALUK CENTRAL LIBRARY,
JEWARGI TALUK,
DIST: KALABURAGI - 585 310.
4. THE PANCHAYAT DEVELOPMENT OFFICER,
YALAGOD GRAM PANCHAYAT,
TQ: YADRAMI,
DIST: KALABURAGI - 585 325.
5. THE SECRETARY
YALAGOD GRAM PANCHAYAT,
TQ: YADRAMI,
DIST: KALABURAGI - 585 325.
6. SRI MANJUNATH
S/O SAIBANNA
AGE: 24 YEARS,
R/O: YALAGOD, TQ: YADRAMI
DIST: KALABURAGI - 585 325.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI MALLIKARJUN C. BASAREDDY - GA FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI B. K. HIREMATH, ADVOCATE FOR R6;
R4 & R5 ARE SERVED)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT 1961, PRAYING TO CALL FOR
THE RECORDS IN WRIT PETITION NO.204065/2015 ON THE
FILE OF LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON'BLE COURT
AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER IMPUGNED DATED 29.11.2024
PASSED IN WRIT PETITION NO 204065/2015 AND GRANT ALL
CONSEQUENTIAL BENEFITS, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE
AND EQUITY.
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR JUDGMENT ON 03.07.2025, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED
THEREIN AS UNDER:.
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WA No. 200125 of 2025
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD NAWAZ
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K S HEMALEKHA
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K. S. HEMALEKHA)
1. Respondent No.6 in the W.P.No.204065/2015 is
the appellant before this Court in this writ appeal and the
petitioner in the writ petition is respondent No.6 herein.
2. The appellant is aggrieved by the order passed
by the learned Single Judge, allowing the writ petition and
setting aside the order passed by the Chief Librarian
Officer, Office of the District Central Library, whereby he
was appointed as the Supervisor of Library at Yalgod
Village, Jevargi Taluk, District Kalaburagi. Learned Single
Judge, by the impugned order directed respondent Nos.1
and 2 to appoint respondent No.6 herein to the said post,
taking into consideration his merit, caste status and
disability, within four weeks from the date of the order.
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3. Learned counsel for the appellant, learned
counsel for respondent No.6 and learned Government
Advocate for the State are heard.
Brief facts:
4. The appellant secured 38.40% marks in the
S.S.L.C examination, whereas respondent No.6 secured
62.80%. Pursuant to the notification issued by the Deputy
Commissioner, Kalaburagi, applications were invited for
the post of the Supervisor of Library at Yalgod Village,
reserved for Scheduled Caste candidates ("SC" for short).
Both the appellant and respondent No.6 have applied for
the said post. As per the terms of the notification, the
candidates were required to pass S.S.L.C. examination and
to submit the S.S.L.C. marks card, transfer certificate and
caste certificate along with their applications.
5. The Deputy Commissioner proceeded to select
the appellant and issued an appointment order dated
08.05.2015. The candidature of respondent No.6 was
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rejected on the ground that he failed to submit the caste
certificate along with his application. Aggrieved by the
appointment of the appellant, respondent No.6 filed
W.P.No.204065/2015, challenging the selection and
appointment of the appellant.
6. Learned Single Judge, by the impugned order
held that the procedural lapse in not notifying the
petitioner about the absence of the caste certificate could
override the principles of fairness and equity, by relying on
the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajesh
Kumar Daria Vs. Rajasthan Public Service
Commission1 (Rajesh Kumar Daria). Further, the learned
Single Judge observed that the doctrine of legitimate
expectation was applicable in the present case, since the
petitioner, being more meritorious, had a legitimate
expectation of being appointed to the post. The learned
Single Judge noted that the post in question is an
honorarium-based position. Hence, correcting the
(2007) 8 SCC 785
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procedural lapse and restoring fairness to the selection
process would not cause any significant prejudice or
financial detriment to the appellant. Further, it was
observed that the appellant had not chosen to contest the
petition, further strengthening the petitioner's claim and
reflected an implied acquiescence to the relief sought.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that
the appellant was selected for the post of Supervisor of
Library, wherein the post was reserved for SC candidates.
