(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B. MURALIDHARA PAI)
1. The accused in S.C. No. 5020/2019 on the file of
2. The facts of the case in nutshell are as under:
2.1 On 10.01.2019 at about 1.00 a.m., one Sri Raghu
lodged a complaint before the Yellapur Police, requesting
initiation of legal action against the accused on the allegation
that the accused had murdered his daughter, Kumari Nayana,
on 09.01.2019 between 9.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m., either by
assaulting her or by administering pesticide. In the said
complaint, the complainant further narrated that the accused
had previously committed certain offences against his wife and
daughters prior to the incident dated 09.01.2019.
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2.2 Based on the said complaint, Yellapur Police
registered a case against the accused in Crime No.10/2019 for
the offences under Sections 324 and 302 of IPC and took up
investigation.
2.3 PW-6 Sri Dinesh, HC No.744, received the
complaint, registered the case and handed over the papers to
PW-17 for the investigation in the case. PW-17 Sri Manjunath,
Police Inspector of Khanapura, has conducted entire investigation
in the case except on 12.1.2019, the day on which he was
deputed to provide security for PSI Examination.
2.4 On 12.1.2019 PW-16 Sri Chandrashekar, CPI of
Joida, was the Investigating Officer in the case. On that day he
said to have recorded voluntary statement of the accused and
drawn seized mahazar at the instance of the accused.
2.5 After conclusion of investigation, charge sheet was
laid against the accused for offences under Sections 302, 324,
323, 498A, and 201 of the IPC. The offences being triable by
Court of Sessions, the case was committed and then made over
to the trial court. The said court framed charges against the
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accused for the above mentioned offenses, who abjured his guilt
and claimed trial.
2.6 The prosecution examined as many as 18
witnesses, exhibited 32 documents and 5 material objects to
prove its case. Statement of the accused was recorded under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and he was confronted with the
allegations as appearing against him in the prosecution case.
The accused denied the same and claimed to be innocent. The
accused adduced his defense by stepping into witness box as
DW-1 and got marked a document as Ex.D1.
2.7 Upon hearing the arguments advanced on both
sides and considering the evidence on record, the trial court
proceeded to convict and sentence the accused for the offences
under Sections 323, 302 and 201 of the IPC and acquitted him
of the charges framed under Sections 498A and 324.
2.8 The accused has preferred this appeal questioning
his conviction and order of sentence for the offences under
Sections 323, 302 and 201 of IPC. No one has challenged the
acquittal of the accused for the offences under Sections 498A
and 324 of the Indian Penal Code.
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3. Sri Megharaj H. Kabadi, learned Counsel appearing
for Sri Raibagi Ganapatsa Ramakrishna, learned Counsel for the
Accused, vehemently contended that the conviction of the
accused by the trial court is based purely on conjectures and
surmises. He submitted that the prosecution case is totally
based on circumstantial evidence and that the prosecution could
not lead reliable evidence to establish the complete chain of
incriminating circumstances required to prove guilt of the
accused. He further submitted that the trial court has
committed grave error in placing reliance on the so-called
suspicious conduct of the accused and alleged failure to give
proper explanation, ignoring the position of law. On these
grounds, learned Counsel for Accused pleaded to accept the
appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and acquit the
accused of the charges leveled against him.
4. Per contra, Sri M.B.Gundwade, learned Additional
State Public Prosecutor, fervently opposed the submissions
advanced by the counsel appearing for the accused. He
submitted that the material witnesses, who hail from a rustic
background, have given natural and truthful evidence regarding
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the incident and suspicious conduct of the accused corresponding
to the time of the incident. He further submitted that trivial
inconsistencies in evidence of these witnesses here and there,
were bound to occur and no advantage thereof can be gained by
the accused. He also submitted that the accused has failed to
explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him
and urged that the conviction recorded by the trial court needs to
be maintained.
5. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
submissions advanced on both sides in the case and have
carefully gone through the impugned judgement and the
materials available on record.
