Karnataka High Court
The Special Land Acquisition Officer vs Devendrappa on 5 December, 2023
Author: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
Bench: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
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MFA No. 101262 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2023
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO. 101262 OF 2022 (LAC)
BETWEEN:
1. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
& UPPER KRISHNA PROJECT,
BAGALKOT-587 103.
2. THE GENERAL MANAGER,
R & R LAQ, UKP, BAGALKOT-587 103.
3. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
NAVANAGAR, BAGALKOT-587103.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SMT. GIRIJA HIREMATH, HCGP)
AND:
DEVENDRAPPA S/O. BASAPPA PUJARI,
AGE. 55 YEARS, OCC. ADVOCATE & AGRICULTURE,
Digitally
signed by R/O. BAGALKOT-587103.
JAGADISH
JAGADISH T R
TR Date:
...RESPONDENT
2023.12.12
15:05:51
+0530
(BY SMT. VEENA HEGDE, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. MANJUNATH A. KARIGANNAVAR, ADVOCATE)
THIS MFA IS FILED U/SEC.54(1) OF LAND ACQUISITION ACT,
1894, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DTD 31.03.2021
PASSED IN LAC.NO.8/2020 ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDITIONAL
SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, BAGALKOT, AWARDING THE COMPENSATION
OF RS. 90/- PER SQ. FT.
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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MFA No. 101262 of 2022
JUDGMENT
This appeal is filed by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer, Upper Krishna Project and others under Section
54(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act')
challenging the judgment and award dated 31.3.2021 passed
in LAC No.8/2020 by the learned II Addl. Senior Civil Judge
and JMFC, Bagalkot (for short, 'reference Court'), whereby
the reference petition filed by the respondent was allowed by
re-determining the market value of property bearing
Sy.No.309/1+2/A measuring 17 guntas situated at Bagalkot
Taluk, at the rate of Rs.90 per sq.ft. with interest and
statutory benefits.
2. Brief facts giving rise to filing of this appeal are
that the appellants/State have issued preliminary notification
dated 29.07.2000 under Section 4(1) of the Act to acquire
various extentS of lands including the subject land
measuring 17 guntas in Sy.No.309/1+2/A of Bagalkot town.
The SLAO has passed an award on 18.10.2001 determining
the market value of the subject land at Rs.26,197/- per acre.
The respondent sought reference under Section 18(1) of the
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Act. The reference Court has re-determined the market
value at Rs.90/- per sq.ft. placing reliance on the evidence
available on record, more particularly, the judgments and
awards passed in LAC Nos.213/2000, 212/2000, 214/2000,
211/2000 and 2/2001 pertaining to lands situated at Haveli
in Bagalkot town. Being aggrieved by re-determination of
market value of the subject land by the reference Court, the
present appeal is filed by State Government.
3. Smt. Girija Hiremath, learned HCGP appearing for
the appellants/State submits that the reference Court has
committed a grave error in entertaining the reference
petition, as admittedly, the SLAO has passed the award on
18.10.2001, however, the reference was sought on
20.02.2020, which is beyond the period of limitation under
Section 18 of the Act. It is further submitted that the
reasoning assigned by the reference Court that the limitation
starts from 17.02.2020 for the purpose of reference is
contrary to law. The order dated 17.02.2020 passed by the
SLAO is only for the purpose of release of the compensation
amount in favour of the respondent herein, who is
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subsequent purchaser of the land in question. It is also
contended that the respondent herein has purchased the
subject land on 6.7.2012, which is subsequent to initiation of
the acquisition proceedings and passing of the award, hence,
subsequent purchaser has no right whatsoever to seek
reference under the Act for seeking higher compensation. It
is contended that the reference Court in paragraphs-9 to 13
of its judgment has recorded a finding that the reference
sought by the subsequent purchaser is within a period of
limitation, which is contrary to Section 18 of the Act. It is
further contended that limitation for the purpose of reference
shall be calculated from the date of award i.e. 18.10.2001
and not from 17.02.2020, where SLAO has ordered for
release of compensation amount in favour of the respondent
herein.
