Karnataka High Court

Sreenivasulu Puvvadi vs Wipro Limited on 29 May, 2024

Author: Ravi V Hosmani

Bench: Ravi V Hosmani

                                                  -1-
                                                                NC: 2024:KHC:18037
                                                              MFA No. 2190 of 2024




                           IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                                DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF MAY, 2024

                                                BEFORE
                              THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAVI V HOSMANI
                      MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.2190 OF 2024 (CPC)
                      BETWEEN:

                      SREENIVASULU PUVVADI,
                      AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
                      S/O LATE NARAYANA PUVVADI,
                      RESIDING AT NO.301,
                      GM REDDY ROYALE, BELLANDUR,
                      ORR ECO SPACE SERVICE ROAD,
                      NEXT TO UDUPI AATITHYA,
                      OPP. APOLLO CLINIC,
                      BENGALURU - 560 103.
                                                                      ...APPELLANT
                      (BY SRI P.M. NAYAK., ADVOCATE)

                      AND:

Digitally signed by   1.    WIPRO LIMITED,
GEETHAKUMARI
PARLATTAYA S                REGISTERED OFFICE,
Location: High              DODDAKANNALLI,
Court of Karnataka
                            SARJAPUR ROAD,
                            BENGALURU - 560 035.
                            BY ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER.

                      2.    WIPRO SYSTEMS,
                            REGISTERED OFFICE: DU PARC TRINITY,
                            10TH FLOOR, 17, M.G. ROAD,
                            BANGALORE - 560 001.
                            PRESENTLY AT NO.5,
                            GHOGA STREET,
                                      -2-
                                                     NC: 2024:KHC:18037
                                                   MFA No. 2190 of 2024




    FORT MUMBAI,
    MAHARASHTRA - 400 023.
    BY ITS HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGER.
                                                        ...RESPONDENTS



        THIS M.F.A. IS FILED UNDER ORDER 43 RULE 1(r) OF
CPC, AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 17.01.2024 PASSED ON IA
NO.1     IN    O.S.NO.2752/2023         ON   THE     FILE   OF    THE   XII
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL JUDGE, BENGALURU CITY, (CCH
NO.27), DISMISSING IA NO.1 FILED UNDER ORDER 39 RULE 1
AND 2 OF CPC.

        THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

                                  JUDGMENT

Challenging order dated 17.01.2024 passed on

I.A.no.1/2023 filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC in

O.S.no.2752/2023, this appeal is filed.

2. Sri P.M.Nayak, learned counsel for appellant

submitted that appeal is by plaintiff in O.S.no.2752/2023 filed

for declaration, declaring that act of defendant no.1 discharging

plaintiff with effect from 10.08.2022 intimated under letter

dated 11.08.2022 as illegal and unsustainable and

consequently direct defendant no.1 to reinstate plaintiff into

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service with all consequential benefits etc., till his retirement on

31.08.2024.

3. It was submitted, in said suit plaintiff had filed

I.A.no.1/2023 under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC for

temporary injunction directing defendant no.1 to reinstate

plaintiff into service during pendency of suit, which under

impugned order, trial Court rejected without justification.

4. Learned counsel for appellant submitted that reason

assigned by trial Court for rejecting application that there was

no fault in use of word "discharge" in termination letter and

same would not attach any stigma etc., were observations

which would affect merits of suit.

5. It was further submitted, even reason that plaintiff

would be entitled for damages would not be justified as an

order of discharge without holding enquiry would be per se

illegal entitling plaintiff for reinstatement and therefore

impugned order calls for interference.

6. Heard learned counsel and perused impugned order.

7. Only point that arises for consideration is:

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"Whether order impugned calls for interference in appeal?"

8. From above, it is not in dispute that plaintiff was an

employee of defendant no.1's company. During his service,

defendant no.1, under a letter dated 11.08.2022 discharged

services of plaintiff with effect from 10.08.2022. It is also not in

dispute that said letter was accompanied with payment for

period of two months. Plaintiff claims that he was due to retire

on 30.08.2024 on attaining age of 58 years.

9. Be that as it may, relief sought for in suit is for

declaration against termination letter and for reinstatement.

Whereas relief sought in application is for temporary injunction

directing reinstatement.

10. On perusal of impugned order, it is seen that trial

Court after taking note of all contentions and documents

produced and after framing proper points for consideration and

assigned reason for rejection. While passing impugned order, it

is observed on perusal of termination letter that it does not

indicate any stigmatic allegation against plaintiff and he would

be entitled for damages as final relief. Though reason assigned

by trial Court for rejection of application, prima facie do not call

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for any interference, however submission of learned counsel

that said observation would affect merits of suit appears to be

substantial, which requires to be taken note of.

11. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Mehtab Ibrahim

Khan vs. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan1 has defined scope of

interference with discretionary orders by Appellate Court. It is

held as under:

"15. In a situation where the learned Trial Court on a consideration of the respective cases of the parties and the documents laid before it was of the view that the entitlement of the plaintiffs to an order of interim mandatory injunction was in serious doubt, the Appellate Court could not have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the learned Trial Judge unless such exercise was found to be palpably incorrect or untenable. The reasons that weighed with the learned Trial Judge, as already noticed, according to us, do not indicate that the view taken is not a possible view. The Appellate Court, therefore, should not have substituted its views in the matter merely on the ground that in its opinion the facts of the case call for a different conclusion. Such an exercise is not the correct parameter for exercise of jurisdiction while hearing an appeal against a discretionary order. While we must not be understood to have said that the Appellate Court was wrong in its conclusions what is sought to be emphasized is that as long as the view of the Trial Court was a possible view the Appellate Court should not have interfered with the same following the virtually settled principles of law in this regard as laid down by this Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.[3] Para 14 of the aforesaid judgment which is extracted below would amply sum up the situation:

2013 (9) SCC 221

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"14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph: (SCR 721) "...

These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton '...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case'." The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle."

16. Though the above discussions would lead us to the conclusion that the learned Appellate Bench of the High Court was not correct in interfering with the order passed by the learned Trial Judge we wish to make it clear that

NC: 2024:KHC:18037

our aforesaid conclusion is not an expression of our opinion on the merits of the controversy between the parties. Our disagreement with the view of the Division Bench is purely on the ground that the manner of exercise of the appellate power is not consistent with the law laid down by this Court in the case of Wander Ltd. (supra). Accordingly, we set aside the order dated 09.10.2012 passed by the Appellate Bench of the Bombay High Court and while restoring the order dated 13.04.2012 of the learned Trial Judge we request the learned Trial Judge, or such other court to which the case may, in the mean time, have been transferred to dispose of the main suit as expeditiously as its calendar would permit with the expectation that the same will be possible within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order. The appeal shall stand disposed of in terms of the above.

In above decision, Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated that

while exercising appellate jurisdiction against discretionary

orders, even if view taken by trial Judge is one of possible view,

there cannot be interference. Therefore, I do not find any

justifiable reason to interfere with impugned order.

12. Hence, appeal is dismissed with observation that

observations made by trial Court or of this Court shall be at

interim stage and shall not bind trial Court at time of final

disposal which shall be by reference to evidence led by parties

during trial. At this stage since it is stated that plaintiff would

attain age of superannuation on 31.08.2024, and counsel for

plaintiff undertakes to co-operate for early conclusion of suit,