Karnataka High Court
Shri Udaya Ravi S/O Ningappa vs The State Of Karnataka on 20 December, 2023
Author: M. Nagaprasanna
Bench: M. Nagaprasanna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2023
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.104906 OF 2023 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
SHRI UDAYA RAVI
S/O NINGAPPA
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
OCC: PRESENTLY WORKING AS INSPECTOR
KARNATAKA STATE INTELLIGENCE
BENGALURU
R/O GANGAVATHI - 583 227.
KOPPAL DISTRICT.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI SANDESH J.CHOUTA, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI NEELENDRA D.GUNDE, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
S.P.ACB/NOW S.P.LOKAYUKTA
REPRESENTED BY SPECIAL COUNSEL
HIGH COURT BUILDING
DHARWAD - 580 009.
2 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
KOPPAL, LOKAYUKTA POLICE STATION
REPRESENTED BY SPECIAL COUNSEL
2
HIGH COURT BUILDING
DHARWAD - 580 009.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI SANTOSH MALAGOUDAR, SPL. PP)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE
APPROPRIATE WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION IN THE NATURE OF
CERTIORARI QUASHING THE COMPLAINT DATED. 8.6.2022
(ANNEXURE-A) AND FIRST INFORMATION REPORT (ANNEXURE-B)
REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT POLICE IN CRIME NO. 6/2022
FOR OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 13(1) (B) R/W 13(2)
UNDER PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1988, DATED.
16.06.2022 AND ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS THERETO.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 01.12.2023, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question
registration of a crime in Crime No.6 of 2022 registered for offences
punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 ('the Act' for short).
2. Heard Sri Sandesh J.Chouta, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner and Sri Santosh Malagoudar, learned
Special Public Prosecutor for the respondents.
3. The facts, in brief, adumbrated are as follows:-
Petitioner gets into the services of the State Government as
Police Sub-Inspector. He is presently in the cadre of Police
Inspector. The petitioner while working as Police Inspector claims to
have generated lot of enmity by challenging the transfer order
dated 29-04-2022 from the post of Police Inspector of Gangavathi
Rural Police Station to the Karnataka State Intelligence Wing,
Bengaluru before the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal at Belagavi
in Application No.10642 of 2022 in which he succeeds. This is
claimed to have gone bad with the administration. A crime comes
to be registered against the petitioner in Crime No.6 of 2022 for
offences punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the Act.
The reason is amassing of wealth disproportionate to his known
sources of income. Registration of crime is what has driven the
petitioner to this Court. Since the petitioner has not sought any
interim order of stay, the learned counsel appearing for the
Lokayukta was heard on the main matter itself.
4. The learned senior counsel representing the petitioner
would vehemently contend that the source report that is drawn qua
the petitioner for conduct of a search in his house is so faulty that
things that are inherently improbable formed the source report and
on the source report it is alleged that the competent authority
delegates it to some other authority who in turn recommends
registration of crime and the crime is registered. For all this, he
would submit that it is contrary to the Act with particular reference
to Section 17 of the Act. He would submit that since the foundation
itself is faulty, further proceedings should not be permitted to
continue, for which he takes this Court to the source report to
contend that the properties of the petitioner acquired prior to his
marriage and properties acquired by his wife long before marriage
are made part of the source report. He would submit that this
circumstance is enough to quash the proceedings.
5. Per-contra, the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing
for the Lokayukta would vehemently oppose the petition contending
that the petitioner got engaged for the marriage in the year 2009
but the marriage was in the year 2011 and all the properties that
the wife has acquired were between 2009 and 2011. He would,
therefore, contend that all the properties belong to the petitioner
and it is a matter of trial for the petitioner to come out clean.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
7. The afore-narrated facts lie in a narrow compass and it is a
matter of record. Since the allegations are for offences punishable
under Section 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of Act, I deem it appropriate to
notice the said provisions which read as follows:
"13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.--
(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal
misconduct,--
... ... ... ...
