Karnataka High Court
Revanasiddaiah vs Janatha Seva Co-Operative Bank Ltd on 19 February, 2025
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA
WRIT PETITION NO.41000 OF 2017 (CS-RES)
BETWEEN
REVANASIDDAIAH
S/O LATE SIDDALINGAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.79,
II FLOOR,I MAIN ROAD,
RHBCS LAYOUT,
ANNAPOORNESHWARI NAGARA,
VISHWANEEDAM POST,
BENGALURU-560091.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI A V GANGADHARAPPA, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. JANATHA SEVA CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD.
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
NO.14, I MAIN ROAD,HAMPINAGARA,
VIJAYANAGARA II STAGE,
BENGALURU-560104.
2. RECOVERY OFFICER &
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR OF
CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES,
CENTRAL RANGE CIRCLE,
NO.32, 2ND FLOOR,
KARANTAKA CO-OP FEDERATION BUILDING,
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT (CENTRAL)
RACE COURSE ROAD,
BENGALURU-560001.
3. DEPUTY REGISTRAR OF
2
CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES
2ND RANGE, BANGALORE CITY DISTRICT,
NO.32, 2ND FLOOR,
KARNATAKA CO-OP.
FEDERATION BUILDING,
BENGALURU-560001.
4. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY
TO GOVERNMENT,
CO-OPERATION DEPARTMENT,
MULTISTORIED BUILDING,
BENGALURU-560001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI SIDDHARTH BABURAO, AGA FOR R2 TO R4
SRI PRADEEP S SAWKAR, ADVOCATE FOR R1)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED
30.11.2015 PASSED BY R-2 IN CASE NO. ARB - C: 45 : CEP : 578:
2014-15 AT ANNEX-K THE ORDER DATED 3.10.2016 PASSED BY THE R-
3 IN CASE NO. DRB - C / APPEAL 03 /2015-16 AT ANNEX-L AND THE
ORDER DATED 29.7.2017 PASSED BY R-4 IN CASE NO. CO : 30
CAP :2016 AT ANEX-M RESPECTIVELY AND ETC.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
ORDERS ON 18.02.2025 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY,
THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA
CAV ORDER
The present writ petition is filed seeking the following
reliefs:
"(a) a writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other
appropriate writ or order quashing the order dated
30.11.2015 passed by the 2nd respondent in Case
No.ARB-C:45:CEP:578:2014-15 produced as Annexure-K,
the order dated 3.10.2016 passed by the 3rd respondent
in Case No.DRB-C/Appeal 03/2015-16 produced as
Annexure-L and the order dated 29.7.2017 passed by the
3
4th respondent in case No.CO:30:CAP:2016 certified copy
of which is produced as Annexure-M respectively.
b) a writ in the nature of mandamus or any
other appropriate writ or order and direct the 2nd
respondent to recover from the 1st respondent entire
amount of `.44,74,690/- with interest at 12% pa., from
the date of petition as per the representation made by the
petitioner dated 22.7.2017 true copy of which is produced
as Annexure-K and as claimed in the execution petition
dated 9.6.2014, true copy of which is produced as
Annexure-J."
2. The relevant facts necessary for consideration of the
present petition are that, the petitioner was working as an
Assistant Manager in the first respondent - bank when he was
terminated on 2.9.1998. Being aggrieved, the petitioner
challenged the said termination in a dispute filed under Section
70 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 19591 which
was dismissed on 19.11.2003. Being aggrieved, the petitioner
filed Appeal No.20/2004 before the Karnataka Appellate
Tribunal2. By judgment dated 14.5.2010, the Tribunal allowed
the appeal of the petitioner, set aside the order dated
19.11.2003 as well as the termination dated 2.9.1998 and the
first respondent was directed to reinstate the petitioner into
services of the bank with all consequential benefits and
1
Hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'
2
Hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal'
4
backwages. The order dated 14.5.2010 of the Tribunal was
affirmed by this Court in WP No.19115/2010.
3. It is further forthcoming that during the pendency of
WP No.19115/2010, consequent to the order dated 22.3.2011
passed on an interim application in the said writ petition, this
Court directed the bank to notionally fix the salary of the
petitioner admissible as an Assistant Manager from the date of
reinstatement and pay all other benefits.
4. Pursuant to the said order dated 22.3.2011, the
petitioner was reinstated and joined services on 16.8.2010. WP
No.19115/2010 was disposed of by order dated 15.9.2011.
The petitioner, thereafter made various representations
claiming arrears of salary, dearness allowance, encashment of
leave, bonus and other benefits as also promotion and since the
same was not acceded to, permission was sought by the
petitioner to prosecute the office bearers of the bank. Since
the said permission was not accorded, the petitioner preferred
WP No.29312/2013 during the pendency of which, on
29.7.2013 the first respondent bank filed a memo along with a
calculation placing on record that the petitioner was entitled to
5
a total sum of `16,22,344/- and after various deductions a sum
of `12,41,002/- was paid. The manner in which the said
calculation was made was also placed on record along with the
said memo. Having regard to the said payment, the writ
petition was disposed of vide order dated 29.7.2013 and in
view of the assertion of the petitioner that the entire amount
due and payable had not been correctly quantified and paid, it
was observed that such satisfaction was required to be decided
in execution proceedings under Section 101 of the Act.
5. Accordingly, the petitioner filed the execution
petition before the second respondent - Assistant Registrar
wherein, balance sum of `44,74,690/- was claimed by the
petitioner. The said proceedings was contested by the first
respondent - Bank. By order dated 30.11.2015 the claim made
by the petitioner was rejected by the second respondent.
Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal under
Section 106 of the Act to the third respondent - Deputy
Registrar which was contested by the first respondent bank. By
order dated 3.10.2016 the third respondent rejected the
appeal. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a revision
6
petition under Section 108 of the Act before the fourth
respondent - Government represented by its Secretary, which
proceedings was contested by the first respondent - Bank. By
order dated 29.7.2017 the said revision was rejected by the
fourth respondent. Being aggrieved the present writ petition is
filed.
6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri
A.V.Gangadharappa vehemently contended that the petitioner
having been reinstated consequent to the order dated
14.5.2010 wherein, all consequential benefits and backwages
were ordered to be paid, the petitioner is entitled to various
claims made by him in the proceedings initiated under Section
101 of the Act. He further contended that the original authority
as well as the appellate authority and revisional authority have
erred in not properly considering the claims and contentions
putforth by the petitioner. Hence, he seeks for allowing of the
present writ petition and granting suitable reliefs. In support of
his submissions, he relies on the following judgments:
7
i) Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya3;
ii) Rajendra Prasad Sharma & ors., v. The State of
Jharkhand4; and
iii) The Management of Andhra Scientific Co. v.
The Presiding Officer5.
7. Per contra, learned counsel Sri Pradeep Sawkar
appearing for first respondent - bank contended that there is no
basis for the claim made by the petitioner and all the
authorities have rightly appreciated the relevant factual and
legal aspects and rejected the same, which orders are not liable
to be interfered with by this Court in the present writ petition.
In support of his submissions he relies on the following
judgments:
i) Andhra Bank v. P.Balakrishna (D) by LRs.,6;
ii) Dilbagh Rai Jerry v. Union of India7;
iii) K.R.Tyagi v. National Textile Corporation Ltd.,
& Anr.,8;
iv) K.R.Tyagi v National Textile Corporation Ltd., &
Anr.,9;
3
(2013) 10 SCC 324
4
2007(2) BLJR 1853
5
LAWS (APH)-1969-11-21
6
(2005) 13 LLJ 891
7
AIR 1974 SC 130
8
(1997) 1 LLJ 999 (Kar HC)
9
Order dated 1.6.1999 passed in WA No.9185/1996
8
v) The General Manager, Vijaya Bank Bengaluru
v. H.C.Jayaprakash10; and
vi) Sundarama Motor (P) Ltd., v. Ameerjan &
Anr.,11
8. The submissions made by both the learned counsel
have been considered and the material on record have been
perused. The questions that arise for consideration are:
i. Whether the second, third and fourth respondents
were justified in rejecting the claims made by the
petitioner?
ii. Whether the claim made by the petitioner before the
second respondent is required to be granted?
Reg. question Nos.i & ii:
9. The relevant factual matrix up to the reinstatement
of the petitioner as noticed above is undisputed. The only
aspect that is required to be adjudicated is as to whether the
petitioner is entitled to the claims made by him in the
proceedings under Section 101 of the Act before the second
respondent.
10. The first respondent - Bank vide memo dated
29.07.2013 filed in W.P.No.29312/2013, has furnished a memo
of calculation of the arrears of salary of the petitioner from
9
1998 to 2011 and as per the said memo of calculation, the
arrears of salary of the petitioner was stated to be
₹16,22,344/-. After deducting professional tax, contribution
towards PF, as also income tax, it was stated by the first
respondent - Bank that the petitioner was eligible for a sum of
₹12,41,002/- which was paid vide pay order bearing No.006071
dated 28.07.2013. The calculation made by the first respondent
- Bank which is placed on record vide the said memo dated
29.07.2013 is extracted herein below for ready reference:
SALARY PAYABLE/CALCULATION
a) Total Amount of Arrears Payable Rs.16,22,344
Less:-Deductions:-
1) Professional Tax Rs. 15,750
2) Contribution towards P.F Rs.1,67,841
-------------- Rs. 1,83,591
----------------
Payable before tax Rs.14,38,753
b) Income tax on Rs.14,38,753/-
i) Rs.14,38,753/-(-)Rs.2,00,000/-
(Exemption) ----
ii) Rs.12,38,753/-, Up to Rs.5,00,000/-
@10% Rs. 50,000
iii) Rs.7,38,753/- Up to Rs.10,00,000/-
@20% Rs.1,47,751
-------------
Rs. 1,97,751
----------------
PAYABLE AFTER TAX Rs.12,41,002
----------------
(Rupees Twelve Lakhs Fourty One Thousand Two Only).
