(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
1. The petitioners are before this Court seeking for the
c) Pass such other orders as this Hon'ble Court
deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the
case, including costs, in the interest of justice and
equity.
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2. The petitioners No.1 to 6 claim to be elected
councillors of respondent No.4-Council. Petitioners
No.7 to 9 though elected Councillors had been
disqualified by an order of the Regional
Commissioner, which has been quashed by this Court
vide its order dated 24.02.2025 in W.P.No.101414 of
2025. The petitioners are before this Court now
contending that the notice which has been issued
fixing the date for holding of the election for the post
of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha for respondent No.4-
Council is not in accordance with law and as such,
the said notice is sought for to be quashed.
3. The submission of Sri K.N.Phanindra, learned senior
counsel appearing for the petitioners is that
3.1. In terms of Clause (b) of Rule 2 of the
Karnataka Municipalities (President and Vice-
President) Election Rules, 1965 (for short, 'the
Rules, 1965') the 'Election Officer' has been
defined. Insofar as Sub-Clause (i) of Clause
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(b) of Rule 2 of the Rules insofar as City
Municipal Councils are concerned-the
respondent No.4, the Deputy Commissioner or
the person performing the duties of the
Deputy Commissioner for the time being would
be the 'Election Officer'.
3.2. Placing reliance on the same, his submission is
that by way of Annexure-C the order dated
06.08.2024, the Deputy Commissioner has
virtually delegated his authority to the
Assistant Commissioner. The Assistant
Commissioner cannot be said to be the Deputy
Commissioner or a person performing the
duties of the Deputy Commissioner, as such,
the nomination and order delegation of
authority by the Deputy Commissioner to the
Assistant Commissioner by way of nomination
is bad in law.
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3.3. Consequently, the notice dated 20.02.2025
issued by the Assistant Commissioner at
Annexure-D is non est contrary to the Rules of
1965. There could be no delegation which
could be made by the Deputy Commissioner,
this he juxtaposes with Sub-clause (ii) and (iii)
of clause (b) of Rule (2) of the Rules, 1965 to
contend that in terms of Clause (ii) it could be
an officer nominated by the Deputy
Commissioner not below the rank of an
Assistant Commissioner, who could be the
Election Officer, there is no such nomination
facility provided under sub-clause (i) of clause
(b) of Rule 2 of the Rules, 1965, as such he
submits that both the nomination by the
Deputy Commissioner and the notice issued by
the Assistant Commissioner are bad in law,
requiring the same to be quashed.
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3.4. Secondly, he submits that the notice at
Annexure-D though dated 20.02.2025 was
served on the petitioners on 21.02.2025 and
as such, there is no 7 clear days notice in
terms of Rule 3 of the Rules of 1965. In this
regard, he relies upon Section 9 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 to contend that the first day
as also the last day would have to be excluded
while considering the period of time in respect
of Rule 3 of the Rules of 1965.
3.5. He further relies upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of K.
Narasimhiah v. H.C.Singri Gowda and
Others, reported in AIR (1967) SC 684,
more particularly at paragraph No.8 thereof,
which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
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"(8) The words " not being 'less than one month "
do imply that clear one month's notice was
necessary to. be given, that is, both the first day
and the last day of the month had to be excluded.
To put it in the language used by Maxwell on
Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition,1 :-
"..when........ not less than' so many days are
to intervene, both the terminal days are
excluded from the computation,"
That does not seem to have been done in the
present case. But in order to decide whether this
portion of the proviso is a mandatory provision, it
is convenient to see the object for which it has
been enacted. Under s. 78, the procedure is laid
down for the levying of a. new tax, which has to
be done by a resolution. But in the proviso, it is
stated that before such a resolution can be
passed, a notice to that effect has to be published
in the official gazette and also in one Malayalam or
Tamil newspaper having circulation within the
municipality. Then comes the period for inviting
objections. The object of notifying in the Gazette
and Local Newspaper is both to give notice to the
public and particularly to the persons who are
likely to be taxed and to invite their objections.
For this purpose, the proviso requires a reasonable
period of not less than one month to be given. The
object of the provision is to give reasonable time
and opportunity and it is given as a guidance that
reasonable time would be a month. The use of the
words "I reasonable period" before the words, not
being less than one month" is significant. If
sufficient time has been given for the invitation of
the objections which only just falls short of the
period mentioned in the proviso, then it would
serve the object of the legislature. The provision in
regard to time in the context must be held to be
directory and not mandatory."
