[Cites 6, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Mr Ajay Kumar vs Sri P Shashikumar on 12 December, 2025
Author: H.P.Sandesh
Bench: H.P.Sandesh
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 12th DAY OF DECEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P. SANDESH
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.1183 OF 2022 (INJ)
BETWEEN:
MR. AJAY KUMAR
S/O LATE NAVARA
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
R/AT No.1-S-21-1583
WIFELESS COMPOUND
NEAR URVA MARKET
BOLOOR VILLAGE
MANGALURU-575 003.
... APPELLANT
(BY SRI RAJASHEKAR S., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI P. SHASHI KUMAR
S/O PUTTASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
R/AT No.856, 31ST 'A' CROSS
JAYANAGAR, THILAK NAGAR
BENGALURU-560 041.
2 . SMT. BHAVANI
W/O LATE SHANKARA
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS
R/AT NEAR SHRI DEVI COLLEGE
BALLALBAGH, MANGALURU-575 003.
... RESPONDENTS
2
(BY SRI P.P. HEGDE, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. VENKATESH SOMAREDDI
M/S. PP HEGDE ASSOCIATES FOR C/R1;
V/O DATED 12.09.2022 NOTICE TO R2 IS DISPENSED WITH)
THIS R.S.A. IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF CPC
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 13.07.2022
PASSED IN RA.No.133/2020 ON THE FILE OF THE I ADDITIONAL
SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND CJM, MANGALURU, D.K, ALLOWING
THE APPEAL AND SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE
DATED 25.02.2020 PASSED IN OS No.241/2014 ON THE FILE OF
THE III ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, MANGALURU, D.K.
THIS R.S.A. HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 08.12.2025 THIS DAY, THE COURT
PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
CAV JUDGMENT
1. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and
also the learned counsel for the respondents.
2. The factual matrix of the case of the plaintiff
before the Trial Court is that, this appellant is in permissive
possession of the suit schedule property and though he
agreed to quit and vacate the suit schedule property, he did
not vacate the same. Hence, he was forced to file a suit for
permanent injunction and mandatory injunction. The
contents of the plaint is that the schedule property
comprised of a house bearing Door No.1-S-21-1583 which
is shown as schedule 'B' property in the plaint. The
defendant was residing in the schedule 'B' premises prior to
the execution of sale deed in favour of this plaintiff by way
of permissive occupant under his erstwhile owner. During
execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, the
defendant had promised him that he would vacate and
handover the schedule 'B' premises to the plaintiff within
four months. Accordingly, the plaintiff had also permitted
the defendant No.1 to reside in the schedule 'B' premises.
As the defendant did not comply with the promise made by
him, the plaintiff by revoking the permission which was
granted earlier had asked the defendant to vacate the
premises which is not been complied with by the defendant
No.1 till the date of filing of this suit and though the plaintiff
subsequently revoked the permission by issuing legal notice
dated 20.01.2014. The defendant has continued to be in
possession of the premises which amounts to un-authorized
possession and further defendant has also un-authorizedly
put up construction in the pavement/roadway abutting to
the schedule 'A' premises.
3. In pursuance of the suit summons, the
defendant appeared and filed the written statement that
there was an agreement of sale in existence in his favour
and also he questioned the title of the plaintiff. As the
defendant had turned hostile towards the plaintiff, the
plaintiff has approached this Court.