ILR 2020 KAR 1783
AIR 1985 SC 144
11. As noticed above, having regard to the said memo,
this Court vide order dated 29.07.2013 passed in
W.P.No.29312/2013 disposed of the said writ petition reserving
liberty to the petitioner to seek relief, if any, under Section 101
of the Act. This Court specifically left open the contention of
both parties with regard to the satisfaction or otherwise of the
order of reinstatement made vide judgment dated 14.05.2010
passed in Appeal No.20/2004 by the Karnataka Appellate
Tribunal, Bengaluru, which was affirmed by this Court in
W.P.No.19115/2010.
12. Thereafter, the petitioner has initiated proceedings
under Section 101 of the Act before the second respondent -
Assistant Registrar. In the said proceedings the claims made by
the petitioner are summarized as under:
Sl. Particulars Amount (₹)
No.
1. Arrears of wages on account of automatic `7,71,819/-
promotion
2. Bonus `2,54,700/-
3. Leave Travel Concession (LTC) `1,30,762/-
4. Earned Leave `3,48,800/-
5. Interest (`17,74,004+`6,49,004) `24,23,008/-
Total `39,29,089/-
13. Before the claims made by the petitioner could be
adjudicated, the legal position as to the entitlement of the
petitioner with respect to "consequential benefits" is required to
be noticed.
14. In the case of BENNETT COLEMAN AND
COMPANY PVT LTD Vs. PUNYA PRIYA DAS GUPTA12, relied
upon by the learned counsel for first respondent, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court was considering a claim made by a workman as
to whether the monetary value of free telephone, newspapers
and car allowance was included as part of his wages for
calculating gratuity. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
said allowances were required to be calculated as part of the
respondent's wages and had to be taken into consideration for
calculation of gratuity payable to him.
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
DILBAGH RAI JARRY Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS13
was considering a case as to whether the claim of a workman
to "running allowance" was required to be included as part of
his wages. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that since the
1969 (2) SCC 1
workman in the said case had not worked, the said allowance
was not a part of his wages.
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of BHARAT
ELECTRONICS LIMITED Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL,
KARNATAKA, BANGALORE AND ANOTHER14 considered the
legal position as held in the case of BENNETT COLEMAN AND
COMPANY PVT LTD12 as well as DILBAGH RAI JERRY13 and
held as follows:
"14. Now confluencing the two legal thoughts expressed
in Bennett Coleman's case12 and Dilbagh Rai Jarry's case13, the
stream of thought which inevitably gurgles up is that an
allowance which from the term of employment flows as not
contingent on actual working is part of wages for the purposes
of section 33(2)(b) but an allowance which is earnable only by
active serving is not an allowance which will form part of
wages, within the meaning of the said provision.
15. In Ramakrishnappa's case15 Hon'ble Single Judge of the
Karnataka High Court employed Bennett Coleman's case to
come to the conclusion that night shift allowance was part of
the wages by observing as follows:
"Therefore, I find it difficult to accede to the contention
of the management that conveyance allowance, night shift
allowance and turnout allowance were not wages as
defined in section 2(rr) of the Act, and therefore, they
were not required to be included in computing the wages
of the petitioner for one month. The decision of the
Supreme Court in Bennett Coleman and Co., though it
arose in the context of quantification of gratuity, the view
taken therein that the allowances given for purchase of
newspapers, towards telephone and conveyance also
(1974) 3 SCC 554
(1990) 2 SCC 314
ILR 1987(1) KAR 378
should be calculated in computing one month's wages for
the purpose of computing gratuity, supports the
construction placed on section 2(rr) of the Act for the
petitioner, for, the Supreme Court invoked the said
definition as the word "wages" had not been defined in
the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service and
Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955. In the Case of Jarry,
on which the learned counsel for the respondent 2 relied,
the question decided was, whether wages payable to a
railway guard for the period he was kept out of service
consequent on his dismissal from service till he was
reinstated included the amount of running allowance,
which was under the rules payable only if the railway
servant has gone on duty, and the Supreme Court held
that it was not, in view of the condition. Section 2(rr) of
the Act did not come up for consideration in that
case and, therefore, not apposite to this case."
This view, as said before, was adopted by the Tribunal to
decline approval to the management. But for reasons set
out before, we are of the view that the Hon'ble Single
Judge fell into an error in enlarging the scope of Bennett
Coleman's case and dwarfing that of Dilbagh Rai Jarry's
case. Thus the conclusion is inescapable that the
workman had to earn night shift allowance by actually
working in the night shift and his claim to that allowance
was contingent upon his reporting to duty and being put
to that shift. The night shift allowance automatically did
not form part of his wages and it was not such an
allowance like in Bennett Coleman's case which flowed to
him as his entitlement not restricted to his service. Thus
we hold that the Tribunal fell into a grave error in
declining the application of the management for approval
on the ground of short payment of Rs.12 on account of
night shift allowance, which the workman supposedly
would have earned had he gone to report on duty, which
in the circumstances he could not, or having worked
rotationally at night, which he did not, and that too
fictionally, in the month following the month and the date
of the application, on which date the dismissal was to be
effective."
(emphasis supplied)
(
17. In the case of K.R.TYAGI Vs. NATIONAL
TEXTILE CORPORATION LTD AND ANOTHER16 relied upon
by the learned counsel for first respondent, a Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court was considering the claim of a workman
who was reinstated into service, wherein, the workman claimed
benefits such as earned leave salary, Leave Travel
Concession17, medical reimbursement, and other benefits. This
Court after noticing the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of BENNETT COLEMAN AND COMPANY
PVT LTD12, DILBAGH RAI JERRY13 and BHARAT
ELECTRONICS LIMITED Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL,
KARNATAKA, BANGALORE AND ANOTHER14 as also the
judgment of this Court in the case of RAMAKRISHNAPPA15
has held as follows:
"14. This Court while disposing of the writ petition has
not ordered for reinstatement of the dismissed employee,
but has made a declaration to the effect that the
petitioner is entitled to all consequential benefits in view
of quashing of the order of termination. What is the effect
of such declaration? Undoubtedly two consequences would
flow - (a) that the employee/worker is reinstated and that
the contract of service is restored; (b) that from that date
he is entitled to the wages at the rate he was entitled to
prior to the date of dismissal. The word "re-instatement"
has been explained by several courts to mean, replacing a
1997 ILLJ 999
Hereinafter referred to as 'LTC'
person in the position from which he was dismissed,
restoration of status quo ante as it existed prior to the
order of termination. Ordinarily reinstatement
contemplates payment of backwages. Though the Officer
was not on duty, he must be deemed to have remained in
service once the order of termination is set aside. Then
the employee is entitled to benefits which would have
accrued to him as if the order of termination was never
passed. Thus the effect of the order of reinstatement is
merely to set at naught the order of wrongful dismissal.
Now the question that requires to be considered is
whether the employee, apart from backwages is entitled
for any other monetary benefits, in the present case
earned leave salary, leave travel concession, medical
reimbursement and annual increments."
(emphasis supplied)
17.1. In the said case, with regard to the claim made
towards earned leave, this Court held as follows:
"The amount payable towards encashment of leave
will not be able towards encashment of leave will not be
reckoned as salary for the purpose of overtime, bonus,
gratuity, etc. A conjoint reading of clauses-6 and 7 of
the Leave Rules leaves no manner of doubt that this
leave has to be earned while in service and not while out
of service. If the workman/employee did not perform
any work during the period of termination, it is not open
to him to demand leave with wages or compensation in
lieu thereof. In my view this claim cannot be treated as
either legal or valid, since the earned leave cannot have
been earned as a matter of right but only by actual
working."
(emphasis supplied)
17.2. With regard to the claim towards LTC, this Court
held as follows:
"15. An employee will be entitled to claim full
reimbursement of actual cost of travel as per the
entitlement rules. This gives a clear indication that the
employee should actually travel to claim leave travel
concession. If he does not travel, he cannot encash leave
travel concession. Since petitioner was out of
employment, the question of himself and his family
members undertaking travel and incurring actual cost of
travel would not arise. Once again question of deeming
that, if the employer not prevented the employee, in the
present petitioner, he would have travelled and he would
have incurred expenses cannot be imported into the
language employed in the Rules and in my view this claim
of the petitioner is also unsustainable in law and in the
face of unambiguous language employed in the Rules."
(emphasis supplied)
17.3 With regard to the claim of medical reimbursement,
this Court held as follows:
"The third claim of the petitioner is in respect of
medical reimbursement and this claim has also been
rejected by the company solely relying upon Employees
Medical Rules, 1978. Medical reimbursement once again
depends on the actual medical expenses incurred by the
employee concerned. Again there is nothing like a notional
expenditure for a notional illness when the employee
concerned was out of employment in view of the
termination order. In my view since the reimbursement is
only on actual expense, while in service, the petitioner's
claim in my view is highly imaginary and wholly
unjustified."
(emphasis supplied)
17.4 Hence, this Court with regard to the claim of the
workman in the said case, held as follows:
"In my view the earned leave salary, leave travel
concession and medical reimbursement are not part of
wages, but which are more or less in the nature of night
shift allowance and running allowance which were
considered by Apex Court in the case of Bharat Electronics
Ltd. and in Dilbagh Rai Jerry's case. In that view of the
matter, it cannot be said that the earned leave salary, LTC
and medical reimbursement were due to the petitioner as
part of his wages for the entire period when he was
prevented from performing his duties in the respondent-
company."
(emphasis supplied)
18. The judgment of the Learned Single Judge in the
case of K.R.TYAGI16 was challenged before the Division Bench
of this Court in Writ Appeal No.9185/1996. Vide order dated
01.06.1999, this Court held as follows:
"In view of the above contentions, the question that
arises for consideration is whether the appellant is entitled
to the benefits claimed by him. Sick leave is granted to a
person who is sick and no monetary benefit can be given
in lieu of the sick leave. When the person has not availed
to either sick leave or casual leave, he is not entitled to
reimbursement or payment in lieu of availing such leave.