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3.6. By relying on the same, he submits that when
words 'not less than' is used, both the terminal
days are to be excluded that is the first day
and the last day are to be excluded. Insofar as
the present matter is concerned, it is his
submission that the notice being served on
21.02.2025, the date of service that is
21.02.2025 is required to be excluded so also
the date of the meeting fixed on 28.02.2025
was required to be excluded. If both
21.02.2025 and 28.02.2025 are excluded,
only the days between 22.02.2025 and
27.02.2025 are available, which provides only
a notice period of 6 days and not a notice of 7
clear days.
3.7. On that basis, he submits that if the first
argument is not acceptable, in terms of second
argument, the notice not being for clear 7
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days is required to be held invalid and a
meeting be restrained from being held.
3.8. Lastly, he submits that insofar as petitioner
Nos.7, 8 and 9 are concerned, though they
were disqualified as on the date on which the
notice under Rule 3 of the Rules, 1964 had
been issued. Subsequently, in view of the
order dated 24.02.2025 passed by this Court
in WP.No.101414 of 2025, the order of
disqualification having been quashed, the
petitioners No.7 to 9 continue to be Councillors
and as such, they need to be permitted to
participate and vote in the election now
scheduled on 28.02.2025, those are three
contentions.
4. Learned AAG Sri Gangadhar J.M., appearing for the
State i.e, respondents No.1 to 3 would submit that
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4.1. in terms of the notification bearing No.UDD 70
MLR 2004, Bangalore dated 13.08.2004 by
exercising powers under Sub-section (2A) of
Section 321 of the Karnataka Municipalities
Act, 1964 (for short, 'the Act, 1964'). The
Government has delegated the powers of the
Deputy Commissioner under Rule 2(b)(i) of
the Rules of 1965 to the Assistant
Commissioner of the Revenue Sub-Division or
the person performing the duties of the
Assistant Commissioner for the time being and
it is in pursuance thereof that from the year
2004, the elections insofar as City Municipal
Councils are concerned, are being held by the
Assistant Commissioners.
4.2. The said notification not having been
challenged continues to hold fort and the said
notification not having been challenged in the
present proceedings also no grievance can be
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raised as regards the Assistant Commissioner
having been appointed as the election officer.
4.3. Therefore the submission of learned senior
counsel on the part of the petitioners that
there is an improper delegation or nomination
and or that the Assistant Commissioner is not
the Election Officer in terms of Sub-clause (i)
of Clause (b) of Rule 2 of the Rules, 1964 is
not sustainable. By virtue of the said
delegation, the Assistant Commissioner is a
competent person. This notification having
been issued in respect to the subordinate
delegation, namely the rules has been
properly issued and as such, the petitioners
cannot claim that the appointment of Assistant
Commissioner is bad in law.
4.4. As regards the calculation of the dates, he
relies upon the decision of a coordinate bench
of this Court Smt.Devi Bai W/o. Manjanaika
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vs. State of Karnataka and another,
WP.No.39290/2011 (LB-ELE) dated
19.10.2011 more particularly paragraphs
Nos.2 and 3. The said Judgment being a short
Judgement the entire Judgment is reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
"ORDER
Petitioner has sought for quashing the notice
issued by the Election Officer fixing the date of
election to the post of Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha of Grama Panchayat, on 20th of
October 2011. The impugned notice is dated
13.10.2011. According to the petitioner, the
notice was served on her on 14.10.2011. Thus, it
is argued by Sri K.Chandrashekar, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner that there is
no seven days clear notice to the petitioner for
participating in the election to be held on 20th of
October 2011. He relies upon up the judgments of
this Court in the case of Sangappa -vs- The
Assistant Commissioner, BijapurDistrict and
another (ILR 2004 KAR 1102) and in the case of
Jitendra Mannulal dubey -VS-State of
Karnataka, by its Secretary, Department of
Rural Development & Panchayath Raj and
Others (ILR 2002 KAR 3216), in support of his
contentions.
2. It is no doubt true that Rule 3 of the
Karnataka Panchayat Raj (Election to Adhyaksha
and Upadhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat) Rules, 1994,
prescribes seven days notice to be served on
every member prior to the date of the meeting. In
the matter on hand, notice impugned is dated
13.10.2011. The date of election is fixed on 20th
October 2011. Prima facie, therefore, it is clear
that there is seven days clear notice to the
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members. Learned Government Advocate submits
that generally election notice would be pasted on
the notice board of the Panchayat on 13.10.2011
itself and that all the members would be knowing
about exact date of election as 13.10.2011 itself.