4. In support of her contentions, she places reliance
on decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shiv
Kumar and Another Vs. Union of India and others1 and
(2019) 10 SCC 229
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Sunil Kumar Jain Vs. Kishan & Others2 and submits that
the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the case of
subsequent purchaser has opined that the subsequent
purchaser has no right to seek reference, she seeks to reject
the reference petition at the threshold. It is further
contended that the reference Court has committed an error
in determining the market value of the subject land at the
rate of Rs.90/- per sq.ft. placing reliance on various earlier
judgments passed by it, which is contrary to settled
principles of law. The reference Court ought to have taken
note of sale consideration mentioned in the Sale Deed dated
6.7.2012 and applied principle of de-escalation and
determined the compensation. She seeks to allow the appeal
filed by the State.
5. Per contra, Smt. Veena Hegde, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent supporting the impugned
judgment and award of the reference Court submits that the
reference Court has assigned detailed reasons while
entertaining the reference petition filed by the respondent
(1995) 4 SCC 147
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and admittedly the appellants have failed to place on record
the issuance of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. It is
submitted that limitation to seek reference commences from
the date of service of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act
or of the knowledge of passing of the award. It is further
submitted that in the instant case, original owner/khatedar
as soon as came to know about passing of award, has
immediately approached the SLAO with a request to pay
compensation in favour of the respondent, who is
subsequent purchaser. Based on the request of the original
owner/khatedar, SLAO has passed order dated 17.02.2020
for release of compensation amount in favour of respondent.
Thereafter, the respondent sought reference on 20.02.2020
and the said reference is within limitation period prescribed
under Section 18 of the Act. Hence, she seeks to reject the
contention of the State that the reference is not within time
prescribed under the Act and such contention has no merit.
6. It is further submitted that the reference Court
while re-determining the compensation at the rate of Rs.90/-
per sq.ft. has assigned detailed reasons from paragraphs-14
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to 19 of its judgment, wherein it has recorded categorical
finding that Ex.P31 to P35 are the certified copies of the
judgments passed by the reference Court with regard to the
adjacent lands, where acquisition is made for the purpose of
Upper Krishna Project and the preliminary notification in
those LAC proceedings are dated 1.9.1998 and 13.10.1999
and in the instant case, preliminary notification is of the year
2000, hence, considered the market value determined in LAC
at Ex.P31 to P35. The reference Court has re-determined
the market value. It also contended that the judgments
passed in LAC No.213/2000 and other LACs relied upon by
the reference Court have attained finality, as the State
Government has not preferred any appeal assailing those
judgments. Hence, she seeks to dismiss the appeal.
7. Having heard the learned HCGP for the
appellants/State, learned counsel for the respondent and
perused the memorandum of appeal along with reference
Court records, the following points would arise for
consideration in this appeal:
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i) Whether the reference Court was justified in
entertaining the reference alleged to have been
sought after the period of Limitation?
ii) Whether re-determination of market value of
the subject land by the reference Court is just
and proper and requires to be interfered with?
8. Answer to the above points would be in the
affirmative for the following reasons:
(a) It is not in dispute that the subject land measuring
17 guntas in Sy.No.309/1+2/A situated at Bagalkote town
was acquired by the appellants under preliminary notification
dated 29.07.2000 and award came to be passed on
18.10.2001 by the SLAO by determining the market value of
the subject land at Rs.26,197/- per acre.
(b) Before considering the legal contentions urged by
the appellant-State, it would be useful to refer the decision
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raja Harish
Chandra Raj Singh Vs. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer
& Another3. The relevant paragraphs are extracted for easy
reference:
AIR 1961 SC 1500
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5. In dealing with this question it is relevant to bear in mind the
legal character of the award made by the Collector under
Section 12. In a sense it is a decision of the Collector reached
by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the Act. It is a
decision, inter alia, in respect of the amount of compensation
which should be paid to the person interested in the property
acquired; but legally the award cannot be treated as a decision;
it is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined
by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition.
