Karnataka High Court
Sri T Manjunath vs State Of Karnataka on 26 July, 2024
Author: H.P. Sandesh
Bench: H.P. Sandesh
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 26TH DAY OF JULY, 2024
R
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P. SANDESH
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.422/2018
C/W
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.599/2018
IN CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.422/2018:
BETWEEN:
STATE BY
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA POLICE,
CITY DIVISION,
BENGALURU-560001.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI PRASAD B.S., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. T.MANJUNATH
SENIOR MOTOR VEHICLE INSPECTOR,
RTO OFFICE, K.R.PURAM,
BENGLAURU-560091.
2. H.B.MASTIGOWDA
REPRESENTATIVE,
SRI SHAKTI MOTOR VEHICLE SCHOOL,
BENGALURU-43.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI VIJAY KUMAR V.B., ADVOCATE)
2
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED 397 R/W
401 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO SET ASIDE DATED 23.08.2017
PASSED IN SPL.C.C.NO.24/2013 PENDING ON THE FILE OF
LXXVI ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND
SPECIAL JUDGE, BENGALURU AND ETC.
IN CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.599/2018:
BETWEEN:
SRI T. MANJUNATH
S/O THIPPESWAMY
AGED 49 YEARS
SENIOR INSPECTOR OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
INSPECTOR, RTO OFFICE, K.R.PURAM,
BANGALORE - 560079.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI VIJAY KUMAR V.B., ADVOCATE)
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE,
CITY DIVISION, BANGALORE-560001.
REP. BY LOKAYUKTHA SPP.
HIGH COURT, M.S.BUILDING,
BENGALURU-560001.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI B.S.PRASAD, ADVOCATE)
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED 397 R/W
401 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED
23.08.2017 PASSED IN SPECIAL CC NO.24/2013 ON THE FILED
OF THE LXXVI ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS COURT
AND SPECIAL COURT, BANGALORE CITY AND ETC.
3
THESE CRIMINAL REVISION PETITIONS HAVING BEEN
HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 12.07.2024 THIS DAY,
THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
These two petitions are filed challenging the order dated
23.08.2017 passed by the Trial Court in allowing the discharge
application filed by the accused No.1/petitioner and giving liberty
to proceed further in accordance with law and to file charge
sheet afresh after obtaining necessary sanction from the
Competent Authority.
2. The factual matrix of the case of the Karnataka
Lokayuktha police in Crl.R.P.No.422/2018 is that the
complainant was working as a Supervisor in M/s Prashanth
Crushers Limited and the company operates many vehicles
including tippers. Accused No.1 was working as a Senior
Inspector of Motor Vehicles at RTO Office, K R Puram, Bengaluru.
Accused No.1 used to threaten the drivers of tipper vehicles
sating that he would seize the vehicles if they do not pay him
periodical bribe. In this background, CW1-Manjunath met CW17-
Sanjeevarayappa, T-Police Inspector, Lokayuktha whereupon he
gave him a voice recorder to record the conversation whereby
accused No.1 was said to have made a demand for bribe amount
of Rs.24,000/- and after bargaining, he reduced it to
Rs.18,000/-. Since the complainant was not inclined to pay the
bribe amount, he gave written information to the Lokayuktha
Inspector, who arranged for the trap. He secured two
independent witnesses who were th Government servants and in
their presence, conducted pre-trap proceedings. During the
course of pre-trap proceedings, an amount of Rs.15,000/- was
entrusted to the complainant to be handed over to accused No.1
upon demand. Thereafter, CW17 along with his staff, two
independent witnesses and the complainant left to the RTO
office, K R Puram, Bengaluru, where accused No.1 was working.
Accused No.1 was trapped while demanding and accepting illegal
gratification of Rs.15,000/- from the complainant through
accused No.2- H B Mastigowda - a private person who is alleged
to have received the amount at the instance of accused No.1.
The Lokayuktha police, after completion of investigation,
obtained Sanction Order from the Commissioner of Transport,
for prosecution against accused No.1 and filed charge sheet
against the accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offence punishable
under Sections 7, 8, 13(1)(d) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988.
3. In pursuance of suit summons, accused Nos.1 and 2
appeared before the Court. Accused No.1 has filed an
application under Section 227 read with Section 239 of Cr.P.C
seeking for discharge. The learned Spl. P.P. has filed statement
of objections and seriously opposed the said application.