However, according to the petitioner, the
notice sent to her through registered post was
served on 14.10.2011 and therefore, seven days
clear notice is not available to her. The said
contention cannot be accepted at this stage. The
Calendar of Events are already issued and election
is scheduled to be held on 20th of October 2011.
Once the Calendar of Events are issued, the
election process cannot be interfered with by this
Court. If the petitioner is aggrieved by the
outcome of the election, it is open for the
petitioner to question the election before the
Tribunal constituted for the said purpose by filing
election petition. The process of election cannot
be interfered after the calendar of events are
issued.
Accordingly, writ petition stands dismissed."
4.5. By relying on the above judgment, he submits
that the notice dated 13.10.2011 having been
served on the Councillors on 14.10.2011, the
date of election being fixed on 20.10.2011.
The co-ordinate bench has come to a
conclusion that there is 7 clear days notice to
the members and even if, there is no such 7
clear days notice issued, the calendar of
events having already been issued and the
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election scheduled, the petitioners therein, if
aggrieved by the outcome of the election,
could always challenge the same in an election
petition. Thus, he submits that a coordinate
bench of this Court having interpreted the said
provision and having come to a conclusion that
the notice dated 13.10.2011 served on
14.10.2011 as regards a meeting to be held
on 20.10.2011, provides 7 days if applied to
the present case would also make the notice
valid. Therefore in the present case, this Court
would have to hold that 7 clear days notice
has been issued.
4.6. There is no requirement to apply Section 9 of
the General Clauses Act to exclude the first
and the last day, more so, when this Court has
already considered the said provision and
delivered a Judgment. He also relies upon the
earlier Judgment of another coordinate bench
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of this Court in the case of Jitendra Mannulal
Dubey vs. State of Karnataka, by its
Secretary, Department of Rural
Development & Panchayath Raj and Others,
reported in ILR 2002 KAR 3216, which has
been relied upon in the case of Smt.Devi Bai
W/o. Manjanaika vs. State of Karnataka
and another, WP.No.39290/2011 (LB-ELE)
dated 19.10.2011.
4.7. Insofar as Jitendra Mannulal Dube's case, he
relies upon paragraph Nos.7 and 8 thereof,
which are reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
"7. The impugned notice is dated
11.04.2002. It is the contention of learned
Counsel for the petitioner that it was served on
him on 12.04.2002. The rule stipulates that notice
of date so fixed must be sent to every member
not less than seven clear days prior to the date of
the meeting. As the stipulation is seven clear days
prior to the date of meeting, if we start
calculating the days from 12.04.2002 i.e., the
date of service of notice and exclude 18.04.2002,
the date of meeting, the notice served on
12.04.2002 would give only six days clear notice
to the member. Thus, the impugned notice issued
in the present case falls short of the requirement
of the rule by one day.
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8. In NARASIMHAIAH VS SINGRI GOWDA
the Apex Court while interpreting the word
'giving' in the context of tendering notice,
observed thus:
"Giving" of anything as ordinarily understood
in the English language is not complete
unless it has reached the hands of the person
to whom it has to be given. In the eye of law
however 'giving' is complete in many matters
where it has been offered to a person but not
accepted by him. Tendering of a notice is in
law therefore giving of a notice even though
the person to whom it is tendered refuses to
accept it. Thus, as soon as the person with a
legal duty to give the notice despatches the
notice to the address of the person to whom
it has to be given, the giving is not
complete".
Thus, in the present case the service having
been done on 12.04.2002, the period would start
to run from 12.04.2002 only and the seven clear
days would be completed only on 18.04.2002. As
the stipulation in the rule is to give notice of 7
clear days prior to the date of meeting, the notice
must have been served on the petitioner on 11-4-
2002 itself to bring it in conformity with the rule.
As the notice gives only 6 clear days notice of the
meeting, it falls short by one clear day. The
intention of the Legislature that the rule has to be
observed strictly and mandatorily becomes all the
more obvious if we consider the word 'shall'
employed in the rule and also the precise number
of days that the Legislature took care to mention
in the rule itself. The purpose of the first meeting
being to achieve the important object of electing
the Adhyaksha and Upa-Adhyaksha, the
stipulation of seven clear days notice has to be
construed as mandatory in character and not as
directory. Had it not been the intention of the
Legislature to insist on seven clear days notice of
the meeting, certainly it would have employed a
different phraseology such as 'sufficient notice' or
'well in advance'. The very fact that the
Legislature took upon itself to mention in the rule
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itself the precise number of days, it is obvious
that the Legislature did not desire to leave
matters to the discretion of the authorities under
the Act."