6. The following admitted facts emerge from the record:
a) The accused and PW-2 Smt. Mangala are the husband
and wife. They had three children by name Kum.
Bhavana, Kum. Nayana and Kum. Sahana.
b) During the relevant period, the eldest daughter i.e.,
Kum. Pavana, was a student of 7th Standard in Morarji
Residential School at Yellapura. Other two daughters
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were studying in 5th and 3rd Standard respectively in
Hemmadi Kumbra Kannada School.
c) The accused was residing in a house at Kumbra along
with his wife/PW-2 and two daughters i.e., Nayana and
Sahana.
d) On account of marital discord, about 7-8 months prior
to the date of incident, the wife/PW-2 went away from
the house by leaving her two daughters with the
accused, without disclosing her whereabouts.
e) On 26.12.2018 the accused gave a complaint to
Yellapur Police about missing of his wife/PW-2. A report
was also published in the newspaper in that regard.
Later, on 3.1.2019 PW-2 met the police and disclosed
the reason for which she is living separately at Karwar.
f) On 4.1.2019, PW-2 and the accused were summoned to
Karuna Women Counselling Centre at Karwar in
connection with their marital discord. In response, the
accused had gone to the counseling centre along with
his daughters and returned to his home with them.
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g) On 9.1.2019 in the evening, PW-3 Kum. Sahana came
to the house of PW-1 and asked him to come to their
house since Kum. Nayana was vomiting and that bad
smell was coming.
h) Accordingly, PW-1, his elder sister Parvati and his
mother went to the house of the accused at 6.00 pm.
They found Kum. Nayana had vomited and that she was
dead. There was pungent smell of pesticide in the
house of the accused.
i) During the intervening night i.e, on 10.1.2019 at 1.00
am, PW-1 lodged the complaint with Yellapur Police
expressing suspicion against the accused.
7. The disputed facts of the case appearing from the
record are as follows:
a) During the counseling at Karwar, the children of the
accused were asked about their views - with whom they
wish to go and it is said that the children expressed their
wish to go with mother, because of which the accused
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was angry with his children on the ground that they did
not express their willingness to go with him.
b) On 5.1.2019 at about 10.30 p.m., the accused beat his
two daughters with broom stick and as such the father of
PW-1, who is the elder brother of the accused, went to
the house of the accused, brought the children to his
house and then, left them back in the house of the
accused in the evening of next day.
c) When PW-1, his elder sister Parvati and his mother went
to the house of the accused on 9.1.2019 at 6.00 pm, the
accused was weeping in the first room by holding Kum.
Nayana.
d) When PW-1 made an attempt to inquire with the accused
about the incident, the accused ran away from the place.
e) The accused who was angry on his children because they
expressed their wish to go with their mother during
counseling, on 9.1.2019 between 9.00 am to 3.00 pm,
murdered the deceased by causing assault on her or by
forcibly administering poison.
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8. The case of the prosecution as projected in the
charge sheet, in brief, is as follows: On 17.06.2018 at about
7:30 p.m., the accused abused his wife in filthy language and
inflicted mental cruelty upon her, for having given birth to three
female children. Thereafter, on 05.01.2019 at about 10:30 p.m.,
the accused beat his daughters i.e., the deceased Nayana and
CW-9 with broom stick, as they did not express their willingness
to go along with the accused when they were asked to express
their view before a counseling centre. Subsequently, in the said
background thinking that if he kills the deceased, who was
suffering from congenital heart disease, he could lead his life
comfortably than spending all his earnings for her treatment, on
09.01.2019 at about 4:30 p.m., the accused forcibly
administered the pesticide in the house, which was brought for
termite treatment, and thereby murdered the deceased. It is
further alleged that the accused tried to destroy the traces and
conceal evidence of the crime by wiping off the vomit of the
deceased.
