Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 11636 Kant
Judgement Date : 28 May, 2024
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF MAY, 2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.NATARAJ
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.5063 OF 2009 (DEC)
BETWEEN:
SYNDICATE BANK,
H.O. MANIPAL,
DISTRICT SOUTH KANARA,
BRANCH OFFICE,
DANDELI
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER
J.N. ROAD, DANDELI,
TALUK:HALIYAL, DISTRICT: UTTAR KANNAD.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. SURESH S. GUNDI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . SHRI. GAJANAN
S/O. JANNA MESTHA
AGE: MAJOR
OCC: SERVICE IN HEALTH DEPARTMENT
STD CLINIC, ANKOLA,
TALUK: ANKOLA
DISTRICT:UTTAR KANNADA
2 . SHRI. MANJUNATH KRISHNA VAIDYA
SINCE DECEASED
REPRESENTED BY HIS LRS
(a) SMT. VANDANA
W/O. MANJUNATH VAIDYA
AGE: MAJOR
2
OCC: HOUSEHOLD
(b) SHRI. VINOD
S/O. MANJUNATH VAIDYA
AGE: MINOR
OCC: STUDENT
(c) SHRI. PRAMOD
S/O. MANJUNATH VAIDYA
AGE: MINOR
OCC: STUDENT
(d) KUMARI. NAGASHREE
D/O. MANJUNATH VAIDYA
AGE: MINOR
OCC: STUDENT
RESPONDENTS (b) to (d) REPRESENTED BY THEIR
NATURAL GUARDIAN MOTHER RESPONDENT
NO.2(a)
ALL ARE R/O. BEHIND MAHABALESHWAR CO-OP.
BANK, MADANAGERI, GOKARNA,
TALUK:KUMTA, DISTRICT: UTTAR KANNADA.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY MS. BHUTE MARA BASAVA, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. G.K.HIREGOUDAR, ADVOCATE FOR
RESPONDENT NO.1;
SRI NARAYANA V. YAJI, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.2(a);
RESPONDENT NOS.2(b) TO 2(d) ARE MINOR REPRESENTED BY
RESPONDENT NO.2(a))
THIS RSA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF CPC
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 21.08.2008
PASSED IN R.A.NO.88/2007 ON THE FILE OF THE CIVIL JUDGE
(SR.DN), YALLAPUR DISMISSING THE APPEAL AND
CONFIRMING THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 09.08.2001
PASSED IN O.S.NO.12/1998 ON THE FILE OF THE CIVIL JUDGE
(JR.DN), DANDELI, DECREEING THE SUIT FILED FOR
DECLARATION AND RECOVERY OF MONEY.
3
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 12.03.2024 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THROUGH VIDEO
CONFERENCE THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:-
JUDGMENT
The defendant No.1 in O.S.No.12/1998 on the file of
the Civil Judge Jr.Dn. Dandeli (henceforth referred to as
'Trial Court' for short) has filed this regular second appeal
challenging the judgment and decree dated 09.08.2001
passed therein as well as the confirming judgment and
decree dated 21.08.2008 passed by the Civil Judge, Sr.Dn.
Yellapur (henceforth referred to as 'First Appellate Court'
for short) in R.A.No.88/2007. Both the Courts held that the
defendant No.1 is not entitled to exercise its lien over the
account of the plaintiff and directed the defendant No.1 to
release a sum of Rs.11,132/- with interest @ 15% per
annum.
2. The parties shall henceforth be referred to as
they were arrayed before the Trial Court.
3. The suit in O.S.No.12/98 was filed for a
declaration that the exercise of bankers lien on the Amar
deposit No.35 which matured on 23.08.1995 and placing it
in M.D. Account No.397/95 for Rs.43,542/- by the
defendant No.1 was illegal, improper unjust and against
the provision of the banker's lien and deducting Rs.6,820/-
from the above deposit towards the due of the defendant
No.2. The plaintiff also sought for a judgment to recover a
sum Rs.6,820/- from defendant No.1 along with interest at
15% p.a. from 24.08.1995 till the date of suit and a sum
of Rs.36,722/- from 24.08.1995 to 24.10.1995.