The leave travel concession can be reimbursed in case the
employee incurs such expenses for travelling. Unless a
person travels and produces the tickets, he does not get
reimbursement. In the present case, there is no evidence
that in the relevant year, the appellant has travelled and
incurred any expenditure. Therefore, granting of such
expenditure in lieu of leave travelling concession does not
arise.
Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance
on the judgment in D G VENKATARAMU & ORS Vs THE
MANAGING DIRECTOR, PANDAVAPURA SAHAKARA
SAKKARE KARKHANE LTD & ANR - 1969 (1) Mys.LJ 578;
BENNETT COLEMAN CO PVT LTD Vs PUNYA PRIYA DAS
GUPTA - AIR 1970 SC 426; WESTERN INDIA
AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION Vs THE INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL, BOMBAY & ORS - ATR (36) 1949 FC 111 and
another judgment of this Court in W.P 35546/93.
Accordingly, the appellant has worked for three years
and seven months. Therefore, we think it just and proper
to direct the respondent to permit him to encash 80 days
earned leave."
(emphasis supplied)
19. In the case of The GENERAL MANAGER, VIJAYA
BANK, BENGALURU Vs. H.C.JAYAPRAKASH18 relied upon by
the learned counsel for first respondent, a Division Bench of
this Court was considering a claim made by an employee who
was reinstated with 60% backwages along with consequential
benefits. The employee sought to encash 240 days of earned
leave which was granted by the learned Single Judge. However,
the Division Bench after noticing various judgments held as
follows:
"14. Earned leave is a privilege a workman would be
entitled only by actual working and it cannot be earned as
a matter of right even if he did not work. Even if he were to
be in employment, he becomes entitled to it only if he
works and earns it, otherwise not. It is similar to night shift
or traveling allowance which accrue only if the person
decides to work. If he does not work, in that event, he is
not entitled to it. Hence, earned leave unless the relevant
regulations expressly specifies otherwise cannot be
considered as part of consequential benefits."
(emphasis supplied)
ILR 2020 KAR 1783
20. In the case of ANDHRA BANK and another Vs. P.
BALAKRISHNA (dead) BY LRs AND OTHERS19 relied upon
by the learned counsel for first respondent, a Full Bench of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court was considering a case wherein the
claim made by an employee who was reinstated into service,
was towards encashment of leave. The Full Bench was
considering the following question:
"5. The core question that arises for determination is
whether an employee is entitled to the benefit of leave
encashment of the period for which he was kept out of
employment consequent on initiation of disciplinary
proceedings which ultimately ended in favour of the
employee and he came to be reinstated into service."
(emphasis supplied)
20.1. After referring to various judgments it was held as
follows:
"15. After going through various settlements of
memoranda between the workmen and the employer, we
are in no doubt to conclude that the privilege is intended
for rest and recuperation and the workman has to render
active service and thereby earn privilege leave to his
credit. A workmen out of service for any reason
whatsoever is not entitled to privilege leave."
(emphasis supplied)
21. In the case of DEEPALI GUNDU SURWASE Vs.
KRANTI JUNIOR ADHYAPAK MAHAVIDYALAYA (D.ED.)
2005 III LLJ (AP) 891
AND OTHERS20 relied upon by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering a case,
wherein, a teacher employed in a school was terminated from
employment, which was set aside by the Tribunal and the
employer was directed to pay full backwages. A learned Single
Judge of the High Court had set aside the order of the Tribunal
for payment of backwages. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while
considering the appeal of the employee held as follows:
"The very idea of restoring an employee to the position
which he held before dismissal or removal or termination
of service implies that the employee will be put in the
same position in which he would have been but for the
illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered
by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise
terminated from service cannot easily be measured in
terms of money. With the passing of an order which has
the effect of severing the employer-employee relationship,
the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the
employee concerned, but his entire family suffers grave
adversities. They are deprived of the source of
sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food
and all opportunities of education and advancement in
life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives
and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These
sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum
decides on the legality of the action taken by the
employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which
is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi
judicial body or court that the action taken by the
employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or
the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to
claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back
wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get
consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically
(2013) 10 SCC 324
plead and prove that during the intervening period the
employee was gainfully employed and was getting the
same emoluments. The Denial of back wages to an
employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the
employer would amount to indirectly punishing the
employee concerned and rewarding the employer by
relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including
the emoluments."
(emphasis supplied)
21.1. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case of
DEEPALI GUNDU SURWASE19 after noticing various
judgments, at paragraph No.38 has laid down various
principles, inter alia, that in the case of wrongful termination of
service, reinstatement with continuity of service and backwages
is the normal rule. Further, the various parameters for claiming
backwages were also laid down. The Hon'ble Supreme Court set
aside the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court
and restored the order of the Tribunal reinstating the teacher
with full backwages. However, the facts of the said case are
inapplicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case did not adjudicate upon
as to what would include "consequential benefits".
22. In the case of RAJENDRA PRASAD SHARMA AND
OTHERS Vs. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND21 relied upon by
the learned counsel for the petitioner, a Co-ordinate Bench of
the Jarkhand High Court while considering a contempt petition
where the workmen having been entitled for consequential
benefits, since the same was not paid, noticing the factual
matrix of the said case, it was held as follows:
"The only dispute in this contempt petition relates to
the question whether monetary consequential as directed
by this Court means only the wages being paid at the time
of retrenchment of the workmen or may include the wage
revision, increments and other allowances during the
interregnum i.e. between the period of retrenchment and
reinstatement as directed by this Court. The monetary
consequential benefits are to be construed in the context of
the judgment of the Court. This Court set aside the order of
retrenchment of the petitioners and directed their
reinstatement with all monetary and consequential benefits
The simple, legal, logical, and rational interpretation has to
be given on the basis of language used by this Court which
alone can reveal the intention in issuing such directions. It
is not in dispute that monetary benefit means all financial
benefits. Consequential benefits are to be construed
accordingly. It simply means all consequences emanating
from the order setting aside the retrenchment of the
petitioners. The natural and legal consequence of setting
aside the order of retrenchment is that the workmen are
deemed to be in service. Once they are deemed to be in
service the consequential benefits shall include all the
monetary and other service benefits which were/are
payable to other similarly situated employees of the
Company. If there has been any pay revision. increments
payable or revision of allowances, all are payable to these
workmen except the bonus or any other amount which has
direct relation with the actual performance of duties. The
2007(2) BLJR 1853
judgment must be understood, construed, and
implemented in this sense."
(emphasis supplied)
23. In the said case of RAJENDRA PRASAD SHARMA
AND OTHERS21 reference was made to the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of APSRTC AND ANOTHER
Vs. S. NARSAGOUD22. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court was considering the case of a workman being reinstated
into service with continuity of service but without back-wages.
In the said case, a dispute was raised by the workman before
the High Court that while fixing wages payable to him on his
reinstatement, the periodical increments which have been
earned by him had he been in service during the period of
absence were not taken into account. The High Court directed
the employer to compute the periodical increments that would
have been earned by the workmen had he been in service
during the period of absence from duty and fix the wages
payable to the workman after his reinstatement by taking into
account the said increments. The said order was challenged by
the employer before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Considering
the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
(2003) 2 SCC 212
"9. We find merit in the submission so made. There
is a difference between an order of reinstatement
accompanied by a simple direction for continuity of service
and a direction where reinstatement is accompanied by a
specific direction that the employee shall be entitled to all
the consequential benefits, which necessarily flow from
reinstatement or accompanied by a specific direction that
the employee shall be entitled to the benefit of the
increments earned during the period of absence. In our
opinion, the employee after having been held guilty of
unauthorised absence from duty cannot claim the benefit of
increments notionally earned during the period of
unauthorised absence in the absence of a specific direction
in that regard and merely because he has been directed to
be reinstated with benefit of continuity in service.
10. The Regulations referred to hereinabove clearly
spell out that the period spent on the extraordinary leave
or leave without pay or a period of overstayal after the
expiry of leave or joining time cannot count towards
increments; unless the order of the competent authority
sanctioning the extraordinary leave or leave without pay or
the order commuting the period of over-stayal into
extraordinary leave or leave without pay is accompanied by
a specific order to count the period for increments. A period
of unauthorised absence from duty treated as a misconduct
and held liable to be punished by way of penalty cannot be
placed on a footing better than the period of extraordinary
leave or leave without pay or a period of overstayal.
Ordinarily, the increments are earned on account of the
period actually spent on duty or during the period spent on
leave the entitlement to which has been earned on account
of the period actually spent on duty. The direction of the
High Court entitling the respondent to earn increments
during the period of unauthorised absence from duty
though held liable to be punished in departmental inquiry
proceedings would amount to putting a premium on the
misconduct of the employee."
(emphasis supplied)
24. The said case of RAJENDRA PRASAD SHARMA
AND OTHERS21 will not aid the case of the petitioner,
inasmuch as in the said case it has been held that the
reinstated workman is entitled to all monetary benefits except
which has direct relation with the actual performance of duties.
25. In the case of THE MANAGEMENT OF ANDHRA
SCIENTIFIC COMPANY Vs. THE PRESIDING OFFICER23
relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a Division
Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was considering a
case as to whether the Labour Court had power under Section
33-C(2) of the ID Act to interpret an award. In the said case it
was held that "the employee cannot be denied all the incidental
benefits which accrued to the post which he is deemed to have
held without a break by reason of reinstatement". Further, it
was held as follows:
"17. In the instant case, the employee is asking for any
higher scale of pay by reason of his working in any
superior or higher grade, but asking for what he is entitled
to in the grade to which he was reinstated and it is within
the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to grant him the
incidental benefits attached to the post.
