25. In the judgment in Himani Alloys Ltd. v.
Tata Steel Ltd. [Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd.,
(2011) 15 SCC 273 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 376] , nature
and scope of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC has been considered
by this Court. In the aforesaid judgment this Court has
held that the discretion conferred under Order 12 Rule
6 CPC is to be exercised judiciously, keeping in mind
that a judgment on admission is a judgment without
trial which permanently denies any remedy to the
defendant. Para 11 of the judgment read as under :
(SCC pp. 276-77)
"11. It is true that a judgment can be given
on an "admission" contained in the minutes of a
meeting. But the admission should be categorical. It
should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party
making it, showing an intention to be bound by it.
Order 12 Rule 6 CPC being an enabling provision, it
is neither mandatory nor peremptory but
discretionary. The court, on examination of the facts
and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial
discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on
admission is a judgment without trial which
permanently denies any remedy to the defendant, by
way of an appeal on merits. Therefore unless the
admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional,
the discretion of the court should not be exercised to
deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the
claim. In short the discretion should be used only
when there is a clear "admission" which can be acted
upon. (See also Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v.
United Bank of India [Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd.
v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120] , Karam
Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust [Karam
Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust, (2010) 4
SCC 753 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 262] and Jeevan
Diesels & Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh Chadha
[Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. v. Jasbir Singh
Chadha, (2010) 6 SCC 601 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ)
745] .) There is no such admission in this case."
26. In the judgment in S.M. Asif v. Virender
Kumar Bajaj [S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015)
9 SCC 287 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 589] , this Court has
held that the power under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is
discretionary and cannot be claimed as a right. It is
further held in the aforesaid case that where the
defendants have raised objections, which go to the root
of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise
discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. Para 8 of the
judgment read as under : (SCC p. 291)
"8. The words in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC "may"
and "make such order ..." show that the power under
Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be
claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission
is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of
discretion of the court. Where the defendants have
raised objections which go to the root of the case, it
would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion
under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an
enabling provision which confers discretion on the
court in delivering a quick judgment on admission
and to the extent of the claim admitted by one of the
parties of his opponent's claim."
27. In the judgment in Balraj Taneja v. Sunil
Madan [Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC
396] , while considering the scope of Order 8 Rule 10
and Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, this Court has held that the
court is not to act blindly upon the admission of a fact
made by the defendant in the written statement nor
should the court proceed to pass judgment blindly
merely because a written statement has not been filed
by the defendant traversing the facts set out by the
plaintiff in the plaint filed in the court.
28. In the aforesaid judgment, while
considering the scope of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, post
amendment by amending Act, 1976 this Court has held
as under : (Balraj Taneja [Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan,
(1999) 8 SCC 396] , SCC p. 408, paras 21-23)
"21. There is yet another provision under
which it is possible for the court to pronounce
judgment on admission. This is contained in Rule 6
of Order 12 CPC which provides as under:
'6. Judgment on admissions.--(1) Where
admissions of fact have been made either in the
pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing,
the court may at any stage of the suit, either on
the application of any party or of its own motion
and without waiting for the determination of any
other question between the parties, make such
order or give such judgment as it may think fit,
having regard to such admissions.
(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced
under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in
accordance with the judgment and the decree
shall bear the date on which the judgment was
pronounced.'
22. This rule was substituted in place of the
old rule by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 1976. The Objects and Reasons for this
amendment are given below:
Under Rule 6, where a claim is admitted, the
court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the
plaintiff and to pass a decree on the admitted
claim. The object of the rule is to enable a party
to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent
of the relief to which, according to the admission
of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The rule
is wide enough to cover oral admissions. The rule
is being amended to clarify that oral admissions
are also covered by the rule.'
23. Under this rule, the court can, at an
interlocutory stage of the proceedings, pass a
judgment on the basis of admissions made by the
defendant. But before the court can act upon the
admission, it has to be shown that the admission is
unequivocal, clear and positive. This rule empowers
the court to pass judgment and decree in respect of
admitted claims pending adjudication of the disputed
claims in the suit."
29. By applying the ratio laid down by this
Court in the aforesaid judgments, it is to be
held that there are no categorical and
unconditional admissions, as claimed by the
respondent-plaintiffs. In view of the stand of
the appellants that, pp. 3 and 4 of the
agreement dated 3-5-2005 are tampered and
their signatures are fabricated, when a specific
issue is already framed, it cannot be said that
there are categorical and unconditional
admissions by the appellants. Mere admission
of entering into arrangement/contract on 7-4-
2005 and 3-5-2005 itself cannot be considered
in isolation, without considering the further
objections of the appellants that certain pages
in the agreement are fabricated. In case the
appellants prove that the agreement is
fabricated as claimed, post-trial it goes to the
root of the case on the claim of the
respondent-plaintiffs. Hence, we are of the
view that the aforesaid judgments fully support
the case of the appellants.
30. The learned counsel for the
respondent-plaintiffs Shri Shyam Divan, relying
on the judgment of this Court in Uttam Singh
Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India
[Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank
of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120] has submitted that
in view of the balance sheets and resolutions of
the company, they are to be considered as
admissions otherwise it will amount to
narrowing down the scope of the Rule itself. In
the aforesaid judgment itself, this Court has
held that when a statement of admission is
brought before the Court, as long as the party
making the statement is given sufficient
opportunity to explain such admissions,
judgment on admission can be delivered. In the
case on hand it is to be noted that the relief
claimed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC by filing a
written application claiming admission only
based on the statement made by the advocate
in the bail application, and there is no other
pleading admission, in the application filed by
the respondent-plaintiffs. It is a trite principle
that any amount of evidence is of no help, in
absence of pleading and foundation in the
application. It is true that when categorical and
unconditional admissions are there, judgment
on admission can be ordered, without
narrowing down the rule but at the same time
the judicious discretion conferred on the court
is to be exercised within the framework of the
rule but not beyond. Even on balance sheets of
the company and the note of one of the
Directors, it is the specific case of the
appellants that the third respondent, in
connivance with the respondent-plaintiffs, is
also working against the appellants. In that
view of the matter the claim of the respondent-
plaintiffs relying on the documents relating to
the company is to be considered with reference
to the defence of the appellants during trial in
the suit.
31. In the judgment in Karam Kapahi
v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust [Karam
Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust,
(2010) 4 SCC 753 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 262] ,
this Court has interpreted the expression
"otherwise" as used in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and
has held that the scope of the said provision of
Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is wider in comparison to
provision of Order 12 Rule 1 CPC. It is true that
after amendment, scope of the rule under
Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is expanded but at the
same time the expression "otherwise" inserted
in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is also to be considered
within the framework of the Rule but not
beyond. In any event, even in a given case, the
admissions are categorical and unconditional,
whether any inference can be drawn on
admissions having regard to documents placed
on record, is a matter to be considered having
regard to facts of each case. There cannot be
any straitjacket formula to extend the benefit
of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC.
16. The learned counsel for the appellant further
argued that since the respondents themselves have admitted
objections regarding the validity of the compromise petition,
the Court has erred in exercising its discretion under Order
12 rule 6 CPC. The counsel in furtherance of this argument
has relied upon the case of S.M. ASIF V. VIRENDER
KUMAR BAJAJ, ((2015) 9 SCC 287), rendered by the
Hon'ble Apex Court, the relevant paragraphs from the above
case are cited thus:
"8. The words in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC "may"
and "make such order ..." show that the power
under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and
cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Judgment
on admission is not a matter of right and rather is
a matter of discretion of the court. Where the
defendants have raised objections which go to the
root of the case, it would not be appropriate to
exercise the discretion under Order 12 Rule 6
CPC. The said rule is an enabling provision which
confers discretion on the court in delivering a
quick judgment on admission and to the extent of
the claim admitted by one of the parties of his
opponent's claim.