4. The plaintiff claimed that he was employed at
the City Municipal Council, Dandeli. The defendant No.2
was employed as a watch man at the inspection bungalow,
Madangeri, Kumta Taluk. He contended that the defendant
No.1 had two branches, one at Dandeli and another at
Kumbarakoppa. He claimed that he had an Amar account
deposit at the branch of defendant No.1 at Dandeli. The
Branch Manager of Dandeli branch, had informed the
plaintiff by a letter dated 16.08.1995 that the amount
deposited in Amar deposit No.35 would mature on
23.08.1995. The Manager requested the plaintiff to renew
the deposit and informed him the various rates of interest
on deposits. On 22.08.1995, the plaintiff received a copy
of a letter dated 12.08.1995 addressed to the Branch
Manager, Kumbarakoppa informing the dues of the
defendant No.2 at his branch. The plaintiff visited the
branch at Dandeli on 24.08.1995 and opened a Savings
Bank account at the branch, in view of the promise that
the amount in Amar deposit would be credited into the
Savings Bank account. The plaintiff was then informed that
he had guaranteed the repayment of the loan raised by
defendant No.2 and that a sum of Rs.6,458/- was due by
defendant No.2 as on 01.07.1995. The plaintiff was
therefore called upon to settle the due, failing which, it
would invoke the lien over the Amar deposit account of the
plaintiff at Dandeli branch. Later, on 28.08.1995, the
plaintiff received another letter dated 24.08.1995 from the
Branch Manager, Dandeli about the maturity of the Amar
deposit on 23.08.1995 and also that the amount was
deposited in M.D. Account No.397/1995 for Rs.43,542/-
and the plaintiff was informed that the bank had exercised
its lien over the deposit to recover the dues of defendant
No.2 at Kumbarakoppa branch. The plaintiff contended
that the defendant No.2 while in service at T.M.C, Dandeli
had applied for a loan with Kumabarakoppa branch of
defendant No.1. The T.M.C, Dandeli had also sent a
certificate to defendant No.1 dated 31.01.1981 furnishing
the details of the salary and recommended sanction of the
loan and informed that suitable intimation be given for
effecting recovery. The loan applied by the defendant No.2
was sanctioned and the plaintiff stood surety. The loan
amount was to be repaid by defendant No.2 by 1981.
However, for the first time, the Branch Manager,
Kumbarakoppa, vide its letter dated 12.08.1995 had
intimated that the said loan amount of Rs.6,458/- plus
interest at 18.75% was due by defendant No.2 as on
01.07.1995. The plaintiff claimed that the said letter came
as a bolt from the blue, as the bank had slept over the
issue for over 14 years and did not take any steps to
recover it within 03 years from the date when the loan fell
due. He contended that he had never admitted his liability
within a period of 03 years from the date of the loan
becoming payable. He claimed that even if the defendant
No.2 had acknowledged the dues, the plaintiff is not liable
to pay the dues and therefore, the branch at
Kumbarakoppa is barred from recovering the loan from the
plaintiff. He contended that the plaintiff stood surety in
view of the condition that the outstanding would be
recovered from defendant No.2 from his salary from time
to time, but the Branch Manager of Kumbarakoppa did not
take any steps to inform T.M.C., Dandeli to recover the
loan dues from the salary of defendant No.2, therefore, he
contends that the plaintiff was not liable to pay any
amount and the defendant No.1 could not exercise any lien
over the amount payable to him. He contended that the
Branch Manager, Dandeli in his letter dated 24.04.1995
had stated that the plaintiff was informed through a staff
on 23.07.1995 and by Kumbarakoppa branch vide letter
dated 12.08.1995, which the plaintiff denied but contended
that the letter dated 12.08.1995 was received by him on
28.08.1995. Therefore, he claimed that the alleged
exercise of banker's lien by the Branch Manager, Dandeli
on the plaintiff's Amar deposit No.35 which matured on
23.08.1995 is highly illegal, improper and unjust. He
claimed that the loan due by the defendant No.2 was
irrecoverable and barred by the law of limitation. He
therefore, prayed that the defendants be directed to repay
Rs.6,820/- deducted out of the Amar deposit of the
plaintiff towards the dues of the defendant No.2 along with
interest at 15% p.a. and Rs.36,722/- from 24.08.1995 to
24.10.1995 along with cost of the suit.
