(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA)
1. The petitioner is before this Court calling in
grounds comes to be rejected. A consequential direction
sought.
2. Heard the learned counsel Sri. Vitthal S. Teli
3. Facts in brief germane are as follows:
The father of the petitioner was appointed as a
Lineman in the respondent-Hubli Electrictiy Supply
Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Corporation', for short). The father of the petitioner dies in
harness on 23.04.2012. The petitioner then submits a
representation seeking appointment on compassionate
grounds on 20.02.2013 and another representation is
made by the mother, the wife of the deceased on the said
date. On 17.05.2014, an application in the appropriate
format is said to have been made. This comes to be
rejected by the Corporation on 06.08.2014. The petitioner
does not challenge the said endorsement, but submits
another representation for the very same relief after 4
years, and this comes to be rejected on 07.01.2018. This
is what forms the challenge in the subject petition.
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4. Subsequent representations submitted by the
petitioner have also ended in endorsements being issued,
rejecting the claim of the petitioner. Therefore the claim of
the petitioner seeking appointment on compassionate
ground now stands rejected.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
Sri.Vitthal S. Teli submits that the father of the petitioner
died in harness. The petitioner is entitled to be considered
for appointment on compassionate grounds. The rejection
on both the occasions or even on 3rd occasion is on
erroneous ground. Therefore a direction should be issued
to the respondent-Corporation to re-consider the case of
the petitioner.
6. The learned counsel Sri.Shivaraj Mudhol
appearing for the respondents would refute the submission
in contending that the petitioner has no right to claim that
he should be appointed on compassionate grounds, it can
only be in terms of the extant guidelines, scheme, rules or
otherwise. In terms of the guidelines prevailing in the
Corporation, the appointment to the petitioner cannot be
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3210
granted. He would submit that death happens in the year
2012, today it is 2025, 13 years after the said death, this
Court should not direct consideration of the case of the
petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the
submissions by the respective counsels and perused the
materials on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts not in dispute. The
father of the petitioner, who was appointed as a Lineman
on 01.04.1983, after serving for about 30 years, dies in
harness on 23.04.2012. An application made for seeking
appointment on compassionate grounds comes to be
rejected. The rejection of which initially is not questioned
by the petitioner, but another representation is submitted
after 4 years, the same rejection comes about in the year
2018, that is what is questioned in the case at hand.
Subsequent representations have also resulted in the
denial of acceptance of the claim of the petitioner. In the
light of the date of death being on 23.04.2012 and 13
years passing by, it would not be appropriate for this Court
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3210
to direct at this juncture, to the Corporation to consider
the case of the petitioner for appointment on
compassionate ground. The right of the kith and kin of the
deceased-employee to be appointed on compassionate
ground need not detain this Court for long or delve deep
into the matter.
9. The Apex Court in Canara Bank vs
Ajithkumar G.K. reported in 2025 SSC OnLine SC 290,
has held as follows:
"24. We have noticed the core issue arising
for decision as well as the guiding legal principles
for appointment on compassionate ground
hereinabove. As observed earlier, decision on the
core issue would also require us to answer certain
sub-issues. We propose to answer them too in the
process.
25. The first sub-issue is in relation to the
lapse of time since the respondent's father passed
away. It has been in excess of two decades. It
does not require anyone to put on a magnifying
glass here to assess the time that has been taken
for the application of the respondent for
compassionate appointment to be finally decided.
The parties have reached the third tier in the
second round. One of the foremost factors for
appointment on compassionate ground is that the
same should be offered at the earliest. Unless
appointment is made soon after the need to
mitigate hardship arises, tiding over the immediate
financial crisis owing to (i) sudden premature and
untimely death of the deceased employee or (ii)
medical incapacitation resulting in the employee's
unfitness to continue in service, - for which
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benevolence is shown by offering an appointment -
may not exist and thereby the very object of such
appointment could stand frustrated.
26. More often than not, spurned claims for
compassionate appointment reach the high courts
or even this Court after consuming substantial
time. The ordinary rule of litigation is that right to
relief should be decided by reference to the date
on which the suitor entered the portals of the
court. The relief that the suitor is entitled in law
could still be denied in equity on account of
subsequent and intervening events, i.e., events
between the date of commencement of the
litigation and the date of the decision; however,
law is well-settled that such relief may not be
denied solely on account of time lost in prosecuting
proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial forum for
no fault of the suitor [see : Beg Raj Singh v. State
of U.P.50]. It would, therefore, not be prudent or
wise to reject a claim only because of the time
taken by the court(s) to decide the issue before it.