9. In the suit for eviction filed by the
respondent landlord, the appellant tenant has
admitted the relationship of tenancy and the
period of lease agreement; but resisted the
respondent-plaintiff's claim by setting up a
defence plea of agreement for sale and that he
paid an advance of Rs 82.50 lakhs, which of
course is stoutly denied by the respondent
landlord. The appellant-defendant also filed the
suit for specific performance, which of course is
contested by the respondent landlord. When such
issues arising between the parties ought to be
decided, mere admission of relationship of
landlord and tenant cannot be said to be an
unequivocal admission to decree the suit under
Order 12 Rule 6 CPC."
17. In substantiating his argument the learned counsel
for the appellant has relied on the case of RAJ A. MENDA
AND ORS. VS. RANI RASAMANI REAL ESTATE AND ORS
(ILR 2007 KARNATAKA 2627), delivered by this very
Hon'ble Court, the relevant paragraphs from the judgement
are cited below:
"52. In order to invoke the provision of Order
12 Rule 6 CPC it is well established that, the
exercise of discretion of Court in passing a decree or
judgment on admission, at the first place, such
relief cannot be claimed by the plaintiffs as of right.
In exercising the discretion, the Court has to satisfy
its judicial consensus on such discretion, admission
must be clear, unequivocal, unconditional,
unambiguous so that it may not be necessary for
the Court to wait till the determination of other
questions and the defendants making such
admission have no right of defence at all and there
is no possibility to succeed in the suit and the
admissions must be taken as a whole and not in
part. Order 12 Rule 6 CPC requires an absolute
admission which could workout by itself and it is not
proper to make a decree under the said provision, if
the admission is not absolute and incapable of being
worked out by itself. This Court as well as the Apex
Court time and again have held that in order to pass
a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC admission must
be complete and sufficient to pass partial decree.
When there is no clear admission and if the
admission sought to be drawn is based on inference,
it cannot be construed as absolute admission in
terms of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and the said provision
cannot be invoked.
53. Though many judgments are relied upon
by the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff on the
question of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC it would not be
necessary to refer to each one. However the
principle enunciated in all the judgments is that,
there has to be absolute, clear unequivocal
admission which is complete and sufficient and
which works out by itself and there is no possibility
of success by a party making such admission.
54. In our view the trial court was not justified
in invoking Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, merely on the
basis of the reply given by one Chandru Raheja on
behalf of K. Raheja Group when the plaintiffs have
denied that the K. Raheja is a legal entity, reply of
Chandru Raheja is of no assistance, for dismissing
the suit at this stage. This matter is required to be
decided based on the evidence."
18. In furtherance of his contention, the counsel has
relied upon the case of this very Hon'ble Court in CREF
FINANCE LIMITED VS. SRI SHANTHI HOMES PRIVATE
LTD. COMPANY AND ORS (AIR 2006 KANT 54), the
relevant paragraphs are cited as thus:
"7 . When an application is filed under Order 12
Rule 6 CPC, objections are filed by the respondents
denying in toto, the said documents would partake the
character of a disputed documents. Under Section 18 of
the Evidence Act, an opportunity is to be given to the
respondents to explain the said admissions and in what
situation those admissions were made. But however,
this is a matter to be decided during the course of trial
and not at a stage, when the application is being
considered under order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Mr. B.S. Viswanath v. Chandikaben J. Mehta
MANU/KA/0021/1990 : AIR 1990 Kant 142 has held
that as can be seen from the provision, the Court in its
discretion has the jurisdiction to pass partial decree on
the basis of the facts admitted, whether such admission
is in the pleadings or otherwise. The scope of the above
provision is, the admission must be such which is
complete and sufficient to pass a partial decree, which
the Court proposes to pass on the basis of admission.
The same view is taken in the case of Janardhan Jog v.
Srikrishna (supra) that the admission must be absolute
and capable of being worked out by itself. It is also to
be noticed that so far as the admission as contemplated
under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
concerned should independently stand without there
being any interlink support and unless that is
established, a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 of the
Code of Civil Procedure cannot be granted."
19. In the same context, the learned counsel has
placed reliance on yet another case of this Hon'ble Court in
JANARDHAN JOG VS. SRIKRISHNA, 1989 (3) KAR LJ
65, the relevant paragraphs of the judgement are herein
stated for reference:
"9. An admission contemplated by Order 12 Rule
3 CPC, has to be an absolute admission, capable of
being worked out by itself. The other questions to be
determined in the suit, on decree being made under
Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, should be such independent
questions, reliefs granted on which should be capable of
being granted without affecting the former decree (i.e.,
the one passed on the basis of admission). If the
admitted fact cannot independently stand, and the
ultimate relief or reliefs to be granted in the suit is
interlinked with those facts, then, it will not be a proper
exercise of the discretion, to make a decree under
Order 12 Rule 6 CPC."
20. Hence, it is contended by the learned counsel for
the appellant in both the appeals that the Trial Court has
improperly relied upon a registered document dated
25.01.2017, which is referred to in the compromise petition.
This reliance is perverse and premature as the said
document is a matter of evidence, and its validity or
admissibility can only be determined at the appropriate stage
of the proceedings.
21. It is further contended that the impugned judgment
is contrary to the earlier order passed by the trial court on
11.04.2017, which was confirmed by the Hon'ble High Court
in its order passed in W.P. No. 17228-17231/2017. The
current judgment is in direct violation of the binding
precedent set by the Hon'ble High Court in the said writ
petition, thereby rendering it unsustainable.
22. The learned counsel for the Appellant finally
submits that the trial court has erred in passing an order
based on the memo dated 6.2.2018, despite the fact that the
Appellant's counsel had endorsed on the memo that they had
no instructions to file objections, is pressed upon.
23. It is also pertinent to note that Respondents 3, 4,
6, and 7 who were signatories to the compromise petition,
did not object to the dismissal of the suit. The trial court
failed to appreciate that the suit should have culminated in a
decree based on the compromise petition. Hence, the
learned counsel for the Appellant seeks this Court to allow
the appeal in RFA No.1589/2020 and to set aside the
judgement and decree dated 20.02.2020 in O.S No.507/2010
and in turn to grant the appellant one-tenth of the share in
the 104 acres of land. Further, the learned counsel for the
appellant has prayed to allow RFA No.1608/2020 and to set
aside the judgment and decree dated 20.02.2020 in
O.S.No.1478/2006 and consequently declare documents of
2005 and 2006 as null and void.
24. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel Shri G.
Krishna Murthy representing Respondent Nos.3 and 4
contends that the Appellant's admissions regarding the
family settlements, and the specific relinquishments by
Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7 unequivocally establish that
the properties in question were duly partitioned, leaving no
further claim by the Appellant against these respondents.
Therefore, the appeals lack merit and deserve to be
dismissed.
25. In support of the above contention, the learned
counsel for the respondent 3 and 4 has relied upon the
judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. V. United Bank of India
and Ors, (2000) 7 SCC 120, the relevant paragraphs of
the judgment are cited below:
"12. As to the object of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, we
need not say anything more than what the legislature
itself has said when the said provision came to be
amended. In the Objects and Reasons set out while
amending the said Rule, it is stated that "where a
claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a
judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on
admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the
party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the
extent of the relief to which according to the
admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled".