4. The Trial Court taking into note of the grounds urged
in the application and the contention raised in statement of
objections, formulated the point as follows:
Whether there are sufficient grounds to frame
charge and proceed with trial of the case as
against the accused persons?
5. The Trial Court taking into note of the grounds urged
in the application and also taking into note of the issue involved
with regard to validity of the Sanction Order, taken up for
consideration as preliminary issue. The Trial Court comes to the
conclusion that accused No.1 is a Group-B Officer and charge
sheet would discloses that competent authority to accord
sanction is the Government and the Sanction granted in this
case is by the Commissioner of Transport, which is invalid and
no sanction in the eye of law and comes to the conclusion that
the Sanction is invalid and non-est and it is just and proper to
return the entire charge sheet papers to the Investigating
Agency with liberty to the State to proceed further in accordance
with law and to file a charge sheet afresh after obtaining
necessary sanction from the Competent Authority as far as
accused No.1 is concerned who is a public servant along with
accused No.2.
6. Being aggrieved by the said order, the Lokayuktha
Police have filed the criminal revision in Crl.R.P.No.422/2018 on
the ground that as per the Notification No.DPAR in
No.SI.A.SV.I.46 SE.E.VI.2008 dated 11.02.2010, it is very clear
that if a person is appointed to Group-C post and thereafter
promoted to Group-B post in respect of such person the original
appointing authority is a competent authority to remove him
from service irrespective of cadre. Respondent No.1 is not
appointed to Group-B by Government but he is promoted from
Group-C post. As per the circular dated 11.02.2010, it is a
Commissioner of Transport was the appointing authority. At the
time of appointment to Group-C post, will continue to be the
competent authority, even when respondent No.1 has moved to
Group-B post. The appointment order No.EST/105/91-92 dated
23.09.1992 shown that he has been appointed as Motor Vehicle
Inspector which is a Group-C post as per pay scale fixed for the
post. Respondent No.1 has been promoted to the cadre of
Senior Inspector of Motor Vehicle as per his service particulars
referred to by the Special Court which shows that from
10.08.2010 he is promoted as Senior Inspector of Motor Vehicle
which is Group-B post with basic pay of Rs.47,400/-. The trap
was taken place on 13.06.2012 and as on that date, the accused
was Group-B officer. As per the circular, the Commissioner is a
competent authority to accord sanction but without considering
all these aspects the learned Special Judge holds that the
sanction is not valid. Hence, the said order is liable to be set
aside.
7. On the other hand, respondent No.1/accused No.1
also filed the criminal revision in Crl.R.P.No.599/2018 contending
that the Court below committed an error in giving liberty to the
Lokayuktha police to obtain fresh sanction and the very
registration of FIR by the Lokayuktha police is contrary to
Section 154 of Cr.P.C and without following the procedure,
Lokayuktha police have directed the complainant to secure the
voice recorder by furnishing the digital voice recorder and
thereafter on obtaining the voice recorder of the petitioner
proceeded to register an FIR on 13.06.2012. In order to
substantiate this contention, the counsel relied upon the decision
of the Apex Court reported in (2013) 8 SUPREME 2 in the case
of LALITH KUMARI vs STATE OF UTTER PRADESH wherein it
is held that registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of
Cr.P.C, if information discloses that the commission of a
cognizable offence and no preliminary enquiry is permissible
under such situations. In the case on hand, the Trial Court erred
in not noticing the fact that the case has been registered after
the investigation. The entire proceeding initiated against the
petitioner/accused is in violation of principles laid down in the
judgment reported in (1992) SUPP.1. SCC 335 in the case of
STATE OF HARYANA vs BHAJANLAL AND OTHERS. It is also
the contention of the counsel that it was the specific case in the
discharge application that the amount paid by the complainant
was towards the payment of taxes in respect of the vehicles
belonging to the complainant and not as a bribe and no sufficient
materials were placed before the Trial Court on record to frame
charges to proceed with the trial. Hence, the matter requires
reconsideration and to set aside the order of giving liberty and
quash the order dated 23.08.2017 and allow the application filed
under Section 227 read with 239 of Cr.P.C.