27. Lapse of time could, however, be a major
factor for denying compassionate appointment
where the claim is lodged belatedly. A presumption
is legitimately drawn in cases of claims lodged
belatedly that the family of the
deceased/incapacitated employee is not in
immediate need of financial assistance. However,
what would be a reasonable time would largely
depend on the policy/scheme for compassionate
appointment under consideration. If any time limit
has been prescribed for making an application and
the claimant applies within such period, lapse of
time cannot be assigned as a ground for rejection.
28. The death of the respondent's father, in
this case, occurred in December 2001. Now, we are
in 2025. The respondent cannot be blamed for the
delay, since he was diligently pursuing his claim
before the appellant and thereafter before the High
Court. Thus, irrespective of how old the (2003) 1
SCC 726 respondent is presently, his age cannot be
determinative for foreclosing his claim and bar a
consideration of the same on merits.
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29. The second sub-issue pertains to the real
objective sought to be achieved by offering
compassionate appointment. We have noticed the
objectives of the scheme of 1993 and construe
such objectives as salutary for deciding any claim
for compassionate appointment. The underlying
idea behind compassionate appointment in death-
in-harness cases appears to be that the premature
and unexpected passing away of the employee,
who was the only bread earner for the family,
leaves the family members in such penurious
condition that but for an appointment on
compassionate ground, they may not survive.
There cannot be a straitjacket formula applicable
uniformly to all cases of employees dying-in-
harness which would warrant appointment on
compassionate grounds. Each case has its own
peculiar features and is required to be dealt with
bearing in mind the financial condition of the
family. It is only in "hand-to-mouth" cases that a
claim for compassionate appointment ought to be
considered and granted, if at all other conditions
are satisfied. Such "hand-to-mouth" cases would
include cases where the family of the deceased is
'below poverty line' and struggling to pay basic
expenses such as food, rent, utilities, etc., arising
out of lack of any steady source of sustenance.
This has to be distinguished from a mere fall in
standard of life arising out of the death of the
bread earner.
30. The observation in Kunti Tiwary (supra) noted
above seems to assume significance and we draw
inspiration therefrom in making the observation that no
appointment on compassionate ground ought to be made
as if it is a matter of course or right, being blissfully
oblivious of the laudable object of any policy/scheme in
this behalf.
31. Thus, examination of the financial condition to
ascertain whether the respondent and his mother were
left in utter financial distress because of the death of the
bread earner is not something that can be loosely
brushed aside.
32. This takes us to the third sub-issue tasking us
to consider whether there has been a proper and
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reasonable assessment of the financial condition of the
family consequent upon death of the respondent's father.
The order of the MD & CEO has been extracted above,
verbatim. What transpires from a bare reading of such
order is that the deceased left behind him his widow, the
respondent and three daughters as his surviving heirs.
All the daughters were married and settled. Only his
spouse and son could count as dependants. The
daughters were not shown to be dependent on the
deceased while he was alive and in service. The
respondent and his mother were residing in their own
house. That apart, the deceased was 4 (four) months
away from retirement on superannuation. It has been
indicated in such order what the last drawn net salary of
the deceased was and had he survived even after
superannuation, what quantum of money would he have
received as monthly pension. Also, the amount of
monthly family pension being paid to the respondent's
mother is indicated. Although on behalf of the
respondent a contention has been raised that there has
been no proper assessment of his financial condition,
rather strangely, the figures referred to by the MD & CEO
have not been disputed at all. We are, thus, left with no
option but to proceed on the basis that the same are
correct. If, indeed, the respondent's father would have
received a pension amount of Rs. 6398/- and burdened
to feed himself as well as his two dependants, viz. his
spouse and son, the amount of family pension initially
sanctioned, i.e., Rs. 4637.92 could not have, by any
stretch of imagination, be seen as insufficient or
inadequate for feeding two mouths. It is also not in
dispute that the net terminal benefits in a sum of Rs.
3.09 lakh paid to the respondent/his mother would have
been the same amount which the deceased would have
received as terminal benefits after superannuation, had
he been alive. Thus, it is not a case where the death of
the respondent's father brought about such dire
consequence and/or disastrous outcome that the
respondent and his mother would have to cope with
miserable effects which, as the respondent urged, could
be remedied only by offering an appointment on
compassionate ground. We regret our inability to be ad
idem with learned counsel for the respondent.