18. We have no hesitation in holding that Section 33C(2)
is wide enough to cover a case like this where the Labour
Court merely gave the benefit of back wages without
specifying the amount the employee had become entitled
to receive from the employer.
19. Writ Appeal No.23 if 1968, must therefore, fail.
20. As regards the claim for bonus and conversion of
leave of the employee into cash, the must say that the
W.A No.23 and 144 of 1968 dated 25.11.1969
claim is untenable. The bonus is excluded from the
definition of "Wages" in Section 2(rr) of the Act. So, there
is a statutory bar to claim bonus and what was awarded to
the employee was back wages. The employee is also not
entitled under the award to get the benefit of conversion of
leave into cash, as what was preserved by reinstatement
was continuity of service. He would not be entitled to leave
unless he had actually worked during the period. Leave has
to be earned to entitle him to the benefit of conversion of
leave into cash. Since he had not earned any leave, his
claim for conversion of leave into cash has to be negative."
(emphasis supplied)
26. The said case of THE MANAGEMENT OF ANDHRA
SCIENTIFIC COMPANY23 will not aid the case of the
petitioner since in the said case also it has been held that the
workman would not be entitled to leave unless he has actually
worked during the said period.
27. Keeping in mind the legal position as noticed above,
the case put forth by the petitioner in the present writ petition
is required to be considered. However, before considering the
case of the petitioner, it is relevant to notice the manner in
which the second, third and fourth respondents have
considered the case of the petitioner.
28. The second respondent/Assistant Registrar while
considering the claim made by the petitioner has noticed the
claim made as under:
"ªÉÄÃ¯É «ªÀj¹zÀAvÉ ¢£ÁAPÀ 22-07-2015 gÀ CfðAiÉÆA¢UÉ rQæ ºÉÆîØgï EªÀgÀÄ F PɼÀV£ÀAvÉ
QèêÀiï C£ÀÄß ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ :-
(1) ¸ÀA§¼À, vÀÄnÖ ¨sÀvÉå, ªÀÄ£É ¨ÁrUÉ ¨sÀvÉå, £ÀUÀgÀ ¥ÀjºÁgÀ ¨sÀvÉå -gÀÆ.7,71,819/-
(2) ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï - 1998 jAzÀ 2010 gÀªÀgÉUÉ -gÀÆ.2,54,700/-
(3) gÀeÉ £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀt
2 ªÀµÀðUÀ½UÉ gÀÆ.1,30,762-00
240 ¢£ÀUÀ½UÉ gÀÆ.3,48,800-00
gÀÆ.4,78,562/-
MlÄÖ: -gÀÆ.15,05.281/-
§rØ
(1) 14-05-2010 jAzÀ 29-07-2013 gÀªÀgÉUÉ gÀÆ.17,74,004/-
(2) 13-8-2014 jAzÀ 22-07-2015 gÀªÀgÉUÉ gÀÆ.6,49,004/- -gÀÆ.24,23,008/-
ªÉÄð£À PÉëëÄUÉ ¥ÀÄl ¸ÀASÉå-1 jAzÀ 5 ¯ÉPÁÌZÁgÀzÀ vÀBSÉÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ®UÀwÛ¹gÀĪÀÅzÁV
rQæ ºÉÆîØgï EªÀgÀÄ «ªÀj¹zÁÝgÉ."
28.1. While considering the claim of the petitioner with
regard to the arrears of salary, the second respondent held as
follows:
"rQæ ºÉÆîØgï EªÀgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ 23-07-2015 gÀAzÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀĪÀ «ªÀgÀUÀ¼À ¥ÀÄl
¸ÀASÉå 1 jAzÀ 3 gÀ°è ¸É¥ÉÖA§gï 1998 jAzÀ DUÀ¸ïÖ 2010 gÀªÀgÉUÉ gÀÆ.23,94,063-00
UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¯ÉPÀÌ ºÁQ EzÀgÀ°è FUÁUÀ¯Éà ¨ÁåAQ¤AzÀ ¥ÀqÉ¢gÀĪÀ gÀÆ.16,22,344-00 UÀ¼À£ÀÄß
PÀ¼ÉzÀÄ gÀÆ.7,71,819-00 UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥Àæ¸ÀÄÛvÀ CªÀįÁéj CfðAiÀÄ°è PÉÆÃjzÁÝgÉ. DzÀgÉ, F
jÃw PÉèêÀiï C£ÀÄß ¯ÉPÀÌ ºÁPÀĪÁUÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É «ªÀj¹zÀAvÉ, ºÀÄzÉÝUÀ¼À ªÀÄÄA§rÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß vÁ£ÉÃ
H»¹PÉÆAqÀÄ, ¸ÀA§¼À ¯ÉPÀÌ ºÁQzÁÝgÉ. EzÀÄ CªÉÊeÁÕ¤PÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÁ£ÀƤUÉ
«gÀÄzÀÞªÁVzÉ. DzÀÝjAzÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É «ªÀj¹zÀ PÀArPÉ 3 (1) gÀ PÉèêÀiï gÀÆ.7,71,819-00
UÀ½UÉ rQæ ºÉÆîØgï EªÀgÀÄ CºÀðjgÀĪÀÅ¢®è JAzÀÄ, wgÀ¸ÀÌj¸À®Ä ¨ÁåAPÀÄ PÉÆÃjzÉ.
ªÉÄÃ¯É «ªÀj¹zÀ ªÀåvÁå¸ÀzÀ ¨ÁQ gÀÆ.7,71,819-00 UÀ¼À §UÉÎ rQæ ºÉÆîØgï
EªÀgÀ PÉèêÀÄð C£ÀÄß ¨ÁåAPÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀĪÀ DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ G¨sÀAiÀÄvÀægÀÆ ºÁdgÀÄ¥Àr¹gÀĪÀ
£ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄUÀ¼À wÃ¥ÀÄðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥Àj²Ã°¸À¯ÁV, rQæ ºÉÆîØgï EªÀgÀÄ ªÉÄÃ¯É «ªÀj¹zÀ
PÉèêÀiï gÀÆ.7,71,819-00 UÀ½UÉ CºÀðjgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. rQæ ºÉÆîØgï EªÀgÀÄ ¸ÀPÁðj
£ËPÀgÀ£À®èzÉà EgÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ, PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀªÀÅ PÁ®PÁ®PÉÌ vÀ£Àß £ËPÀgÀjUÉ
C£ÀéAiÀĪÁUÀĪÀAvÉ ºÉÆgÀr¹gÀĪÀ vÀÄnÖ¨sÀvÉå DzÉñÀUÀ¼ÀÄ rQæ ºÉÆîØgï EªÀjUÉ
C£Àé¬Ä¸ÀĪÀÅ¢®è. PÁgÀt wgÀ¸ÀÌj¹zÉ."
28.2. While considering the claim of the petitioner with
respect to bonus, the second respondent held as follows:
"gÀÆ.2,54,700-00 UÀ¼À ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï C£ÀÄß rQæ ºÉÆîØgï EªÀgÀÄ PÉèêÀiï ªÀiÁrzÁÝgÉ.
F §UÉÎ ¨ÁåAPÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀĪÀ DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉUÀ¼À°è, PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀºÀPÁgÀ ¸ÀAWÀUÀ¼À PÁAiÉÄÝ 1959
gÀ PÀ®A 57 (3) (J¥sï) gÀ£ÀéAiÀÄ £ÉÆÃAzÁ¬ÄvÀ G¥À¤AiÀĪÀÄzÀ°è ¤gÀƦ¹gÀĪÀAvÉ
¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï ¥ÁªÀw¸À§ºÀÄzÁVzÉ JAzÀÄ PÁ£ÀƤzÉ. DzÀgÉ, £ÉÆÃAzÁ¬ÄvÀ
G¥À¤AiÀĪÀÄzÀ°è ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï ¤ÃqÀĪÀ §UÉÎ G¯ÉèÃR EgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. DzÀÝjAzÀ ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ïUÉ
CºÀð«gÀĪÀÅ¢®è JAzÀÄ «ªÀj¹ ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï PÉèêÀiï C£ÀÄß wgÀ¸ÀÌj¸À®Ä ¨ÁåAPÀÄ PÉÆÃjzÉ.
F ¨ÁåAPÀÄ £ÉÆÃAzÁ¬ÄvÀ G¥À¤AiÀĪÀÄzÀ ¥ÀæwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ºÁdgÀÄ¥Àr¹zÉ.
ªÉÄÃ¯É «ªÀj¹zÀ ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï PÉèêÀiï §UÉÎ G¨sÀAiÀÄvÀægÀ ºÉýPÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥Àj²Ã°¸À¯ÁUÉzÉ.
Section 57 (3) (f) of the Act provides for the following:
"Section 57-Net profit and their disposal:- (3) (f) The
payment of bonus to the employees of the society, to the
extent and in the manner specified in the byelaws." ¨ÁåAQ£À
DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß UÀªÀĤ¸À¯ÁV, £ÉÆÃAzÁ¬ÄvÀ G¥À¤AiÀĪÀÄzÀ°è ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï §UÉÎ.
G¯ÉèÃR EgÀĪÀÅ¢®è JAzÀÄ «ªÀj¹zÉ. EzÀ£ÀÄß «gÉÆâü¹, rQæ ºÉÆîØgï EªÀgÀÄ
AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà zÁR¯Áw CxÀªÁ ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÁdgÀÄ¥Àr¹gÀĪÀÅ¢®è. rQæ ºÉÆîØgï
EªÀgÀÄ PÀArPÉ 3 (2) gÀ°è «ªÀj¹gÀĪÀ ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï PÉèêÀiï gÀÆ.2,54,200-00 UÀ½UÉ
CºÀðjgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. PÁgÀt wgÀ¸ÀÌj¹zÉ."