We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of
this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain
speedy judgment. Where the other party has made a
plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it
should apply and also wherever there is a clear
admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible
for the party making such admission to succeed.
13. The next contention canvassed is that the
resolutions or minutes of the meeting of the Board of
Directors, resolution passed thereon and the letter
sending the said resolution to the respondent Bank
cannot amount to a pleading or come within the scope
of the Rule as such statements are not made in the
course of the pleadings or otherwise. When a
statement is made to a party and such statement is
brought before the court showing admission of liability
by an application filed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and
the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the
said admission and if such explanation is not accepted
by the court, we do not think the trial court is helpless
in refusing to pass a decree. We have advertised the
basis of the claim and the manner in which the trial
court has dealt with the same. When the trial Judge
states that the statement made in the proceedings of
the Board of Directors' meeting and the letter sent as
well as the pleadings when read together, leads to
unambiguous and clear admission with only the extent
to which the admission is made in dispute, and the
court had a duty to decide the same and grant a
decree, we think this approach is unexceptionable."
26. Learned Senior Counsel Shri G. Krishnamurthy
representing Respondent Nos.3, 4, 6 and 7 in both the
appeals has referred to the List of documents filed along with
their written statement filed before the Trial Court. The
documents include, i) Copy of the Village map of
Akkalenahalli and Mallenahalli villages issued on 16.08.1975
showing the unofficial markings of different portions; ii) Copy
of the memorandum of oral partition dated 01.04.1970 which
consists of page No.3 to Page No.12; iii) Copies of survey
sketches in respect of schedule properties - 37 in number;
iv) Coloured survey sketch of schedule properties; v) Copies
of tax paid receipts - 13 in number; vi) Copy of
memorandum of confirmation of Oral Family Settlement
dated 25.07.1998; vii) Copy of Memorandum of Confirmation
of Oral Family Arrangement-cum-partition dated 18.11.2005;
viii) Coloured map of properties belonging to defendants
after re-arrangement and consolidation under memorandum
dated 18.11.2025; ix) Coloured map of properties jointly
held by defendants under memorandum dated 18.11.2005;
x) Copy of memorandum of understanding dated
20.01.2006; xi) Copies of extracts from the Mutation
Register and xii) Copies of land tax assessment register.
27. Learned Senior Counsel Shri G. Krishnamurthy has
emphatically submitted for consideration of these documents
in support of his arguments and contends that it is not
required to interfere with the judgment and decree rendered
by the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Devanahalli as regards
the application been filed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
28. The learned Senior Counsel Shri G. Krishna Murthy
further contends that the genesis of the dispute originates
from the properties purchased by late Sri M.S. Ramaiah in
1951, measuring 666 acres of agricultural land in Kalenahalli
Marenahalli Village, Devanahalli Taluk. On April 1, 1970, late
Sri M.S. Ramaiah executed a family partition deed covering
an extent of 561 acres 36 guntas, out of which 30 acres 26
guntas were retained by him and 104 acres 10 guntas were
excluded from partition due to various constraints such as
gramatana, quarry areas, and tenant rights. The remaining
531 acres and 10 guntas were partitioned among family
members. The Appellant, under this partition, was allotted
specific survey numbers amounting to 51 acres 8 guntas.
Subsequently, on November 17, 1997, the Appellant
purchased 8 additional acres in Sy. No.37/25 through a
registered sale deed. Following the demise of late M.S.
Ramaiah on December 25, 1997, a Memorandum of
Confirmation of Oral Family Settlement was executed on July
25, 1998, wherein the remaining properties retained by late
M.S. Ramaiah, including 30 acres and 26 guntas, were
distributed among family members. As a result, the
Appellant's share, inclusive of properties acquired through
partition and purchase, totalled 62 acres 11 guntas.
29. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that
significant development occurred on November 18, 2005,
when all the Respondents, excluding the Appellant, executed
a Registered Memorandum of Confirmation of Oral Family
Arrangement-Cum-Partition Deed. This arrangement aimed
to reorganize the properties for better utilization. The deed
specifically dealt with an extent of 85 acres 29 guntas, which
was held jointly by the Respondents, and marked as "K" in
the annexed plan in this Appeal. This arrangement was
further solidified through subsequent deeds, including a
Registered Deed of Family Arrangement Cum Partition dated
August 28, 2006, wherein the properties jointly held by the
Respondents and those acquired through gift deeds were
divided among them, allocating individual shares to each
Respondent.
30. The learned Senior Counsel further contends that
the Appellant, being dissatisfied with these arrangements,
instituted O.S.No.1478/2006, seeking a declaration that the
Memorandum of Confirmation of Oral Family Arrangement
dated November 18, 2005, was not binding on him. The
Appellant later amended the plaint to include a challenge to
the Registered Deed of Family Arrangement dated August
28, 2006. However, the learned Trial Court dismissed the
suit on August 19, 2008, citing insufficiency of court fees and
other grounds. Although the Appellant appealed against this
order in RFA 1314/2008, the matter was remanded for fresh
consideration on February 23, 2012.
31. The learned Senior Counsel Shri G. Krishna Murthy
further emphasized that on 25.01.2017, a significant
compromise was reached. A "Registered Deed of Family
Settlement Cum Arrangement" was executed between the
Appellant and Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7. In this
settlement, the Appellant was declared the absolute owner of
Schedule 'A' property and accepted and received a sum of
Rs.6.5 crores as consideration for relinquishing his share in
the agricultural properties. In return, the Appellant agreed to
withdraw O.S. No. 1478/2006 and O.S. No. 507/2010
against Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7. A compromise
petition was filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC to effect this
agreement. The Appellant explicitly acknowledged the
validity of the "Memorandum of Confirmation of Oral Family
Arrangement Cum Partition" dated November 18, 2005, and
declared that it did not affect his rights. The Appellant also
confirmed that Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7 are rightful
owners of the properties allotted to them under the said
arrangement. Incidentally, Respondents No. 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9
raised objections to this compromise, and contended that the
settlement would prejudice their rights and that the
compromise petition was inseparable from the dispute
concerning the entire property. Consequently, this Hon'ble
Court, in its order dated 19.11.2018, dismissed the writ
petitions filed by Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7 challenging
the objections, observing that the disputes regarding the
document dated November 18, 2005, were inseparable from
the larger issues in the suit. Furthermore, it held that
accepting the compromise petition would prejudice
Respondents No. 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9.
32. The learned Senior counsel further submits that the
Trial Court, on 20.02.2020, considered the objections and
the application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC and held that the
Appellant had categorically admitted the validity of the
document dated 18.11.2005, as it pertained to Respondents
No. 3, 4, 6, and 7. The court emphasized that the conduct of
the parties is crucial in such adjudication, and the wide scope
of Order XII Rule 6 CPC allowed for a decision on the matter.
Consequently, the application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC
was allowed, and the suits against Respondents No. 3, 4, 6,
and 7 were dismissed.