8. The counsel for the accused/petitioner in his
arguments would vehemently contend that the Trial Court fails
to take note of the fact that the accused/petitioner was
exonerated in a departmental proceedings and the allegation in
the departmental enquiry as well as in a criminal prosecution is
identical. The counsel further would vehemently contend that in
the similar set of facts and circumstances, this Court vide order
dated 18.12.2021 in Crl.P.No.200542/2017, relying upon the
decision of Radheshyam Kejriwal and Ashoo Surendranath
Tewari comes to the conclusion that both the cases are aptly
applicable to the facts of the case on hand and quashed the
proceedings and the petitioner is also entitled for the relief of
quashing the order of the Trial Court and consequently allowed
the application filed for discharge. The counsel also would
vehemently contend that the Departmental Enquiry is clear that
there is no material and he was exonerated and there cannot be
a criminal prosecution against the petitioner herein.
9. The counsel in support of his arguments also relies
upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2020) 9 SCC
636 in the case of ASHOO SURENDRANATH TEWARI vs
DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, EOW, CBI AND
ANOTHER and brought to notice of this Court in paragraph 8
wherein the Apex Court held that the standard of proof in a
departmental proceeding, being based on preponderance of
probability is somewhat lower than the standard of proof in a
criminal proceeding where the case has to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The counsel also brought to notice of this
Court paragraphs 12 and 13 wherein the Apex Court referring
some of the judgments held that the finding in the adjudication
proceedings in favour of the person facing trial for identical
violation will depend upon the nature of finding. If the
exoneration in adjudication proceedings is on technical ground
and not on merit, prosecution may continue and in the case of
exoneration, however, on merits where the allegation is found to
be not sustainable at all and the person held innocent, criminal
prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot
be allowed to continue, the underlying principle being the higher
standard of proof in criminal cases.
10. Per contra, the counsel appearing for Lokayuktha in
his arguments would vehemently contend that a very approach
of the Trial Court is erroneous. The Trial Court failed to take
note of the Notification dated 11.02.2010 and sanction is also
accorded in terms of the said sanction and nothing is discussed
in the order of the Trial Court with regard to the Notification is
concerned. Even the order of sanction itself clearly discloses that
sanction is given based on the Notification of the Government
and the same has not been considered by the Trial Court and
committed an error in giving liberty to file fresh charge sheet
along with fresh sanction. The counsel also brought to notice of
this Court to the sanction order issued by the Commissioner of
Transport wherein, in paragraph 6, the Commissioner of
Transport referred the Notification dated 11.02.2010 and
categorically stated that in terms of the said Notification, in
respect of Group-B Officer, except the Tahsildar Group-II,
appointed the Departmental Head as an appointing/removing
authority and also referred the order dated 19.05.2010 and
hence, sanction was accorded under Section 19(1)(c) and the
same has not been considered by the Trial Court and proceeded
erroneously in coming to the conclusion that there is no any
valid sanction.
11. The counsel also in support of his arguments relied
upon the judgment of the Apex Court passed in Criminal
Appeal No.1322/2018 in the case of STATE OF MIZORAM vs
DR. C SANGNGHINA and brought to notice of this Court the
discussion made in the very same judgment wherein an
observation is made that accused was discharged due to lack of
proper sanction there is no charge sheet after obtaining valid
sanction unless there is failure of justice on account of error,
omission or irregularity in grant of sanction for prosecution, the
proceedings under the Act could not be vitiated. The counsel
referring this judgment would vehemently contend that the
judgment is very clear that even valid charge sheet can be
obtained. The counsel also relied upon the recent judgment of
the Apex Court passed in Criminal Appeal arising out of Spl.
(Crl.) No.8254/2023 dated 23.04.2024 wherein the Apex
Court made an observation that more so when despite the
accused having been exonerated in the departmental
proceedings yet the competent authority, vide Annexure P3
proceeded to accord sanction for prosecution. The High Court,
failed to account for the principles enunciated by this Court in
the case of State of Haryana and others VS Bhanjan Lal and
others and also comes to the conclusion that it was the pleaded
case of the Lokayukta before the High Court that the
continuance of the trial was not on the very same evidence as
what weighed with the authorities in exonerating the employee
in the departmental proceedings and hence, High Court
committed an error in not proceedings in a proper perspective.