28.3. While considering the claim of the petitioner with
regard to Earned Leave, second respondent held as follows:
"UÀ½PÉ gÀeÉ £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀtzÀ §UÉÎ ¨ÁåAPÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀĪÀ DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉUÀ¼À°è «ªÀj¹gÀĪÀ
CA±ÀUÀ¼ÉAzÀgÉ ¢£ÁAPÀ 02-09-1998 jAzÀ DUÀ¸ïÖ 2010 gÀªÀgÉUÉ C£ÀéAiÀĪÁUÀĪÀ
PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀ ¸ÀºÀgÀPÁgÀ ¸ÀAWÀUÀ¼À ¤AiÀĪÀÄ 1960 gÀ (3)(iii) gÀ£ÀéAiÀÄ PÉ®¸À
¤ªÀð»¹zÀ CªÀ¢UÉ ªÀiÁvÀæ UÀ½PÉ gÀeÉUÉ £ËPÀgÀ£ÀÄ CºÀð¤gÀÄvÁÛ£É. DzÀgÉ, rQæ ºÉÆîØgï
EªÀgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ 02-09-1998 gÀAzÀÄ ¸ÉêɬÄAzÀ ªÀeÁUÉÆArzÀÄÝ, DUÀ¸ïÖ 2010 gÀ°è
¸ÉêÉUÉ ¥ÀÄ£Àgï £ÉêÀÄPÀ DVzÁÝgÉ. ¸ÀzÀj CªÀ¢üAiÀÄ°è ¸ÉÃªÉ ¤ªÀð»¹gÀĪÀÅ¢®è. PÁgÀt
UÀ½UÉ gÀeÉUÉ rQæ ºÉÆîØgï EªÀgÀÄ CºÀð«gÀĪÀÅ¢®èªÉAzÀÄ «ªÀj¹. F ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ
PÉèêÀiï C£ÀÄß wgÀ¸ÀÌj¸À®Ä ¨ÁåAPÀÄ PÉÆÃjzÉ. F ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ UËgÀªÁ¤évÀ PÀ£ÁðlPÀ
GZÀÑ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀĪÀÅ jmï Cfð¸ÀASÉå, 735/1989 gÀ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è ¢£ÁAPÀ 11-09-1996
gÀAzÀÄ wÃ¥Àð£ÀÄß G¯ÉèÃT¹, wæð£À eÉgÁPïì ¥ÀæwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ºÁdgÀÄ¥Àr¹zÉ.
UÀ½PÉ gÀeÉ £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀtzÀ PÉèêÀiï §UÉÎ G¨sÀAiÀÄvÀægÀ ºÉýPÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥Àj²Ã°¸À¯ÁVzÉ. ªÉÄïÉ
«ªÀj¹zÀ CªÀ¢üAiÀÄ°è The Karnataka Co-operative Societies Rules,
1960. Rule 18(3) (iii) provides for the following: "An
employee shall be entitled for "earned leave on full pay at
the rate of 1/11th of the period spent on duty. ¢£ÁAPÀ 02-09-
1998 jAzÀ DUÀ¸ïÖ 2010 gÀªÀgÉUÉ, CAzÀgÉ ¸ÉêɬÄAzÀ ªÀeÁUÉÆAqÀ CªÀ¢üAiÀÄ°è, rQæ
ºÉÆîØgï EªÀgÀÄ ¨ÁåAQ£À°è PÉ®¸À ¤ªÀð»¹gÀĪÀÅ¢®è. DzÀÝjAzÀ, UÀ½PÉ gÀeÉ £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀt
¸Ë®¨sÀåPÉÌ rQæ ºÉÆîØgï EªÀgÀÄ CºÀðjgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. F »£É߯ÉAiÀÄ°è UËgÀªÁ¤évÀ
PÀ£ÁðlPÀ GZÀÑ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀĪÀÅ ¤ÃrgÀĪÀ ªÉÄð£À wæð£À PÀArPÉ 14 £ÀÄß
UÀªÀĤ¸À§ºÀÄzÁVzÉ. DzÀÝjAzÀ, PÀArPÉ 3(3) gÀ°è «ªÀj¹gÀĪÀ 4,78,562-00
CºÀðjgÀĪÀÅ¢®è. PÁgÀt wgÀ¸ÀÌj¹zÉ."
28.4. With regard to the claim of the petitioner to
interest, second respondent held that the order of
reinstatement not having specified that interest ought to be
paid, refused the claim for interest.
29. The third respondent - Deputy Registrar while
considering the appeal of the petitioner vide its order dated
03.10.2016 held as under:
"¨ÁåAPÀÄ PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀºÀPÁgÀ ¸ÀAWÀUÀ¼À C¢ü¤AiÀĪÀÄzÀ£éÀAiÀÄ £ÉÆÃAzÀtÂAiÀiÁVzÀÄÝ,
¸ÀºÀPÁgÀ ¸ÀAWÀUÀ¼À ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ 1960 gÀ ¤AiÀĪÀÄ 17 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 18 gÀAvÉ ªÉÃvÀ£À
¨sÀvÉåUÀ¼À£ÀÄß £ËPÀgÀgÀÄ ¥ÀqÉAiÀÄ®Ä CºÀðjgÀĪÀÅzÁV w½¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. CzÀgÀAvÉ
¸ÀºÀPÁgÀ E¯ÁSÉAiÀÄ DzÉñÀzÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ:06-03-2004 gÀ£ÀéAiÀÄ
ªÉÃvÀ£À±ÉæÃtÂUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀjµÀÌj¹zÀÄÝ, CzÀgÀAvÉ ¥ÁªÀw¹gÀĪÀÅzÁV w½¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
ªÉÄîä£À«zÁgÀgÀÄ ¸ÀºÁAiÀÄPÀ ªÀåªÀ¸ÁÜ¥ÀPÀgÁV PÉ®¸À ¤ªÀð»¹zÀÄÝ,
ªÀeÁUÉƽ¹gÀĪÀ PÁgÀt D ºÀÄzÉÝAiÀÄ ªÉÃvÀ£À ¨sÀvÉåUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÁªÀw¹gÀĪÀÅzÁV
w½¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. CzÀgÀAvÉ ¸ÀzÀjAiÀĪÀjUÉ gÀÆ.16,22,344/- UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¯ÉPÁÌZÁgÀ
ªÀiÁr ¥ÁªÀw¹gÀĪÀÅzÁV w½¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. DzÀgÉ ªÉÄîä£À«zÁgÀgÀÄ
ªÀÄÄA§rÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥ÀjUÀt¹ PÉèÃA ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀÅzÁV w½¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. F §UÉÎ
«ªÀgÀªÁzÀ vÀ:SÉÛ ¤ÃrgÀĪÀÅzÁV w½¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ¨ÉÆãÀ¥ï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ gÀeÉ
£ÀUÀ¢üÃPÀgÀtªÀ£ÀÄß ¸ÀºÀ ¥ÁªÀw¹gÀĪÀÅzÁV w½¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. F ªÉÄð£À J¯Áè
PÁgÀtUÀ½AzÀ CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀĪÀ ªÀÄ£À«AiÀÄ£ÀÄß wgÀ¸ÀÌj¸À¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ
PÉÆÃjgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
vÀzÀ£ÀAvÀgÀ ªÁ¢ vÀªÀÄä °TvÀ ªÁzÀ ªÀÄAqÀ£ÉAiÀÄ°è ªÉÄîä£À«AiÀÄ°è
w½¹gÀĪÀ CA±ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀÄ£ÀgÀÄZÀÑj¸ÀÄvÁÛ 12 ªÀµÀðUÀ¼À CªÀ¢üAiÀÄ°è ªÉÃvÀ£À ¨sÀvÉå,
¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï gÀeÁ ¸ÀA§¼À EvÁå¢ ¸ÉÃj MlÄÖ gÀÆ. 45,04,782/- UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ±ÉÃPÀqÀ
18 gÀ §rØAiÉÆA¢UÉ ¥ÁªÀw¸À¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ ªÀÄ£À« ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ºÁUÀÆ ¥ÀæwªÁ¢
¥ÀgÀ ªÀQîgÀÄ ¸ÀºÀ vÀªÀÄä DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉAiÀÄ°è ¸À°è¹gÀĪÀ CA±ÀUÀ¼À£Éß ¥ÀÄ£ÀgÀÄZÀÑj¸ÀÄvÁÛ
¸ÀºÁAiÀÄPÀ ªÀåªÀ¸ÁÜ¥ÀPÀgÀ ºÀÄzÉÝAiÀÄ ªÉÃvÀ£À±ÉæÃtÂUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀºÀPÁgÀ
¸ÀAWÀUÀ¼À ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ 1960 gÀ ¤AiÀĪÀÄ 17 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 18 gÀAvÉ ¯ÉPÁÌZÁgÀ ªÀiÁr
¥ÁªÀw¹gÀĪÀÅzÁV ¥ÀæzsÁ£À ªÀåªÀ¸ÁÜ¥ÀPÀgÀ ºÀÄzÉÝAiÀÄ ªÉÃvÀ£À §rÛUÀ¼À£ÀÄß
¥ÁªÀw¸À®Ä CªÀPÁ±À«gÀĪÀÅ¢®èªÉAzÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ ¸ÀPÁðj £ËPÀgÀjUÉ ¥ÁªÀw¸ÀĪÀ
ªÉÃvÀ£À ¨sÀvÉåUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÁªÀw¸À®Ä CªÀPÁ±À«gÀĪÀÅ¢®èªÉAzÀÄ w½¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ºÁUÀÆ
PÀmÁªÀuÉ ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀ DzÁAiÀÄ vÉjUÉ ªÉÆvÀÛªÀ£ÀÄß ¸ÀºÀ ªÀgÀªÀiÁ£À vÉjUÉ E¯ÁSÉUÉ
¥ÁªÀw¹gÀĪÀÅzÁV w½¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. F J¯Áè CA±ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀjUÀt¹
ªÉÄîä£À«zÁgÀgÀ ªÀÄ£À«AiÀÄ£ÀÄß wgÀ¸ÀÌj¸À®Ä ªÀÄ£À« ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ."
