Karnataka High Court
Ajit S/O Shamrao Veergouda vs State Of Karnataka on 5 October, 2023
Bench: Sachin Shankar Magadum
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2023
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
WRIT PETITION NO. 101146 OF 2015
BETWEEN:
SHRI AJIT S/O. SHAMRAO VEERGOUDA,
AGE: 75 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: PLOT NO. 19/20, SWAMINATH COLONY,
R.C. NAGAR, BELAGAVI.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI.PRASADKUMAR R.GUNAKI & SRI.I.A.MULLA, ADVS.)
AND:
MOHANKUMAR
B SHELAR
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
Digitally signed
by
MOHANKUMAR
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
B SHELAR
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU-01.
2. THE TAHSILDAR,
BELAGAVI TALUKA, DIST: BELAGAVI.
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
BELAGAVI.
4. THE DEPUTY CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS,
SOCIAL FORESTRY DIVISION,
ZILLA PANCHAYAT, BELAGAVI -16.
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5. THE COMMISSIONER,
BELAGAVI URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
HUDCO COLONY, ASHOK NAGAR,
BELAGAVI-590016.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.P.N.HATTI, HCGP FOR R1, R2, R4 & R5,
SRI.M.A.HULIYAL, ADV. FOR R3)
THIS PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE
RELEVANT RECORDS IN THIS CASE AND QUASH THE
ENDORSEMENT PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.3 ANNEXURE-H
IN KAMSHA/ULC/D/SR-1148, DATED 27-11-2014 DECLARE
THAT THE KABJA PANCHANAMA ANNEXURE-D AND KABJA
PAVATHI ANNEXURE-E DATED 4-10-78 ARE ILLEGAL NULL AND
VOID AND DIRECT THE RESPONDENT NO.3 TO ACCEPT THE
REFUND AMOUNT AND RESTORE THE NAME OF THE
PETITIONER IN RECORD OF RIGHTS IN RESPECT OF 9938.06
SQ. METERS IN R.S. NO.705/2 AND R.S.NO. 705/B/2/2
SITUATE AT ANAGOL, BELGAUM, THROUGH RESPONDENT NO.2
AND SUCH OTHER RELIEFS.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 21.09.2023, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE
THE FOLLOWING:
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ORDER
The captioned petition is filed questioning the
endorsement issued by respondent No.3 vide Annexure-H
dated 27.11.2014 and consequent declaration of Kabja
panchanama vide Annexure-D and Kabja Pavathi vide
Annexure-E issued under the provisions of Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short 'the Act').
2. The petitioner claims to be the owner of the
lands bearing Sy.No.705/2 and Sy.No.705/B/2/2 totally
measuring 2 acres 38 guntas situated at Angol, Belagavi.
The petitioner admits that these lands were subject matter
of Urban Land Ceiling proceedings (ULC proceedings) and
petitioner filed his declaration before the competent
authority under Section 6(1) of the Act on 11.09.1976. It
is also admitted by the petitioner that the authority
prepared a draft statement under Section 8(1) of the Act
and consequently, final statement was prepared and
served on the petitioner under Section 9 of the Act on
10.01.1978, thereby determining the extent of excess
vacant land held by the petitioner as 9938.06 square
meters.
3. The petitioner's main ground and challenge
under the captioned petition is that petitioner never
voluntarily handed over possession of excess vacant land
to the competent authority as required under Section
10(5) of the Act. The petitioner claimed that possession of
excess vacant land alleged to have been taken is only a
paper possession. The petitioner is also seriously
disputing the Kabaa Panchanama drawn in presence of
Revenue Inspector.
4. At para 16 of the petition, the petitioner admits
that he has received compensation of Rs.39,752.24/-
which was towards the value of excess vacant land.
However, petitioner claims that he has refunded the said
amount to the respondent No.3 by way of Demand Draft
dated 26.09.2014. The petitioner claimed that since
possession is not taken and in view of the fact that the
1976 Act came to be repealed on 22.03.1999, the entire
proceedings abate and therefore, Section 3 of the Repeal
Act provides for restoration of excess land.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
reiterating the grounds urged in the petition would
vehemently argue and contend that the notice to handover
possession under Section 10(5) is issued in English
language and therefore, there is no proper service of
notice under Section 10(5). Therefore, he would place
reliance on Section 4 of the Repeal Act, 1999 and would
contend that since possession is not taken, all proceedings
relating to any order made or prepared to be made under
the Principal Act pending immediately before the
commencement of this Act would automatically abate.
Learned counsel questioning the manner in which the
alleged Kabja pavathi and Kabja panchanama are prepared
vide Annexures-E and D respectively would contend that
the competent authority has not taken possession and
therefore, he would vehemently argue and contend that
mere signature of petitioner on the Kabja pavathi is not
enough to make it a legal and valid surrender of
possession. Questioning the Kabja panchanama vide
Annexure-D, he would vehemently argue and contend that
the same does not disclose the measurement and
boundaries of excess vacant land and therefore, Kabja
panchanama is not prepared as contemplated under the
law. Questioning the authority of Revenue Inspector, he
would contend that he is not competent to take possession
of excess land. Referring to provisions of sub-section 2(a)
and (b) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999, he would
contend that the petitioner is entitled to seek restoration
of excess land as he has refunded the compensation paid
by the authorities.
6. To buttress his arguments, he has placed
reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of State of U.P. vs. Hari Ram1.
7. He has also placed reliance on additional
documents produced along with I.A.No.2/2017. He has
also referred to the documents produced at Annexures-Q1
to Q6 produced along with I.A.No.2/2017.