4. The defendant No.1 in his written statement
denied that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule
property and no sale deed dated 01.10.2012 as stated by
the plaintiff in his plaint got registered in favour of the
plaintiff and as such, the plaintiff was never put in
possession of the plaint schedule property. However, he
admits the existence of schedule 'B' premises and contend
that, he is in possession of the said house. He denied the
very averment of the plaint that he is not in permissive
possession under erstwhile owner as alleged by the plaintiff
and also has denied that there was no correspondent
between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 to the effect
that this defendant had agreed to vacate and handover the
schedule 'B' house premises in favour of the plaintiff within
four months. It is also contended that, when there arise no
licensor or licensee relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant, the question of plaintiff revoking the permission
will not arise and he does not have any right to revoke the
permission. It is contended that, originally the plaint
schedule premises belongs to Smt. Bhavani and the same
was granted to her by the Government under the provisions
of PTCL Act and the alleged sale deed executed by said
Bhavani in favour of the plaintiff without obtaining
permission from the competent authority is bad in law and
the same will not convey any right. It is also contended
that, he had entered into agreement of sale with erstwhile
owner on 17.05.2011 by paying entire sale consideration
amount and she could not obtain the required permission
from the concerned authority to transfer the schedule
property in favour of this defendant. Hence, he could not
get the sale deed registered in his favour. It is also his
case that the said erstwhile owner also had executed power
of attorney on 31.05.2011 and also a registered Will on
31.05.2011 in his favour. By virtue of the agreement of
sale, he is in possession of the property and defendant is in
actual possession of the same and the same is also an
irrevocable one. It is also contended that Bhavani had no
valid right to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.
The defendant No.1 also took the defence that Court fee
paid is insufficient and there is no jurisdiction to file the suit
for the relief of mandatory injunction. It is contended that
bare injunction suit is not maintainable without seeking an
order of declaration.
5. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the
plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and got marked the
documents as Exs.P1 to P6. On the other hand, the
defendants got examined the general power of attorney
holder as D.W.1 and got marked the documents as Exs.D1
to D4.
6. The Trial Court, after considering both oral and
documentary evidence placed on record, answered all the
issues as 'negative', in coming to the conclusion that the
plaintiff is not the owner of the suit schedule property and
comes to the conclusion that the defendant No.1 is not in
permissive possession of the suit schedule property and the
plaintiff is not entitled for the relief of possession of 'B'
schedule property and also not entitled for prohibitory
injunction with regard to 'A' schedule property and also not
proved the interference made by the defendant No.1 in
peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint 'A'
schedule property of the plaintiff.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of
the dismissal of the suit, an appeal is filed before the First
Appellate Court in R.A.No.133/2020, wherein the grounds
urged by the plaintiff before the First Appellate Court is that
the very approach of the Trial Court is erroneous and the
Trial Court has failed to understand the principles of
mandatory injunction and the findings of the Trial Court on
the issues are opposed to the evidence. It is also contended
that the Trial Court has committed serious illegalities by
dismissing the suit of the plaintiff, in coming to the
conclusion that there is prohibition under the PTCL Act and
the same has resulted in miscarriage of justice.
8. Based on the grounds urged in the appeal, the
First Appellate Court also, formulated the points whether
the plaintiff has proved that defendant No.1 is in permissive
occupation of the suit 'B' schedule property and it is lawfully
terminated, whether the plaintiff proves the alleged
interference of the first defendant in his peaceful possession
and enjoyment of the suit 'A' schedule property and
whether the judgment and decree of the Trial Court
requires interference.
9. The First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of
both oral and documentary evidence placed on record,
answered all the points as 'affirmative', in coming to the
conclusion that the plaintiff has proved that the defendant
No.1 is in permissive possession of the premises and his
possession is also terminated by issuing legal notice and
also comes to the conclusion that, in respect of 'A' schedule
property, there was interference by the defendant No.1 and
the Trial Court also committed an error in not appreciating
both oral and documentary evidence placed on record and
also extracted Sections 4 and 5 of the Karnataka Schedule
Castes and Schedule Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of
Certain Lands) Act, 1978 and Rules 1979 ('the Act' for
short) and extracting the same, the First Appellate Court
comes to the conclusion that the provisions of Sections 4
and 5 of the Act attracts to the case on hand and the
transaction between the parties is erroneous and set aside
the judgment of the Trial Court and allowed the appeal,
granting the relief of mandatory injunction directing the
defendant to vacate and handover vacant possession of the
schedule 'B' premises to the plaintiff within one month and
also granted prohibitory injunction restraining the
defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the plaint 'A' schedule property.
10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of
the First Appellate Court, this second appeal is filed before
this Court. This Court earlier heard the matter when the
matter was listed for admission and at the time of
admission itself, disposed of the same vide judgment dated
17.02.2023 setting aside the judgment and decree of the
First Appellate Court by reversing the judgment of the Trial
Court. However, given liberty to the plaintiff to approach an
appropriate forum seeking for an order of eviction against
the defendant No.1.