The notification expressly mandate that applicants were
required to submit their S.S.L.C. marks card, transfer
certificate and caste certificate along with their application.
The appellant having duly submitted all required
documents was accordingly found eligible. On the other
hand, the petitioner-respondent No.6 herein failed to
submit the caste certificate at the time of submitting
application thereby rendering the application incomplete.
It is submitted that the appellant cannot be penalized for
any alleged administrative oversight when there was no
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misrepresentation or fraud on his part. It is admitted that
the appellant has served in the post for over a decade
without any remark on his service and also contends that
the appellant has received the Best Services Award-2024
by the CEO, Zilla Panchayat, Kalaburagi. That the
appellant has faithfully discharged his duties, setting aside
his appointment at this stage would cause grave injustice.
It is contended that there is no malafide bias or procedural
illegality in the appellant's appointment and thus, the
order of the learned Single Judge that the appointment of
a less meritorious candidate undermines public trust is one
which needs interference by this Court.
8. Learned counsel for respondent No.6 submits
that respondent No.6 is more meritorious than the
appellant, the post in question, being for a public function
in an educational and knowledge based role, rightly calls
for selection based on academic merit with eligible
category. Respondent No.6 being an SC candidate had
every reason to legitimately expect selection, given his
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higher academic merit. It is contended that the selection
authority ought to have issued a communication pointing
out the deficiency, particularly when respondent No.6
clearly belonged to a SC community and denial of such
opportunity reflects procedural arbitrariness and contends
that the learned Single Judge was justified in setting aside
the order of appointment of the appellant. Placing reliance
upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union
of India and Others Vs. Hindustan Development
Corporation and Others2 (Hindustan Development
Corporation), submits that the legitimate expectation
arises when a candidate reasonably anticipates selection
based on consistent practice of merit based appointment.
9. Learned Government Advocate has placed the
records and submits that as on the date of submitting the
application, the application of respondent No.6 was not
accompanied by the caste certificate.
(1993) 3 SCC 499
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10. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties, the point that arises for consideration is that:
Whether the order passed by the learned Single
Judge warrants interference in the present facts
and circumstances of the case?
11. The proposition of law regarding the primacy of
merit in public appointment particularly when read with
objective of affirmation action and the applicability of the
doctrine of legitimate expectation is not in dispute. Public
authorities are undoubtedly obligated to act fairly and in a
non-discriminatory manner, especially when a candidate
belonging to reserve category has a reasonable
expectation of selection.
12. However, the crucial issue in the present case is
that the post was specifically reserved for the scheduled
caste candidates, and the recruitment notification
expressly required that the candidates should submit their
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S.S.L.C. marks card, transfer certificate and the caste
certificate along with the application.
13. It is an admitted fact that the writ petitioner
(respondent No.6 herein), though more meritorious, failed
to submit the caste certificate at the time of submission of
application, thereby not fulfilling an essential condition of
eligibility. On the other hand, the appellant complied with
all the stipulated requirements including submission of
caste certificate and was accordingly selected. In public
appointments, while merit is important, it cannot
substitute for the compliance of mandatory conditions.
