Karnataka High Court
P V Rudrappa vs The State Of Karnataka on 30 January, 2024
Author: Krishna S Dixit
Bench: Krishna S Dixit
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WP No. 9642 of 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2024 R
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE KRISHNA S DIXIT
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA
WRIT PETITION NO. 9642 OF 2020 (S-KSAT)
BETWEEN:
P V RUDRAPPA,
S/O LATE PUJARA VEERAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
PANCHAYAT DEVELOPMENT OFFICER
(UNDER ORDER OF DISMISSAL)
KODAANURU GRAMA PANCHAYATH
MOYAGONDA HOBLI,
DAVANAGERE (TALUK)-577 534.
R/O NO.900/03, HYLAK HOSPITAL ROAD,
1ST MAIN, 2ND CROSS, SHAKTHI NAGAR,
DAVANAGERE-577 511.
...PETITIONER
Digitally signed (BY SRI. RANGANATHA S JOIS.,ADVOCATE)
by SHARADA
VANI B AND:
Location: HIGH
COURT OF 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
KARNATAKA REP BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND
PANCHAYAT RAJ,
M S BUILDING, BANGALORE-560 001.
2. THE LOKAYUKTHA,
REP BY ITS REGISTRAR,
M S BUILDING, BANGALORE-560 001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.KHAMROZ KHAN, AGA FOR R1;
SRI. VENKATESH ARABATTI., ADVOCATE FOR R2)
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WP No. 9642 of 2020
THIS WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AN
227 OF THE COSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO CALL FOR
THE RECORDS RELATING OT THE ORDER DT 10.02.2020 MADE
IN A.NO.3668/2019 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL VIDE ANNEXURE-A, PERUSE AND
QUASH THE SAID ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL AS ARBITRARY,
WITHOUT APPLICATION OF MIND, ILLEGAL AND CONTRARY TO
LAW AND ALLOW THE APPLICATION FILED BY PETITIONER
BEFORE THE HONBLE KSAT IN A.NO.3668/2019ISSUE
DIRECTION TO THE RESPONDENT TO FORTHWITH REINSTATE
THE PETITIONER INTO SERVICE AND TO TREAT HIM AS
HAVING CONTINUED IN SERVICE WITH ALL CONSEQUENTIAL
MONETARY BENEFITS TILL THE DATE OF HIS RETIREMENT AND
THEREAFTER GRANT PENSIONARY BENEFITS WITH INTEREST
AT 12 PER CENT PER ANNUM.
THIS WRIT PETITION, COMING ON FOR HEARING THIS
DAY, KRISHNA S. DIXIT. J., MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
Petitioner an employee dismissed on the ground of
proven act of bribery, is knocking at the doors of Writ
Court for assailing the Karnataka State Administrative
Tribunal's order dated 10.02.2020 whereby his Application
No.3668/2019 has been dismissed. In the said Application,
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petitioner had challenged the Penalty Order of Dismissal
from service dated 24.05.2019.
II. Learned counsel for the Petitioner argues that
his client has been acquitted after a full-fledged trial and
the said acquittal is honourable; in the earlier round of
litigation, i.e., in Petitioner's Application No.1864/2017 the
very Tribunal had directed the Respondent No.1 to
consider the Criminal Court order of acquittal along with
his Reply to the 2nd Show Cause Notice; such consideration
has not taken place and that, had it taken place, the
Petitioner would have emerged victorious in the
Disciplinary Proceedings. He further submits that there is
thus a gross error apparent on the face of the record
warranting interference of this Court for setting the same
at naught and thereby doing justice to the Petitioner.
III. After service of notice, the State is represented
by learned AGA and the Lokayukta speaks through its
Panel Counsel. Both they vehemently resist the Petition
contending that: criminal trial and Disciplinary Proceedings
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are different from each other; what happens in the former
has nothing to do with what should happen in the latter;
acquittal in criminal trial is not a bar against holding
Disciplinary Enquiry; the Disciplinary Authority having
considered all aspects of the matter accepted the Enquiry
Report that found the Petitioner guilty of charges and
then has levied the penalty of dismissal from service; the
matter having been examined by the Tribunal, relief has
been rightly denied to him. A Writ Court exercising a
limited supervisory jurisdiction cannot undertake a deeper
examination of impugned orders. Therefore, they submit,
Petition should be dismissed on settled principles.
