Karnataka High Court

D Krishna vs The Deputy Commissioner on 24 October, 2024

Author: N S Sanjay Gowda

Bench: N S Sanjay Gowda

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                                                          WP No. 4152 of 2024




                           IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                             DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2024

                                               BEFORE
                             THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE N S SANJAY GOWDA
                               WRIT PETITION NO. 4152 OF 2024 (SCST)
                      BETWEEN:

                      1.    D KRISHNA
                            S/O LATE DEVEGOWDA
                            AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS

                      2.    H G MANJULA
                            W/O D KRISHNA
                            AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
                            RESIDING AT

                      3.    K KISHORE
                            S/O D KRISHNA
                            AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS

                      4.    K KEERTHI
                            S/O D KRISHNA
                            AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS
Digitally signed by
KIRAN KUMAR R               ALL ARE RESIDING AT
Location: High
Court of Karnataka
                            H. NO 1337, 3RD CROSS
                            2ND STAGE, SRIRAMPURA
                            MYSURU CITY, MYSORE DISTRICT 570030

                            PRSENTLY RESIDING AT
                            NO 626, C BLOCK
                            VIJAYANAGAR 3RD STAGE
                            NEAR CAFE CORNUCOPIA
                            MYSORE 570030.
                                                                ...PETITIONERS
                      (BY SRI. R.S.RAVI, SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR,
                          SRI. PRATHEEP K C., ADVOCATE)
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                                     WP No. 4152 of 2024




AND:

1.   THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
     MYSORE
     MYSORE DISTRICT 570030.

2.   THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
     MYSURU SUB DIVISION
     MYSORE DISTRICT 570030.

3.   MANCHAIAH
     S/O LATE CHAMUNDI
     MAJOR

4.   KALANINGAYYA
     S/O LATE CHAMUNDI
     MAJOR

5.   CHAMARAJU
     S/O LATE CHAMUNDI
     MAJOR

6.   SHANKARA
     S/O LATE CHAMUNDI
     MAJOR

     R-3 TO R-6 ARE R/AT NO 218/1,
     ALOKA ROAD, ILAVALA HOBLI
     MYSORE TALUK,
     MYSORE DISTRICT 570030.

7.   PRABHAKARA
     S/O LATE CHANANKEGOWDA
     MAJOR
     R/AT H NO 1572
     VIJAYANAGARA, 2ND STAGE
     DEVARAJA MOHALLA, MYSORE CITY
     MYSORE DISTRICT 570030.

8.   MOHAN KUMAR
     S/O MARIGOWDA, MAJOR
     R/AT H NO 669/1
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                                             WP No. 4152 of 2024




     2ND MAIN VIJAYNAGAR, 3RD STAGE
     DEFVARAJA MOHALLA
     MYSORE CITY, MYSOER DISTRICT 570030
                                          ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. SAVITHRAMMA., AGA FOR R-1 & R-2;
    SRI. N.B.N.SWAMY., ADVOCATE FOR R-3 TO R-6;
    SRI. D.C.DEEPAK., ADVOCATE FOR R-7 & R-8)

    THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION PRAYING
TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 02.01.2024 IN CASE
NO. PTCL 12/22 (RD005-0000390920) PASSED BY R-1
(ANNEXURE-J), ETC.

    THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM:    HON'BLE MR JUSTICE N S SANJAY GOWDA

                         ORAL ORDER

1. On 28.02.1980, an application filed for resumption by

Chamundaiah @ Chamundi, the grantee was rejected by the

Assistant Commissioner. Chamundaiah chose to accept the

order and did not file an appeal.

2. About 27 years thereafter, the children of Chamundaiah

filed one more application for resumption. The Assistant

Commissioner rejected said application. Being aggrieved by this

rejection, the children of Chamundaiah preferred an appeal in

the year 2022 i.e., nearly after 12 years.

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3. The Deputy Commissioner by the impugned order has

proceeded to accept the application for resumption and has

allowed the appeal. The Deputy Commissioner has recorded a

finding that the alienation was made in contravention of the

terms of the grant and, therefore, resumption was a necessity.

4. One Laxmanadasa had purchased the property through a

registered Sale Deed dated 27.05.1961 from Chamundaiah and

the father of the petitioners had, in turn, purchased the same

from Laxmandasa on 26.05.1975.