Equity cannot override express eligibility conditions, and
sympathy for the more qualified candidate cannot be a
basis to invalidate a lawful appointment that was made in
strict adherence to the notified procedure. The Apex Court
in the case Vikas Pratap Singh and Others Vs. State of
Chhattisgarh and Others3 (Vikas Pratap Singh) held at
para No.20 as under:
2013 10 SCR 1114
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"20. The pristine maxim of fraus et jus nunquam
cohabitant (fraud and justice never dwell together)
has never lost its temper over the centuries and it
continues to dwell in spirit and body of service law
jurisprudence. It is settled law that no legal right in
respect of appointment to a said post vests in a
candidate who has obtained the employment by
fraud, mischief, misrepresentation or malafide. (See:
District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social
Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram
and another v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3
SCC 655, P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and
others, (1994) 1 SCC 1 and Union of India and
others v. M. Bhaskaran, 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 100). It
is also settled law that a person appointed
erroneously on a post must not reap the benefits of
wrongful appointment jeopardizing the interests of
the meritorious and worthy candidates. However, in
cases where a wrongful or irregular appointment is
made without any mistake on the part of the
appointee and upon discovery of such error or
irregularity the appointee is terminated, this Court
has taken a sympathetic view in the light of various
factors including bonafide of the candidate in such
appointment and length of service of the candidate
after such appointment (See: Vinodan T. and Ors.v.
University of Calicut and Ors., (2002) 4 SCC 726;
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State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and Ors. (2006) 1
SCC 667)."
14. In the case of Rajesh Kumar Daria supra,
reliance placed by the learned Single Judge to equate the
petitioner stating that he has better merit and created a
legitimate expectation of selection, the said decision is
distinguishable to the present facts as in the case of
Rajesh Kumar Daria supra, it did not involve a failure to
meet the mandatory eligibility conditions and as stated
supra in the present facts, the notification expressly
required caste certificate to be annexed with the
application and admittedly the caste certificate was not
submitted by the petitioner and thus the question of
enforceable legitimate expectation would not arise. While
the Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar Daria,
Hindustan Development Corporation and N.M.
Thomos stated supra has emphasized the importance of
merit, legitimate expectation and affirmative action. None
of those decisions would support the petitioner when the
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candidate who fails to comply with an express eligibility
condition, such as submitting a caste certificate along with
the application is entitled to selection purely on account of
higher academic merit.
15. The appellant fulfilled all the mandatory
requirements stipulated in the recruitment notification,
including the submission of the S.S.L.C. marks card,
transfer certificate and the caste certificate along with the
application. On the contrary, respondent No.6 (petitioner)
failed to annex his caste certificate thereby rendering his
application incomplete and ineligible for consideration at
the threshold.
16. The notification clearly mandates submitting of
supporting documents with the application, this aspect was
totally overlooked by the learned Single Judge. In Ashok
Kumar Sharma and Others Vs. Chander Shekhar and
Another4 (Ashok Kumar Sharma), the Apex Court held
(1997) 4 SCC 18
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that a person who acquires the prescribed qualification
subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered
at all. An advertisement or notification issued/published
calling for applications constitutes a representation to the
public and the authority issuing it is bound by such
representation. It cannot act contrary to it. While merit
would be a significant factor, it cannot compensate for
non-compliance with the basic mandatory conditions.
Permitting such deviations undermines the sanctity of the
selection process and creates an unfair precedent,
potentially encouraging administrative disorder. The Apex
Court in the case of Hindustan Development
Corporation supra held as under:
"19. x x x x x
In Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society v. Union of
India [(1992) 4 SCC 477] Justice G.N. Ray speaking
for the Bench observed as under : (SCC pp. 494-95,
paras 15 and 16)
"... In the aforesaid facts, the Group Housing
Societies were entitled to 'legitimate expectation' of
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following consistent past practice in the matter of
allotment, even though they may not have any legal
right in private law to receive such treatment. The
existence of 'legitimate expectation' may have a
number of different consequences and one of such
consequences is that the authority ought not to act
to defeat the 'legitimate expectation' without some
overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing
so. In a case of 'legitimate expectation' if the
authority proposes to defeat a person's 'legitimate
expectation' it should afford him an opportunity to
make representations in the matter. In this
connection reference may be made to the
discussions on 'legitimate expectation' at page 151 of
Volume 1(1) of Halsbury's Laws of England -- Fourth
Edition (re-issue). We may also refer to a decision of
the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions
v. Minister for the Civil Service [(1984) 3 All ER
935]. It has been held in the said decision that an
aggrieved person was entitled to judicial review if he
could show that a decision of the public authority
affected him of some benefit or advantage which in
the past he had been permitted to enjoy and which
he legitimately expected to be permitted to continue
to enjoy either until he was given reasons for
withdrawal and the opportunity to comment on such
reasons.