4.8. He submits that the above case also relating
to the election of the Adhyaksha and
Upadyaksha, a notice dated 11.04.2002
having been served on the Councillors on
12.04.2002 and the election proposed to be
held on 18.04.2002, it was held that 7 days
notice was available. The contention of
petitioners therein was that if the calculation
of number of days is made from the date of
service of notice i.e. 12.04.2002 by excluding
the date of the election i.e., 18.04.2002, there
was only 6 clear days notices. The coordinate
bench came to a conclusion that service
having been affected on 12.04.2002, the
period would start to run from 12.04.2002 and
7 days would be completed by 18.04.2002 and
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as such held that the notice issued therein is
proper and correct providing 7 days notice.
4.9. On that basis, he submits that the particular
provision concerned having already been
interpreted by two coordinate benches. The
said orders would be equally applicable and
binding on this Court and there will be no need
to further interpret the same by applying
Section 9 of the General Clauses Act.
4.10. Insofar as respondents No.7 to 9 are
concerned, his submission is that they were
disqualified as on the date on which the
election was notified. There is no need to issue
any notice to them and no notice having been
issued to them, the question of them
participating in the election would not arise
and as such, he submits that the exclusion
made of petitioners No.7 to 9 is proper and
correct.
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5. Heard Sri K.N.Phanindra learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioners and Sri J.M.Gangadhar,
learned Additional Advocate General appearing for
respondents No.1 to 3 as well as Sri Harsh Desai,
learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4.
6. The points that would arise for determination in the
present matter are,
(I) Whether the notice issued by the Assistant
Commissioner at Annexure-D is in terms
of Sub-clause (i) of clause-(b) of Rule 2 of
the Rules, 1965?
(II) Whether the notice is in compliance with
Rule 3 of the Rules, 1965?
(III) Whether petitioners No.7 to 9 are required
to be permitted to participate in the
election and cast their vote?
(IV) What order ?
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7. Answer to point No.(I) Whether the notice issued
by the Assistant Commissioner at Annexure-D is in
terms of Sub-section (i) of clause-(b) of Rule 2 of
the Rules, 1965?
7.1. Clause (b) of Rule 2 of the Rules of 1965 is
reproduced hereunder of easy reference :
"2. Definitions -In these rules, unless the
context otherwise requires.-
(a) xxxxxx
(b) "Election officer" means:-
(i) in the case of city municipal councils,
the Deputy Commissioner or the person
performing the duties of the Deputy
Commissioner for the time being.
(ii) in the case of town municipal councils at
District headquarters, any officer
nominated by the Deputy Commissioner
in this behalf not below the rank of an
Assistant Commissioner; and
(iii) in the case of other town municipal
councils and town panchayats the
Tahsildar or the person performing the
duties of the Tahasildar for the time
being."
7.2. A perusal of the Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of
Rule 2 of the Rules, 1965 would indicate that
in case the City Municipal Councils, the Deputy
Commissioner or the person performing the
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duties of the Deputy Commissioner for the
time being would be the Election Officer. It is
on this basis that Sri K.N.Phanindra learned
senior counsel would submit that it is only the
Deputy Commissioner, who could be the
Election Officer. The Assistant Commissioner
being a Subordinate Officer could not be the
Election Officer.
7.3. Insofar as this aspect is concerned, learned
Additional Advocate General has relied upon
the notification dated 13.08.2004. The said
notification is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
"Urban Development Secretariat
NOTIFICATION
No.UDD 70 MLR 2004, Bangalore Dated :13.08.2004.
In the exercise of powers conferred by Sub
Section 2A of Section 321 of the Karnataka
Municipalities Act, 1964 (Karnataka Act 22 of 1964)
Government hereby delegate the powers of the Deputy
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Commissioner under Rule 2(b)(i) of the Karnataka
Municipalities (President & Vice President Election)
Rules, 1965 with immediate effect to the Assistant
Commissioner of Revenue Sub Division or the person
performing the duties of the Assistant Commissioner
for the time being."