8. Per contra, learned AGA while countering the
claim of the petitioner has reiterated the stand taken in
the statement of objections. Referring to Annexure-R1, he
would vehemently argue and contend that respondent
No.1/State having recovered possession under Section
10(5), the States name is duly mutated vide Annexure-R1
which is dated 19.10.1978. Referring to Annexure-R2, he
would point out that compensation is already paid.
Learned AGA would further point out that the land is
thereafter handed over to respondent No.5 - Belagavi
AIR 2013 SC 1793
Urban Development Authority (BUDA). Referring to these
significant details, he would contend that the present
petition filed in 2015 is not maintainable.
9. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5
arguing in the same vein has also reiterated the defence
set up in the statement of objections filed by respondent
No.5. Referring to Annexure-R5, he would point out that
respondent No.5 authorities name was duly mutated
pursuant to transfer of land by the State. Respondent
No.5 being Urban Development Authority has formed a
layout which is evident from Annexure-R6. Having
executed and completed the project, the scheme is handed
over to the Corporation which is evident from Annexure-
R8. Referring to these significant details, learned counsel
appearing for respondent No.5 would contend that this is a
stale case and therefore, would not warrant interference at
the hands of this Court.
10. Heard learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner and learned AGA for the State and learned
counsel appearing for respondent No.5-authority.
11. It is borne out from the records that the
petition lands were declared as excess lands and a final
statement was prepared and served on the petitioner
under Section 9 on 10.01.1978. The said final statement
was published by way of a notification under Section 10(1)
on 21.01.1978. The petitioner has admitted at para 16 of
the amended writ petition that he has received the
compensation from the competent authority towards value
of excess vacant land. The documents produced by
respondent No.5/authority as well as by the State also
indicates that respondent No.1/State later has transferred
the land in question in favour of respondent
No.5/authority.
12. If all these significant details are looked into,
then the question that requires consideration before
examining the merits of the case is, as to whether the writ
petition suffers from inordinate delay and laches. If
petitioner has received compensation amount to the tune
of Rs.39,752/- in 1979, the relief sought in the captioned
petition cannot be entertained as there is inordinate delay
in knocking the doors of the writ Court. If petitioner has
received compensation in 1979, he could not have filed the
present petition in 2015 as petitioner is found to be guilty
of delay and laches. It is imperative, if petitioner wants to
invoke extraordinary remedy available under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, then he should come to the
Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity.
Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ is an
adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion.
13. If the petitioner by his conduct has accepted
the compensation in 1979, he cannot be permitted to
refund the compensation amount in 2015 and then seek
restitution of the petition lands which were declared
excess lands under properly constituted proceedings. It is
a trite law that Doctrine of laches in Court of equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical Doctrine, where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy as the petitioner's
conduct in the present case on hand is found to be grossly
unfair and has to be regarded as equivalent to a waiver
having accepted the compensation. The lapse of time and
delay are most material. The Court while examining such
stale case have to be cautious and have to take
cognizance of the long delay and the nature of acts done
by a litigant during the interval. The Court has to be also
cautious and examine as to whether any relief, if granted,
which might effect either party and cause a balance of
justice or injustice. The proper principle while dealing a
stale case is that Courts do not encourage litigant,
agitating stale claim and exhume matters which have
already been disposed of or where the rights of third
parties have accrued in the mean time.
14. In the present case on hand, the State having
paid the compensation to the petitioner has transferred
the land in question in favour of respondent No.5/BUDA.
If properties are lost in 1979 and if the nature of land is
substantially altered third party rights created cannot be
negated at the instance of the party who has slept over his
rights for almost four decades. Therefore, on account of
laches and delay, the prayer sought in the instant petition
cannot be entertained at this juncture.
15. Be that as it may, even on merits, this Court
would find that the competent authority has taken
possession of the excess land on 04.10.1978 under Kabja
panchanama which is evident from Annexure-D followed
by Kabja pavathi. The competent authority has received
Kabja pavathi dated 04.10.1978 from the petitioner.
Though petitioner is now questioning the procedure
adopted by the competent authority, on account of
passage of time, these details cannot be enquired into at
this juncture. The fact that there is an unequivocal
admission in the petition itself by the petitioner admitting
the receipt of compensation, the procedure adopted by the
authority in securing possession stands substantiated and
does not need any further proof in regard to taking of
possession in the manner known to law.
16. The documents placed on record by respondent
No.5/authority and respondent No.1/State also indicates
that post declaration of the petition land as an excess
land, mutation came to be effected. The respondent
No.1/State's name was duly mutated as per Annexure-R1
to the statement of objections filed by respondent
No.1/State. The further material placed on record by
respondent No.5 vide Annexures-R5, R6 and R7 would
clearly clinch the controversy between the parties. Under
Annexure-R5 to the statement of objections filed by the
respondent No.5, BUDA's name is duly mutated.
Annexure-R6 clearly demonstrates that BUDA has formed
a layout. Therefore, at this juncture, I am not inclined to
examine as to how the respondent No.1/State has utilized
the land after declaring the petition land as excess land.
The contention of the petitioner that record of rights are
fabricated also cannot be examined at this juncture. As
rightly pointed out by the learned AGA, petitioner had an
efficacious remedy of appeal under Section 33 of the ULC
Act. Therefore, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Sulochana Chandrakant Galande
vs. Pune Municipal Transport and Others2 is squarely
applicable to the present case on hand. The contention of
the petitioner that compensation paid was deficit and
therefore, proceedings stood abated also cannot be
examined at this juncture.
(2010) 8 SCC 467
17. For the foregoing reasons, I pass the following:
ORDER
The writ petition is devoid of merits and accordingly,
stands dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
CA