9. The materials available on record clearly indicate
that there is no dispute with regard to the cause of death of the
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deceased. PW-4 - Dr. Abhijith, who conducted the post-mortem
examination, based on his observations and the report received
from the RFSL, Mangaluru, stated that the cause of death of the
deceased appears to be due to poisoning by an insecticide
belonging to the pyrethroid group. The opinion so expressed by
PW-4 stands corroborated by the post-mortem report and the
FSL report, which are marked as Ex.P7 and Ex.P-25 respectively.
10. Undisputedly, the prosecution case entirely rests on
circumstantial evidence to establish the allegation against the
accused as there was no eye witness to the incident of alleged
forcible administration of pesticide to the deceased. As such
before proceeding further, we find it beneficial to refer to some
of the important decisions, which lay down legal position
governing the field in cases based on circumstantial evidence.
11. In Vaibhav v. State of Maharashtra, reported in
[(2025) 8 SCC 315], as under:
"29. In criminal jurisprudence, it is a time-tested
proposition that the primary burden falls upon the
shoulders of the prosecution and it is only if the
prosecution succeeds in discharging its burden beyond
reasonable doubt that the burden shifts upon the
accused to explain the evidence against him or to
present a defence.
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31. In law, there is a significant difference in the
evidentiary burden to be discharged by the prosecution
and the accused. Whereas, the former is expected to
discharge its burden beyond reasonable doubt, the
latter is only required to prove a defence on the anvil of
preponderance of probabilities. If the accused leads
defence evidence in the course of a criminal trial, the
same ought to be tested as probable or improbable in
the facts and circumstances of the case.
33. ... It is trite law that in a case based on
circumstantial evidence, motive is relevant. However, it
is not conclusive of the matter. There is no rule of law
that the absence of motive would ipso facto dismember
the chain of evidence and would lead to automatic
acquittal of the accused. It is so because the weight of
other evidence needs to be seen and if the remaining
evidence is sufficient to prove guilt, motive may not
hold relevance. But a complete absence of motive is
certainly a circumstance which may weigh in favour of
the accused. During appreciation of evidence wherein
favourable and unfavourable circumstances are sifted
and weighed against each other, this circumstance
ought to be incorporated as one leaning in favour of the
accused.
37. ... Ordinarily, in cases involving direct evidence of
the commission of crime, motive has little role to play
as presence or absence of motive is immaterial if the
commission of the crime stands proved through other
evidence. Even otherwise, motiveless crimes are not
unknown to the society.
38. However, in cases purely based on circumstantial
evidence, the absence of motive could raise serious
questions and might even render the chain of evidence
as doubtful. It is so because the presence of motive
does the job of explaining the circumstantial evidence.
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43. ...It is a time-tested proposition of law that when a
court is faced with a situation wherein two different
views appear to be reasonably possible, the matter is to
be decided in favour of the accused. The benefit of a
counter possibility goes to the accused in such cases...".
12. In Subramanya Vs State of Karnataka reported in
(2022 INSC 1083), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that
".... Even if it is believed that the accused had a motive
to commit the crime, the same may be an important
circumstance in a case based on circumstantial
evidence but cannot take the place as a conclusive
proof that the person concerned was the author of the
crime. One could even say that the presence of motive
in the facts and circumstances of the case creates a
strong suspicion against the accused but suspicion,
howsoever strong, cannot be a substitute for proof of
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt..."
13. In Munikrishna @ Krishna Etc. Vs State by Ulsoor
Police Station [2022 INSC 1322], Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
relying on Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and another Vs State of
Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1952 SC 343, held that
"12. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the Court has
to scrutinize each and every circumstantial possibility,
which is place before it in the form of an evidence and
the evidence must point towards only one conclusion,
which is the guilt of the accsused. In other words, a
very heavy duty is cast upon the prosecution to prove
its case, beyond reasonable doubt. ...".