30. The fourth respondent while considering the revision
of the petitioner under Section 108 of the Act, after noticing the
various contentions framed the following points for
consideration:
"1. 1£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ¨ÁåAQ¤AzÀ CfðzÁgÀjUÉ ¥ÁªÀw¸À¨ÉÃPÁzÀ ¨ÁQ
ªÉÃvÀ£À ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¨sÀvÉåUÀ¼ÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ EvÀgÀ ¸Ë®¨sÀåUÀ¼À ¨Á§ÄÛ CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ PÉèöÊA
ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀ ªÉÆvÀÛ gÀÆ. 45.04,782-00 UÀ½UÉ CºÀðgÉAzÀÄ CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ
¸Á©ÃvÀÄ¥Àr¸ÀĪÀgÉÃ?
2. 2 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 3£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢AiÀĪÀgÀÄ ºÉÆgÀr¹gÀĪÀ ¥Àæ²ßvÀ DzÉñÀUÀ¼ÀÄ
£ÁåAiÀĸÀªÀÄävÀªÁVgÀĪÀÅ¢®èªÉAzÀÄ CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ ¸ÀªÀÄyð¸ÀĪÀgÉÃ?
3. CfðzÁgÀjUÉ 1£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ¨ÁåAQ¤AzÀ ¥ÁªÀw¸À¨ÉÃPÁzÀ ¨ÁQ
ªÉÃvÀ£À ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¨sÀvÉåUÀ¼À ¨Á§Ä gÀÆ. 16,22.344-00UÀ½UÉ ªÀiÁvÀæ CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ
CºÀðgÉAzÀÄ 1£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢AiÀĪÀgÀÄ ¸ÀªÀÄyð¸ÀĪÀgÉÃ?
4. 2 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 3£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢AiÀĪÀgÀÄ ºÉÆgÀr¹gÀĪÀ ¥Àæ²ßvÀ DzÉñÀUÀ¼ÀÄ
£ÁåAiÀĸÀªÀÄävÀªÉAzÀÄ 1£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢AiÀĪÀgÀÄ ¸Á©ÃvÀÄ¥Àr¸ÀĪÀgÉÃ?
5. ºÁUÁzÀgÉ F ¥Áæ¢üPÁgÀzÀ DzÉñÀªÉãÀÄ?"
30.1. The fourth respondent while considering the claim of
the petitioner with regard to arrears of salary has held as
follows:
"CfðzÁgÀgÀ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ ºÉýPÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥Àj²Ã°¸À¯ÁV CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ
CAzÁf£À ªÉÄÃ¯É ªÉÃvÀ£À ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¨sÀvÉåUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¯ÉPÀÌ ºÁQ PÉèöʪÀiï ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀ
CA±ÀªÀ£ÀÄß CfðzÁgÀgÉà M¦àPÉÆArgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ¸ÀàµÀÖªÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. C®èzÉ
CfðzÁgÀgÀ ªÀÄ£À«AiÀÄ°è G¯ÉèÃT¸ÀÄgÀĪÀ DzÉñÀUÀ¼ÀÄ gÁdå ¸ÀPÁðgÀ £ËPÀgÀjUÉ
vÀÄnÖ¨sÀvÉå ªÀÄAdÆgÁw ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀ DzÉñÀUÀ¼ÁVzÀÄÝ F DzÉñÀUÀ¼ÀÄ 1£ÉÃ
¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ¨ÁåAQ£À £ËPÀgÀjUÀÆ C£ÀéAiÀĪÁUÀÄvÀÛªÉA§ CA±ÀªÀ£ÀÄß ¸ÀªÀÄxÀð¤ÃAiÀÄ
zÁR¯ÉUÀ¼ÉÆA¢V CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ ¸Á©ÃvÀÄ¥Àr¹gÀĪÀÅ¢®è ªÀÄvÀÄÛ CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ
¸ÉêɬÄAzÀ ªÀeÁ DzÀ ¥ÀjuÁªÀĪÁV ¥ÀzÉÆãÀßw¬ÄAzÀ ªÀAavÀgÁVgÀĪÀ §UÉÎ
AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà ªÀiÁ»w CxÀªÁ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß MzÀV¹gÀĪÀÅ¢®è. DzÀÄzÀjAzÀ
gÁdå ¸ÀPÁðj £ËPÀgÀjUÉ C£ÀéAiÀĪÁUÀĪÀ vÀÄnÖ ¨sÀvÉå zsÀgÀzÀ°è ¨ÁQ ªÉÃvÀ£ÀPÉÌ
vÀÄnÖ ¨sÀvÉåAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¯ÉPÀÌ ºÁQgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀåªÀ¸ÁÜ¥ÀPÀgÀÄ, ¸ÀºÁAiÀÄPÀ ¥ÀæzsÁ£À
ªÀåªÀ¸ÁÜ¥ÀPÀgÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ ¥ÀæzsÁ£À ªÀåªÀ¸ÁÜ¥ÀPÀgÀ ºÀÄzÉÝUÀ½UÉ C£ÀéAiÀĪÁUÀĪÀ ªÉÃvÀ£À
ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¨sÀvÉåUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÉèöʪÀiï ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ¸ÀªÀÄxÀð¤ÃAiÀĪÀ®èªÉAzÀÄ
C©ü¥ÁæAiÀÄ¥ÀnÖzÉ."
30.2. The fourth respondent while considering the claim of
the petitioner towards bonus has held as follows:
"CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ PÉèöʪÀiï ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀ ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ïUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ 1£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢
¨ÁåAQ£À ¥ÀgÀ ªÀQîgÀÄ ªÀÄAr¹gÀĪÀ °TvÀ ªÁzÀzÀ°è PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀºÀPÁgÀ
¸ÀAWÀUÀ¼À PÁAiÉÄÝ 1959 gÀ PÀ®A 57(3)(J¥sï) gÀ°è£À CªÀPÁ±ÀzÀAvÉ
¸ÀA§AzsÀ¥ÀlÖ ¸ÀºÀPÁgÀ ¸ÀAWÀzÀ/¨ÁåAQ£À £ÉÆÃAzÁ¬ÄvÀ G¥À¤AiÀĪÀÄzÀ°è
¤gÀƦ¹gÀĪÀAvÉ ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï ¥ÁªÀw¸À®Ä CªÀPÁ±À«zÀÄÝ, 1£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ¨ÁåAQ£À
G¥À¤AiÀĪÀÄzÀ°è ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï ¤ÃqÀĪÀ §UÉÎ G¯ÉèÃR«gÀĪÀÅ¢®èªÁzÀÝjAzÀ
CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï CºÀðjgÀĪÀÅ¢®è JA§ÄzÁV ªÁzÀ ªÀÄAr¹zÀÄÝ. 1£ÉÃ
¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ¨ÁåAQ£À £ÉÆÃAzÁ¬ÄvÀ G¥À¤AiÀĪÀÄzÀ°è ¨ÁåAQ£À £ËPÀgÀjUÉ
¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï ¥ÁªÀw¸ÀĪÀ PÀÄjvÀÄ CªÀPÁ±À ªÀiÁrPÉÆArgÀĪÀ §UÉÎ CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ
AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà ªÀiÁ»w/zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß MzÀV¹gÀĪÀÅ¢®è. C®èzÉ UËgÀªÀ GZÀÑ
£ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀĪÀÅ jmï Cfð ¸ÀASÉå. 19115/2010 (¹J¸ï-DgïEJ¸ï) gÀ°è£À
«Ä¸À¯ÉäAiÀĸï fà ¸ÀASÉå 1367/2011 gÀ°è ¢£ÁAPÀ:
22-03-2011 gÀAzÀÄ ¤ÃrgÀĪÀ wæð£À°è CfðzÁgÀ£ÀÄß ¸ÉêɬÄAzÀÀ ªÀeÁ
DVgÀĪÀ ¸ÀAzÀ¨sÀðzÀ°è ¸ÀºÁAiÀÄPÀ ªÀåªÀ¸ÁÜ¥ÀPÀgÁV PÁAiÀÄð¤ªÀð»¸ÀÄwÛzÀÄÝ. ¸ÀzÀj
ºÀÄzÉÝUÉ C£ÀéAiÀĪÁUÀĪÀ ªÉÃvÀ£ÀÄß ¤UÀzÀ¥Àr¸ÀĪÀAvÉ ºÁUÀÆ CfðzÁgÀ£ÀÄß
¸ÉêÉAiÀÄ°è ¥ÀÄ£Àgï¸ÁÛ¦¹zÀ ¢£ÁAPÀ¢AzÀ C£ÀéAiÀĪÁUÀĪÀAvÉ ªÉÃvÀ£À ªÀÄvÀÄÛ
EvÀgÉ ¸Ë®¨sÀåUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÁªÀw¸ÀĪÀAvÉ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀĪÀÅ DzÉò¹gÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
DzÀÄzÀjAzÀ CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ 1£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ¨ÁåAQ£À ¸ÉêɬÄAzÀ ªÀeÁUÉÆAqÀ
CªÀ¢ü¬ÄAzÀ ¸ÉêÉAiÀÄ°è ¥ÀÄ£Àgï ¸Áܦ¹gÀĪÀ CªÀ¢üAiÀĪÀgÉV£À CªÀ¢üUÉ
¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï PÉèöÊA ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ £ÁåAiÀĸÀªÀÄävÀªÀ®èªÉAzÀÄ C©ü¥ÁæAiÀÄ¥ÀnÖzÉ."