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It may be indicated here that the doctrine of
'legitimate expectation' imposes in essence a duty on
public authority to act fairly by taking into
consideration all relevant factors relating to such
'legitimate expectation'. Within the conspectus of fair
dealing in case of 'legitimate expectation', the
reasonable opportunities to make representation by
the parties likely to be affected by any change of
consistent past policy, come in. We, have not been
shown any compelling reasons taken into
consideration by the Central Government to make a
departure from the existing policy of allotment with
reference to seniority in Registration by introducing a
new guideline."
(emphasis supplied)
xxxxx
23. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth
Edition, Volume I(I) 151 a passage explaining the
scope of "legitimate expectations" runs thus:
"81. Legitimate expectations.-- A person
may have a legitimate expectation of being
treated in a certain way by an administrative
authority even though he has no legal right in
private law to receive such treatment. The
expectation may arise either from a
representation or promise made by the
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authority, including an implied
representation, or from consistent past
practice.
The existence of a legitimate expectation
may have a number of different
consequences; it may give locus standi to
seek leave to apply for judicial review; it may
mean that the authority ought not to act so
as to defeat the expectation without some
overriding reason of public policy to justify its
doing so; or it may mean that, if the
authority proposes to defeat a person's
legitimate expectation, it must afford him an
opportunity to make representations on the
matter. The courts also distinguish, for
example in licensing cases, between original
applications, applications to renew and
revocations; a party who has been granted a
licence may have a legitimate expectation
that it will be renewed unless there is some
good reason not to do so, and may therefore
be entitled to greater procedural protection
than a mere applicant for a grant."
(emphasis supplied)
24. We find that the concept of legitimate
expectation first stepped into the English Law in
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Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs
[(1969) 2 Ch 149 : (1969) 1 All ER 904] wherein it
was observed that an alien who had been given
leave to enter the United Kingdom for a limited
period had a legitimate expectation of being allowed
to stay for the permitted time and if that permission
was revoked before the time expires, that alien
ought to be given an opportunity of making
representations. Thereafter the concept has been
considered in a number of cases. In A.G. of Hong
Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu [(1983) 2 AC 629 : (1983) 2
All ER 346] Lord Fraser said that "the principle that a
public authority is bound by its undertakings as to
the procedure it will follow, provided they do not
conflict with its duty, is applicable to the undertaking
given by the Government of Hong Kong to the
respondent ... that each case would be considered on
its merits".
xxxxx
27. Of late the doctrine of legitimate
expectation is being pressed into service in many
cases particularly in contractual sphere while
canvassing the implications underlying the
administrative law. Since we have not come across
any pronouncement of this Court on this subject
explaining the meaning and scope of the doctrine of
legitimate expectation, we would like to examine the
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same a little more elaborately at this stage. Who is
the expectant and what is the nature of the
expectation? When does such an expectation become
a legitimate one and what is the foundation for the
same? What are the duties of the administrative
authorities while taking a decision in cases attracting
the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
28. Time is a three-fold present : the present
as we experience it, the past as a present memory
and future as a present expectation. For legal
purposes, the expectation cannot be the same as
anticipation. It is different from a wish, a desire or a
hope nor can it amount to a claim or demand on the
ground of a right. However earnest and sincere a
wish, a desire or a hope may be and however
confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they
by themselves cannot amount to an assertable
expectation and a mere disappointment does not
attract legal consequences. A pious hope even
leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a
legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an
expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on
the sanction of law or custom or an established
procedure followed in regular and natural sequence.