IV. We have heard learned counsel for the parties
and perused the Petition papers that are bulky. Having
done that, we are of a considered view that this Petition
deserves to be allowed and relief needs to be granted to
the Petitioner, for the following reasons:
1. AS TO NON-CONSIDERATION OF ACQUITTAL
ORDER WHILST LEVYING PUNISHMENT:
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(a) The specific charge against the Petitioner both in
the criminal case i.e., Spl Case (LOK) No. 3/2012 and the
Disciplinary Proceedings, was verbatim same namely, that
whilst working as the Panchayat Development Officer, he
had demanded & accepted a bribe of Rs.4,000/- on
08.07.2011 from the complainant Mr.Chandrappa for
changing the Katha in respect of a house site. After a full-
fledged trial, the learned Special Judge (Lokayukta),
Davanagere, handed an acquittal order on 30.01.2017.
The Tribunal in its order dated 08.08.2018 in Petitioner's
Application No.1864/2017 having quashed Order dated
25.02.2017 had directed the Respondent No.1 to consider
the matter afresh in the light of Acquittal Order and the
reply filed by him.
(b) An extreme punishment of dismissal from service
is levied on the petitioner. Job being the only source of
livelihood, the Disciplinary Authority ought to have shown
due seriousness in treating the matter. However, that is
not done. Except referring to the Acquittal Order, there is
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absolutely no discussion by the first Respondent, in the
impugned order of penalty. Referring to an order is one
thing and discussing about it, to arrive at a decision is
another. More often than not, the authorities that be,
labour under a wrong impression that the reference per se
is tantamount to discussion. We do not subscribe to this
militantly wrong view. Had the Acquittal Order been duly
adverted to, the outcome of Disciplinary Proceedings
would have been much different and to the advantage of
the delinquent employee. Thus, its non-consideration
despite Tribunal's mandate, constitutes the first error
apparent on the face of the record.
2. AS TO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS & DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, AND
INVOCABILITY OF DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY:
(a) The vehement submission of learned AGA &
learned Panel Counsel that there is difference between
Criminal Proceedings and Disciplinary Proceedings, cannot
be disputed. Even an average law student would not
disagree with this. The nature of criminal proceedings, the
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form before which they are brought, the quality &
quantum of evidence, degree of proof and the outcome of
such proceedings, are all much different from those in a
Disciplinary Proceeding. The rule of evidence applicable to
Departmental Proceedings is not the same for criminal
trial; criminal cases are ordinarily governed inter alia by
the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 & the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The technical rule relating
to sufficiency of evidence does not apply to departmental
enquiries. The authority conducting such enquiry is
guided by the Rules of Natural Justice & Fairness. In a
departmental enquiry, there is no inhibition against placing
reliance on the evidence of a co-delinquent, unlike in a
criminal case. This is the reason why courts ordinarily do
not stay the disciplinary proceedings only on the ground
that a parallel criminal proceeding pends.
(b) What is observed by the Apex Court in AJIT
KUMAR NAG vs. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD., 2005
SCC Online SC 1352 at para 11 is worth reproducing:
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"As far as acquittal of the appellant by a
criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the
said order does not preclude the Corporation
from taking an action if it is otherwise
permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly
well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would
not debar an employer from exercising power in
accordance with Rules and Regulations in force.
The two proceedings criminal and departmental
are entirely different. They operate in different
fields and have different objectives. Whereas
the object of criminal trial is to inflict
appropriate punishment on offender, the
purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with
the delinquent departmentally and to impose
penalty in accordance with service Rules. In a
criminal trial, incriminating statement made by
the accused in certain circumstances or before
certain officers is totally inadmissible in
evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and
procedure would not apply to departmental
proceedings. The degree of proof which is
necessary to order a conviction is different from
the degree of proof necessary to record the
commission of delinquency. The rule relating to
appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings
is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of
proof is on the prosecution and unless the
prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the
accused 'beyond reasonable doubt', he cannot
be convicted by a court of law. In departmental
enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be
imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding
recorded on the basis of 'preponderance of
probability'. Acquittal of the appellant by a
Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso
facto absolve him from the liability under the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We
are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention
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of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a
criminal court, the impugned order dismissing
him from service deserves to be quashed and
set aside".
