Karnataka High Court
Sri Yoganand vs The Deputy Commissioner on 25 July, 2024
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WP No. 19754 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF JULY, 2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S.INDIRESH
WRIT PETITION NO.19754 OF 2024 (KLR-LG)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI YOGANAND
S/O LATE MAHADEVU
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
2. SMT. PRABHAVATHI
D/O LATE MAHADEVU
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
3. SMT. RUKMINI
D/O LATE MAHADEVU
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
4. SMT. PRAMILA
D/O LATE MAHADEVU
Digitally signed by AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
ARUNKUMAR M S
Location: High
Court of Karnataka 5. SRI. BASAVARAJU
S/O LATE MAHADEVU
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
PETITIONER NOS. 1 TO 5 ARE
R/AT NAGANAHALLI,
KASABA HOBLI,
MYSURU - 570003.
6. SMT. JAYAMMA
W/O LATE MOLLEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 77 YEARS
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WP No. 19754 of 2024
7. SRI. M. CHAMARAJU
S/O LATE MOLLEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
8. SMT. B.M. NAGARATNA
D/O LATE MOLLEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
9. SMT. JAYALAKSHMI
D/O LATE MOLLEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
10. SMT. M. GEETHA
D/O LATE SRI MOLLEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
PETITIONER NOS. 6 TO 10
ARE R/AT NO.146,
BELAVADI VILLAGE AND POST,
MYSURU - 570018.
11. SMT. CHAMAKKA
W/O LATE CHAMUNDEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
12. SRI. SHIVALINGEGOWDA
S/O LATE CHAMUNDEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
PETITIONER NOS. 11 AND 12 ARE
RESIDING AT BELAVADI VILLAGE,
YELAWALA HOBLI,
MYSURU TALUK - 571130.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. RAJARAMA S., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
D C OFFICE COMPLEX,
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WP No. 19754 of 2024
KRISHNARAJA BOULEVARD ROAD,
K G KOPPAL
MYSURU - 570001.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
MYSURU REVENUE SUB-DIVISION
D C OFFICE COMPLEX,
KRISHNARAJA BOULEVARD ROAD
K G KOPPAL
MYSURU - 570001.
3. THE TAHSILDAR
OFFIER OF THE TAHSILDAR
MINI VIDHANA SOUDHA
NAZARBAD MOHALLA
MYSURU - 570010.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. B.P. RADHA, AGA )
**********
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 21.12.2010 IN
L.N.D(1) C.R.:119:2005-06 ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT
NO.1 i.e., DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, VIDE ANNX-A.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS
UNDER:
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WP No. 19754 of 2024
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S.INDIRESH
ORAL ORDER
1. Smt. B.P. Radha, learned Additional Government
Advocate is directed to accept notice for respondents. She
is permitted to file memo of appearance in the Registry,
within two weeks.
2. Petitioners are assailing the Order dated 21.12.2010
in L.N.D.(1)C.R.119/2005-06 (Annexure-A) passed by
respondent No.1.
3. Relevant facts for adjudication of this Writ Petition as
contended by the petitioners are that, grand father of the
petitioners was in possession of the land to an extent of 8
acres 11 guntas in Sy. No.218 of Belavadi Village, Ilavala
Hobli, Mysuru Taluk and District and name of the grand
father of the petitioners was regularised by issuing grant
certificate dated 26.09.1955 (Annexures-B and D). The
petitioners have also produced a sketch relating to the land
in question (Annexure-C) issued by the competent
authority. It is further grievance of the petitioners that
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petitioners are in possession of the land in terms of the
report made by the Revenue Inspector as per Annexure-F
to the writ petition. It is further stated in the writ petition
that the name of the grand father of the petitioners was
reflected in the RTC records and same would establish that,
petitioners are in cultivation of the land in question.
4. It is also stated that on 03.11.2008, the Assistant
Commissioner - respondent No.2 conducted spot inspection
and reported as per Annexure-H with regard to the
agricultural activity being made by the grand father of the
petitioners, however, the respondent No.1 has issued the
order dated 21.12.2010 (Annexure-A) whereby the grant
made in favour of grand father of the petitioners during
1955 came to be rejected without haring the petitioners'
grand father or petitioners herein. Feeling aggrieved by the
same, the petitioners have presented this Writ Petition.
5. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the
parties.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
submitted that before issuing the order at Annexure-A,
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petitioners have not been heard in the matter and suo-
motu the respondent No.1 has passed the impugned order
which affects the right of the petitioners as the land in
question has been granted in favour of the grand father of
the petitioners as per Annexures- B and D. Learned
counsel further submitted that sketch has also been issued
pursuant to the grant certificate and petitioners are is
possession of the land in question and accordingly, he
sought interference of this Court.
7. Learned Additional Government Advocate opposed
the submissions made by the learned counsel for the
petitioners on the ground of delay in approaching this
Court by challenging the order passed by the respondent
No.1 as per Annexure-A to the Writ Petition.
8. It is also contended by learned Additional
Government Advocate that civil litigations were pending
consideration in suit in O.S. No.325/2011 before the Trial
Court as well as before this Court in RSA No.85/2021
(Annexure-K to the Writ Petition) and accordingly, she
sought for dismissal of the writ petition.
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9. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties and on careful examination of the writ papers would
indicate that there is no dispute with regard to issuance of
grant certificate by respondent - authority on 26.09.1955
(Annexures-B and D). Pursuant to the same, a sketch has
been prepared by the respondent - authority as per
Annexure-C, demarking the boundaries in respect of the
land in question. It is also forthcoming from the Writ
Petition that petitioners are in possession and cultivation of
the land and RTC extracts is produced for more than three
decades. The Revenue Inspector has also given a report
(Annexure-H) with regard to cultivation being made by the
grandfather of the petitioners in the land in question. It is
also forthcoming from the Writ Petition that civil dispute in
O.S. No.325/2011 was disposed of before the Trial Court
against which appeal in R.A. No.49/2009 was preferred
before the First Appellate Court and the learned VII Addl.
District Judge, Mysuru, dismissed the appeal. Challenging
the said order, RSA No.85/2021 has been preferred before
this Court. This Court, while disposing of RSA No.85/2021
on 22.01.2024 (Annexure-K) made an observation that
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liberty is reserved to the plaintiffs therein to pursue
remedy seeking grant of land as permissible under law.
10. In the said aspect of the matter, as civil litigation was
pending consideration pursuant to the suit being filed in
O.S. No.325/2011 as well as in R.A. No.49/2009 which
came to be disposed of resulting in filing of RSA
No.85/2021(Annexure-K) before this Court, which came to
be disposed of by this Court, whereby liberty has been
reserved to the parties and therefore, I am of the view
that, respondent - authority ought to have heard the
petitioners before issuing the impugned order at Annexure-
A to the Writ Petition. Even otherwise, on careful
examination of the order dated 21.12.2010 in
L.N.D.(1)C.R.119/2005-06(Annexure-A), nothing has been
stated by respondent No.1 with regard to the grant made
in favour of the grand father of the petitioners being
cancelled by way of an order passed in that aspect. No
reasons are assigned and order passed is in violation of
principles of natural justice. In that view of the matter, I
find force in the submission made by the petitioners that
impugned order at Annexure-A has been passed without
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giving notice to the petitioners as well no opportunity of
hearing has been extended to the petitioners to have their
say in the matter. At this juncture, it is relevant to cite
the Judgment of this Court in the case of
M. RAMAKRISHNAPPA Vs. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
LAND RECORDS AND ANOTHER reported in ILR 2007
KAR 769, wherein, this Court has held that, the suo-motu
proceedings cannot be initiated by the respondent-
authorities after lapse of three years and the power is to be
exercised by the competent authority within a reasonable
period. In this Writ Petition, it is evident from Annexure-B
that, grant certificate in respect of the land in question has
been granted in favour of Chamundi Gowda on 26.09.1955
and thereafter, revenue records have been changed in
favour of the original grantee and the respondent No.1 has
passed the impugned order dated 21.12.2010 (Annexure-
A) after lapse of fifty-five years which is not permissible
under law. In this aspect, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of JOINT COLLECTOR RANGA REDDY DISTRICT
AND ANOTHER Vs. D. NARSING RAO AND OTHERS
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reported in (2015) 3 SCC 695 at paragraphs 25 to 32
held as follows:
"25. The legal position is fairly well settled by a
long line of decisions of this Court which have laid
down that even when there is no period of
limitation prescribed for the exercise of any power,
revisional or otherwise, such power must be
exercised within a reasonable period. This is so
even in cases where allegations of fraud have
necessitated the exercise of any corrective power.