7.4. A perusal of the above notification indicates
that by exercising powers conferred under
Sub-section (2A) of Section 321 of the
Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, the
Government has delegated the powers of the
Deputy Commissioner under Rule 2(b)(i) of
the Rules of 1965 to the Assistant
Commissioner of the Revenue Sub-Division or
the person performing duties of the Assistant
Commissioner for the time being.
7.5. Section 321 of the Karnataka Municipalities
Act, 1964, reads as under:
321. Delegation of powers by
Government.--(1) The Government may by
notification delegate to the 1 [Director of
municipal Administration, Deputy commissioner,
Assistant Commissioner or Thasildar such of its
powers under this Act except the power to make
rules.
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(2) The Government may by notification
delegate to the Deputy Commissioner any of the
powers conferred under this Act on the 1
[Director of Municipal Administration.
(2A) The Government may by notification,
delegate to any other officer such of its powers
or power conferred on any officer under this Act
except the power to make rules.
(3) Every delegation under [sub-section (1),
(2) or (2A)]1 may be subject to such restrictions
and conditions as may be specified in the
notification."
7.6. A reading of Section 321 of the Act, 1964
would indicate that the Government has the
power to delegate to the Director of Municipal
Administration, Deputy Commissioner,
Assistant Commissioner or Tahashildar such
powers under this Act except the power to
make rules. The Government may also by
notification delegate to the Deputy
Commissioner any of the powers conferred
under the Act on the Director of Municipal
Administration.
7.7. It is in pursuance of these powers to delegate
under Section 321 of the Act, 1964 that the
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notification dated 13.08.2004 has been issued
and specific delegation has been made of the
powers of the Deputy Commissioner under
Sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Rule 2 of the
Rules, 1965 to the Assistant Commissioner.
7.8. Neither the powers under Section 321 nor the
notification dated 13.08.2004 are under
challenge in these proceedings. Be that as it
may, the notification which has been enforced
from 13.08.2004 delegating the powers of the
Deputy Commissioner to the Assistant
Commissioner of the Revenue Sub-division to
act in pursuance of sub-clause (ii) of clause
(b) of Rule 2 of the Rules, 1965 has been
acted upon for the last two decades and is to
the knowledge on one and all including the
petitioners.
7.9. Thus the contention of Sri K.N.Phanindra
learned senior counsel in the face of the above
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notification dated 13.08.2004 cannot be
accepted.
7.10. I answer point No.I by holding that the
Election Officer in terms of Sub-clause (i) of
Clause (b) of Rule 2 would include the
Assistant Commissioner of the Revenue Sub-
division or the person performing the duties of
the Assistant Commissioner for the time being
in terms of the notification dated 13.08.2004
and thus notice issued at Annexure-D is
proper and valid and there can be no infirmity
found with the said order.
8. Answer to point No.(II): Whether the notice is in
compliance with Rule 3 of the Rules, 1965?
8.1. Much argument has been advanced on the
notice not providing 7 days notice as required
under Rule 3 of the Rules of 1965. Rule 3 is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
"3. Appointment of date of meeting :- The
election of President and Vice-President shall be
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held in the meeting fixed by the Election Officer
and he shall thereupon send to every Councillor
notice of dates so fixed not less than seven
days prior to the date of meeting."
8.2. A perusal of the said Rule 3 indicates that the
election of the President and Vice-President
shall be held in a meeting fixed by the Election
Officer, and the Election Officer shall
thereupon send to every councillor notice of
the date so fixed not less than 7 days prior to
the date of the meeting.
8.3. It is not in dispute that the Election Officer has
issued notice and that the date has also been
fixed by the Election Officer. The receipt of
notices by the councillors is also not in
dispute. What is only in dispute is as regards
the 7 days prior notice in terms of Rule 3.
8.4. The submission of Sri. K. N. Phanindra,
learned Senior Counsel, is that the notice
dated 20.02.2025, served on 21.02.2025 on
all the petitioners, and the meeting proposed
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to be held on 28.02.2025, there is no 7 days
clear notice. In this regard, he contends that
both 21.02.2025, that is the date on which the
notice was served, and 28.02.2025, the date
on which the meeting is proposed to be held,
are to be excluded. If these two are excluded,
then only 6 days' clear notice remains.
8.5. This interpretation is based on Section 9 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
9. Commencement and termination of
time.--
(1) In any Central Act or Regulation made
after the commencement of this Act, it shall
be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the
first in a series of days or any other period of
time, to use the word "from", and, for the
purpose of including the last in a series of
days or any other period of time, to use the
word "to".