11. Being aggrieved by the order passed by this
Court, the plaintiff/appellant filed the Civil Appeal before
the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.13084/2024. The Apex
Court set-aside the order only on the ground that no
substantive question of law is framed nor answered while
allowing the appeal and on the above said ground only,
judgment of this Court is set-aside and matter has been
remitted to this Court for fresh consideration and also
direction is given to expeditiously hear the appeal
preferably within a period of 6 months from the date of
order. This Court having considered the order passed by the
Apex Court vide order dated 25.06.2025 framed the
following substantive question of law admitting the second
appeal:
(1) Whether the First Appellate Court
committed an error in granting the relief of
mandatory injunction directing the
defendant and all persons claiming through
or under him to vacate and handover
vacant possession of the schedule 'B'
premises without considering the material
on record?
(2) Whether the First Appellate Court
committed an error in granting the relief of
permanent prohibitory injunction
restraining the defendant causing
interference with the peaceful possession
and enjoyment of 'A' schedule property by
the plaintiff or constructing any structure in
the plaint 'A' schedule property or in the
pavement/roadway abutting to the plaint
'A' schedule property and the same is
against the material available on record?
(3) What order?
12. The counsel appearing for the appellant/1st
defendant in the second appeal would vehemently contend
that the main case of the plaintiff before the Trial Court
while seeking the relief of mandatory injunction and
permanent injunction that the appellant is in permissive
possession and inspite of his request, he did not vacate the
premises and sought for mandatory injunction. The counsel
would vehemently contend that the very suit was resisted
by rising several grounds in the written statement. Firstly,
ownership is disputed and secondly, suit for the relief of
mandatory injunction and permanent injunction is not
maintainable without seeking the relief of declaration.
Thirdly, it is contended that the property belongs to SC/ST
and the same is a granted land and there cannot be any
sale without the permission. It is also contended that there
was an agreement and GPA in favour of defendant No.1 and
also 2nd defendant had executed a Will in favour of
defendant No.1. It is contended that defendant is having a
subsisting right over the suit schedule property. It is further
contended that plaintiff is only a money lender and
defendant No.1 availed the loan, but, created the document
of sale deed and obtained the sale deed fraudulently. The
counsel would vehemently contend that
defendant/appellant has examined the power of attorney
holder as D.W.1 and also marked document Ex.D.1 to
Ex.D.4 and Trial Court rightly dismissed the suit answering
Issue No.1 to 3 as negative. However, the First Appellate
Court committed an error in allowing the appeal and
reversed the judgment. The reasoning of the First Appellate
Court that the appellant is in permissive possession is not
based on the material. Hence, counsel would vehemently
contend that suit itself is not maintainable and also cannot
seek the relief of mandatory injunction and First Appellate
Court committed an error in granting the relief of
permanent injunction. The counsel would vehemently
contend that P.W.1 categorically admitted in his cross-
examination that he is a tenant and paid the rent at the
rate of Rs.1,500/- per month for a period of 6 months and
the same is not a stray admission as contended by the
respondent. The counsel would vehemently contend that
suit for bare injunction and mandatory injunction is not
maintainable. The counsel also would vehemently contend
that this Court earlier while disposing of the appeal, held
that there is a clear admission that the appellant is a tenant
and hence, suit for mandatory injunction and permanent
injunction is not maintainable and defendant No.1 has
continued the possession as tenant and taken note of
admission and hence, question of he is in permissive
possession does not arise and hence, this Court has to allow
the second appeal and set-aside the order of the First
Appellate Court.
13. The counsel in support of his argument
reiterated the grounds which have been urged earlier that
is, the order passed in W.P.No.50983/2015 dated
05.01.2021 and brought to notice of this Court paragraph
No.7 with regard to the issue involved between the parties,
whether the plaintiff proves that she is a joint owner of the
plaint schedule property along with other legal heirs of Late
Thomas Velgas as alleged in the plaint. The Court given the
finding that the finding recorded by the Trial Court that the
plaintiff has correctly valued the suit schedule property with
regard to the first relief of mandatory injunction under
Section 26(a) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits
Valuation Act, 1958 is erroneous and plaintiffs are liable to
value the suit under Section 26(a) of the Act, particularly
when there is a issue with regard to the plaintiff's title over
the suit schedule property within the meaning of Section
26(a)(ii) of the Act.