However, the above observations are by way of general
rule which admits at least one exception namely the
abnorm of honourable acquittal.
(c) In RAM LAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN,
(2024) 1 SCC 175, it is observed at para 30 as under:
"We are additionally satisfied that in the
teeth of the finding of the Appellate Judge, the
disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed
thereon cannot be allowed to stand.
The charges were not just similar but identical
and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances
were all the same. This is a case where in
exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders
of the disciplinary authority and the appellate
authority as allowing them to stand will be
unjust, unfair and oppressive."
In other words, when the facts, evidentiary material and
the circumstances arising from the criminal case are
identical to those in the disciplinary proceedings, ordinarily
there cannot be difference in terms of their outcome. If
on identical set of facts/allegations that are vouched by
the very same evidentiary material/witnesses, an accused
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employee is acquitted after a full-fledged trial, ordinarily
he cannot be punished in a disciplinary enquiry. In a way,
this can be likened to doctrine of double jeopardy,
constitutionally enacted in Article 20(2); the Apex Court
in a catena of decisions has applied the same even in
disciplinary proceedings eg., STATE OF HARYANA vs.
BALWANT SINGH, (2003) 3 SCC 362. This vital aspect has
not figured in the consideration of petitioner's case at the
hands of disciplinary authority. Alas, Tribunal too missed
it. This constitutes yet another lacuna in the impugned
orders.
3. AS TO PLEA OF HONOURABLE ACQUITTAL & ITS
EFFECT ON DISCIPLINARY ACTION:
(a) As a norm offences are tried in the Criminal
Courts. After the trial, Court may convict or acquit the
accused. Even at the pre-trial stage, an accused may be
discharged too. There may be quashment of criminal
cases by the Apex Court/High Court. An order of acquittal
generally means that the person has not committed the
offence for which he was charged and tried; the cloud on
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his presumed innocence thus stands removed. Acquittal is
recorded when prosecution fails to prove its case beyond
all reasonable doubt; that is, when the guilt is not proved
to the hilt. The benefit of doubt given to the accused does
not mean that he was involved in the case, but the same
could not be established by the prosecution. In Criminal
Jurisprudence, the term "beyond reasonable doubt"
employed in a judgement ordinarily does not imply stigma
qua the one who was accused. However, that is not the
end of matter when the accused being a delinquent
employee is facing a disciplinary proceeding on the same
allegations. That is where the plea of 'honourable
acquittal', factors.
(b) The concept of 'honourable acquittal' is easy to
say, but difficult to employ, there being no statutory
definition thereof, more particularly in the IPC, Cr.PC &
Indian Evidence Act. Lord Williams, J. in ROBERT STUART
WAUCHOPE vs. EMPEROR (1934) 61 ILR Cal.168 observed:
"The expression 'honourably acquitted' is one which is
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unknown to court of justice. Apparently it is a form of
order used in courts martial and other extra judicial
tribunals...". The Apex Court in COMMISSIONER OF
POLICE, NEW DELHI v MEHER SINGH, (2013) 7 SCC 68 at
para 25 explained the same:
"...the expressions "honourable acquittal",
"acquitted of blame" and "fully exonerated" are
unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the
Penal Code. They are coined by judicial
pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is
meant by the expression "honourably
acquitted". ... when the accused is acquitted
after full consideration of the prosecution case
and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the
charges leveled against the accused, it can
possibly be said that the accused was
honourably acquitted."
(c) The idea of 'honourable acquittal' is not easy to
define although it can be illustrated. If an accused is
discharged at pre-trial stage or the criminal proceeding
launched against him is quashed, there is no difficulty in
treating the same as the cases of 'honourable acquittal' for
the limited purpose of disciplinary enquiry. (We are
mindful that the question of acquittal comes post trial). A
case of 'honourable acquittal' may arise when, after trial
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the Criminal Court orders acquittal with any of nearly the
following illustrives:
(i) the accused is falsely prosecuted to seek
vengeance or for some ulterior motive.