Again it is distinguishable from a genuine
expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably
legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate
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expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and
therefore it does not amount to a right in the
conventional sense.
29. It has to be noticed that the concept of
legitimate expectation in administrative law has now,
undoubtedly, gained sufficient importance. It is
stated that "legitimate expectation" is the latest
recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the
courts for the review of administrative action and
this creation takes its place beside such principles as
the rules of natural justice, unreasonableness, the
fiduciary duty of local authorities and "in future,
perhaps, the principle of proportionality". A passage
in Administrative Law, Sixth Edition by H.W.R. Wade
page 424 reads thus:
"These are revealing decisions. They show
that the courts now expect Government
departments to honour their published
statements or else to treat the citizen with
the fullest personal consideration. Unfairness
in the form of unreasonableness here comes
close to unfairness in the form of violation of
natural justice, and the doctrine of legitimate
expectation can operate in both contexts. It is
obvious, furthermore, that this principle of
substantive, as opposed to procedural,
fairness may undermine some of the
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established rules about estoppel and
misleading advice, which tend to operate
unfairly. Lord Scarman has stated
emphatically that unfairness in the purported
exercise of a power can amount to an abuse
or excess of power, and this seems likely to
develop into an important general doctrine."
Another passage at page 522 in the above book
reads thus:
"It was in fact for the purpose of restricting
the right to be heard that 'legitimate
expectation' was introduced into the law. It
made its first appearance in a case where
alien students of 'scientology' were refused
extension of their entry permits as an act of
policy by the Home Secretary, who had
announced that no discretionary benefits
would be granted to this sect. The court of
appeal held that they had no legitimate
expectation of extension beyond the
permitted time, and so no right to a hearing,
though revocation of their permits within that
time would have been contrary to legitimate
expectation. Official statements of policy,
therefore, may cancel legitimate expectation,
just as they may create it, as seen above. In
a different context, where car-hire drivers
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had habitually offended against airport
byelaws, with many convictions and unpaid
fines, it was held that they had no legitimate
expectation of being heard before being
banned by the airport authority.
There is some ambiguity in the dicta about
legitimate expectation, which may mean
either expectation of a fair hearing or
expectation of the licence or other benefit
which is being sought. But the result is the
same in either case; absence of legitimate
expectation will absolve the public authority
from affording a hearing."
(emphasis supplied)
30. In some cases a question arose whether
the concept of legitimate expectation is an impact
only on the procedure or whether it also can have a
substantive impact and if so to what extent. Attorney
General for New South Wales v. Quin [(1990) 64
Aust LJR 327] is a case from Australia in which this
aspect is dealt with. In that case the Local Courts Act
abolished Courts of Petty Sessions and replaced
them by Local Courts. Section 12 of the Act
empowered the Governor to appoint any qualified
person to be a Magistrate in the new court system.
Mr Quin, who had been a Stipendiary Magistrate in
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charge of a Court of Petty Sessions under the old
system, applied for, but was refused, an
appointment under the new system. That was
challenged. The challenge was upheld by the
appellate court on the ground that the selection
committee had taken into account an adverse report
on him without giving a notice to him of the contents
of the same. In the appeal by the Attorney-General
against that order before the High Court, it was
argued on behalf of Mr Quin that he had a legitimate
expectation that he would be treated in the same
way as his former colleagues considering his
application on its own merits. Coming to the nature
of the substantive impact of the doctrine, Brennan, J.
observed that the doctrine of legitimate expectations
ought not to "unlock the gate which shuts the court
out of review on the merits", and that the courts
should not trespass "into the forbidden field of the
merits" by striking down administrative acts or
decisions which failed to fulfil the expectations. In
the same case Mason, C.J. was of the view that if
substantive protection is to be accorded to legitimate
expectations that would encounter the objection of
entailing "curial interference with administrative
decisions on the merits by precluding the decision-
maker from ultimately making the decision which he
or she considers most appropriate in the
circumstances".