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14. In Nusrat Parveen Vs State of Jharkhand [2024
INSC 955] Hon'ble Apex Court has held that
"17. It is a cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that Section 106 of the Evidence Act shall
apply and the onus to explain would shift on to the
accused only after the prosecution succeeds in
establishing the basic facts from which a reasonable
inference can be drawn regarding the existence of
certain other facts which are within the special
knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to
offer a proper explanation about the existence of the
said other facts, the Court can draw an appropriate
inference against the accused. In cases based on
circumstantial evidence, the accused's failure to provide
a reasonable explanation as required under Section 106
of the Evidence Act can serve as an additional link in
the chain of circumstantial evidence - but only if the
prosecution has already established other essential
ingredients sufficient to shift the onus on to the
accused. However, if the prosecution fails to establish a
complete chain of circumstances in the first place, then
the accused's failure to discharge the burden under
Section 106 of the Evidence Act becomes irrelevant...."
15. With regard to the incident dated 09.01.2019, PW-3
has stated that on the particular day the deceased was at home
owing to her illness, and when PW-3 was at school, the accused
came there at about 3:30 p.m. and took her home saying that
the deceased was unwell. PW-3 has stated that upon returning
home, she noticed the deceased vomiting. She further stated
that as the accused asked her to take bath, she went and took
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bath and on returning once again she found the deceased
vomiting. PW-3 stated that thereafter the accused had sent her
to call CW-11 and CW-1.
16. It is to be noted that in her examination-in-chief,
PW-3 has clearly stated that she does not know whether the
accused had forcibly administered any pesticide to the deceased.
In spite of such categorical statement made by PW-3, the
prosecution has neither disputed the said statement of PW-3 nor
chose to cross examine her, by treating her as a hostile witness.
In view of the same, it is to be held that the testimony of PW-3
in no way helpful for the prosecution in proving the guilt of the
accused.
17. PW-1 - Sri Raghu, is the de-facto complainant. In
his evidence, PW-1 has stated that on the particular day in the
afternoon while he was at home, PW-3 came there and informed
him that the deceased was vomiting and requested him to come
to their house. PW-1 further stated that accordingly he went to
the house of the accused at around 5:00 p.m. along with his
mother and elder sister, and found the deceased lying dead.
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18. The prosecution has treated PW-1 as a hostile
witness and subjected him to cross-examination. Nevertheless,
no material admission supportive of the prosecution case has
been elicited from his mouth. The prosecution contends that
since the accused is the paternal uncle of PW-1, he has turned
hostile to support and protect the accused. In support of this
contention, the prosecution relies upon the complaint, the
further statement dated 12.01.2019, and the statement of PW-1
recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., all of which are marked
as Exs.P-1 to P-3 respectively.
19. This Court has carefully examined the contents of
Exs. P1 to P3. In the complaint it is stated that on going to the
house of the accused, PW-1 had found the accused sitting in the
first room, weeping and holding the deceased, who was dead. It
is further stated that when PW-1 attempted to enquire with the
accused, he ran away from the spot. The complaint further
records the information gathered by PW-1 from PW-3 and about
the things noticed/observed by PW-1 at the place. The further
statement of PW-1 recorded on 12.01.2019 mentions that the
facts narrated therein were based on the information allegedly
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revealed by the accused when he was brought to the place of
crime. Whereas, the statement of PW-1 recorded under Section
164 of Cr.P.C. contains a mention that the police, upon visiting
the spot, had opined that the accused might have poisoned the
deceased. Thus, the statement of PW-1 recorded under Section
164 Cr.P.C. gives an impression that the story of forcible
administration of the pesticide to the deceased by the accused
surfaced only after the police visited the spot. In the above
circumstances, it is to be held that PW-1 has deposed before the
Court only regarding the facts within his knowledge.
20. The prosecution has examined the mother of the
deceased and the wife of the accused namely Smt. Mangala as
PW-2. In her deposition, PW-2 stated that upon making an
enquiry, PW-3 informed her that the accused had administered
poison to the deceased. A similar version is reflected in the
deposition of PW-12 - Smt. Parvati, the mother of PW-2. A
careful perusal of the evidence of PW-3 reveals that first of all
PW-3 has not made any such statement before the court. The
prosecution has produced the statements of PW-2 and PW-12
recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at
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Ex.P4 and Ex.P19 respectively. Significantly, these statements
recorded on 29.01.2019, are silent regarding any information
allegedly received from PW-3.