30.3. With regard to the claim of the petitioner towards
earned leave, fourth respondent has held as follows:
"CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ PÉèöʪÀiï ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀ UÀ½PÉ gÀeÉ £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀt ªÉÆvÀÛzÀ
¸ÀA§AzsÀªÁV 1£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ¨ÁåAQ£À ¥ÀgÀ ªÀQîgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀĪÀ °TvÀ
ªÁzÀzÀ°è PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀºÀPÁgÀ ¸ÀAWÀUÀ¼À ¤AiÀĪÀÄ 1960 gÀ ¤AiÀĪÀÄ 18(3)(iii)
gÀ°è£À CªÀPÁ±ÀzÀAvÉ PÀvÀðªÀå ¤ªÀð»¹zÀ CªÀ¢üUÉ ªÀiÁvÀæ UÀ½PÉ gÀeÉUÉ
CºÀðvɬÄzÀÄÝ, CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ:02-09-1998 gÀAzÀÄ ¸ÉêɬÄAzÀ
ªÀeÁUÉÆArzÀÄÝ, DUÀ¸ïÖ 2010 gÀ°è ¥ÀÄ£À: ¸ÉêÉUÉ ¥ÀÄ£Àgï £ÉêÀÄPÀªÁVgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
F CªÀ¢üAiÀÄ°è CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ PÁAiÀÄð¤ªÀð»¹gÀĪÀÅ¢®èªÁzÀ PÁgÀt
CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ ¤AiÀĪÀiÁ£ÀĸÁgÀ UÀ½PÉ gÀeÉ £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀt ¸Ë®¨sÀåPÉÌ
CºÀðgÁVgÀĪÀÅ¢®èªÉAzÀÄ ªÁzÀ ªÀÄAr¹zÀÄÝ, CªÀgÀ ªÁzÀªÀ£ÀÄß ¸ÀªÀÄyð¸À®Ä
jmï Cfð ¸ÀASÉå. 735/929 gÀ°è ¢£ÁAPÀ:11-09-1996 gÀAzÀÄ ¤ÃrgÀĪÀ
wÃ¥Àð£ÀÄß G¯ÉèÃT¹ wæð£À ¥ÀæwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß C£ÀħAzsÀ Dgï 1(7) gÀ°è
¸À°è¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. F ¸ÀA§AzsÀªÁV CfðzÁgÀgÀ ¥ÀgÀ ªÀQîgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀĪÀ
ºÉýPÉAiÀÄ°è CfðzÁgÀgÀ£ÀÄß ¸ÉêɬÄAzÀ ªÀeÁUÉƽ¹gÀĪÀ DzÉñÀªÀ£ÀÄß
vÀ½îºÁQgÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ CfðzÁgÀgÀÄ ¸ÉêÉAiÀÄ°è ªÀÄÄAzÀĪÀgÉ¢gÀĪÀgÉAzÀÄ
¥ÀjUÀt¹. vÀvÀìA§AzsÀªÁzÀ ¸Ë®¨sÀåUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¨ÁQ ªÉÃvÀ£ÀªÀ£ÀÄß UËgÀªÀ GZÀÑ
£ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ DzÉñÁ£ÀĸÁgÀ ¥ÁªÀw¸À¨ÉÃPÁUÀÄvÀÛzÉ JA§ÄzÀÄ
¸ÀªÀÄxÀð¤ÃAiÀĪÁVgÀĪÀÅ¢®èªÉAzÀÄ C©ü¥ÁæAiÀÄ¥ÀnÖzÉ."
30.4. The fourth respondent after noticing the scope of
revision as contained under Section 108 of the Act has
recorded a finding that the power of revision under Section 108
of the Act is not akin to the power of appeal under Section 106
of the Act and in the absence of the order under revision being
contrary to law or resulting in miscarriage of justice, the power
of revision is not liable to be exercised.
31. It is forthcoming that second respondent - Assistant
Registrar has noticed the various claims made by the petitioner
and has adjudicated upon the same. The third respondent -
Deputy Registrar while considering the appeal of the petitioner
has noticed the findings of the second respondent and
dismissed the appeal. As also, the fourth respondent while
considering the revision of the petitioner has noticed various
claims made by the petitioner as well as the adjudication of the
same. Further, the scope of revision under Section 108 of the
Act was noticed and dismissed the revision.
32. Although the claim of the petitioner has been
considered by three authorities namely, the second respondent,
the third respondent as well as the fourth respondent, a
detailed consideration of the case of the petitioner is
undertaken having regard to the fact that the petitioner has
been litigating for many years for benefits which he claims are
due and payable to him from the first respondent - bank.
33. It is relevant to note that the claim of the petitioner
is primarily on the following aspects:
i. Arrears of salary together with the periodic
promotions and increments as claimed by the
petitioner;
ii. Encashment of earned leave;
iii. Bonus;
iv. Leave Travel Concession (LTC);
v. Interest.
34. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his
contentions put forth in the above writ petition has filed memo
dated 14.12.2023 together with following documents:
i) Copy of the relevant portion of bye-laws of
the first respondent -Society.
ii) Copy of the relevant portion of 28th Annual
Report of the first respondent -Society.
iii) Copy of the relevant portion of 32nd Annual
Report of the first respondent -Society.
iv) Calculation sheet produced by the petitioner
before the third respondent.
35. The relevant extracts of bye-law No.67 with regard
to staff strength, bye-law No.68 with regard to the service
conditions of the employees of the first respondent have been
produced.
36. The extract of the 20th Annual Report of respondent
No.1-Society for the year 2008-09 has been produced which
indicates at Sl.No.36 and 38 regarding payment of bonus. The
extract of the 32nd Annual Report of the first respondent for the
year 2012-13 pertaining to payment of bonus at Sl.No.38 has
been produced.
37. A copy of the calculation sheet produced by the
petitioner before the third respondent indicates that the
petitioner has made a total claim of ₹45,04,782/- wherein the
petitioner has produced a chart to demonstrate the amounts
claimed towards salary for the post of Manager from
01.01.1999 to 31.12.2003; the salary paid to the post of
Assistant General Manager from 01.01.2004 to 31.12.2008;
and salary paid for the post of General Manager from
01.01.2009 till August-2010. It is clear from the said chart that
the petitioner has made his claim for arrears of salary by
placing on record that the salary constitutes basic pay,
dearness allowance, house rent allowance and city
compensatory allowance.
38. Hence, it is clear that the petitioner has claimed the
arrears of salary as also other allowances together with the
probable enhancement of salary and allowances by averring
that he would have been periodically promoted from the post of
Manager to that of Assistant General Manager and thereafter to
that of General Manager. However, the petitioner has not
produced any material to demonstrate that promotions in the
employment of the first respondent - Bank are periodic in
nature and merely by working for a specific period of time the
petitioner would have automatically been granted the
promotion.
39. At this juncture, it is relevant to notice that in the
memo dated 29.7.2013 filed by the first respondent - bank in
WP No.29312/2013 (which has been referred to in detail at
para 10 hereinabove), the first respondent has calculated the
amounts payable to the petitioner as arrears of salary and
other benefits as `16,22,344/- and after deducting the amounts
towards professional tax, contribution towards provident fund
and admissible TDS, the first respondent has calculated the
amounts payable to the petitioner in a sum of `12,41,002/-
which was paid as noticed in the said memo. Along with the
said memo, the basis of calculation that is made in the said
memo are produced as Annexure-F to the present writ petition.
40. It is forthcoming from a perusal of Annexure-F that
the first respondent while calculating the salary from
September 1998 up to August 2010 has placed on record the
basis of the calculation of the said salary by indicating the
various constituents of the said salary i.e., Basic Pay, Dearness
Allowance (D.A.), HRA and CCA. The deductions made towards
Professional Tax and Provident Fund have also been indicated.
41. It is further relevant to note that while calculating
the Basic Pay of the petitioner, the first respondent - Bank has
taken the Basic Pay as `1,440/- for the year 1998, `1,480/- for
the year 1999, `1,520/- for the year 2000, `6,150/- for the
year 2001, `6,300/- for the year 2002, `6,450 for the year
2003, `6,600/- for the year 2004, `6,750/- for the year 2005
up to June 2006, `6,900/- from July 2006 up to June 2007,
`7,050/- from July 2007 to December 2007, `14,050/- from
January 2008 to June 2008, `1,440/- from July 2008 to June
2009, `1,480/- from July 2009 to June 2010 and `15,200/- for
the Month of July 2010. Similarly insofar as the other
constituents like D.A., HRA, CCA, periodically higher amounts
have been taken, commensurate with the increase in the basic
pay.
42. It is the submission of learned counsel for the bank
that whenever there has been periodic increments/revisions in
the Basic Pay and the corresponding increase for other
constituents, the same has been calculated while calculating
the arrears of salary of the petitioner.
43. It is relevant to note here that the petitioner has not
pointed out any error with regard to the calculation made by
the first respondent - bank in terms of the calculation produced
as Annexure-F to the writ petition, although the petitioner has
disputed the same as being incorrect and has filed a memo
indicating the amounts claimed as already noticed hereinabove.
However, in the absence of the petitioner demonstrating any
error in the calculations made by the first respondent - Bank, it
is not open for this Court to undertake a calculation of the
same in the present writ petition.
44. It is further relevant to note that reference has been
made to Section 57(3)(f) of the Karnataka Co-operative
Societies Act, 195924 and Rule 18(a)(3)(iii) of the Karnataka
Co-operative Societies Rules, 196025 with regard to payment of
bonus and earned leave. In this context, it is relevant to note
the said provisions as under:
44.1. Section 57(3)(f) reads as follows:
"57.Net profits and their disposal-(1) The net profits of
co-operative societies shall be determined in accordance with
such rules as may be prescribed and different rules may be
made for different classes of co-operative societies.
(3) The balance of the net profits may [xxxxx] be utilized for
all or any of the following purposes, namely-
[(a)xxxx;
(b)xxxx;]
(c) payment of bonus to members on the amount or volume
of business done by them with the society to the extent and in
the manner specified in the bye-laws:
Provided that no bonus shall be payable to members in a
credit society;
(d) .............