5. The defendant No.1 contested the suit by filing
its written statement wherein it claimed that the plaintiff
had opened an Amar deposit at its branch at Dandeli which
was to mature on 23.08.1995. It also admitted that a
letter dated 16.08.1995 was addressed to the plaintiff
informing him about the maturity of the deposit made by
him. It also admitted that the plaintiff had opened Savings
Bank account in the bank but it denied that the account
was opened on the instructions of the Branch Manager,
Dandeli. It admitted that it had addressed a letter
12.08.1995 requesting the plaintiff to settle the dues of
defendant No.2 failing which, it would be constrained to
exercise its lien over the Amar deposit of plaintiff and
consequent thereto it exercised the lien and adjusted the
due of defendant No.2 from out of the amount payable to
the plaintiff. It also admitted that the plaintiff got issued a
notice on 03.09.1995 which was replied on 10.10.1995,
whereby the plaintiff was informed that defendant No.1
had exercised its lien as provided in law and the defendant
No.1 claimed that it had statutory lien over the deposit
which was in its hand to set off the liability due to the
bank. It contended that right of lien is a defence in law and
not a right to initiate action and as such, even if the claim
is barred by law of limitation that did not prevent the
defendant No.1 to exercise its lien. Therefore, it claimed
that the suit of the plaintiff is misconceived and the
plaintiff is not entitled to any of reliefs from the defendant
No.1. It alleged that the plaintiff and defendant No.2 had
colluded with each other.
6. Based on these contentions, the Trial Court
frame the following issues:
"1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the suit scheme with interest from the defendant No.1 as claimed in the suit?
2. Whether the plaintiff proves that exercise of bankers lien on amar deposit of plaintiff is illegal and improper?
3. Whether the defendant No.1 proves that bar of limitation does not apply to exercise bankers lien as claimed in para 5 of W.S.?
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief claimed in the suit?
5. What decree or order?"
7. The plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and he
marked Exs.P1 to P10. The manager of the defendant No.1
was examined as DW.1 and he marked Exs.D1 to D5.
8. Based on the oral and documentary evidence,
the Trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff and held
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the suit claim of
Rs.11,132/- along with interest at 15% from the date of
suit till realisation.
9. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and
decree, the defendant No.1 filed R.A.No.88/2007 before
the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court
secured the records of the Trial Court, heard the counsel
for the parties and framed the following points for
consideration:
"1. Whether the appellant proves that the provisions of Indian Contract Act and Limitation Act bearing on the point were not properly considered by the lower Court?
2. Whether the appellant further proves that under what provisions of law in regard to general lien of banking are override effect on the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963?
3. Whether the judgment and decree of the lower court calls for interference with by this court?
4. What order?"
10. The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal
and confirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court.
Being aggrieved by the concurrent judgment and decree of
the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, the defendant
No.1 has filed this regular second appeal.
11. This appeal was admitted to consider the
following substantial questions of law:
"Whether the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have committed a serious error in coming to the conclusion that the Banker's General Lien cannot be made applicable in respect of a time barred debt?"
12. The learned counsel for the defendant No.1
contended that the general lien of a banker to retain the
goods bailed by a customer or any person on his behalf is
statutorily recognized in Section 171 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872. He contends that the law relating to limitation
prescribes that a person approaching the Court belatedly
may loose the remedy but not the right. He contends that
so long as a banker is in possession of funds of a customer
or any funds deposited on behalf of the customer, it is
entitled to exercise its lien and adjust it against the
outstanding. In this regard, he relied upon the following
judgments:
(i) Punjab National Bank and others Vs. Surendra
Prasad Sinha - 1993 SUPP (1) SCC 499;
(ii) Vasupalaiah Vs. Vysya Bank - ILR 2001
Karnataka 5015;
13. Per contra, the learned counsel for the plaintiff
contends that the surety offered by the plaintiff for the
repayment of the loan raised by the defendant No.2 was
subject to conditions set out in the loan agreement and the
surety document. He submits that the defendant No.1 has
not furnished any documents relating to the loan
sanctioned and the terms of surety etc., He contended
that the defendant No.2 was employed and therefore the
defendant No.1 must have recovered the loan by
addressing appropriate communication to the employer of
the defendant No.2. He submits that the defendant No.1
cannot be allowed to take advantage of its lien without
establishing its right to recover the loan from the Amar
deposit of plaintiff.