21. It is also borne out from the record and the
depositions of PW-2 and PW-12 that they had reached the scene
of occurrence only around 11:00 p.m. on 09.01.2019 or
thereafter. If at all PW-3 had indeed possessed such vital
information, it would be natural for her to disclose the same
forthwith to PW-1 or to other persons present at the place of
occurrence. The absence of any such disclosure at the earliest
opportunity militates against the veracity of the version put
forth by PW-2 and PW-12. Consequently, their statements,
being inconsistent with the other evidence on record, do not
inspire confidence to be safely relied upon.
22. The definite case of the prosecution is that the
accused, being enraged by the conduct of his children who
expressed their desire to go with their mother before the
counseling and having been fed up over incurring all his
earnings on the medical treatment of the deceased, formed an
intention to eliminate her, and in furtherance of the said
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intention, he allegedly administered pesticide to the deceased
forcibly.
23. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the
deceased was suffering from a congenital heart ailment. The
document produced by the defense at Ex.D-1 reveals that the
deceased had undergone a VSD closure surgery at the age of
three years at the Jayadeva Institute of Cardiovascular Sciences
and Research, Bengaluru. Although PW-2 has stated in her
evidence that the deceased had completely recovered after the
surgery, the materials on record coupled with the admissions
elicited from the witnesses and the suggestions put to the
accused during cross-examination, indicate that the deceased
continued to remain under regular medical follow-up. It is further
an admitted position that the accused had borne all the expenses
incurred towards the medical treatment of the deceased for
nearly 8 years without any grumble. The admissions of the
prosecution witnesses go to show that due to marital discord
though PW-2 was living separately from accused for about 9
months, the accused was looking after his minor children by
keeping them with him. In the above said circumstances, this
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Court holds that the prosecution has not adduced sufficient
evidence on record to prove alleged motive for the accused to
commit the murder of the deceased.
24. The impugned judgment reveals that the learned
Trial Court has proceeded to hold the accused guilty of
committing the murder of the deceased more on the basis of
conjectures and surmises rather than on any cogent and reliable
evidence establishing his involvement in the alleged crime. The
conviction appears to rest substantially on the purported
voluntary statement of the accused marked as Ex.P32 and the
seizure mahazar marked as Ex.P14, wherein the Trial Court has
concluded that the pesticide bottle marked as M.O.4 was
recovered at the instance of the accused. However, a plain
reading of Ex.P14 discloses that though it contains a reference
to the Investigating Officer having recovered a 250 ml pesticide
bottle bearing the label "Karate Syngenta" from the place
allegedly shown by the accused, there is no indication
whatsoever that any residue or leftover pesticide was found in
the said bottle allegedly recovered at the instance of the
accused.
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25. The reasons assigned by the learned Trial Court
indicate that it has drawn an adverse inference against the
accused on the ground that he failed to offer any explanation as
to how the pesticide bottle marked as M.O.4 came to be found
outside the cowshed, lying under a tree, when he had himself
stated that he had kept it inside the cowshed. The Trial Court
further held that there was no possibility of the deceased having
accessed M.O-4 from the cowshed and consumed the same,
particularly in the absence of any evidence to show that the
accused had informed the deceased about the presence of the
pesticide therein. A bare reading of this reasoning, however,
reveals that such a conclusion has been reached purely on
assumptions and conjectures rather than on the basis of any
substantive evidence available on record.
26. Moreover, the contents of Ex.P13 make it apparent
that the Trial Court has not taken into consideration all relevant
aspects before arriving at such a finding. Ex.P13, being the spot
mahazar drawn on 10.01.2019 at the scene of the incident,
clearly records that the Investigating Officer had seized a packet
containing pesticide powder bearing the label 'Deltnion
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Malathion DP' found lying beneath a TV table, allegedly used by
the accused for committing the offence. If the contents of
Ex.P13 are to be accepted as true, there was no justifiable
reason for the Trial Court to conclude that the deceased had no
occasion to become aware of the pesticide or to exclude the
possibility of her access to it.