If the owner accepts the offer no further proceeding is required
to be taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceedings
are concluded. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer
Section 18 gives him the statutory right of having the question
determined by court, and it is the amount of compensation
which the court may determine that would bind both the owner
and the Collector. In that case it is on the amount thus
determined judicially that the acquisition proceedings would be
concluded. It is because of this nature of the award that the
award can be appropriately described as a tender or offer made
by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of
the property for his acceptance. In Ezra v. Secretary of
State [(1903) ILR 30 Cal 605-36 at p. 86] it has been held that
"the meaning to be attached to the word 'award' under Section
11 and its nature and effect must be arrived at not from the
mere use of the same expression in both instances but from the
examination of the provisions of the law relating to the
Collector's proceedings culminating in the award. The
consideration to which have referred satisfy us that the
Collector acts in the matter of the enquiry and the valuation of
the land only as an agent of the Government and not as a
judicial officer; and that consequently, although the
Government is bound by his proceedings, the persons
interested are not concluded by his finding regarding the value
of the land or the compensation to be awarded". Then the High
Court has added that such tender once made is binding on the
Government and the Government cannot require that the value
fixed by its own officer acting on its behalf should be open to
question at its own instance before the civil court. The said case
was taken before the Privy Council in Ezra v. Secretary of State
for India [(1905) ILR 32 Cal 605] and their Lordships have
expressly approved of the observations made by the High Court
to which we have just referred. Therefore, if the award made by
the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of
the Government to the owner of the property then the making
of the award as properly understood must involve the
communication of the offer to the party concerned. That is the
normal requirement under the contract law and its applicability
to cases of award made under the Act cannot be reasonably
excluded. Thus considered the date of the award cannot be
determined solely by reference to the time when the award is
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signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office; it must
involve the consideration of the question as to when it was
known to the party concerned either actually or constructively.
If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical
construction of the words "the date of the award" occurring in
the relevant section would not be appropriate.
6. There is yet another point which leads to the same
conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision
taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the
property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision
ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property and in
that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is
essentially fair and just that the said decision should be
communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party
affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an
essential element which must be satisfied before the decision
can be brought into force. Thus considered the making of the
award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the
award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector;
it must involve the communication of the said award to the
party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is
pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are
affected by it it can be said to be made when pronounced. If
the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated
to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date
previously announced the award is said to be communicated to
the said party even if the said party is not actually present on
the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the
date of its pronouncement, an award is pronounced and a party
is not present the award can be said to be made when it is
communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party
affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an
essential requirement of fairplay and natural justice the
expression "the date of the award" used in the proviso must
mean the date when the award is either communicated to the
party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In
our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the
words "from the date of the Collector's award" used in the
proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.
7. In this connection it is material to recall the fact that under
Section 12(2) it is obligatory on the Collector to give immediate
notice of the award to the persons interested as are not present
personally or by their representatives when the award is made.
This requirement itself postulates the necessity of the
communication of the award to the party concerned. The
legislature recognised that the making of the award under
Section 11 followed by its filing under Section 12(1) would not
meet the requirements of justice before bringing the award into
force. It thought that the communication of the award to the
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party concerned was also necessary, and so by the use of the
mandatory words an obligation is placed on the Collector to
communicate the award immediately to the person concerned.
It is significant that the section requires the Collector to give
notice of the award immediately after making it. This provision
lends support to the view which we have taken about the
construction of the expression "from the date of the Collector's
award" in the proviso to Section 18. It is because
communication of the order is regarded by the legislature as
necessary that Section 12(2) has imposed an obligation on the
Collector and if the relevant clause in the proviso is read in the
light of this statutory requirement it tends to show that the
literal and mechanical construction of the said clause would be
wholly inappropriate. It would indeed be a very curious result
that the failure of the Collector to discharge his obligation under
Section 12(2) should directly tend to make ineffective the right
of the party to make an application under Section 18, and this
result could not possibly have been intended by the legislature.
Keeping in mind the exposition of law referred supra,
this Court proceeds to consider the case on hand.
(c) It is also not in dispute that the respondent
herein is the subsequent purchaser of the land in question.
The respondent has purchased the subject land vide
registered Sale Deed dated 6.7.2012, which is admittedly
after issuance of preliminary notification and passing of the
award. It is admitted that the appellants have failed to place
on record any evidence before the reference Court or before
this Court with regard to issuance of notice under Section
12(2) of the Act to the original owner/khatedar. In the
absence of issuance of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act,
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it is the knowledge of the original owner/khatedar about the
passing of the award would be a factor for the purpose of
computation of limitation under Section 18 of the Act. In the
instant case, admittedly, the original owner/khatedar has
approached the SLAO making request to pay compensation
amount to the respondent, who is subsequent purchaser and
based on such request of the original owner/khatedar, the
SLAO has passed the order dated 17.02.2020 for release of
compensation amount in favour of the respondent.