14. The counsel also relied upon the order of this
Court reported in ILR 2002 KAR 3512 in case of Pushpa
Shivaprasad V/s C.G.Sarojamma and others wherein
this Court has held that in a suit for injunction where the
defendant disputes the title of plaintiff, fee shall have to be
computed ad valorem and half of the market value of the
subject matter of the suit or Rs.10,000/- whichever is
higher. The counsel re-iterates the principles of these two
judgments which earlier he had quoted.
15. Per contra, the counsel appearing for the
respondents in his argument would vehemently contend
that Ex.P.6 is the sale deed dated 01.10.2012 and
consideration was also paid and counsel would vehemently
contend that not only house property, it also includes 5
cents of land. The counsel would vehemently contend that
this defendant is a signatory to the sale deed and
specifically contended that he was in permissive possession
with earlier erstwhile owner and he is a licensee and even
made the payment of rent also and the same is towards a
licensee fee and not as a tenant. The counsel would
contend that Ex.P.2-notice was given and reply was given in
terms of Ex.P.5. The counsel also vehemently contend that
in the written statement, no plea as he was a tenant and
whatever the amount paid is not as a rent. The defendant
also examined power of attorney holder as D.W.1 and
whatever the amount is paid is towards the license charges,
not as a rent and at no point of time rent is paid and finding
of Trial Court is erroneous and Appellate Court rightly re-
appreciated the material available on record and passed the
order.
16. The counsel in support of his argument, he relied
upon the judgment reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1665 in
case of Kishundeo Rout and Other V/s Govind Rao and
others and brought to notice of this Court discussion made
in paragraph No.24, 25 and 26 wherein it is held that
determination in a case should be founded upon the case
either to be found in the pleadings as involved in or
consistent with the case thereby made out.
17. The counsel also relies upon the judgment
reported in (2018) 11 SCC 652 in case of Shivaji Balram
Haibaitti V/s Avinash Maruthi Pawar and brought to
notice of this Court paragraph No.23 to 26 and contend that
the Court has to record findings only on the issues which
are the part of pleadings and which parties are contesting
the case and must be discussed with regard to its factual
foundation in the pleading and invite finding on such plea
and respondent never claimed that he was in possession of
the suit shop as tenant of the appellant's predecessor in
title. On the other hand, the respondent had asserted his
ownership right over the suit shop on the strength of his
long adverse possession. In paragraph No.26 held that the
High Court, however, did not undertake this exercise and
rather affirmed these findings when it did not consider it
proper to frame any substantive question of law. The
respondent did not adduce any evidence to prove that he
was in possession of the suit shop as tenant of the
appellant's predecessor in title. In order to prove the
tenancy between the respondent and the appellant's
predecessor in title, it was necessary for the respondent to
have file rent receipts/lease deed, etc., and also to have
examined his landlord who, according to him, had inducted
him as a tenant in the suit shop. It was not done. Hence,
counsel would contend that this judgment is aptly
applicable to the case on hand.
18. The counsel also relied upon the judgment
reported in (2003) 8 SCC 740 in case of Kashinath
(Dead) through LR's V/s Jaganath and brought to
notice of this Court paragraph No.17 wherein held that
when evidence is not in line with the pleadings and is at
variance with it, adverse inference has to be drawn and the
evidence cannot be looked into or relied upon.
19. In reply to this argument, the counsel appearing
for the appellant would vehemently contend that the
citations in case of Kishundeo Rout and Shivaji Balram
Haibaitti which have been relied upon are not applicable to
the case on hand and the same is with regard to the
adverse inference and adverse possession of land. The very
case of the plaintiff is inconsistent and plaintiff cannot take
inconsistence, but, defendant can take any inconsistent
defence. The counsel would vehemently contend that
Kashinath's case that is 3rd citation helps the appellant and
not helps the respondent.