27. The Trial Court has observed that the accused was
well aware that the pesticide in question was of a poisonous
nature and, therefore, was required to be kept securely and out
of the reach of children so as to avoid any possibility of
accidental consumption. No exception can be taken to this
observation of the Trial Court. However, proceeding on the basis
of this premise, the Trial Court has further concluded that such
awareness on the part of the accused necessarily implies that he
must have himself taken out the said pesticide and administered
it to the deceased. This conclusion, in the considered view of
this Court, is unsustainable, as it is founded not on any direct or
circumstantial evidence but merely on inference unsupported by
the material on record.
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28. The Trial Court has also drawn an adverse inference
against the accused on the ground that he raised a false plea
that he was not present in the house at the relevant point of
time, and that he did not make any complaint or petition to the
police regarding the alleged consumption of poison by the
deceased, and that such conduct of the accused raises a
suspicion against him. During the course of arguments, the
learned Additional State Public Prosecutor has sought to support
the impugned judgment by contending that the accused failed to
substantiate the plea of alibi raised by him during the trial of the
case.
29. It is true that during the course of his evidence, the
accused has deposed that he was not present in his house at the
relevant point of time, as he had been to the residence of one
Sri Shekhar Krishnagouda for the purpose of seeking financial
assistance. It is also correct that the accused has not chosen to
examine the said Sri Shekhar Krishnagouda in support of his
version. However, it is a well-settled principle of criminal
jurisprudence that the burden cast upon the accused to
substantiate his defence is not of the same rigorous standard as
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that placed upon the prosecution. The accused is only required
to establish the probability of his defence and is not bound to
prove his case beyond all reasonable doubt. Therefore, mere
non-examination of Sri Shekhar Krishnagouda, by itself, cannot
be held as fatal to the defence version, especially when the
explanation offered by the accused appears probable and
consistent with the surrounding circumstances.
30. Admittedly, the incident in question occurred on
09.01.2019 at about 4:30 p.m. The accused, being the father of
the deceased and the sole earning member of the family, cannot
be reasonably expected to remain present in the house
throughout the day. Therefore, the mere assertion of the
accused that he was not in the house at the relevant point of
time cannot, by itself, be a ground to doubt or discard his
version. On the contrary, the burden squarely lay upon the
prosecution to adduce cogent and convincing evidence to
establish that the accused was indeed present in the house at
the time when the deceased allegedly consumed or was
administered poison. It is only upon such foundational proof
being adduced by the prosecution that the question of the
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accused offering an explanation would arise. Unless and until the
prosecution discharges its primary burden of proving the
presence and guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
absence of an explanation from the accused cannot be held
against him.
31. It is also pertinent to note that as per Ex.P9, the
place of occurrence is situated at a distance of about 35 kilo
metres from the concerned Police Station. The statement of PW-
1 reveals that upon his arrival at the scene, the accused was
found in a state of grief within the house. It is further seen that
PW-1 proceeded to the Police Station and lodged the complaint
only around midnight, i.e., at about 01:00 hours, although the
incident had taken place at approximately 4:30 p.m. Having
regard to the above factual circumstances, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the mere conduct of the accused, as
noticed by the witnesses, cannot form a legitimate basis for
drawing any adverse inference against him.
32. In the present case, the trial Court has recorded a
finding that even according to the version of the accused, the
smell of the poison/pesticide in question was extremely pungent
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and unbearable. On that basis, the trial Court opined that it
would be highly improbable for a child aged about 11 years to
voluntarily consume such a substance and thereby commit
suicide. The trial Court further observed that an eleven-year-old
child would not ordinarily possess the requisite knowledge,
understanding, or intent to resort to suicide by consuming a
poisonous substance, and consequently, ruled out the possibility
of suicide. However, in the considered view of this Court, the
reasoning so assigned by the trial Court does not appear to be
sustainable. These observations, standing by themselves, cannot
form a valid or sufficient basis to hold the accused guilty of the
alleged offences. Upon a comprehensive evaluation of the
material on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has
utterly failed to establish the accusation of forcible
administration of pesticide by the accused.