33. The next sub-issue, which cannot be
overlooked, is this. The scheme of 1993 envisages
assessment of the suitability of the claimant for
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compassionate appointment. As has been laid down in
several decisions of this Court, noted above, the clauses
forming part of the policy/scheme for compassionate
appointment have to be followed to the letter. Without
the respondent having been subjected to a suitability
test, the Division Bench plainly fell in error in directing
the respondent's appointment in the category of clerk
relying on the decision in Canara Bank (supra). It is of
some significance that even Canara Bank (supra) did not
order appointment but required reconsideration of the
claim.
34. Whether relaxation in age ought to have been
granted is the next sub-issue. A contention raised on
behalf of the respondent, and which succeeded, was to
the effect that since he was overaged only by eight
months on the date of death of his father, he should
have been granted relaxation of age for which power was
conferred by the scheme of 1993. We are conscious that
there is substance in the contention on behalf of the
respondent that this issue is no longer open to be
decided here. The decision initially taken that the
respondent was over-aged had been set aside in the first
round of litigation and, therefore, the principle of res
judicata is indeed attracted.
35. However, the point having been argued at
some length, our views on interpretation of the scheme
of 1993 could be of some worth for courts deciding
similar such issue in future. We are in agreement with
learned counsel for the appellant that the question of
relaxation would arise only when the claimant satisfies
the other requirements of the scheme of 1993 for
compassionate appointment. What seems to be logical is
that no dependant, who otherwise satisfies all criteria for
compassionate appointment including suitability, should
be told off at the gate solely on the ground of age-bar. If
the age of the claimant is found to be within the
relaxable limit, discretion is available to be exercised in
an appropriate case. Relaxation of age is a step to be
taken in the final stages of the entire process and it
would arise for consideration provided all other
conditions for appointment are satisfied. If in a given
case, such as this, that the family of the deceased is not
found to be indigent, the first threshold is not crossed
and thereby, the process does not progress any further.
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In such a case, it would be in idle formality to consider
whether relaxation of age should be granted.
36. Finally, it is noteworthy that although the
Single Bench directed further consideration of the claim
of the respondent upon quashing of the impugned order
of rejection passed by the MD & CEO, the Division Bench
went a step further and directed appointment. Power of
an appellate court is circumscribed by laws. Unless a
particular case in appeal is so exceptional in nature that
the appellate court considers it imperative to exercise
power akin to power conferred on appellate courts by
Order XLI Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code, such power
should normally not be exercised. We have not found
reference to the said provision as the source from which
the Division Bench drew power to order appointment to
be offered without the respondent being subjected to the
suitability test. Obviously, therefore, the appellants could
not have been worse off for filing an appeal.
37. Turning focus to the core issue, we have found
that the High Court - both the Single Bench and the
Division Bench - heavily relied on the decision in Canara
Bank (supra) in reaching its respective conclusions. We
do appreciate the predicament of the High Court.
Perhaps, the said Benches were left with no other option
but to feel bound by what this Court had observed and
decided therein; more so, because the decision dealt
with the scheme of 1993 framed by the appellant itself,
which is under consideration here.
38. The high courts, we reiterate, must bear in
mind the decision of this Court in Director of
Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao51 where certain
pertinent observations were made in regard to the
binding effect of a decision of this Court. The relevant
passage reads:
"7. ... The law which will be binding
under Article 141 would, therefore, extend to all
observations of points raised and decided by the
Court in a given case. So far as constitutional
matters are concerned, it is a practice of the Court
not to make any pronouncement on points not
directly raised for its decision. The decision in a
judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be assailed
on the ground that certain aspects were not
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3210
considered or the relevant provisions were not
brought to the notice of the Court (see ...). When
the Supreme Court decides a principle it would be
the duty of the High Court or a subordinate court
to follow the decision of the Supreme Court. A
judgment of the High Court which refuses to follow
the decision and directions of the Supreme Court
or seeks to revive a decision of the High Court
which had been set aside by the Supreme Court is
a nullity. ..."
(emphasis supplied)
39. The ratio of the decision in Canara
Bank (supra) in view of Article 141 of the Constitution
was binding on the High Court, no matter whether in
such decision this Court considered all the provisions of
the scheme of 1993 or not. Even an obiter dictum of this
Court could be binding on the high courts. However,
being a coordinate bench, we neither feel bound (2002)
4 SCC 638 by any obiter dictum nor any principle laid
down in an earlier decision which did not have the
occasion to consider the issue of financial condition from
all relevant perspectives.
40. Leaving aside the fact that Canara
Bank (supra) has been referred to a larger bench, we
have independently looked into the issue having regard
to all relevant factors.
41. Paragraph 1 of the decision in Canara
Bank (supra) records the common question of law arising
in the civil appeals. Briefly put, the question was whether
the family members of the employee dying-in- harness
during the subsistence of the scheme of 1993 were
entitled to claim compassionate appointment
notwithstanding that their financial condition was good
and that the scheme of 1993 had been replaced with the
scheme of 2005.