14. I have considered the contentions of the
learned counsel for the plaintiff and the learned counsel for
the defendant No.1. I have also perused the records of the
Trial Court as well as its judgment and the judgment of the
First Appellate Court.
15. The facts that are not in dispute are that the
defendant No.2 had raised a loan from the defendant No.1
and that the plaintiff stood surety for the repayment of the
loan. That the plaintiff had subscribed to a deposit scheme
floated by the defendant No.1 which had matured for
payment and that the plaintiff had opened a Savings Bank
Account at the defendant No.1 so as to enable it to credit
into it the maturity value of the deposit.
16. The question in controversy is whether the
defendant No.1 could have denied the payment of the
maturity value of the deposit, on the ground that the
defendant No.2 had failed to repay the loan and that it had
a general lien over the amount bailed to it, either by
defendant No.2 or on his behalf.
17. In order to answer this question, it is
appropriate to first see whether the defendant No.1 had
placed on record the documents to establish: (i) the terms
of loan sanctioned to defendant No.2; (ii) the terms of
surety offered by the plaintiff; (iii) the steps taken by the
defendant No.1 to recover the installments from out of the
salary payable to defendant No.2 and or from the
retirement benefits etc.,
18. A perusal of the documentary evidence
produced by the defendant No.1 shows that what were
produced were the reply dated 10.10.1995 addressed to
the notice dated 03.09.1995 caused by the plaintiff
(Ex.D1), a letter dated 16.10.1995 addressed to the
plaintiff intimating him the adjustment of a sum of
Rs.6,820/- against the loan outstanding of the defendant
No.2 (Ex.D2), a postal acknowledgment (Ex.D3), receipt
dated 24.10.1995 executed by the plaintiff (Ex.D4), a
challan showing that a sum of Rs.36,722/- was credited
into the Savings Bank account of the plaintiff (Ex.D5).
Therefore, there was not even a shred of documentary
evidence to demonstrate the terms and conditions of
sanction of the loan, the terms and conditions of the surety
offered by plaintiff. This assumes significance due to the
usage of the words "unless otherwise provided by the
contract" found in Section 128 and "in the absence of any
provision in the guarantee to the contrary" found in
Section 137 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Thus, it was
incumbent upon the defendant No.1 to produce documents
to show that there was nothing contrary mentioned in the
loan documents pertaining to the liability of the plaintiff so
as to create an exception within the meaning of Section
128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
19. In so far as the oral evidence of the defendant
No.1 is concerned, the manager of the defendant No.1 was
examined as DW.1, who deposed as follows:
2£Éà ¥Àwæ ªÁ¢UÉ ¸ÀªÀÄäA¢¹zÀAvÉ ¸Á®zÀ ¥ÀvÀæ £Á£ÀÄ £ÉÆÃr¯Áè CAzÀgÉ ¤eÁ. 2 £Éà ¥Àwæ ªÁ¢ CªÀ¢Aü iÀÄ°è ¸Á®zÀ ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß CªÀ¢Aü iÀİè vÀÄA§zÉ EzÀÝ°è ¨ÁåAQ£Àªg À ÄÀ PÀª æ ÀÄ vÉUÉzÀÄPÉÆ¼Àî¨PÉ ÁUÀÄvÀz Û É CAzÀgÉ ¤eÁ.