(b) if he intentionally enriches himself illicitly during the
period of his office.
Explanation 1.--A person shall be presumed to have
intentionally enriched himself illicitly if he or any person on
his behalf, is in possession of or has, at any time during the
period of his office, been in possession of pecuniary
resources or property disproportionate to his known sources
of income which the public servant cannot satisfactorily
account for.
Explanation 2.--The expression "known sources of
income" means income received from any lawful sources.]
(2) Any public servant who commits criminal
misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall be not less than four years but which may extend
to ten years and shall also be liable to fine."
For an offence under Section 13(1)(b) which deals with amassing of
wealth disproportionate to the known source of income, it requires
a source of information which would prima facie determine a known
source of income. The prima facie determination would be in terms
of a source report. The source report is drawn on 08-06-2022 by
the Inspector of Police. The subject source report insofar as clauses
(a) and (b) read as follows:
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Clause (a) deals with assets of the petitioner qua his salary and
acquisition. Clause (b) deals with properties of his wife and
relatives. Clause (a) takes the check period from 01-09-2005 up to
the date of considering the source report i.e., 08-06-2022 and he is
said to have possessed `3,72,000/- only. Therefore, no proceeding
could have been initiated against the petitioner qua clause (a) - his
income as it was not disproportionate.
8. The income of the wife of the petitioner is in clause (b).
The check period in clause (b) is the same as in clause (a) i.e.,
01-09-2005 to 08-06-2022. The petitioner gets married in the year
2011. The properties that the wife has acquired prior to her
marriage and her family members, are shown to be from the
income of the petitioner in the name of the wife. The total assets of
the wife is assessed at `1,24,25,000/-. Put together, the
disproportionate asset is to the tune of `1,09,50,000/-. No cash
was found at the time of search. What has become of this source
report is the offence under Section 13(1)(b) of the Act. The
petitioner's check period between 01-09-2005 to 8-06-2022 cannot
be found fault with. But, it is ununderstandable as to how the
check period remains the same to the wife as well, as the marriage
happens in the year 2011 and several properties acquired by the
members of the family or wife's family are shown to be the income
of the petitioner which is disproportionate to the known source of
income. It is this faulty check report concerning the wife of the
petitioner or the properties standing in the name of the family
members of wife that has led the petitioner into the web of crime.
The source report ought to have been drawn in a proper manner.
9. The source report can be projected to be anything, but
while directing registration of crime by the Superintendent of Police,
he sought to have applied his mind. The dates would go this way.
The source report is drawn on 08-06-2022. The competent
authority/Superintendent of Police does not scrutinize. He delegates
the authority of scrutiny to an Inspector on 09-06-2022. The
Inspector scrutinizes the source report and gives it back to the
competent authority, the Superintendent of Police on 14-06-2022
and the crime comes to be registered on 15-06-2022. All that the
Deputy Superintendent of Police would do is to endorse on the
source report to register the crime. It is this action that is found
fault with by the Apex Court while interpreting Section 17 of the
Act, which requires the competent authority alone to apply his mind
and register the crime.
10. It is the contention of the learned senior counsel that
source information report contains several glorified items which
cannot even touch upon the petitioner and salary of the petitioner is
not taken to its complete value and so on and so forth, all to
buttress the submission that the source information report does
bear no application of mind as it is prepared in a jiffy. To consider
the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, it is
germane to notice Section 17 of the Act. Section 17 of the Act
reads as follows:
"17. Persons authorised to investigate.--
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no police officer below the rank,--
(a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment, of an Inspector of Police;
(b) in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta,
Madras and Ahmedabad and in any other
metropolitan area notified as such under sub-
section (1) of Section 8 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), of an Assistant
Commissioner of Police;
(c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or
a police officer of equivalent rank,
shall investigate any offence punishable under this Act without
the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the
First Class, as the case may be, or make any arrest therefor
without a warrant:
PROVIDED that if a police officer not below the rank
of an Inspector of Police is authorised by the State
Government in this behalf by general or special order, he
may also investigate any such offence without the order
of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first
class, as the case may be, or make arrest therefor
without a warrant:
PROVIDED FURTHER that an offence referred to in clause
(b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall not be investigated
without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a
Superintendent of Police."