33. In furtherance of the above argument, the learned
Senior Counsel for respondents 3 and 4 has relied on a
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
NAGINDAS RAMDAS V. DALPATRAM ICHHARAM ALIAS
BRIJRAM AND ORS, ((1974) 1 SCC 242)), the relevant
portion of the judgement is cited below for reference:
"28. We do not find any force in the contention of
Mr Dholakia, that the facts admitted in the
compromise, itself were insufficient to make out even
a prima facie ground for eviction mentioned in Section
12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act, merely because the
tenant had made an application for fixation of
standard rent, which was still pending at the time of
passing of the decree. By admitting to pay the arrears
of rent and mesne profits at the rate of Rs 15 per
month, the tenant had clearly withdrawn or
abandoned his application for fixation of standard
rent. The admission in the compromise was thus as
admission of the material facts which constituted a
ground for eviction under Section 12(3)(a). Rent was
admittedly payable by the month; since the
application for fixation of fair rent stood withdrawn,
there was no dispute with regard to the amount of
standard rent. Further, the rent was admittedly in
arrears for a period of more than six months; so much
so that in the present case, the tenant had neglected
to pay the balance of arrears, amounting to
Rs.152/50, even long after the decree and the
landlord was compelled to recover the same by
execution.
34. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent
explained further that regarding O.S. No.507/2010, the Trial
Court observed that Respondents No. 3, 4, 6, and 7 had
relinquished all claims over the Appellant's share and the
properties in question, indicating that the schedule properties
were not joint family properties and were not available for
partition.
35. The learned Senior counsel Sri Madhusudhan R.
Naik representing the learned counsel Shri Jagadeesh C.K.
for Respondent Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in RFA no. 1608 of 2020
and the Senior counsel Sri Shashi Kiran Shetty representing
the learned counsel Shri Jagadeesh C.K. for Respondent
Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in RFA no. 1589 of 2020 contend that
the appeals filed by the Appellant are frivolous and baseless,
aimed at perpetuating unjust litigation among siblings for
over 19 years.
36. Both the learned Senior Counsel reiterate the
factual background of the case that late M.S. Ramaiah
partitioned certain lands among himself, his two wives, and
ten children, through an oral family arrangement on
01.04.1970, which partition was reflected in a 'Wardi note.'
He contends that over time, nine of the children mutually re-
arranged their scattered holdings into consolidated blocks for
better enjoyment. They formalized this re-arrangement
through two registered documents:
(i) The Memorandum of Confirmation of Oral Family
Arrangement Cum Partition dated 18.11.2005 and
(ii) The Deed of Family Arrangement Cum Partition dated
28.08.2006.
37. It is contended that the Appellant, however, did not
join this re-arrangement, and his share under the original
oral partition remained untouched. Despite the fact that the
Appellant's share was unaffected, he filed a suit in O.S. No.
1478/2006 before the Senior Civil Judge, Devanahalli,
seeking a declaration and permanent injunction against the
Respondents 1 to 9, alleging that the two documents had
shifted his properties to a disadvantageous location by re-
aligning roads. Further, during the pendency of the suit, the
appellant and Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7 filed a compromise
petition under Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC, stating that the
documents in question did not affect the appellant's
interests. They sought dismissal of the suit against
Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7 while allowing it to continue
against the remaining Respondents. Respondents 1, 2, 5, 8,
and 9 opposed this partial compromise, arguing that the
dispute, involving common documents and in-severable
issues, could not be resolved selectively against a few
Respondents.
38. The learned Senior Counsels further contend that
the Trial court, recognizing the in-severable nature of the
dispute, deferred consideration of the compromise petition
until the final disposal of the suit. This order was challenged
by Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7 in W.P. No. 17232/2017,
which this Hon'ble Court dismissed on 19.11.2018, affirming
the Trial court's decision. Subsequently, Respondents 3, 4, 6,
and 7 filed a memo requesting the dismissal of the suit
against them based on an alleged settlement deed dated
25.01.2017. The Respondents 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9 opposed this
memo, arguing that it sought to dilute and circumvent the
orders of this Hon'ble Court and the trial court. The Learned
Senior Counsel further submits that the trial court, without
addressing the objections raised by the Respondents 1, 2, 5,
8 and 9, dismissed the suit against Respondents 3, 4, 6,
and 7. Aggrieved by this, the Respondents 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9
filed a Civil Revision Petition (C.R.P No. 11/2019), which,
along with other proceedings, was remanded for
reconsideration to the Trial Court. Upon rehearing, the trial
court rightly allowed the Respondents' application under
Order XII Rule 6 of CPC and dismissed the suit in its entirety,
which is now challenged in this appeal.
39. The Learned Senior Counsels finally emphasized
that the Appellant's admissions in the compromise petition
dated 01.02.2017, acknowledging the validity of the
challenged documents of 2005 and 2006 concerning
Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7, amount to an 'admission' under
Order XII Rule 6 of CPC. Given the in-severable nature of the
dispute, it is contended that the Appellant cannot selectively
pursue the suit against some Respondents (1,2,5,8 and 9)
while withdrawing it against others (3,4,6 and 7) and that
the trial court rightly recognized that the Appellant's
admission rendered the suit untenable and warranted
dismissal.
40. In furtherance of this argument, the learned Senior
Counsels for the Respondents Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 have
relied upon a judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of KARAM KAPAHI AND ORS. VS. LAL CHAND
PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST AND ORS, (AIR 2010 SC
2077). The relevant paragraphs of the judgement are
extracted thus:
"47. Prior to amendment the Rule read thus:
6. Judgment on admissions. - Any party may,
at any stage of a suit, where admissions of
facts have been made, either on pleadings or
otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment
or order as upon such admission he may be
entitled to, without waiting for the
determination of any other question between
the parties and the Court may upon such
application make such order or give such
judgment, as the Court may think just.
48. In the 54th Law Commission Report, an
amendment was suggested to enable the Court
to give a judgment not only on the application
of a party but on its own motion. It is thus clear
that the amendment was brought about to
further the ends of justice and give these
provisions a wider sweep by empowering
judges to use it 'ex debito justitial, a Latin
term, meaning a debt of justice. In our opinion
the thrust of the amendment is that in an
appropriate case, a party, on the admission of
the other party, can press for judgment, as a
matter of legal right. However, the Court
always retains its discretion in the matter of
pronouncing judgment.
49. If the provision of order 12 Rule 1 CPC is
compared with Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, it becomes
clear that the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC
is wider in as much as the provision of order 12
Rule 1 CPC is limited to admission by 'pleading
or otherwise in writing' but in Order 12 Rule 6
CPC the expression 'or otherwise' is much wider
in view of the words used therein namely:
'admission of fact...either in the pleading or
otherwise, whether orally or in writing'
41. The learned Senior Counsels for the Respondent
Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in both appeals have also relied on an
Apex Court judgment in the case of UTTAM SINGH
DUGGAL & CO. LTD. V. UNITED BANK OF INDIA AND
ORS, ((2000) 7 SCC 120)), (supra).
42. The learned Senior Counsels have further relied on
a judgment in THIRU JOHN AND ORS. V. RETURNING
OFFICER AND ORS. ((1977) 3 SCC 540)) to argue that a
clear and unequivocal admission by a party constitutes
substantive evidence, thereby shifting the burden of proof
onto the party making the admission. The relevant
paragraph is stated below:
"15. It is well settled that, a party's
admission as defined in Sections 17 to 20
fulfilling the requirements of Section 21 of
Evidence Act, is substantive evidence proprio
vigore. An admission, if clearly and unequivocally
made, is the best evidence against the party
making it and though not conclusive, shifts the
onus on to the maker on the principle that "what
a party himself admits to be true may reasonably
be presumed to be so and until the presumption
was rebutted the fact admitted must be taken to
be established".
43. The learned Senior counsels have further relied on
a judgment in the case of ARUN GENERAL INDUSTRIES
LTD. VS. THE RISHAB MANUFACTURERS (PR.) LTD.