¸Á® ¥Àqz É À 3 ªÀµð À zÀ CªÀ¢Aü iÀİè CzÀ£ÀÄß ªÀ¸ÀÆ®Ä ªÀiÁqÀĪÀ PÀª æ ÀÄ vÉUz É ÀÄPÉÆ¼Àî¨PÉ ÁUÀÄvÀz Û É CAzÀgÉ ¤eÁ. 2£Éà ¥Àwæ ªÁ¢¬ÄAzÁ ¸Á®zÀ ¨Á§ÄÛªÀÄgÀÄ¥ÁªÀw M¦àUÉ ¥ÀvÀæ vÉUz É ÀÄPÉÆAr¯Áè CAzÀgÉ £À£U À É UÉÆw¯Áè. ªÁ¢AiÀÄÄ ¨ÁåAQUÉ PÀ¼ÄÀ »¹zÀ £ÉÆÃnù£À°è ¸Á®zÀ ¨Á§ÄÛ «ªÀgª À ÁV §gÉ¢zÁÝgÉ ¤eÁ. ªÁ¢AiÀÄ PÀq¢ É AzÁ £ÉÆÃn¸À §AzÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ ¤±Á£É r 4 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 5 §gÉ¢zÀÄÝ EzÉ CAzÀgÉ ¤eÁ. CªÀÄgÀ r¥ÉÆfl ºÀt ªÉÄZÀåªÉgÀ DzÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ ªÁ¢UÉ PÉÆqÀĪÀ ªÀgU É É CªÀgÀÄ gÀ²Ã¢ PÉÆqÀzÃÉ EzÀÝ PÁgÀt vÀqÉ »rAiÀįÁVvÀÄÛ. CªÀÄgÀ r¥ÉÆfmï ºÀuÁ ªÉÄZÀƪÉgÀ DVzÀÄÝ £À£Àß »A¢£À ªÀiÁå£d É gÀ EzÁÝUÀ CAzÀgÉ ¤d. CªÀgÀÄ AiÀiÁPÉ vÀqÉ »r¢zÀÝgÀÄ JAzÀÄ £À£U À É
ºÉüÀ®Ä §gÀĪÀÅ¢¯Áè. ªÁ¢AiÀÄÄ vÀ£Àß CªÀÄgÀ r¥ÉÆfl ºÀuÁ EzÀ£ÀÄß ¸Á®zÀ ¨Á§ÄÛ ºÉÆAzÁtÂPÉ ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä M¦àUÉ PÉÆnÖzÁÝ£É JAzÀÄ £Á£ÀÄ GzÁºÀgu À AÉ iÀİè PÁt¹®è CAzÀgÉ ¤dªÀ¯Áè. ªÁ¢AiÀÄÄ PÀ°vÀª£ À ÀÄ EzÁÝ£É CAzÀgÉ ¤eÁ. ¤r 4 gÀAvÉ SÁ° ¹èÃ¥À £À ªÉÄÃ¯É ªÁ¢AiÀÄ ¸À» ¥Àqz É ÀÄ £ÀAvÀgÀ CzÀ£ÀÄß «ªÀgª À ÁV ¨ÁåAQ£Àªg À ÀÄ vÀÄA©zÁÝgÉ CAzÀgÉ ¤dªÀ¯Áè. ¤r 4 gÀ°è §gÉzz À ÀÄÝ £ÀªÄÀ ä »A¢£À ªÀiÁå£d É gÀ EzÁÝg.É ¤r 5 £ÀÄß £ÀªÀÄä ¹§âA¢ ªÀĺÁ¯É §gÉ¢zÁÝg.É "
On the other hand, the plaintiff was examined as
PW.1 in his cross-examination he deposed as follows:
"2£Éà ¥Àw æ ªÁ¢AiÀÄÄ 12-8-95 gÀAzÀÄ ¸ÀºÁ CªÀ£ÀÄ ¨ÁåAQ¤AzÀ ¥Àqz É ÀÄPÉÆAqÀ ¸Á® vÀÄA©¯Áè J£ÀÄߪÀ «µÀAiÀÄ £À£U À É UÉÆwÛg° À ¯Áè ¸ÁQë ºÉüÀÄvÁÛg.É £À£U À É ¨ÁåAQ¤AzÀ £ÉÆÃnøÀ §AzÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ UÉÆvÁÛ¬ÄvÀÄ. 2£Éà ¥Àwæ ªÁ¢ £À£Àß UɼAÉ iÀÄ CAzÀgÉ ¸Àj C¯Áè. £Á£ÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 2£Éà ¥Àwæ ªÁ¢ MAzÉà PÀZÉÃjAiÀİè PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛzÀÝjAzÀ CªÀgÀ ¥ÀjZÀAiÀÄ EzÉ.