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31. In R v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department ex parte Ruddock [(1987) 2 All ER 518]
Taylor, J. after referring to the ratio laid down in
some of the above cases held thus:
"On these authorities I conclude that the
doctrine of legitimate expectation in essence
imposes a duty to act fairly. Whilst most of
the cases are concerned, as Lord Roskill said,
with a right to be heard, I do not think the
doctrine is so confined. Indeed, in a case
where ex hypothesi there is no right to be
heard, it may be thought the more important
to fair dealing that a promise or undertaking
given by a minister as to how he will proceed
should be kept. Of course such promise or
undertaking must not conflict with his
statutory duty or his duty, as here, in the
exercise of a prerogative power. I accept the
submission of counsel for the Secretary of
State that the respondent cannot fetter his
discretion. By declaring a policy he does not
preclude any possible need to change it. But
then if the practice has been to publish the
current policy, it would be incumbent on him
in dealing fairly to publish the new policy,
unless again that would conflict with his
duties. Had the criteria here needed changing
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for national security reasons, no doubt the
respondent could have changed them. Had
those reasons prevented him also from
publishing the new criteria, no doubt he could
have refrained from doing so. Had he even
decided to keep the criteria but depart from
them in this single case for national security
reasons, no doubt those reasons would have
afforded him a defence to judicial review as in
the GCHQ case."
(emphasis supplied)
In Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union [(1971)
2 QB 175: (1971) 1 All ER 1148, 1154 (f-h)] Lord
Denning observed as under:
"If a man seeks a privilege to which he has
no particular claim -- such as an appointment
to some post or other -- then he can be
turned away without a word. He need not be
heard. No explanation need be given; see the
cases cited in Schmidt v. Secretary of State
for Home Affairs [(1993) 1 SCC 71 : JT
(1992) 6 SC 259] at pages 170-171. But if he
is a man whose property is at stake, or who is
being deprived of his livelihood, then reasons
should be given why he is being turned down,
and he should be given a chance to be heard.
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I go further. If he is a man who has some
right or interest, or some legitimate
expectation, of which it would not be fair to
deprive him without a hearing, or reasons
given, then these should be afforded him,
according as the case may demand."
(emphasis supplied)"
17. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred
only if it is founded on the sanction of law or a custom or
an established procedure followed in regular and natural
sequence. Every such legitimate expectation does not by
itself fructify into a right and therefore, it does not amount
to a right in conventional sense. In Hindu Development
Corporation supra, the Apex Court held that in a case of
legitimate expectation, if the authority proposes to defeat
a person's legitimate expectation, it should afford him an
opportunity to make representation. The legitimate
expectation arises only when the candidate satisfies the
basic mandatory norms/conditions and is denied a benefit
arbitrarily. The respondent No.6 herein failed to meet the
condition essential to the selection process and hence it
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disentitles him from invoking this doctrine. The appellant
was appointed in a bonafide manner and not through
fraud, misrepresentation or manipulation. His
appointment was made after due process and based on
proper documentation submitted in accordance with the
notification.
18. The appellant has served in the institution for
over a decade without blemish. His service has to be
viewed with consideration, particularly when his
appointment was not due to fraudulent act or irregularity
on his part. Applying of principle based on doctrine of
expectation would not arise in the present facts and
accordingly, the point for consideration is answered and
we pass the following:
ORDER
i) Writ appeal is allowed.
- 28 -
NC: 2025:KHC-K:3912-DB
HC-KAR
ii) The impugned order dated 29.11.2024 passed
by the learned Single Judge in
W.P.No.204065/2015 is hereby set aside.
iii) The order dated 08.05.2015 appointing the
appellant as Supervisor of Library of Yalgod
village of Jewargi Taluk, District Kalaburagi is
restored.
Sd/-
(MOHAMMAD NAWAZ)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(K S HEMALEKHA)
JUDGE
BL
CT:NI