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 17 begins with a non-obstante clause reading
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the Deputy Superintendent of police or a Police Officer
of an equivalent rank shall investigate any offence punishable under
the Act, provided that if a Police Officer not below the rank of an
Inspector of Police is authorized in this behalf he may register the
crime and investigate into the matter. Section 17 mandates
investigation by a person authorized in this behalf. The
investigation, in the case at hand, is conducted by the Inspector of
Police. Therefore, authorization should be from the hands of the
Deputy Superintendent of Police. The second proviso to Section 17
provides that an offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1)
of Section 13 cannot be investigated without the order of a Police
Officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police.
Authorization by a Superintendent of Police in favour of an officer
should be to enable him to carry out investigation in terms of
Section 17 of the Act. This is the statutory prescription.
11. The power to grant such sanction for registration of crime
and investigation is conferred upon the Authority not below the
rank of Superintendent of Police. The registration of crime should
precede authorization from the Superintendent of Police. In the
case at hand, the registration of crime has happened on an
endorsement made on the source information report itself. There
can be no qualm about such endorsement being made as they are
generally made. Whether it is in compliance with Section 17 of the
Act is what is required to be noticed. Section 17 had fallen for
interpretation in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJAN
LAL1. Certain paragraphs of the said judgment would throw light
on this aspect. The Apex Court was interpreting identical provision
under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Apex Court holds
as follows:
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
"114. Section 5-A(1) of the Act with the relevant
provisos reads thus:
5-A. Investigation into cases under this Act.--
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), no police officer
below the rank, --
(a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment, of an Inspector of Police;
(b) in the presidency towns of Calcutta and Madras, of
an Assistant Commissioner of Police;
(c) in the presidency town of Bombay, of a
Superintendent of Police; and
(d) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of
Police,
shall investigate any offence punishable under
Section 161, Section 165 or Section 165-A of the
Penal Code, 1860 or under Section 5 of this Act
without the order of a Presidency Magistrate or a
Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or
make any arrest therefor without a warrant:
Provided that if a police officer not below the
rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised by the
State Government in this behalf by general or
special order, he may also investigate any such
offence without the order of a Presidency
Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the
case may be, or make arrest therefor without a
warrant:
Provided further that an offence referred to in
clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 shall not be
investigated without the order of a police officer not
below the rank of a Superintendent of Police."
115. Section 5-A of the Act as it originally stood, was
inserted by the Prevention of Corruption (Second Amendment)
Act 59 of 1952 based on the recommendations of the committee
of Members of Parliament under the chairmanship of Dr Bakshi
Tek Chand. The said section as it stands now was substituted by
Act 40 of 1964, the main object of which is to protect the public
servant against harassment and victimisation. (See State of
M.P. v. Mubarak Ali [1959 Supp 2 SCR 201 : AIR 1959 SC 707:
1959 Cri LJ 921 : (1960) 1 LLJ 36] ). In A.C. Sharma v. Delhi
Administration [(1973) 1 SCC 726 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 608 :
(1973) 3 SCR 477] , Dua, J. said that the scheme of this
provision is for effectively achieving the object of
successful investigation into the serious offences
mentioned in Section 5 of the Act without unreasonably
exposing the public servant concerned to frivolous and
vexatious proceedings. A Constitution Bench of this Court
in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984
SCC (Cri) 277 : (1984) 2 SCR 914, 941] at page 941 has
observed that "Section 5-A is a safeguard against
investigation of offences by public servants, by petty or
lower rank police officers".