AND ORS, (AIR 1972 MP 147) to explain the application of
Order 12 rule 6 under the CPC, the relevant paragraph from
the judgement is cited below:
"7. Applying these principles to the facts of the
present case, it would appear that the case
before me falls within the scope of Order XII,
Rule 6 CPC and no sufficient grounds have been
assigned to induce me to hold either that the
order under revision was unjust to the plaintiff
or that the learned Judge in making a direction
for delivery of possession to him 'without
prejudice to the rights of the parties' in terms
of that rule, had acted illegally or with material
irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction.
Relying upon Dularsingh's case (AIR 1937
Nag 184) (supra.) the learned counsel urged
that the pleadings can be dissected. There can
hardly be any quarrel with that proposition
which has already been stated earlier. It is
equally true that if an admission is made
subject to a condition, it must either be
accepted subject to that condition or not
accented at all. These principles, however, are
not applicable here. In this connection, the
learned counsel draws my attention to the
opening words of paragraph 15 of the plaint
which read "In case it is held", for his
submission that the right to the alternative
relief arises only upon an adjudication that
there was a frustration of the contract
consequent upon the alleged surrender of 99.36
acres of land and therefore the primary relief of
specific performance cannot be had. On the
contrary, the plaintiff's claim consists of two
distinct portions and nothing prevented the
defendant from confessing judgment to one
portion "without prejudice to the rights of the
parties" as regards the other portion of the
claim."
44. Thus, learned Senior counsel Sri Madhusudhan R.
Naik representing the learned counsel Shri Jagadeesh C.K.
for Respondent Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in RFA no. 1608 of 2020
and the learned Senior counsel Sri Shashi Kiran Shetty
representing the learned counsel Shri Jagadeesh C.K. for
Respondent Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in RFA no. 1589 of 2020,
emphasizes that the appellant's claim is based on a false
premise, as his share under the original partition was neither
disturbed nor affected. The appellant's selective approach to
pursuing the suit violates established principles of law and
fairness. Hence, it is their contention that the Trial court's
decision to dismiss the suit in its entirety, is legally sound
and does not warrant interference by this Hon'ble Court. On
these grounds, they pray for dismissal of both these appeals.
45. The Learned counsel Shri Vivek Holla representing
Respondent nos. 6 and 7 in both these appeals, emphasized
the Appellant's admissions in the compromise petition dated
01.02.2017, acknowledging the validity of the challenged
documents of (i) The Memorandum of Confirmation of Oral
Family Arrangement Cum Partition dated 18.11.2005 and
(ii) The Deed of Family Arrangement Cum Partition dated
28.08.2006, concerning only Respondents 3, 4, 6, and 7,
amount to an 'admission' under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC and
relied upon several judgments of various courts to
substantiate that the trial court was correct in recognizing
the Appellant's admission, thereby rendering the suit
untenable, and warranting its dismissal.
46. The learned counsel for Respondent Nos.6 and 7
relied upon the following case laws, to establish his
arguments:
i) KARAM KAPAHI AND ORS V. LAL CHAND PUBLIC
CHARITABLE TRUST AND ORS, ((2010) 4 SCC 753))
40. If the provision of Order 12 Rule 1 CPC is
compared with Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, it becomes
clear that the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC
is wider inasmuch as the provision of Order 12
Rule 1 CPC is limited to admission by "pleading
or otherwise in writing" but in Order 12 Rule 6
CPC the expression "or otherwise" is much wider
in view of the words used therein, namely:
"admission of fact ... either in the pleading or
otherwise, whether orally or in writing".
41. Keeping the width of this provision (i.e.
Order 12 Rule 6 CPC) in mind this Court held
that under this Rule admissions can be inferred
from the facts and circumstances of the case
(see Charanjit Lal Mehra v. Kamal Saroj
Mahajan [(2005) 11 SCC 279] , SCC at p. 285,
para 8). Admissions in answer to interrogatories
are also covered under this Rule (see Mullas's
Commentary on the Code, 16th Edn., Vol. II, p.
2177).
ii) BARNWAL MARKETING AND ORS VS. GEE PEE
INFOTECH PVT. LTD, (2015) 3 BC 652
"28. However, in the case of Peerless Abasan
Finance Ltd.-vs.-M/s. Gagan Polymers (P) Ltd.
reported in 2002 (4) ICC 194, in paragraph 6 of
the judgment K.J. Sengupta, J. held as follows:-
"I have considered the entire submissions made
in both the two applications, I would like to
pronounce combined judgment on the issue in
its entirety. As far as the plea of Mr. Mitra that I
cannot pronounce judgment relying on a
document being the letter which was written
before filing of the suit is concerned, I am of the
view that the aforesaid piece of evidence, which
is sought to be relied on admission, is an
acceptable admission within the meaning of
Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
as the word 'otherwise' means and includes any
piece of admission whether it is made before
filing the suit or subsequently."
iii) HSBC BANK VS. SILVERLINE TECHNOLOGIES
LTD. AND ORS, (AIR 2006 BOM 134)
"19. This leads me to the next ancillary issue
which has been argued by the learned Counsel
for the defendants that suit is based on
enforcement of judgment and decree and not
based on the settlement agreement arrived at
between the parties. It has been contended that
the settlement agreement being merged in the
judgment and decree of the foreign Court no
decree can be passed by this Court in the
present Notice of Motion. Insofar as aforesaid
contention is concerned, I find no substance in
the present case as held by the Apex Court in
the case of Uttam Singh Duggal and Co. Ltd.
(supra) that the Court is empowered under
Order 12, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code to
pass a decree on the basis of any admission
including the documents which are not forming
part of the proceedings. In the present case,
settlement agreement is very much a part of the
present proceeding. In para 5 of the said plaint,
the said agreement has been specifically
pleaded and the said settlement agreement is
annexed at Ex. A to the plaintiff.
In my opinion, merely because relief sought is
for decree in terms of judgment already entered
into by the American Court it cannot be stated
that this Court is not empowered to pass a
decree on the basis of admission contained in
the said settlement agreement which is forming
part of the suit proceeding.
20. I am of the opinion that there is a clear cut
unequivocal, unambiguous admission of liability
on the part of defendant No. 1 and 2 as
recorded in writing and therefore, plaintiffs are
entitled to decree and judgment under Order
12, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code for
decree on admission. Accordingly, I make the
present notice of motion absolute and decree
the suit for the sum of US 17,919,603.68 with
interest thereon @ 9% p.a. from the date of the
suit till payment and/or realisation. The Notice
of Motion and Suit both are disposed of
accordingly. No order as to costs.
iv) NEPC MICON LIMITED VS. M/S SIEMENS LTD,
((2004)1 MAD LJ 395))
"11 . As we stated earlier and at the risk of
repetition, we cannot but state that the
appellant/defendant admitted that Rs. 76 lakhs
and odd is due and payable by him by his letter
dated 16.9.94 and also in the Memorandum of
Compromise dated 29.11.95 as well as through
letters dated 29.12.95 and 2.1.96 followed by
issuance of two cheques for the said amount,
which when presented have bounced. It is,
therefore, clear that the appellant/defendant
has admitted his liability through the above
documents and the learned single Judge was
justified in passing a decree for the admitted
amount in terms of Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C.
The appeal deserves to be dismissed and it is,
accordingly, dismissed."
v) NATIONAL TEXTILE CORPORATION LTD. AND ORS.