33. It is crucial to note that though PW-3 stated that the
accused called her from school and when she came home, she
saw the deceased vomiting. But, PW-3 has not whispered
anything about the information gathered from the deceased.
Thus, it seems the deceased did not tell PW-3 that the accused
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had forced her to consume the pesticide. Thus, aforesaid factual
aspects, when examined in their proper perspective,
unmistakably reveal the failure of the prosecution in establishing
its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence adduced falls
short of the degree of conviction required to substantiate the
accusation leveled against the accused. Moreover, the facts and
surrounding circumstances of the case do not exclude the
plausible hypothesis of the deceased having committed suicide.
It is a well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that when
two views are reasonably possible on the evidence on record,
the one favourable to the accused must be adopted. In the light
of a careful and anxious consideration of the entire material
placed on record by the prosecution, we are of the considered
view that the evidence relied upon to fasten the guilt of the
accused under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is far from
convincing.
34. The prosecution has also invoked Section 201 of the
Indian Penal Code against the accused on the allegation that he
had wiped out the vomit of the deceased with the intention of
destroying the evidence of the crime. First of all, there is no
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reliable or cogent evidence on record to establish that it was the
accused who had in fact cleaned or removed the vomit from the
place of occurrence. Even assuming that the accused had done
so, this Court finds no material to infer that such an act was
committed with a deliberate intention to cause the
disappearance of evidence or to screen him from legal
punishment. The mere act of cleaning or removing the vomit or
dirt within one's own household cannot by itself be construed as
conduct motivated by a criminal design. To attribute such
intention in the absence of any supporting evidence would
indeed be unwarranted and speculative.
35. Similarly, the prosecution has invoked Section 323 of
the Indian Penal Code against the accused on the allegation that
he had assaulted the deceased and PW-3 with a broomstick. It is
the contention of the prosecution that the testimony of PW-3,
when read in conjunction with the medical evidence on record,
establishes this accusation. It is true that as per the medical
evidence, certain simple injuries such as minor abrasions were
noted during the medical examination of both the deceased and
PW-3. However, it remains undisputed that the deceased and
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PW-3 were school going children at the relevant point of time,
and the nature of the injuries recorded could very well have
been sustained in the ordinary course of daily activities. In these
circumstances, and in the absence of convincing and reliable
evidence to connect the accused with the alleged acts of assault,
this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt
of the accused under Sections 201 and 323 of the Indian Penal
Code beyond reasonable doubt.
36. Finally, though the present case was tried for
offences punishable under Sections 302, 324, 323, 498A, and
201 of the Indian Penal Code, this Court is of the considered
opinion that it is not a fit case to invoke the provisions of either
Section 357 or Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The applicability of Section 357 Cr.P.C. does not arise since the
accused stands acquitted of all the charges framed against him,
leaving no scope for awarding any compensation under the said
provision. Likewise, Section 357A Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked in
the absence of any credible material to establish that the
deceased Kumari Nayana, met with her death as a consequence
of any offence committed against her. On the contrary, the facts
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and circumstances emerging from the record do not completely
exclude the possibility of the deceased having committed
suicide.
37. In the result, this Court proceeds to pass the
following :
ORDER
(i) The appeal is allowed.
(ii) The judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 11.07.2025 passed in S.C.
No.5020/2019 by the learned First Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Karwar sitting at
Sirsi, is set aside.
(iii) Consequently, the accused is acquitted from
the charges framed under Sections 302, 323
and 201 of IPC and ordered to be set at liberty
forthwith.
(iv) The office is directed to send a communication to
concerned jail authority to release the accused
forthwith, if he is not required for any other case.
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(v) The office is further directed to return the trial court
record to concerned court forthwith.
Sd/-
(R.DEVDAS)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(B. MURALIDHARA PAI)
JUDGE
VB /CT-AN
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 2