12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the
respective counsel and also on perusal of the material available
on record, the points that would arise for the consideration of
this Court are:
1. Whether the Special Court committed an error
in allowing the application filed under Section
227 r/w 239 of Cr.P.C in discharging the
accused Nos.1 and 2 on the ground that
sanction is not valid?
2. Whether the Special Court committed an error
in giving liberty to file the charge sheet along
with fresh sanction and giving of liberty is
erroneous as contended by the accused
No.1/petitioner?
3. What order?
13. Having considered the materials available on record,
it is the case of the prosecution that accused No.1 demands
bribe amount of Rs.24,000/- and the same was reduced to
Rs.18,000/- and trap was conducted while accepting the amount
of Rs.15,000/- through accused No.2 who is the private person.
The police investigated the matter and filed the charge sheet and
sanction was obtained from the Transport Commissioner and no
dispute with regard to the said fact is concerned. It is also not in
dispute that accused No.1 was appointed as a Motor Vehicle
Inspector as Group-C employee and he was promoted in 2010 as
Group-B Officer. It is the main contention that sanction is not
valid and sanction ought to have been obtained from the
Government not from the Transport Commissioner. It is brought
to notice of this Court by the Special Counsel for Lokayukta to
the Notification dated 11.02.2010 issued by the Government of
Karnataka, which read thus:
"In exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to
sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 of the Karnataka Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, the
Government of Karnataka hereby specifies that the Heads
of Department concerned shall be the Appointing
Authorities in respect of first appointment to Group-B
poses in all Departments/Services, except Group-B posts
of Tahsildar Grade-II.
Provided that the Government shall continue to be
the disciplinary authority for the purpose of imposing any
of the penalties specified under Clauses (v) to (viii) of
Rule 8 of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 in respect of the persons
appointed by the Government to the States Civil Services
Group-B posts except the Group-B posts in respect of
which Heads of Departments concerned have already
been notified as the Appointing Authorities."
14. Having read this Notification, it is very clear that
Heads of Departments concerned shall be the Appointing
Authorities in respect of first appointment to Group-B posts in all
departments except the Group-B posts of Tahsildar Grade-II. It
is also important to note that the Transport Commissioner while
giving sanction also referred this Notification but the Trial Court
even not discussed anything about this Notification and it
appears that even not read the Sanction Order of the Transport
Commissioner which was given as sanction and proceeded
erroneously in coming to the conclusion that the Government is
the Competent Authority. The power exercised by the
Commissioner is also not considered by the Trial Court and the
Transport Commissioner while giving the sanction also even
referred the Government Order dated 19.05.2010 and so also
Government Order dated 15.11.2012 wherein specifically he has
stated that he is having the power of appointing or removing of
the employees and hence, he had invoked Section 19(1)(c) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to give the sanction.
15. The counsel for respondents, no doubt, relied upon
the judgment of this Court passed in Crl.P.No.200542/2017. But
the factual aspects of the said case and the present case is
different and said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the
case on hand. No doubt, the Apex Court also in the case of
ASHOO SURENDRANATH TEWARI which has been relied upon
by the counsel for the respondent held that when the identical
issues involved in the Departmental Enquiry as well as the
charges leveled against him in the criminal proceedings,
discussion was made that the higher standard of proof in
criminal cases is beyond reasonable doubt and in a case of
Departmental Enquiry, preponderance of probabilities and no
discharge with regard to the principles laid down in the
judgment.
16. This Court has to take note of the factual aspects of
the case and also the judgments relied upon by the counsel
appearing for the Lokayukta in the case of State of Mizoram
referred supra wherein the Apex Court held that it will not
amounts to double jeopardy and also taken note of Article 20(2)
of the Constitution of India and comes to the conclusion that the
Special Court finds that sanction is not valid and directed the
prosecution to proceed further in accordance with law. In view
of the discussions made above, it is clear that the very approach
of the Special Court is erroneous. The counsel for the Lokayukta
police brought to notice of this Court to the recent judgment of
the Apex Court passed in Criminal Appeal arising out of Slp
(Crl.) No.8254/2023 dated 23.04.2024 wherein also the
case of invoking Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 was discussed in detail. Hence, this Court would like to
supply the emphasis of the said judgment to consider the same
in the present case.