VS. ASHVAL VADERAA (2010 SCC ONLINE DEL 544)
"17. It is settled law that admissions need not be
made expressly in the pleadings. Even on the
constructive admissions Court can proceed to
pass a decree in plaintiff's favour. In order to
invoke the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 CPC,
admissions de hors pleadings may also be
considered as is evident from the use of the word
"otherwise" in the said provision. See Shikhar
Chand v. Mst. Bari Bai MANU/MP/0018/1974 :
AIR 1974 MP 75; K. Kishore v. Allahabad Bank
MANU/DE/0910/1997 : 1997 (41) DRJ 698;
Uttam Singh Srivastava v. Sanjiv Tuli
MANU/DE/0424/2005 : 119 (2005) DLT 202;
Rama Ghei v. U.P. State Handloom Corporation
MANU/DE/0322/2001 : 91 (2001) DLT 386 and
R.N. Sachdeva v. R.L. Mahajan Charitable Trust
MANU/DE/0910/1997 : 1997 (41) DRJ 698. Such
admissions may be contained in documents
written or executed between the parties before
the action is brought or even from the statements
of parties recorded in the Court, including
statements recorded under Order X Rule 1 CPC.
Admissions may also be gleaned from vague and
nonspecific denials made in the pleadings and
documents, which on the face of it appear to
have been deliberately made in order to mislead
the Court, or gathered from the non-traversal of
specific averments made in the pleadings and
documents."
vi) PUNJAB AND SIND BANK VS. FRONTLINE
CORPORATION LTD (AIR 2023 SC 2786)
"26. We find that the present appeal deserves to
be allowed on another ground also. Undisputedly,
the jurisdiction which was exercised by the Division
Bench was analogous to the one exercised Under
Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It will be relevant to refer to the following
observations of this Court in the case of Wander
Ltd. and Anr. v. Antox India P. Ltd.
MANU/SC/0595/1990 : 1990 (Supp) SCC 727
"14 . The appeals before the Division Bench
were against the exercise of discretion by the
Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court
will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of
the court of first instance and substitute its own
discretion except where the discretion has been
shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or
capriciously or perversely or where the court had
ignored the settled principles of law regulating
grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An
appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be
an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not
reassess the material and seek to reach a
conclusion different from the one reached by the
court below if the one reached by that court was
reasonably possible on the material. The appellate
court would normally not be justified in interfering
with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely
on the ground that if it had considered the matter
at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary
conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by
the trial court reasonably and in a judicial the fact
that the appellate court would have taken a
different view may not justify interference with the
trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to
these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers
(Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [
MANU/SC/0001/1960 : (1960) 3 SCR 713 : AIR
1960 SC 1156]: (SCR 721)
"... These principles are well established, but as
has been observed byViscount Simon in Charles
Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton [1942 AC 130]'...the
law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an
order made by a judge below in the exercise of his
discretion is well established, and any difficulty
that arises is due only to the application of well
settled principles in an individual case."
The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to
this principle."
27. It has been held by this Court that the
Appellate Court would not interfere with the
exercise of discretion of the court of first instance
and substitute its own discretion except where the
discretion has been shown to have been exercised
arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where
the court had ignored the settled principles of law
regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory
injunctions. It has been held that an appeal against
exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on
principle. It has further been held that the
Appellate Court will not reassess the material and
seek to reach a conclusion different from the one
reached by the court below if the one reached by
that court was reasonably possible on the material.
It has been held that if the discretion has been
exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a
judicial manner the fact that the appellate court
would have taken a different view may not justify
interference with the trial court's exercise of
discretion.
47. Basing his submission on the above case laws, the
learned counsel Shri Vivek Holla for Respondent Nos.6 and 7
prays for dismissal of the present appeals as being without
any merit.
48. In the context of the contentions advanced by the
learned Senior Counsels and the respective learned counsel
for the parties, it is relevant to state that RFA 1589 of 2020
(arising out of O.S. No. 507 of 2010) was filed for partition
and separate possession of 104 acres out of 666 acres owned
by the late M.S. Ramaiah. The appellant sought a declaration
of rights and a share of 1/10th of the undivided property.
This suit was dismissed by the trial court based on Order XII
Rule 6 CPC, citing unambiguous admissions by the appellant
in compromise petitions and associated documents.
49. On the basis of the case on hand and the
contentions advanced by the respective counsel for both the
parties, the issues that would arise for consideration in the
above appeals are,
1) Whether the trial court's reliance on Order XII
Rule 6 CPC to dismiss the suits was legally
justified?
2) Whether the admissions by the plaintiff /
appellant herein in the compromise petition
constitute binding, unequivocal admissions under
the law?
50. In order to answer the issues, it is relevant to refer
to Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, which empowers Courts to
deliver judgments based on admissions only if, i) the
admission is clear, unequivocal, and unqualified; ii) No
further evidence is required to adjudicate the matter.
51. The Appellant, in the compromise petition dated
01.02.2017, explicitly admitted the validity of the 2005 and
2006 documents regarding defendants Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7,
including the title and possession of their respective
properties, particularly, paragraph 2 of the "compromise
petition" stated that defendants Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7 are
entitled to properties as per the 2005 and 2006 documents.
Further, the Appellant had agreed not to pursue claims
against them.
52. As regards admission, it is relevant to refer to a
judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of UTTAM
SINGH DUGGAL & CO. LTD. V. UNITED BANK OF INDIA,
((2000) 7 SCC 120)) :: (2000 SCC ONLINE SC 1134)
"12. As to the object of Order 12 Rule 6, we
need not say anything more than what the
legislature itself has said when the said provision
came to be amended. In the Objects and Reasons
set out while amending the said Rule, it is stated
that "where a claim is admitted, the court has
jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff
and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The
object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain
a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the
relief to which according to the admission of the
defendant, the plaintiff is entitled". We should not
unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as
the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy
judgment. Where the other party has made a
plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it
should apply and also wherever there is a clear
admission of facts in the face of which it is
impossible for the party making such admission
to succeed.
53. Further, in this regard, it is relevant to refer to a
judgment in the case of TIRATH RAM SHAH CHARITABLE
TRUST & ORS. VS. MRS. SUGHRA BI @ SUGHRA BEGUM
(DECD.) (2015 SCC Online Del 13655)
".. 11. The object of Order XII Rule 6 CPC is
that once there are categorical admissions made
by a party, then the litigation should not be
permitted to linger on unnecessarily and in
appropriate cases, on an application filed by a
party under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, asking for a
decree on the basis of the said admissions, the
Court ought to exercise its discretion and bring an
end to such litigation by passing appropriate
orders. The other consideration, while passing a
decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, is to ensure
that the judicial process is not abused and a
person entitled to relief, is granted such relief
without delaying the passing of a decree in
his/her favour, or making him/her go through the
rigorous of a trial. Para 12. In the case of
Charanjit Lal Mehra Vs. Smt. Kamal Saroj
Mahajan, MANU/SC/0191/2005 : (2005) 11 SCC
279, the Supreme Court has held that an
admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be
inferred from the facts and circumstances of the
case and that order XII Rule 6 CPC has been
enacted to expedite trial and where the Courts
find that the suit can be disposed of on such
admissions, it should not hesitate from doing so.
It is also relevant to refer to the observations of a
Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vijaya
Myne Vs. Satya Bhusan Kaura
MANU/DE/9812/2006 : 142 (2007) DLT 483,
where in the light of innumerable authorities on
Order XII Rule 6 CPC, it was held that admissions
can be constructive admissions and need not be
specific or expressive, which can be inferred from
vague and evasive denial in the written statement
while answering specific pleas in the plaint and
further, that admissions can even be inferred
from the facts and circumstances of a case."