42. While reasoning that the stand of the appellant
was unjustified, the coordinate bench had the occasion
to consider several decisions of this Court and ultimately
held as follows:
"19. Insofar as the contention of the
appellant Bank that since the respondent's family
is getting family pension and also obtained the
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terminal benefits, in our view, is of no
consequence in considering the application for
compassionate appointment. Clause 3.2 of the
1993 Scheme says that in case the dependant of
the deceased employee to be offered appointment
is a minor, the Bank may keep the offer of
appointment open till the minor attains the age of
majority. This would indicate that granting of
terminal benefits is of no consequence because
even if terminal benefit is given, if the applicant is
a minor, the Bank would keep the appointment
open till the minor attains majority.
...
22. Considering the scope of the scheme
'Dying in Harness Scheme 1993' then in force and
the facts and circumstances of the case, the High
Court rightly directed the appellant Bank to
reconsider the claim of the respondent for
compassionate appointment in accordance with
law and as per the Scheme (1993) then in
existence. We do not find any reason warranting
interference."
43. In our considered view, the objectives of the
scheme of 1993 and the requirements of disclosure
relating to financial condition and the details of liabilities
of the deceased employee in the prescribed formats
(Annexures I and II, respectively) would leave none in
doubt about the intention of the policy makers.
Overcoming the immediate financial difficulties on
account of sudden stoppage of the main source of
income and existence of indigent circumstances
necessitating employment to one of the dependants
being at the heart of the scheme of 1993, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to accept it as a valid proposition of law
that grant of terminal benefits cannot be of any
consequence since paragraph 3.2 of the scheme of 1993
permits the offer of appointment to be kept open till such
time the surviving minor dependant, who is to be offered
appointment, attains majority. To our mind, what
paragraph 3.2 postulates is that, despite there being
indigent circumstances necessitating appointment, the
object of compassionate appointment thereunder should
not be frustrated for mere absence of an eligible
dependant family member. The offer would be kept open
for such minor to attain majority, whereafter he would
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be offered appointment subject to suitability, and once
he accepts the appointment, he would be under an
obligation to look after the other indigent family
members. Although paragraph 3.2 may not be wholly in
sync with the objective of overcoming immediate
financial difficulties, it has to be seen as a benevolent
clause extending the benefit of compassionate
appointment even beyond reasonable limits, obviously to
cover exceptional cases, for ensuring the right of the
family members of the deceased employee to live with
human dignity. The idea for incorporation of this clause
in the scheme of 1993 cannot be confused with
grant/release of terminal benefits. Both operate in
different arena and, therefore, we respectfully disagree
with the reasoning in paragraph 19 of Canara
Bank (supra).
44. As pertinently held in B. Kishore (supra),
indigence of the dependants of the deceased employee is
the fundamental condition to be satisfied under any
scheme for appointment on compassionate ground and
that if such indigence is not proved, grant of relief in
furtherance of protective discrimination would result in a
sort of reservation for the dependents of the employee
dying-in-harness, thereby directly conflicting with the
ideal of equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of
the Constitution. Also, judicial decisions abound that in
deciding a claim for appointment on compassionate
grounds, the financial situation of the deceased
employee's family must be assessed. In a situation
otherwise, the purpose of the scheme may be
undermined; without this evaluation, any dependent of
an employee who dies while in service might claim a
right to employment as if it is heritable.
45. The ratio decidendi of all these decisions have
to be read in harmony to achieve the noble goal of giving
succour to the dependants of the employee dying-in-
harness, who are genuinely in need, and not with the
aim of giving them a post for another post. One has to
remember in this connection the caution sounded
in Umesh Kumar Nagpal (supra) that as against the
destitute family of the deceased there are millions of
other families which are equally, if not more, destitute.
46. Premised on the aforesaid reasoning of ours, we
conclude that the order of the MD & CEO refusing to grant
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the prayer of the respondent for compassionate
appointment was unexceptionable and, therefore, not
liable to any interference in the exercise of writ
jurisdiction."
10. The Apex Court considers the entire spectrum
of the law on compassionate appointment and holds that
cases of compassionate appointment should be considered
only when the situation is hand to mouth. In the case at
hand, 13 years have passed by after the death. It cannot
be construed that the present situation of the family of the
deceased is hand to mouth. Therefore, the claim of the
petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds
cannot be considered and a direction to that effect cannot
be rendered in the case at hand.
11. Finding no merit, the petition stands rejected.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
KGK/CT-ASC