We may briefly refer to some of the decisions only
to bring home the point that the absence of a
stipulated period of limitation makes little or no
difference insofar as the exercise of the power is
concerned which ought to be permissible only when
the power is invoked within a reasonable period.
26. In one of the earlier decisions of this Court in
S.B. Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India [(1976) 2
SCC 181 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 177] , this Court held
that exercise of suo motu power of revision must
also be within a reasonable time and that any
unreasonable delay in the exercise may affect the
validity. But what would constitute reasonable time
would depend upon the facts of each case.
27. To the same effect is the decision of this Court
in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie
Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy [(2003) 7 SCC 667]
wherein this Court held that even in cases of fraud
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the revisional power must be exercised within a
reasonable period and that several factors need to
be kept in mind while deciding whether relief should
be denied only on the ground of delay. The Court
said: (SCC p. 677, para 9)
"9. ... In cases of fraud, this power could be
exercised within a reasonable time from the
date of detection or discovery of fraud. While
exercising such power, several factors need to
be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of
the third parties over the immovable property
due to passage of considerable time, change of
hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the
orders attaining finality under the provisions of
other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act)."
28. To the same effect is the view taken by this
Court in Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune
Municipal Transport [(2010) 8 SCC 467 : (2010) 3
SCC (Civ) 415] wherein this Court reiterated the
legal position and held that the power to revise
orders and proceedings cannot be exercised
arbitrarily and interminably. This Court observed:
(SCC p. 476, para 28)
"28. The legislature in its wisdom did not fix
a time-limit for exercising the revisional power
nor inserted the words 'at any time' in Section
34 of the 1976 Act. It does not mean that the
legislature intended to leave the orders passed
under the Act open to variation for an indefinite
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period inasmuch as it would have the effect of
rendering title of the holders/allottee(s)
permanently precarious and in a state of
perpetual uncertainty. In case it is assumed that
the legislature has conferred an everlasting and
interminable power in point of time, the title
over the declared surplus land, in the hands of
the State/allottee, would forever remain
virtually insecure. The Court has to construe the
statutory provision in a way which makes the
provisions workable, advancing the purpose and
object of enactment of the statute."
29. In State of H.P. v. Rajkumar Brijender Singh
[(2004) 10 SCC 585] this Court held that in the
absence of any special circumstances a delay of 15
years in suo motu exercise of revisional power was
impermissible as the delay was unduly long and
unexplained. This Court observed: (SCC pp. 588-
89, para 6)
"6. We are now left with the second question
which was raised by the respondents before the
High Court, namely, the delayed exercise of the
power under sub-section (3) of Section 20. As
indicated above, the Financial Commissioner
exercised the power after 15 years of the order
of the Collector. It is true that sub-section (3)
provides that such a power may be exercised at
any time but this expression does not mean
there would be no time-limit or it is in infinity.
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All that is meant is that such powers should be
exercised within a reasonable time. No fixed
period of limitation may be laid but
unreasonable delay in exercise of the power
would tend to undo the things which have
attained finality. It depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case as to what is the
reasonable time within which the power of suo
motu action could be exercised. For example, in
this case, as the appeal had been withdrawn but
the Financial Commissioner had taken up the
matter in exercise of his suo motu power, it
could well be open for the State to submit that
the facts and circumstances were such that it
would be within reasonable time but as we have
already noted that the order of the Collector
which has been interfered with was passed in
January 1976 and the appeal preferred by the
State was also withdrawn sometime in March
1976. The learned counsel for the appellant was
not able to point out such other special facts
and circumstances by reason of which it could
be said that exercise of suo motu power after
15 years of the order interfered with was within
a reasonable time. That being the position in
our view, the order of the Financial
Commissioner stands vitiated having been
passed after a long lapse of 15 years of the
order which has been interfered with. Therefore,
while holding that the Financial Commissioner
would have power to proceed suo motu in a
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suitable case even though an appeal preferred
before the lower appellate authority is
withdrawn, may be, by the State. Thus, the
view taken by the High Court is not sustainable.