54. It is also relevant to refer to a judgment in the case
of CHARANJIT LAL MEHRA AND ORS. VS. KAMAL
SAROJ MAHAJAN AND ORS.( AIR 2005 SC 2765),
wherein it is held thus:
"8. Learned counsel made an alternative
submission that the revision petition was not
maintainable and the lease deed is not registered
one and therefore, it is not maintainable. None of
these objections were raised by the defendants
before the learned Single Judge. Even before the
trial court, the non-registration of lease deed
(which did not prescribe any term) was not put in
issue, it is only devised now to some how defeat
and delay the eviction and possession of the
premises to the landlady. In fact, Order XII Rule
8 C.P.C. is enacted for the purpose of and in
order to expedite the trials it there is any
admission on behalf of the defendants or an
admission can be interred from the facts and
circumstances of the case without any dispute;
then, in such a case in order to expedite and
dispose of the matter such admission can be
acted upon....."
55. In the case of "USHA RANI JAIN VS. NIRULAS
CORNER HOUSE PVT. LTD." ((1998) 73 DLT 124), it is
held thus:
"18. The object of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is to
enable a party to obtain a speedy judgment, at
least, to the extent of the admissions of the
defendant to which relief the plaintiff is entitled
to. The rule permits the passing of the judgment
at any stage without waiting for determination of
other questions. It is equally settled that before a
court can act under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, the
admission must be clear, unambiguous,
unconditional and unequivocal. Admission in
pleadings are either actual or constructive. Actual
admission consists of facts expressly admitted
either in pleadings or in answer to
interrogatories."
56. The above decision was relied by the Delhi High
Court in the case of "Shivraj Yadav and Ors. vs. Arun
Nirula (02.08.2022 - DEL HC) 2022 SCC Online Del
2352"
57. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment in the
case of HIMANI ALLOYS LTD. VERSUS TATA STEEL LTD.,
((2011) 15 SCC 273)), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has
observed that the power under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is
discretionary, which should be exercised only when the
admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional. The Apex
Court, however, held that such a judgment under Order XII
Rule 6 CPC could be based on admissions contained in
documents other than pleadings, and in fact, observed that a
judgment could be given, even on the basis of an admission
contained in the minutes of a meeting. The relevant extracts
of the said decision read as under:
"4. Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code provides
that where admission of facts have been made in
the pleadings or otherwise, whether oral or in
writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit
either on the application of any party or of its
own motion and without waiting for the
determination of any other question between the
parties, make such order on give such judgment
as it may think fit, having regard to such
admissions."
58. Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, deals
with admissions and their admissibility. It states that,
"Admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the
person who makes them, or his representative in interest;
but they cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person who
makes them, except in the following cases--"
1. When it is of such a nature that, if the person making
it were dead, it would be relevant as between third
persons under Section 32.
2. When it consists of a statement of the existence of
any state of mind or body, relevant or in issue, made
at or about the time when such state of mind or body
existed, and is accompanied by conduct rendering its
falsehood improbable.
3. If it is relevant otherwise than as an admission.
59. On a careful consideration of the above case laws
and the definition of 'admission' under Section 21 of the
Indian Evidence Act, it is found that the Appellant's
admission in the compromise petition dated 01.02.2017
clearly falls within the scope of Section 21 as an admission,
against the interest of the Appellant himself. The admission
validates the 2005 and 2006 documents concerning the
rights of Respondents Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7, as a result
rendering the Appellant's subsequent claims untenable.
60. As per Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act itself,
these admissions are relevant and can be used against the
Appellant, especially as they were made in judicial
proceedings and are accompanied by corroborative evidence
(i.e., the compromise petition and family settlement deeds).
61. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to a judgment of
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of THIRU JOHN AND
ORS. VS. RETURNING OFFICER AND ORS. (AIR 1977 SC
1724), wherein the relevant portion of the said judgment
reads thus:
"15. It is well settled that, a party's
admission as defined in Sections 17 to 20 fulfilling
the requirements of Section 21, Evidence Act, is
substantive evidence proprio vigore. An
admission, if clearly and unequivocally made, is
the best evidence against the party making it and
though not conclusive, shifts the onus on to the
maker on the principle that "what a party himself
admits to be true may reasonably be presumed
to be so and until the presumption was rebutted
the fact admitted must be taken to be
established".
62. In this regard, it is also relevant to refer to Section
115 of the Indian Evidence Act, of 1872, which applies to
statements made in a deed, meaning the person who
executed the deed cannot later contradict the facts stated
within it. A party is stopped from denying facts admitted in
earlier proceedings. In the present case, the Appellant,
through compromise and subsequent actions, accepted the
rights of defendants Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7 as per the 2005 and
2006 documents. Thus, the Appellant cannot now assert
claims contrary to these admissions, particularly when the
admissions were recorded in a legal proceeding.
63. We find justification in the submission of the
learned counsel for the respective respondents that the Trial
court has rightly applied Order XII Rule 6 CPC, as admissions
which resolved the core issues of ownership and partition
between the Appellant and Respondents Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7.
The further trial would have been redundant and against the
judicial economy, as the Appellant's admissions eliminated
the need for evidence.
64. In the case of ELUMALAI AND ORS. VS. M.
KAMALA AND ORS.(2023 SCC ONLINE SC 84), it has
been held thus:
" ......The effect of the estoppel cannot be
warded off by persons claiming through the
person whose conduct has generated the
estoppel. We also find no merit at all in the
attempt to draw a distinction based on religion.
The principle of estoppel applies without such
distinction."
65. In the case of PARMA NAND VS. CHAMPA LAL
AND ORS., (AIR 1956 ALL 225), it has been held thus:
"11. Estoppel by deed is based on the principle
that when a person has entered into a solemn
engagement by a deed under his hand and seal
as to certain facts, he shall not be permitted to
deny any matter which he has so asserted. It is a
rule of evidence according to which certain
evidence is taken to be of so high and conclusive
nature as to admit of no contradictory proof
(Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition,
Vol. 13, Para. 513, page 456)."
66. For the purpose of consideration of the grounds
urged in these two appeals, it is relevant to refer to the
object and scope of Order XII Rule 6 CPC. It enables either
party at any stage of the suit to move for judgment on the
admissions which have been made by the other side.
However, the rule is permissive which does not preclude a
party to the proceedings but a judgment on admission is not
a matter of right but it is in the discretion of the Court. The
court must be satisfied that the admissions made are clearly
unambiguous, definite and unequivocal. Therefore, for
exercise of discretion by the Court under Order XII Rule 6 of
the CPC, the admission must be unequivocal. Where the
plaintiff relied on some documents to assert admission by the
defendant, but the said documents were of the character of
disputed documents, it was held that such disputed
documents cannot form the basis of admission for the
purpose of decree. Whereas in order to invoke the provision
of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, it is well-established that the
exercise of discretion of the Court in passing a decree or
judgment on admission, the Court has to satisfy its judicial
conscience. In a suit for partition, where in spite of
admission of relationship between the parties, there were
different issues which were yet to be decided, it was held
that the Trial Court rightly refused to exercise discretion in
an application filed under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. But a
decree can be passed under this rule on the basis of an
admission, whether it is contained in the pleadings or
elsewhere. Such an admission may be in writing or may be
oral. No particular form of admission is necessary. Keeping
in view the reasons stated in their application filed under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC and also keeping in view the pleadings
made in the suit initiated by the plaintiff against the
defendant, the same has to be considered by exercising
discretionary powers. Order XII Rule 6 CPC is an enabling
provision to both the parties to the proceeding and the object
of the rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy
judgment, at least to the extent of admission of the parties
to the proceeding.