Admittedly, passing of the award by SLAO has come to the
knowledge of the land owner as well as respondent only on
17.02.2020, hence, contention of the appellants/State that
the reference is sought beyond the prescribed period of
limitation under Section 18 of the Act does not merit
consideration. The SLAO has passed the order on
17.02.2020 by permitting the respondent to receive
compensation amount as determined by him and
immediately thereafter, the respondent on 20.02.2020 has
sought reference under Section 18(1) of the Act. Hence,
there is no delay in seeking the reference by the respondent.
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(d) The SLAO, who is appellant No.1 herein did not
object or refuse to send the reference to the reference Court
under Section 18(1) of the Act, he himself has forwarded the
reference application to the reference Court without any
objections, which clearly demonstrates that the reference
sought by the respondent is within time prescribed under the
Act. It is also not in dispute that the reference Court has
taken cognizance of the reference made by the appellant and
proceeded to continue for the proceedings, which were never
challenged by the appellants/State in any of the proceedings.
Hence, on this ground also, the appellants cannot be allowed
to contend that the reference is beyond the period of
limitation. On a meticulous appreciation of the evidence
available on record, this Court is of the considered view that
the reference sought by the respondent is within period of
limitation and the finding recorded by the reference Court
with regard to the said issue does not call for interference in
the present appeal filed by the State.
(e) The contention of the appellants-State that the
respondent being the subsequent purchaser cannot seek
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reference and in support of the said contention, the
appellants-State have relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the cases of Shivkumar4 and Sunil
Kumar Jain5 referred supra. On careful perusal of the
aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is
evident that the issue involved in those cases was pertaining
to challenge to the acquisition proceedings under the
provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013. In the instant case, the respondent
being the interested person in the subject land as defined
under Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is
entitled to seek reference.
9. The appellants/State have contended that the
reference Court had re-determined the market value of the
subject land at the rate of Rs.90/- per sq.ft. is contrary to
the settled principles of law and it ought to have determined
the market value based on the registered Sale Deed dated
6.7.2012 which was executed by the original owner/khatedar
(2019) 10 SCC 229
(1995) 4 SCC 147
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in favour of the respondent herein. The said contention also
does not merit any consideration, as the appellants have
failed to place on record the said sale deed before the
reference Court as well as before this Court. The reference
Court records clearly demonstrate that the appellants have
not adduced any evidence, except producing certified copy of
the award with consent. In the absence of any contra
evidence being placed by the appellants before the reference
Court, the contention of the appellants that the reference
Court ought to have placed reliance on the Sale Deed dated
6.7.2012 does not merit consideration.
10. The reference Court while re-determining the
market value at Rs.90/- per sq.ft. has assigned a detailed
reasons, more particularly, with regard to Ex.P31 to P35, the
certified copies of the judgments and awards passed by the
reference Court in LAC Nos.213/2000, 212/2000, 214/2000,
211/2000 and 2/2001 pertaining to the lands situated at
Haveli in Bagalkote town. Admittedly, the land in question is
also situated at Haveli, Bagalkote town. In the aforesaid LAC
proceedings, the reference Court has re-determined the
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market value of the acquired land at Rs.90/- per sq.ft. and
the said judgments and award of the reference Court have
attained finality as the State has not preferred any appeal
against those orders. Hence, this Court fully agrees with the
finding recorded by the reference Court on this issue.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed
reliance on decision of co-ordinate Bench of this Court in MFA
No.101603/2014 disposed off on 10.03.2020, wherein this
Court has upheld the determination of the market value at
Rs.90/- per sq.ft. and the said appeal was arising from LAC
No.213/2002 and in the said proceedings, preliminary
notification was issued on 11.02.1999. In the instant case,
preliminary notification is dated 29.07.2000, which is much
later than notification referred supra. The aforesaid order
passed in MFA No.101603/2014 by co-ordinate Bench of this
Court has been challenged by the appellants/State in Special
Leave to Appeal (C) No. 2392/2021, which came to be
dismissed on 23.02.2021. Since re-determination of the
market value at the rate of Rs.90/- per sq.ft. with regard to
adjacent land referred to supra has attained finality, we do
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not find any justification to reduce the market value
determined by the reference Court. The reference Court on
appreciation of the evidence available on record has recorded
a categorical finding with regard to re-determination of
market value of the subject land at Rs.90/- per sq.ft. The
said findings of the reference Court are neither perverse nor
contrary to the settled principles of law or evidence on record
calling for interference by this Court in the present appeal.
12. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in the
appeal filed by the State and the same is hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE
JTR