(e)donations of amounts not exceeding ten percent of
the net profits for any charitable purpose as defined in
Section 2 of Charitable Endowments Act, 1890 (Central
Act VI of 1890); and
(f) payment of bonus to employees of the society, to
the extent and in the manner specified in the bye-laws:
Provided that the bonus payable in any year to any
employee shall not exceed two months' pay."
Hereinafter referred to as the 'ACT'
Hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules'
44.2. Rule 18(a)(3)(iii) of the Rules reads as follows:
"18.(a) Conditions of service of officers and employees of
Co-operative Societies.
(3) Leave
(iii) An employee shall be entitled for "earned leave" on full
pay at the rate of one-eleventh of the period spent on duty.
The earned leave can be accumulated up to a maximum period
of [240 days];"
45. It is clear that Section 57(3)(f) of the Act merely
provides that the bonus to the employees shall be paid in the
manner specified under the bye-laws and Rule 18(a)(3)(iii) of
the Rules stipulates that an employee shall be entitled for
earned leave on full pay at the rate of one-eleventh of the
period spent on duty and that earned leave can be accumulated
up to a maximum period of 240 days.
46. Bye-law No.68(7)(c) of the first respondent -Society
states as follows:
"¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï ¥ÁªÀw PÁAiÉÄÝ 1965gÀ G¥À§AzsÀUÀ¼À£ÀéAiÀÄ ¨ÁåAQ£À ¹§âA¢ ªÀUÀðPÉÌ
ªÀÄAqÀ°AiÀÄÄ ¨ÉÆãÀ¸Àì£ÀÄß PÉÆqÀvÀPÀÌzÀÄÝ. ¤ÃqÀ¨ÉÃPÁzÀ ¨ÉÆãÀ¹ì£À ¥Àj«ÄwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï
PÁAiÉÄÝ 1965gÀ°è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹gÀĪÀ jÃwAiÀÄ°è ¤zsÀðj¸ÀgÀPÀÌzÀÄÝ. ¨ÉÆãÀ¹ìUÉ ºÀQÌ®èzÀ ¨ÁåAQ£À
¹§âA¢UÉ ¸ÁªÀiÁ£Àå ¤PÁAiÀÄzÀ C£ÀĪÉÆÃzÀ£É ªÉÄÃgÉUÉ ¨ÉÆãÀ¹ìUÉ §zÀ¯ÁV ¤ªÀé¼À ¯Á¨sÀzÀ°è
C£ÀÄUÀæºÀ PÉÆÃqÀÄUÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß (JPÉìUÉæöAiÀiÁ) PÉÆqÀ§ºÀÄzÀÄ. DzÁUÀÆå C£ÀÄUÀæºÀ PÉÆqÀÄUÉAiÀÄ
UÀjµÀ× ¸ÀAzÁAiÀĪÀÅ ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ï PÁAiÉÄÝAiÀÄ°è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹gÀĪÀ UÀjµÀ× ªÉƧ®UÀ£ÀÄß
«ÄÃgÀvÀPÀÌzÀÝ®è."
47. Having regard to the legal position as noticed above
and the factual matrix of the present case, it is clear that the
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the periodic promotion
as claimed by him i.e., from the post of Manager to the post of
Assistant General Manager from 01.01.2004, and from the post
of Assistant General Manager to the post of General Manager
from 01.01.2009 is not an automatic process. It is clear that
the various promotional avenues might have enured to the
petitioner, only if the petitioner had actually worked and
discharged his duty. The petitioner has not placed any material
on record to demonstrate that either under the Act, the Rules
or by the bye-laws of the Society, the promotions claimed by
the petitioner is automatic upon the petitioner being in service
for a specified period of time.
48. It is further relevant to note that along with the
arrears of salary, the petitioner has claimed dearness
allowance, house rent allowance and city compensatory
allowance. Having regard to the legal position as noticed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of DILBAGH RAI JERRY13,
the petitioner was required to demonstrate that the allowance
claimed flows from the term of employment not contingent on
actual working, which he has failed to do. The legal position has
also been noticed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case
of The GENERAL MANAGER, VIJAYA BANK, BENGALURU17,
wherein, the earlier judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
have been noticed and it was held that the claim of the
petitioner towards earned leave is unsustainable and not liable
to be granted, which is squarely applicable to the factual matrix
of the present case.
49. With regard to the claim of the petitioner towards
bonus and leave travel concession, in view of the fact that the
said two items are payable only upon the petitioner actively
serving his employment and actually undertaking the travel
respectively, the claim of the petitioner towards the same is
also unsustainable and not liable to be granted.
50. Having regard to the aforementioned, it is clear that
the petitioner has failed to demonstrate his entitlement in
respect of the amounts claimed by him in the proceedings
before the second respondent.
51. An another aspect in respect of which submissions
have been made was that the petitioner was not an income tax
assessee and the first respondent ought not to have deducted
the income tax amount of ₹1,97,751/- while making payment
of sum of ₹12,41,002/-. In this context, reliance has been
placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
SUNDARAM MOTORS (P) Ltd. And AMEERJAN AND
ANOTHER26, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as
follows:
3. "Mr. Ramamurthy pointed out that in view of the
provision contained in Section 192(1) of the Income Tax Act,
1961, it would be obligatory upon the appellant to deduct
Income-tax from the amount of compensation ordered to be
paid by this Court as per its judgment dated 7th August, 1984,
at the average rate of income-tax computed on the basis of the
rates in force for the financial year in which the payment is
made, on the estimated income of the assessee under the head
"Salaries" for that financial year. After drawing our attention
to S.89 of the I.T Act, 1961, which provides that "where, by
reason of any portion of an assessee's salary being paid in
arrears or in advance or by reason of his having received in any
one financial year salary for more than twelve months or a
payment which under the provisions of Cl.(3) of S.17 is a profit
in lieu of salary, his income is assessed at a rate higher than
that at which it would otherwise have been assessed, the ITO
shall, on an application made to him in this behalf, grant such
relief as may be prescribed", he proceeded to submit that
unless, the relief as provided by S.89 is claimed, the appellant-
employer is under a statutory obligation to deduct the income-
tax from the lump sum directed to be paid by the judgment of
AIR 1985 SC 144
this Court and, therefore, the appellant will be in a position to
make payment to the tune of Rs.1,11,000/- only after
deducting the requisite amount payable as income-tax and
which will have to be deposited by the appellant with the
concerned authority under the IT Act.
4. We have made it abundantly clear in our judgment and
order dated 7th August, 1984, that the compensation awarded is
in lieu of back-wages, and future wages in lieu of reinstatement
which were and would be payable from year to year. Therefore,
we made it very clear that the entire amount awarded by our
judgment shall be spread over from 1970 to 1989, 1970 being
the year of dismissal from service and 1989 being the year of
retirement on superannuation as per the relevant service rules.
We are, accordingly, clear in our minds that viewed from any
angle, respondent-Ameerjan, the workman is fully entitled to
the relief under S.89 of the I.T Act. No other view on this point
is possible. In order to satisfy the requirements of law, the
respondent-Ameerjan shall with the assistance of the appellant
and its income-tax consultants make the necessary application
to the ITO having jurisdiction in the matter at Bangalore for
relief under S.89 and the officer concerned shall, without
further enquiry, grant him immediate relief under S.89 and
dispose of the proceedings within a period of three months from
the date of the application, so that the spirit and purpose of our
judgment and order would be implemented without
unnecessary delay and the agony and torture of unemployment
heaped upon the lowly paid respondent Ameerjan from 1970 be
relieved."
(Emphasis supplied)
52. Section 89 of the Income Tax Act, 196127 states as
follows:
"89. Where an assessee is in receipt of a sum in the
nature of salary, being paid in arrears or in advance or is in
receipt, in any one financial year, of salary for more than
twelve months or a payment which under the provisions of
clause (3) of section 17 is a profit in lieu of salary, or is in
receipt of a sum in the nature of family pension as defined in
the Explanation to clause (iia) of section 57, being paid in
arrears, due to which his total income is assessed at a rate
higher than that at which it would otherwise have been
Hereinafter referred to as the 'IT Act'
assessed, the Assessing Officer shall, on an application made
to him in this behalf, grant such relief as may be prescribed.
Provided that no such relief shall be granted in respect of
any amount received or receivable by an assessee on his
voluntary retirement or termination of his service, in
accordance with any scheme or schemes of voluntary
retirement or in the case of a public sector company referred
to in sub-clause (i) of clause (10c) of section 10, a scheme
of voluntary separation, if an exemption in respect of any
amount received or receivable on such voluntary retirement
or termination of his service or voluntary separation has
been claimed by the assessee under clause (10c) of section
10 in respect of such, or any other, assessment year."
53. It is clear from the aforementioned that first
respondent had calculated the total amount of arrears payable
to the petitioner in a sum of ₹16,22,344/-. The said amount
was in respect of the arrears of salary from 1998 to 2011.
Hence, the petitioner was entitled for the benefit under Section
89 of the IT Act i.e., for the relief of spread over.
54. In view of the discussion made above, the questions
framed for consideration are answered in the negative.
However, having regard to the basis of calculation furnished by
first respondent - bank vide memo dated 29.7.2013, the
present writ petition is partly allowed only to the extent of
directing that the amount of ₹16,22,344/- assessed by first
respondent as the total arrears payable to the petitioner be
spread over for the period 1998 to 2011. Consequently,
although first respondent has deducted a sum of ₹1,47,751/-
as TDS in respect of payment made to the petitioner, the same
shall be liable to be considered for appropriate relief under
Section 89 of the IT Act and for the said purpose it shall be
open to the petitioner to make necessary application to the tax
authorities for claiming relief under Section 89 of the IT Act and
if such an application is made, the tax authorities shall consider
the same expeditiously in accordance with law.
55. Ordered accordingly.
Sd/-
(C.M.POONACHA)
JUDGE
Bs/nd/sh