"7. In the aforesaid backdrop, in the
considered view of this Court, the approach adopted
by the Courts in quashing the FIR in the attending
facts and circumstances, is legally unsustainable. It
ventured into an inquiry, unwarranted at this stage,
holding that there is no direct evidence that the
present respondent had demanded any money and
that there was no material to proceed against him,
completely forgetting, if not ignoring the material
which had surfaced during the course of
investigation, amongst others, the pendrive,
allegedly, indicating his complicity in the crime.
8. Under these circumstances, in the
attending facts and circumstances, we allow the
appeal, more so when despite the accused having
been exonerated in the departmental proceedings
yet the competent authority, vide Annexure P3
proceeded to accord sanction for prosecution. The
High Court, in our considered view, failed to account
for the principles enunciated by this Court in the
case of State of Haryana and others VS Bhajan Lal
and others (1992) SCC Suppl.1 335.
9. We may also observe that it was the
pleaded case of the Lokayukta before the High Court
that the continuance of the trial was not on the very
same evidence as what weighed with the authorities
in exonerating the employee in the departmental
proceedings. This fact, also appears not to have
been considered by the High Court in its correct
perspective."
(emphasis supplied)
17. The Apex Court in the above judgment made an
observation that the High Court ventured into an inquiry,
unwarranted at this stage, holding that there is no direct
evidence that the present respondent had demanded any money
and that there was no material to proceed against him,
completely forgetting, if not ignoring the material which had
surfaced during the course of investigation, amongst others, the
pendrive, allegedly, indicating his complicity in the crime. In the
case on hand also it has to be noted that accused was trapped
and a conversation was recorded and in this regard, FSL report
is also collected and demand also made and received alleged
bribe of Rs.15,000/- through accused No.2. It is also important
to note that in paragraph 8, the Apex Court also observed that
more so when despite the accused having been exonerated in
the departmental proceedings yet the competent authority, vide
Annexure P3 proceeded to accord sanction for prosecution. The
High Court, in our considered view, failed to account for the
principles enunciated by this Court in the case of State of
Haryana and others VS Bhajan Lal and others. In the case
on hand also sanction was granted having considered the
material available on record regarding demand and acceptance
of the alleged bribery.
18. The Apex Court also an observation is made in
paragraph 9 that the continuance of the trial was not on the very
same evidence as what weighed with the authorities in
exonerating the employee in the departmental proceedings. This
fact, also appears not to have been considered by the High Court
in its correct perspective. In the case on hand also, departmental
enquiry is different with regard to misconduct. But in the case on
hand, there is a criminal misconduct making demand and
acceptance of bribe amount. Hence, having considered the
material available on record, it needs to comes to the conclusion
that the principles laid down in the case of ASHOO
SURENDRANATH TEWARI is not applicable to the facts of the
case on hand when there is an evidence of conversation with
regard to demand and acceptance of bribe amount of
Rs.15,000/- through accused No.2. When the criminal
misconduct has been alleged against a Government employee
who is discharging the duty as a public servant, demanded the
amount illegally and raid was conducted and material discloses
regarding demand and acceptance of the same, it needs trial and
even exonerating him in Departmental Enquiry will not come in
the way of continuing the trial against the petitioner/accused
No1. Hence, I do not find any merit in the petition filed by the
petitioner/accused No1. Even though, questioning of giving
liberty to proceed further against accused No.1/petitioner, no
grounds are made out even for setting aside the order of giving
liberty to proceed against him in accordance with law. I have
already pointed out that the question of giving liberty also does
not arise when sanction is accorded by the Competent Authority
in terms of the Notification dated 11.02.2010 which has been
extracted above which confers on the Transport Commissioner to
accord the sanction in view of the order of the Government.
Hence, the order impugned is liable to be set aside and the Trial
Court has to proceed further against the accused Nos.1 and 2 in
accordance with law. Hence, answer the points accordingly.
Point No.3:
19. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the
following:
ORDER
The Crl.R.P.No.422/2018 filed by the
Lokayukta is allowed by setting aside the order
dated 23.08.2017 passed in SPL.C.C.No.24/2013 by
the Trial Court and the Crl.R.P.No.599/2018 filed by
the petitioner/accused is dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
SN