5. The petitioners, having succeeded to the title of the

property, are before this Court contending that the second

application for resumption could not have been entertained by

the Deputy Commissioner. In support of their contention, they

relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in

W.A.No.3855/2019 disposed of on 06.11.2019.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the grantee, on the other

hand, contended that the principle of res judicata cannot be

applied to proceedings under the Karnataka Scheduled Castes

and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands)

Act ("the PTCL Act"). He places reliance on the decision of the

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Division Bench of this Court in the case of G.V.Venkatareddy1

in support of his contention.

7. The facts, as stated above, are not in dispute. In other

words, it is not in dispute that the first application made by the

grantee himself for resumption was dismissed and had attained

finality. It is also not in dispute that his children, after a period

of 27 years, made an application for resumption for the second

time and on that second application being rejected, they

preferred an appeal 12 years thereafter.

8. A Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal

No.3855/2019 has held as follows:

"10. In this context, it is relevant to advert to one aspect of the matter, which may not have been dealt with by the authorities as well as by the learned Single Judge but the same may be relevant for the purpose of deciding the maintainability of the present proceedings. As stated supra, the proceedings under sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act having been originally initiated by the appellant and the sixth respondent in the year 2007, the same

G.M.VENKATAREDDY & ANOTHER VS. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, KOLAR DISTRICT & OTHERS - ILR 2012 3168

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was dismissed by the Assistant Commissioner. The appeal filed before the Deputy Commissioner was dismissed as withdrawn pursuant to a memo dated 16th June 2014 (Annexure-E to the writ petition) under which, the appellant and the sixth respondent have unconditionally withdrew the appeal. Under these circumstances, having unconditionally withdrawn the appeal as well as the earlier proceedings initiated by them, the appellant and the sixth respondent could not have initiated the fresh proceedings once again for a second time under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act on the same set of facts on the same cause of action in respect of the same subject matter, i.e., the schedule property."

9. It is therefore clear that the Division Bench has

categorically stated that when a proceeding under the PTCL Act

is withdrawn by the grantee, a fresh proceeding cannot be

initiated for the second time under Section 4 of the PTCL Act. In

other words, the implication of this order is that an application

for resumption can be filed only once and a party cannot file an

application for the second time and that too after his first

application was rejected.

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10. Reliance placed on the decision in the case of

G.M.Venkatareddy (supra) cannot be of any avail since the

Division Bench has merely stated as follows:

"ii) The first contention is that since the appellant Chikkamma died during the pendency of the restoration application filed by the heirs of the original allottee and before it came to be allowed on 28.03.2010 by the Assistant Commissioner, the order has to be set-aside.

The contention had been rejected by the Deputy Commissioner as well as by the Writ Court on the ground that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply in their full rigour to the proceedings under the PTCL Act. We find no error in this conclusion especially keeping in perspective the fact that under Section 5 of the PTCL Act suo moto powers have been conferred on the Assistant Commissioner for taking possession of the land, after evicting all persons in possession thereof, if the said Authority is satisfied that transfer of any granted land is null and void and alienated in contravention of the terms of the grant. So far as the suo moto power is concerned, no period of limitation has been prescribed. The legal position is that the true owner, in this case the State, can always take appropriate steps for resumption of possession unless this relief is barred. The relief becomes barred only in the event that adverse possession is established. The appellants who are the heirs of the purchaser have neither pleaded nor proved the essential ingredients of adverse possession. It is significant that the dispute was already sub judice before

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the expiry of the thirty years from the date of purchase. We hasten to reiterate that the legal position is not that after the expiry of thirty years, the plea of adverse possession is automatically established. The second ground advanced before us is that the application filed by the heirs of the original allottee for restoration of land was barred by delay and laches. We have already observed that these principles are not attracted to annihilate the provisions prescribing the period of prescription. The Learned Government counsel is fully justified in placing reliance on paragraph-8 of HUCHEGOWDA, which we have already extracted above."

11. As could be seen from the above, the Division Bench has

merely observed in the context of the appellant therein dying

during the pendency of the resumption application that setting

aside of the order would have no effect and in that context it

was observed that the provisions of the CPC would not apply in

their full rigour to a proceeding under the PTCL Act. This

judgment therefore cannot support the proposition that any

number of applications can be filed by the grantee and that too,

after the initial application for resumption has been rejected

and has attained attained finality. I am therefore of the view

that the impugned order cannot be sustained and the same is

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