20. Having heard the learned counsel for the
appellant, the learned counsel for the respondents and also
considering the substantive question of law framed by this
Court, this Court has to analyze the material available on
record. Now, the question before this Court is whether the
First Appellate Court committed an error in granting the
relief of mandatory injunction directing the defendant and
all persons claiming through are under him to vacate and
hand over vacant possession of the 'B' scheduled premises
without considering the material available on record and
whether the First Appellate Court committed an error in
granting the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction
restraining the defendant causing interference with the
peaceful possession and enjoyment of 'A' schedule property
by the plaintiff or constructing any structure in the plaint 'A'
schedule property or in the pavement/road way abutting to
the plaint 'A' schedule property. Having considered the
substantive question of law framed by this Court and also
the material available on record, it is not in dispute that
plaintiff has sought for the relief of mandatory injunction
against the appellant on the ground that appellant is in
permissive possession and earlier to the purchase of the
property from the erstwhile owner and also continued the
possession with a promise that he would vacate the
premises within 4 months. The main contention of
defendant No.1 in the written statement is that not only
with regard to the relief is concerned and also the Court
fee. The Court was not having jurisdiction to entertain suit
for mandatory injunction. In keeping the pleadings of the
plaintiff and also the defendant, it is not in dispute that this
appellant is in possession of the suit 'B' schedule property.
The appellant also does not dispute the fact that he was in
possession and he took the possession from the erstwhile
owner. It is also the contention that there was a sale
agreement in his favour and consequent upon the same,
power of attorney and Will was executed. But, the fact is
that there was a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and the
appellant was also a signatory to the sale deed and sale
deed was executed in the year 2012. Inspite of he was
having a sale agreement, power of attorney and Will, he
had affixed his signature on the sale deed. Hence, it is very
clear that he had not claimed any right based on those
documents having full knowledge and consciously he had
signed the said sale deed and what made him to become
the signatory to the sale deed and no explanation is offered
by the appellant and hence, he cannot disputes the title.
The sale deed-Ex.P.6 is very clear that it contains his
signature. The relief is also sought for only mandatory
injunction as well as permanent prohibitory injunction. This
Court earlier also in detail discussed all these issues
involved between the parties and comes to the conclusion
that no need to file a suit for declaratory relief when the
appellant himself is signatory to the sale deed and
mandatory injunction and prohibitory injunction is
maintainable. This Court also in elaborately discussed with
regard to the Court fee is concerned. The very case of the
plaintiff before the Court is that he had agreed to vacate,
but he did not vacate the same, but, his contention is that
he is in permissive possession and P.W.1 was also
subjected to cross-examination and particularly in the
cross-examination in paragraph No.24 while answering
Issue No.2, whether the plaintiff proves that defendant
No.1 is in permissive possession of the suit schedule
property. The Trial Court taken note of answer elicited from
the mouth of P.W.1 wherein he categorically admitted that
the defendant, defendant's elder sister and Bhavani were
residing. In further cross-examination, admitted that
defendant, defendant's elder sister and Bhavani were also
residing and other sisters have not been made as parties,
because the defendant has continued the possession as a
tenant.
21. It is also important to note that in the further
cross-examination, answer is elicited from the mouth of
P.W.1 that defendant was paying a rent of Rs.1,500/- per
month and he used to pay the rent by way of cash and he
had paid the rent for a period of 6 months, after purchase
of the suit schedule property. It is also important to note
that P.W.1 categorically admitted that before purchasing
the property, he had inspected the property and further he
says that defendant only informed him that he is a tenant.
When such admissions are given, the same is not a stray
admission as contended by the respondent. Hence, it is
clear that case of P.W.1 is that defendant is in permissive
possession, but, answer is elicited from the mouth of P.W.1
that he is a tenant. Hence, it is very clear that question of
seeking the relief of mandatory injunction does not arise.