2£Éà ¥Àwæ ªÁ¢ ¥Àqz É ÀÄPÉÆAqÀ ¸Á®zÀ §UÉÎ £À£U À É ªÀiÁ»w EzÉ.
CzÀPÉÌ £Á£ÀÄ eÁ«ÄãÀzÁgÀgÀ JAzÀÄ ¸À» ªÀiÁrzÉÝãÉ. ¸Á® ¥Àqz É ª À £ À ÃÉ dªÁ¨ÁÝj eÁ«ÄãÀzÁgÀ£ÁzÀª¤ À UÀÆ ¸ÀºÁ ¸Á® ªÀÄgÀÄ¥ÁªÀw ªÀiÁqÀĪÀ dªÁ¨ÁÝj EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ CAzÀgÉ ¤eÁ.
¨ÁåAQ£Àªg À ÄÀ 12-8-95gÀAzÀÄ £À£Àß CªÀÄgÀ r¥ÉÆÃfl ºÀt J¸ï © SÁvÉUÉ dªÀiÁ DVzÀÄÝ MAzÀÄ ªÉÃ¼É ¸Á® ªÀÄgÀÄ¥ÁªÀw ªÀiÁqÀzÃÉ ºÉÆÃzÀgÉ ¨ÁåAQ£Àªg À ÀÄ vÀªÀÄVgÀĪÀ ºÀPÀÄÌ ZÀ¯Á¬Ä¹ £À£Àß ºÀt¢AzÀ ªÀ¸ÀÆ®Ä ªÀiÁrPÉÆ¼ÀÄîªÀÅzÁV w½¹zÀÝgÀÄ CAzÀgÉ ¤eÁ. £ÀAvÀgÀ £Á£ÀÄ 2£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢UÉ ¥ÀvÀæ §gÉzÀÄ ºÀt vÀÄA§®Ä ºÉý¯Áè. ¸ÁQë ºÉüÀÄvÁÛgÉ ªÉÊAiÀÄQÛPª À ÁV ºÉÆÃV ºÉý §A¢zÉÝÃ£É JAzÀÄ."
20. This evidence therefore, established the fact
that the defendant No.2 had raised a loan from defendant
No.1 and that the plaintiff stood surety for the loan. It also
established that the plaintiff was aware of the outstanding
payable by the defendant No.2 to defendant No.1. To this
extent, the defendant No.1 is able to establish its case.
However, what needs to be noted is that a surety would be
liable to repay the loan payable by the borrower, if the
principal creditor has complied with the terms of sanction
of the loan. In this regard, it is relevant to consider the
assertions made by the plaintiff in paragraph No.E of the
plaint which is extracted below:
"(E) If the officials of the Kumbarakoppa branch of defendant No.1 were diligent in the discharge
of their duties, to recover the said dues of the loan amount, they would have certainly taken the necessary legal steps to recover the said dues of the loan amount from the defendant No.2 in time. Further the T.M.C. Dandeli, had also intimated the said Kumbarakoppa Branch Manager, that the loan may please be sanctioned and intimated to the said office, for effecting recovery by the letter dated
21.01.1981. The branch manager of the Kumbarakoppa branch had not taken any steps to intimate the T.M.C. Dandeli, for effecting the recovery of the loan dues of the defendant No.2 from his salary. It is further submitted that as the claim for the dues of loan amount in question is barred by the law of limitation, the defendant No.1, has no legal rights of recovery of the same by any more."
21. In response to this, the defendant No.1
contended as follows:
"4. Therefore rest of the contentions made by the plaintiff in para No.2(D), (E), (F), (G), etc are all rudiment."