(ii) that there is absolutely no evidence to implicate
the accused in the proceedings;
(iii) there is very little evidence which is insufficient
to connect the accused with the commission of crime;
(iv) the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the
charges against the accused;
(v) the prosecution witnesses are unworthy of any
credit and their version does not generate any confidence.
We again say that the above are only illustrative and not
exhaustive. We would also add a caveat that in considering
as to whether the case of delinquent is of 'honourable
acquittal', the entire judgement in Criminal Case should be
perused. It is also desirable to secure a copy of record of
the proceedings for examination, unless the said exercise
poses practical difficulty. At least, it should be open to the
delinquent employee to produce such copies.
4. AS TO THE ROLE OF ENQUIRY OFFICER IN
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS:
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(a) Now let us examine the findings of Criminal Court
in its acquittal order dated 30.01.2017; at para 34, it has
observed as under:
"... the evidence of Investigating Officer and
P.W.2 also clearly depict that this accused
never demanded for the bribe amount of
Rs.4,000/- and on the other hand, this
complainant himself repeatedly stated with
regard to the amount of Rs.4,000/-. He has
further admitted that the accused specially
informed to the complainant by stating that
¤Ã£ÀÄ ºÉÆÃUÀÄ, ¤£ï PÉ®ìPÀÌ ºÉÆÃUÀÄ, £Á£ÀÄ PÀ½ì PÉÆrÛ¤,
"
zÀÄqÀÄØ¥ÀqÀÄØ K£ÀÄ ¨ÁåqÀ ºÉÆÃUÀÄ SÁvÉ DVvÉ ºÉÆÃUÀÄ. So,
all these things clearly create a doubt in the
mind of the Court regarding the demand made
by this accused for bribe. Admittedly, this
accused demanded the complainant to pay the
tax (KANDAAYA), for that the complainant paid
that amount and the accused has issued two
receipts..."
With the above finding amongst other, the Criminal court
acquitted the Petitioner. True it is, the judgement in so
many words does not say that it is a case of honourable
acquittal. However, merely on that ground, one cannot
hastily conclude that Petitioner has no case on the doctrine
of honourable acquittal. A bare perusal of the acquittal
order strengthens his case for the quashment of dismissal
from service, the khata of property having been
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admittedly transferred a day before the alleged bribe
amount was handed to him and the pink test proved
positive.
(b) The counsel for the petitioner is right in pointing
out that Mr.Chandrappa who had lodged complaint before
the Lokayukta Police was examined as PW1 on behalf of
prosecution on 06.07.2013. In the cross-examination, he
specifically admitted that the petitioner told him about the
transfer of khata having already been done a day before,
there was no need of any payment and that he could go.
However, in the disciplinary enquiry on 20.11.2014, he
had deposed as PW1 in variance of the same. In all
fairness he ought to have revealed in the enquiry as to
what he had deposed before the Criminal Court. Similarly,
the Investigating Officer Mr.Nagaraja Madahalli was
examined as PW9 in the criminal case long before he
deposed as PW3 in the disciplinary enquiry. As a public
servant, at least he ought to have disclosed to the Enquiry
Officer as to what Mr. Chandrappa had admitted in the
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then on-going criminal trial. Even he did not do it, either.
Fair play is flouted and petitioner is victimized.
(c) Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
enables the Judge, in order to discover or to obtain proper
proof of relevant facts, put any question he pleases, in any
form, at any time, to any witness or parties, about any
fact relevant or irrelevant and he may order the
production of any document. As of necessity, such power,
may be in a lesser extent, needs to be conceded to those
who conduct departmental enquiries. The Enquiry Officer
cannot be a mute spectator in the disciplinary
proceedings; he has a passive role, if not active, in
ascertaining the truth and for that purpose he can put any
questions to any party or witnesses. His role is not of an
Umpire in a sports event. Otherwise, a departmental
proceeding would be a game of chance, if not of dice.
The Enquiry Officer ought to have asked the complainant
ie., PW1 & the Investigating Officer i.e., PW3 as to what
was their stand on record in the subject criminal trial.