Though not pleaded by the defendant in the written
statement that he is a tenant, but, the very admission on
the part of P.W.1 takes away the case of the plaintiff with
regard to the permissive possession is concerned. The suit
is in effect one for possession though couched in the form
of a suit for mandatory injunction as what would be given
to the plaintiff in case he succeeds in possession of the
property to which he may be found to be entitled, however
the Court has to take note of the principles laid down in the
judgment and also the facts and circumstances of each case
since the counsel appearing for the respondent has relied
upon the judgment of Apex Court in Sant Lal Jain's case. No
doubt the counsel while arguing the case also relied upon
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kishundeo Rout
and others wherein Apex Court held that the determination
in a case should be founded upon the case either to be
found in the pleadings as involved in or consistent with the
case thereby and no doubt the pleadings is the basis for a
case, but, once the plaintiff pleaded that the defendant is in
permissive possession, but, during the course of cross-
examination, he categorically admitted that he was a tenant
and even prior to the purchasing of the property he had
visited the property and defendant only informed him that
he is a tenant and also clear admission that he was a tenant
and paid the rent and no doubt the other judgment in
Shivaji Balram's case which was referred supra also, it is
held that Court has to record findings only on the issue
which are the part of pleadings on which parties are
contesting the case, so also in a Kashinath's judgment,
when the evidence is not in line with the pleadings and is at
variance with it, advance inference has to be drawn and the
evidence cannot be looked into or relied upon and the same
is also applicable to the case of both plaintiff and defendant.
When the evidence is not in line with the pleadings and is at
variance with it, adverse inference has to be drawn, but, in
the case on hand, plaintiff pleads that defendant is in
permissive possession, but, during the course of cross-
examination, he gave the evidence that he was a tenant
and also adverse inference has to be drawn not only against
the plaintiff and even against the defendant also. The Court
has to take note of the scope and demeanor of the cross-
examination and there is an unequivocal admission on the
part of the plaintiff that he was a tenant. When such being
the case, the very contention of the respondents' counsel
that finding must be only based on the pleadings cannot be
accepted. This Court already pointed out that possession is
not in dispute, but nature of possession is the crux of the
issue. Though plaintiff claims that he is in permissive
possession in order to prove the same, even not examined
the previous owner. But, unequivocal admission is very
clear that he was a tenant and not only he came to know
about the same, even prior to the purchasing of the
property, through defendant only, he came to know that he
was a tenant and subsequently paid the rent as a tenant for
a period of 6 months and subsequently, he had purchased
the property and all these materials clear that he is a
tenant. The issue involved between the parties also is
whether the Court can grant the mandatory injunction and
when there is a clear admission that he is a tenant and he
continued as a tenant and paid the rent of Rs.1,500/- per
month for a period of 6 months and if it is stray admission
then there would have been a force in the argument of
respondents' counsel, but, the same is not the stray
admission as contended and hence, the Civil Court has no
jurisdiction to grant the relief of mandatory injunction and
permanent injunction and ought to have sought for the
relief of eviction against the appellant. When the Civil Court
has no jurisdiction to entertain the mandatory injunction
and permanent injunction, there cannot be any injunction
against the appellant also and the same would be under
due process of law only and eviction must be made under
due process of law invoking the jurisdiction of the Court to
grant the relief. Hence, I am of the opinion that First
Appellate Court committed an error in ignoring the material
of unequivocal admission on the part of P.W.1 that there is
an existence of tenant and landlord jural relationship
between the parties and question of granting the relief of
mandatory injunction does not arise. Hence, I answer the
substantive question of law as affirmative that First
Appellate Court committed an error and it requires
interference. However, this Court has taken note of the fact
that suit was filed in the year 2014 and almost parties
before the Court to get the possession for more than a
decade and a direction may be given to the Trial Court in
case if any eviction proceedings is initiated and the same
has to be considered within a time bound period of one
year.
22. In view of the discussions made above, I pass
the following:
ORDER
i) The Second Appeal is allowed.
ii) Impugned judgment of the First Appellate Court
passed in R.A.No.133/2020 dated 13.07.2022 on
the file of I Addl. Senior Civil Judge & CJM,
Mangaluru, D.K is set-aside. Liberty is given to
the plaintiff to approach an appropriate forum
seeking for an order of eviction/ejection against
the defendant No.1. If such proceedings is
initiated, the Trial Court is directed to dispose of
the said proceedings within a time bound period
of one year.
Sd/-
(H.P. SANDESH)
JUDGE
RHS