67. Both the suits in O.S. No. 507 of 2010 and O.S. No.
1478 of 2006 involved disputes regarding the same
properties and parties, with overlapping admissions by the
Appellant. The Appellant's admissions in the compromise
petition dated 01.02.2017 acknowledged the validity of the
2005 and 2006 documents for defendants Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7
and his disinterestedness in prosecuting claims against these
defendants. The trial court's reliance on Order XII Rule 6
CPC was proper, as the admissions were unequivocal and
settled the primary issues.
68. In the instant appeals, both the learned counsel for
the appellant and also the learned Senior Counsel for the
respective respondents have facilitated plethora of decisions
for consideration as regards the scope of Order XII Rule 6 of
the CPC on admission.
69. In O.S.No.1478/2006, paragraph 30 of the
judgment and decree rendered by the Court of the Senior
Civil Judge & JMFC, Devanahalli, reveals that the plaintiff /
appellant had filed objection to I.A.No.31 filed by defendant
Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9. It is pertinent to note that though the
plaintiff filed objections to I.A.No.31 under Order 12 Rule 6
CPC filed by Defendants 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9, but on the memo of
the defendants 3, 4, 6 and 7, the plaintiff had endorsed that
he had no instructions to file objections. Even in the course
of arguments, the plaintiff's counsel had made the same
submission. The Trial Court observed that it need not wait
for the plaintiff's counsel until he obtained the plaintiff's
instructions. Further, it held that it was clear that the
plaintiff did not oppose the memo filed by the defendant
nos.3, 4, 6 and 7. On the other hand, the plaintiff admitted
the settlement with defendant Nos.3, 4, 6 and 7 in the
compromise petition under Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC. This
clearly showed the conduct of the plaintiff / appellant herein.
Hence, the question that arose before the Trial Court was
whether the statement of the plaintiff / appellant came
within the purview of Order XII Rule 6 of CPC.
70. Order XII Rule 6 CPC relates to judgments on
admission where the admission of facts have been made
either on pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing,
the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the
application of a party or of its own motion and without
waiting for the determination of any other question between
the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it
may think fit, having regard to such admissions. A plain
reading of Order XII Rule 6 CPC makes it abundantly clear
that it is open to the Court to pass a judgment on admissions
in the pleadings or otherwise. The said provision clearly
indicates that it is open to the Court to pronounce judgment
on statement made by the parties and documents on record
can be taken note of dehors the pleadings. Admission may
be made either specific or constructively. Further, Section
17 to 20 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 also has been
referred by the learned Trial Judge in the said judgment.
71. The proceeding in O.S.No.1478/2006 had been
initiated by the plaintiff / appellant for declaration to declare
that the registered document termed as "Memorandum of
confirmation of oral family arrangement cum partition dated
18.11.2005 bearing No.DNH-1-04097-2005-06 and deed of
family arrangement cum partition dated 28.08.2006
registered as No.475/2006-07 are not binding on the plaintiff
/ appellant. The said document was marked as Exhibit D4
and Exhibit D5 in the recital of the deed dated 18.11.2005,
which has also been considered by the Trial Court while
rendering the judgment and decree on admissions. These
are the contentious contentions urged by the learned Senior
Counsel for the parties in the rank of respondents in both
these appeals.
72. Whereas in the aforesaid proceedings, the plaintiff
had admitted the shares allotted to the defendant Nos.3, 4, 6
and 7 under the registered family arrangements dated
18.11.2005 and 28.08.2006 by confirming the same in the
compromise petition as well as the registered agreement
dated 25.01.2017 entered by the plaintiff with Defendant
Nos.3, 4, 6 and 7, which amounted to admission on the part
of the plaintiff regarding validity of those documents. Since
the said documents cannot be divided separately between
the defendants 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 on the one hand and
defendants 3, 4, 6 and 7 on the other hand, hence, the Trial
Court held that there was a clear admission on the part of
the plaintiff as the benefit of confirmation given by the
plaintiff enures to the benefit of defendant Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and
9 also. Hence, the Trial Court held that the suit will not
survive against the defendants 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in view of the
admission of the plaintiff. The same has been held by the
Court of the Senior Civil Judge & JMFC, Devanahalli in the
proceedings in O.S.No.1478/2006.
73. In respect of the proceedings in O.S.No.507/2010,
the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
in UTTAM SINGH DUGGAL & Co. Ltd. Vs. UNITED BANK
OF INDIA AND OTHERS (2000 (7) SCC 120) (supra),
the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that the learned Trial
Judge took the view that the pre-requisites of Order 12 Rule
6 CPC has been satisfied in this case and that on a plain
reading of the resolution of the Board dated 30.05.1990,
there could be no doubt that the petitioner had made a clear,
unambiguous and unconditional acknowledgement of its
liability to the Bank. The object is to enable a party to obtain
speedy judgment of the lis in between the party to the
proceedings. Thus, in the case on hand, the pre-requisites
for an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is satisfied and
hence, the Trial Court came to a conclusion that the suit
would not survive as against Defendant Nos.1, 2, 5, 8 and 9.
Hence, the Trial Court had held that in view of the admission
of the plaintiff, the dispute involved in the suit is resolved.
Therefore, both the memo dated 06.12.2018 and I.A.No.12
under Order XII Rule 6 deserved to be allowed. Hence, the
Trial Court held that the suit would not survive as against the
defendants 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9 in view of the admission of the
plaintiff and hence the Trial Court had rightly held that no
more dispute subsists between the parties and accordingly,
dismissed the suit of the plaintiff in O.S.No.507/2010.
74. The admissions by the Appellant in the compromise
petition constituted a deliberate and conscious
acknowledgement of facts, binding on him under Section 115
of the Evidence Act and Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The
admissions preclude the need for further evidence or trial,
ensuring judicial efficiency. Hence, we are of the considered
opinion that the Trial court's judgment aligns with
established legal principles and the dismissal of the suits
does not affect the rights of defendants Nos. 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9
to assert their claims independently. Hence, the issues
framed above, are answered in the affirmative and the
dismissal of O.S. No. 507 of 2010 and O.S. No. 1478 of 2006
by the Trial court under Order XII Rule 6 CPC requires to
upheld for the reasons that, i) the admissions by the plaintiff
/ appellant in the compromise petition are binding, clear, and
unequivocal; ii) the application of Order XII Rule 6 CPC is
justified, as further trial would have been redundant; iii) The
trial court's judgment aligns with established legal
precedents and ensures procedural fairness and judicial
economy.
75. In view of the aforesaid reasons and findings, it is
deemed appropriate to state that there is no illegality or
absurdity committed by the Court of the Senior Civil Judge,
Devanahalli in rendering the judgment and decree dated
20.02.2020 in O.S. No. 1478/2006 and O.S.No. 507/2010
which are under challenge in both the appeals. Accordingly,
we proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
i) The appeal filed by the appellant in RFA
No.1589/2020 as well as the connected appeal in RFA
No.1608/2020 are hereby dismissed.
ii) The judgment and decree dated 20.02.2020 passed
by the Senior Civil Judge & JMFC, Devanahalli in
O.S.No.507/2010 is hereby upheld.
iii) The judgment and decree dated 20.02.2020 passed
by the Senior Civil judge & JMFC, Devanahalli in
O.S.No.1478/2006 is also upheld.
SD/-
(K.SOMASHEKAR)
JUDGE
SD/-
(VENKATESH NAIK T)
JUDGE
KS