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But he did not undertake this exercise. This court has been
observing in cases coming before it that more often than
not, departmental enquiries are conducted by untrained
Enquiry Officers who do not have minimum expertise in
the matters and that puts the stake holders at risk. It
hardly needs to be stated that the persons conducting
enquiries should be competent, fair & impartial. A crash
course of training in matters like this would be of great
advantage to all the stake holders. It assumes more
importance inasmuch as ordinarily the Conduct Rules do
not permit delinquents to engage the services of lawyers/
legally trained minds, though charges are grave and
consequences are disastrous. This sounds strange, but
that is how it is. The material lapse on the part of
Enquiry Officer in the case at hand has resulted into
masking of the truth to the prejudice of the petitioner.
5. NEED FOR PROTECTION OF HONEST EMPLOYEES
FROM MISCHIEF MONGERS:
(a) Ours is a Welfare State, the days of East India
Company having long gone by. The Constitution provides
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for protection of inter alia the Executive which obviously
would include civil servants like the Petitioner. On being
appointed, the transition happens from contract to status.
The conditions of service of public servants are regulated
by Conduct Rules, with various nomenclatures. Persons in
public employment are not slaves of the Government, nor
of their higher ups in the echelon of administration. All
they discharge public duties, with no fear nor favour.
Protection of honest officials augurs well for public
administration needs no deliberation. It gives a sense of
security to them in discharging their duties, diligently.
(b) The Government or the higher ups in the
hierarchy need to take all steps in protecting the honest
officials and penalizing proven delinquency. They should
be mindful of mischief mongers, who for ulterior motives,
at times launch false cases of corruption/bribery. The
purpose of enacting Secs.196 & 197 in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding provisions
existed even in Macaulay's Code) or the like provisions, is
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to achieve this object. 'Good faith clauses' do obtain in all
civilized jurisdictions. This statutory object if ignored,
honest officials scrupulously discharging their public duties
run the risk of false implication in criminal cases and/or
disciplinary proceedings. This would affect the morale of
the office staff. However, it is not that there are no black
sheep in the system. They are a class apart for a
'differential treatment'. More is not necessary to specify.
6. AS TO THE OBJECT OF JUDICIAL & QUASI-JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS:
(a) The ultimate object of judicial/quasi-judicial
proceedings, is to find out the truth/fact, and on that
basis, do justice to the parties, of course, in accordance
with law. In KPTCL vs. C.NAGARAJU (2020) 1 SCC (L&S)
92 at para 13, it is observed:
"...The object of a Departmental Inquiry is to
find out whether the delinquent is guilty of
misconduct under the conduct rules for the
purpose of determining whether he should be
continued in service..."
It hardly needs to be stated that a disciplinary enquiry is
a quasi-judicial proceeding and an Enquiry Officer is a
quasi-judicial authority vide UNION OF INDIA vs. PRAKASH
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KUMAR TANDON, (2009) 2 SCC 541 para 15. At times, a
departmental proceeding partakes the character of quasi-
criminal proceedings too, depending upon its complexity
and the enormity of outcome. For example, a penalty of
dismissal from service may prove disastrous to the family
of delinquent employee. Therefore, matters like this merit
a deeper consideration. Ours is not a court of appeal; our
focal point is the decision making process and not the
decision itself. We are advertent to all this. Writ Courts'
duty to find out the truth and do justice to the parties,
cannot be hijacked by assuming limitations of
technicalities. In DAVIS vs. MILLS, 194 U.S. 451
(1904) Justice Oliver Wendell Homes, had forewarned:
"Constitutions are intended to preserve practical
and substantial rights, not to maintain
theories..."
(b) The Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice
System headed by a great Judge of yester decades namely
late Justice V.S.Malimath, in it's Report of March 2003,
under caption 'TRUTH AND JUSTICE' has stated as under:
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"Truth does not pay homage to any society
ancient or modern. But society has to pay
homage to truth or perish" Swami Vivekananda.
The Indian ethos accords the highest
importance to truth. The motto Satyameva
Jayate (Truth alone succeeds) is inscribed in our
National Emblem "Ashoka Sthamba". Our epics
extol the virtue of truth... For the common man
truth and justice are synonymous. So when
truth fails, justice fails...".