(2) This section applies also to all Central
Acts made after the third day of January,
1868, and to all Regulations made on or after
the fourteenth day of January, 1887.
8.6. A perusal of Section 9 would indicate that, if in
any Central Act or Regulation made after the
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commencement of the Act, it shall be
sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first
in a series of days or any other period of time,
to use the word "from", and, for the purpose
of including the last in a series of days or any
other period of time to use the word "to".
8.7. That is to say, if in the statute the word "from"
or "to" are used, insofar as usage of the word
"from" is concerned, the first of the series is to
be excluded. Insofar as the word "to" being
used, the last of the series of dates is to be
excluded.
8.8. In the present matter, a perusal of Rule 3
does not indicate either the usage of the word
"from" or the usage of the word "to", but only
indicates that 7 days prior notice is to be
issued. It is also not "7 clear days," as sought
to be contended by Sri. K. N. Phanindra,
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learned Senior Counsel, it is only 7 days prior
notice which is to be issued.
8.9. The two coordinate Benches of this Court have
interpreted the said period as "prior notice"
and not as "clear notice" and have held in
similar circumstances that, if there is a gap of
7 days from the date of service of notice to the
date of holding of the meeting, then the same
would fulfil the requirement of Rule 3 of the
Rules of 1965.
8.10. In the present case, notice having been served
on 21.02.2025 and the meeting proposed to
be held on 28.02.2025, by taking into
consideration 21.02.2025 and calculating the
same until 27.02.2025, there are 7 prior days
from 21.02.2025 to 27.02.2025
(21,22,23,24,25,26 and 27th).
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8.11. This aspect could also be considered from
another perspective as to why 7 prior days'
notice has been fixed under Rule 3 of Rules of
1965. In my considered opinion, this has been
so fixed to provide enough opportunity to all
the concerned to get ready for the meeting, if
necessary, by campaigning for the election,
etc. Unless any prejudice is caused to any
person by a lesser period of notice, then the
same cannot, in my considered opinion, fall
foul of Rule 3 of the Rules of 1965.
8.12. In that view of the matter, I answer point
number 2 by holding that the notice dated
20.02.2025, served on 21.02.2025, for a
meeting to be held on 28.02.2025, provides 7
days' prior notice and is in compliance with
Rule 3 of the Rules of 1965.
9. Answer to point number (III): Whether
petitioners No.7 to 9 are required to be permitted
to participate in the election and cast their vote?
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9.1. The submission of Sri. K. N. Phanindra,
learned Senior Counsel, in this regard is that
having been quashed by this Court vide order
dated 24.02.2025 passed in
W.P.No.101414/2025, they are now eligible to
vote at the meeting to be conducted on
28.02.2025, and as such, they should be
permitted to do so.
9.2. The submission of the learned Additional
Advocate General that they were not
councillors as on the date of issuance of notice
for holding election, their disqualification
having been set aside subsequently cannot be
accepted, on their disqualification being set
aside they would continue to be members of
the council and so long as they are ready to
waive notice, they should be permitted to vote
at the election, the matter would have been
different if the disqualified members were to
insist on fresh notice, which they would not
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have been entitled for, now that they have
waived notice and indicated their intention to
participate, it would be in the interest of the
democratic polity to allow them to paticipate.
9.3. There is therefore substance in the submission
made by Shrri K N Phanindra learned Senior
Counsel, inasmuch as there is no
disqualification as of now for petitioners No.7
to 9 to vote in the elections, since their
disqualification having been quashed, they
continue to be councillors of respondent No.4.
The same is, however, subject to the orders to
be passed by the Regional Commissioner on
account of the remand made by this Court
vide the aforesaid order dated 24.02.2025 in
WP No.101414/2025.
10. Answer to Point No.4: What Order?
In view of my findings on all the above points, I
pass the following:
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ORDER
i. Writ Petition is dismissed.
ii. Petitioners No.7 to 9 are permitted to participate
and vote in the elections to be held on
28.02.2025, subject to any orders passed by the
Regional Commissioner in pursuance of the order
of remand dated 24.02.2025 passed in
W.P.No.101414/2025.
In view of disposal of the main petition, pending I.As., if
any, do not survive for consideration and are disposed of.
Sd/-
(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
JUDGE
CKK - upto para 9
GAB - para 10 to end
CT-MCK