22. The defendant No.1 did not even deny the
assertion made by the plaintiff and hence the fact asserted
by the plaintiff has to be construed as admitted as
provided in Order VIII Rule 5 of CPC.
23. Therefore, if the plaintiff stood surety for
repayment of the loan by the defendant No.2, in view of
the condition that the defendant No.1 shall recover it from
the salary of defendant No.2, the non-taking of steps to
intimate the Town Muncipal Council, Dandeli, resulted in
discharge of the liability of the surety. In this regard, it is
profitable to refer to Section 139 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872 which reads as follows:
"139. Discharge of surety by creditor's act or omission impairing surety's eventual remedy.- If the creditor does any act which is inconsistent with the rights of the surety, or omits to do any act which his duty to the surety requires him to do, and the eventual remedy of the surety himself against the principal debtor is thereby impaired, the surety is discharged."
"Illustrations (c) to Section 139 of the Indian Contract Act is relevant and the same is extracted below:
(c) A puts M as apprentice to B, and gives a guarantee to B for M's fidelity. B promises on his part that he will at least once a month, see M make up on the cash. B omits to see this done as promised, and M embezzles. A is not liable to B on his gurantee."
24. When the plaintiff had asserted a fact in the
plaint that the defendant No.1 was required to intimate the
Town Municipal Council, Dandeli, (employer of defendant
No.2) to effect recovery from out of the salary of the
defendant No.2, and when the plaintiff specifically asserted
that the defendant No.1 failed to do so, it was incumbent
upon the defendant No.1 to establish before the Court that
such an intimation was indeed given to the Town Municipal
Council, Dandeli and that the outstanding amount payable
by the defendant No.2 was the amount that could not be
recovered despite exercising the aforesaid option. It is
indisputable that the liability of a surety is coextensive
with that of a principal debtor, as provided under Section
128 of the Indian Contract Act and as observed by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Kishun and
others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others - AIR
2012 SC 2288 as well as the judgment of the Apex Court
in the case of Punjab National Bank Vs. Surendra
Prasad Sinha - 1993 SUPP (1) SCC 499 where it was
held "it is settled law that the creditor would be entitled to
adjust, from the payment of a sum by a debtor towards
the time barred debt from the guarantor's account. The
appellant did not act in violation of any law when he cut
the amount from the fixed deposit of the respondent, that
is the surety when the principal debtor failed to pay. It is
also well settled that mere forbearance on the part of the
creditor to sue the principal debtor or to enforce any other
remedy against him does not, in the absence of any
provision in the guarantee to the contrary, discharge the
surety. However, the surety could be discharged in certain
circumstances enumerated under Sections 133, 134, 135,
138 and 139 of the Indian Contract Act. In view of
illustration (c) to Section 139 of the Indian Contract Act,
the failure on the part of the defendant No.1 to intimate
the Town Municipal Council, Dandeli, to effect recovery
from out of the salary of the defendant No.2, did discharge
the plaintiff from his obligation to pay the loan outstanding
payable by the defendant No.2 to defendant No.1.
25. Consequently, though ordinarily, the defendant
No.1 had a general lien over all amounts lying with it, yet
the defendant No.1 was bound to establish before the
Court that it had taken due care and caution as provided
under the loan agreement as well as surety document.
Since the defendant No.1 has failed to produce the
documents before the Court to establish that the
defendant No.1 had done all that it could do to comply
with the terms and conditions of the loan agreement and
the surety document, the defendant No.1 was not entitled
to any remedy. Consequently, the appeal filed by the
defendant No.1 is liable to be dismissed.
26. In so far as substantial question of law framed
by this Court is concerned, it is held that the defendant
No.1 has a general lien over the amounts lying with it,
belonging either to the principal debtor or to the surety.
However, in view of the default on the part of defendant
No.1 to establish that it had taken all due care and caution
as provided under the loan agreement to recover the
amounts from the salary of the defendant No.2, the
liability on the surety stood discharged.
27. In that view of the matter, this appeal lacks
merit and is dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
HJ
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!