But the order of the Financial Commissioner
suffers from the vice of the exercise of the
power after unreasonable lapse of time and
such delayed action on his part nullifies the
order passed by him in exercise of power under
sub-section (3) of Section 20."
30. We may also refer to the decision of this Court
in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District
Board, Bhojpur [(1992) 2 SCC 598 : AIR 1993 SC
802] wherein the Court explained the legal position
as under: (SCC pp. 602-03, para 13)
"13. The rule which says that the Court may
not enquire into belated and stale claim is not a
rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound
and proper exercise of discretion. Each case
must depend upon its own facts. It will all
depend on what the breach of the fundamental
right and the remedy claimed are and how delay
arose. The principle on which the relief to the
party on the grounds of laches or delay is
denied is that the rights which have accrued to
others by reason of the delay in filing the
petition should not be allowed to be disturbed
unless there is a reasonable explanation for the
delay. The real test to determine delay in such
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cases is that the petitioner should come to the
writ court before a parallel right is created and
that the lapse of time is not attributable to any
laches or negligence. The test is not as to
physical running of time. Where the
circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the
illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained
on the sole ground of laches. The decision in
Tilokchand case [Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B.
Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110] relied on is
distinguishable on the facts of the present case.
The levy if based on the net profits of the
railway undertaking was beyond the authority
and the illegal nature of the same has been
questioned though belatedly in the pending
proceedings after the pronouncement of the
High Court in the matter relating to the
subsequent years. That being the case, the
claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on
the sole ground of delay. We are of the opinion
that the High Court was wrong in dismissing the
writ petition in limine and refusing to grant the
relief sought for. We however agree that the
suit has been rightly dismissed."
31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional
jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or
transactions were to remain forever open to
challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless
uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy
of law. Because, even when there is no period of
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limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers,
the intervening delay, may have led to creation of
third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a
belated exercise of a discretionary power especially
when no cogent explanation for the delay is in
sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with
the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders
sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of
power must be within a reasonable period of the
discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or
transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the
time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the
exercise of revisional power would itself be
tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests
such power in an authority.
32. In the case at hand, while the entry sought to
be corrected is described as fraudulent, there is
nothing in the notice impugned before the High
Court as to when was the alleged fraud discovered
by the State. A specific statement in that regard
was essential for it was a jurisdictional fact, which
ought to be clearly asserted in the notice issued to
the respondents. The attempt of the appellant State
to demonstrate that the notice was issued within a
reasonable period of the discovery of the alleged
fraud is, therefore, futile. At any rate, when the
Government allowed the land in question for
housing sites to be given to government employees
in the year 1991, it must be presumed to have
known about the record and the revenue entries
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concerning the parcel of land made in the ordinary
course of official business. Inasmuch as, the notice
was issued as late as on 31-12-2004, it was
delayed by nearly 13 years. No explanation has
been offered even for this delay assuming that the
same ought to be counted only from the year 1991.
Judged from any angle the notice seeking to
reverse the entries made half a century ago, was
clearly beyond reasonable time and was rightly
quashed."
11. Recently, in the case of SMT. SHYAMO DEVI AND
OTHERS Vs. STATE OF U.P. THROUGH SECRTARY AND
OTHERS reported in AIR 2024 SC 2862, held that the revenue
authorities have to exercise their jurisdiction within a reasonable
period, if no period of limitation is prescribed in the Statute.
Taking into consideration the revenue records produced by the
petitioners and the RTC extracts which stand in the name of the
grandfather of the petitioners for more than three decades and
that grant certificate issued to the grandfather of the petitioners
has been produced at Annexures-B and D to the Writ Petition, I
am of the opinion that, the action of the respondent No.1 is
arbitrary and unreasonable and as such the Writ Petition is liable
to be allowed.
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12. In the result, I pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) The Order dated 21.12.2010 passed by the first
respondent herein, in L.N.D.(1)C.R.119/2005-06, is hereby
set aside.
(iii) It is open for the petitioners to approach the
competent authority for further action in the matter, for
modification of revenue records, if any.
Sd/-
(E.S.INDIRESH)
JUDGE
sac*