Added, what is observed in MARIA MARGARIDA SEQUEIRA
FERNANDES vs. ERASMO JACK DE SEQUEIRA, (2012) 5
SCC 370 at para 43 assumes significance:
" 'Satyameva Jayate' (literally "truth stands
invincible") is a mantra from the ancient
scripture Mundaka Upanishad. Upon
Independence of India, it was adopted as the
national motto of India. It is inscribed in
Devnagri script at the base of the national
emblem. The meaning of the full mantra is as
follows: "Truth alone triumphs; not falsehood.
Through truth the divine path is spread out by
which the sages whose desires have been
completely fulfilled, reach where that supreme
treasure of truth resides".
Therefore, the Enquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority &
Appellate Authority at the department level, are all
required to keep the above in mind. They should never try
to somehow hold the delinquent official guilty, by hook or
crook. The rules of reason & justice should triumph. This
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ideal approach is lacking, we notice, in matters of the
kind. Cases of mindless sacking of employees nowadays
galore. Proportionality in penalty is rarely seen. We say
this with a lot of penury at heart. Petitioner was a victim,
we repeat. Strangely, justice eluded him even at the level
of Service Law Tribunal. This happened when there is
absolutely no material to prima facie substantiate the
allegations of demand & acceptance of bribe for doing the
public duty.
(c) The vehement contention of learned AGA and
the Lokayukta Panel Counsel that notwithstanding what
the complainant as a witness had deposed in the Criminal
Case should be ignored and what subsequently, he had
said in the departmental inquiry, should alone be given
credit, is difficult to countenance. Reasons are not far to
seek: The charge leveled against him in both the
proceedings was verbatim same; they were structured on
the basis of same set of facts, witnesses and evidentiary
material. As already mentioned above, the Tribunal itself
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in order dated 8.8.2018 had directed the consideration of
petitioner's case afresh in the light of acquittal order of the
Criminal Court. This order was made in his earlier
Application No.1864/2017 whereby, the penalty order
dated 25.2.2017 was set at naught. At the operative
portion, the Tribunal had observed as under:
"However, the applicant is permitted to give a
copy of the acquittal order dated 30.01.2017
passed by the Principal District & Sessions and
Special Judge (Lokayukta) at Davanagere in
Special (Lokayuktha) case No.03/2012 to the 1st
respondent within one month from today and
the 1st respondent is directed to consider the
reply of the applicant to the second show cause
notice as well as the fact that the applicant has
been acquitted in the criminal case and pass a
fresh order in accordance with law, within three
months thereafter..."
The said order having attained finality, there is no scope
for sustaining contention of the kind that runs counter to
its substratum.
7. AS TO WHAT RELIEF PETITIONER IS ENTITILED
TO AFTER ADJUSTING EQUITIES:
We are told at the Bar that the petitioner has
attained the age of superannuation. He has been out of
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employment for long, although for no fault of his. It is he
who gave scope for all this. However, the fact remains
that whatever be the reason, he has not served the State
during the period between dismissal from service and his
attaining the age of superannuation. Therefore for this
interregnum, he is not entitled to be paid salary on the
principle of 'no work, no pay'. That being said, the subject
period needs to be reckoned only for the purpose of
fixation of pension & payment of terminal benefits, that
have over the years accumulated. Any other relief in
variance of this would cause prejudice to the public
Exchequer. The competing interests, have thus been
equitably adjusted.
In the above circumstances, this petition succeeds
with the following directions:
(i) A Writ of Certiorari issues quashing the order of
the Tribunal and the penalty order of dismissal from
service;
(ii) A Writ of Mandamus issues to the first
respondent to determine & pay to the petitioner all his
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terminal benefits such as pension, DCRG, etc., within a
period of three months.
(iii) Delay, if brooked in complying direction (ii) would
entail the State with interest at the rate of 1% per
mensem on the amount payable to the petitioner;
however the same may be recovered by the State from
the erring officials personally, in accordance with law.
Costs reluctantly made easy.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE
Snb/bsv