116. According to Section 5-A, notwithstanding
anything contained in the Code, no police officer below
the rank specified in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 5-A(1),
shall investigate any offence punishable under Section
161, 165 or 165-A of the IPC or under Section 5 of the Act
without the order of a Presidency Magistrate or a
Magistrate of the first class as the case may be or make
arrest therefor without a warrant. There are two provisos
to that section. As per the first proviso, if a police officer
not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised
by the State Government, either by general or special
order, he may investigate any such offence without the
order of a Magistrate or make arrest therefor without a
warrant. According to the second proviso, an offence
referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 5
shall not be investigated without the order of a police
officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police.
117. It means that a police officer not below the
rank of an Inspector of Police authorised by the State
Government in terms of the first proviso can take up the
investigation of an offence referred to in clause (e) of
Section 5(1) only on a separate and independent order of
a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of
Police. To say in other words, a strict compliance of the
second proviso is an additional legal requirement to that
of the first proviso for conferring a valid authority on a
police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police
to investigate an offence falling under clause (e) of
Section 5(1) of the Act. This is clearly spelt out from the
expression "further provided" occurring in the second
proviso.
118. A conjoint reading of the main provision,
Section 5-A(1) and the two provisos thereto, shows that
the investigation by the designated police officer is the
rule and the investigation by an officer of a lower rank is
an exception.
119. It has been ruled by this Court in several
decisions that Section 5-A of the Act is mandatory and
not directory and the investigation conducted in violation
thereof bears the stamp of illegality but that illegality
committed in the course of an investigation does not
affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the court for
trial and where the cognizance of the case has in fact
been taken and the case is proceeded to termination, the
invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate
the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused
thereby. See (1) H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. State of
Delhi [(1955) 1 SCR 1150 : AIR 1955 SC 196 : 1955 Cri LJ 526]
; (2) Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay [(1962) 2 SCR 195 :
AIR 1961 SC 1762: (1961) 2 Cri LJ 828]; (3) Munna Lal v. State
of Uttar Pradesh [(1964) 3 SCR 88 : AIR 1964 SC 28: (1964) 1
Cri LJ 11]; (4) S.N. Bose v. State of Bihar [(1968) 3 SCR 563 :
AIR 1968 SC 1292: 1968 Cri LJ 1484]; (5) Muni Lal v. Delhi
Administration [(1971) 2 SCC 48: 1971 SCC (Cri) 407] and
(6) Khandu Sonu Dhobi v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 3 SCC
786 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 854: (1972) 3 SCR 510]. However,
in Rishbud case [(1955) 1 SCR 1150 : AIR 1955 SC 196: 1955
Cri LJ 526] and Muni Lal case [(1971) 2 SCC 48: 1971 SCC (Cri)
407] , it has been ruled that if any breach of the said mandatory
proviso relating to investigation is brought to the notice of the
court at an early stage of the trial, the court will have to
consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass
appropriate orders as may be called for to rectify the illegality
and cure the defects in the investigation.
120. Coming to the facts of the present case under
consideration, the investigation did not proceed and could not
be proceeded with, since the High Court by an interlocutory
order restrained the investigation even at the initial stage, i.e.
on the date when rule nisi was issued in the writ petition.
Therefore, it is the appropriate stage for examination of the
question as to whether the necessary requirements
contemplated under Section 5-A(1) in permitting the Inspector
of Police, are strictly complied with or not.
121. For the proper understanding of the reasoning which
we would like to give touching the question of the validity of the
authority of appellant 3, we would like to reproduce the
Government Order dated July 26, 1975 which reads as follows:
"Haryana Government,
Home Department,
ORDER
No. 4816-3H-75/22965 July 26, 1975
Conferred by the first proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the
Governor of Haryana hereby authorises all the Inspectors of
Police under the administrative control of the Inspector General
of Police, Haryana to investigate offences under Section 5 of the
said Act.
S.D. Bhandari
Secretary to Government, Haryana
Home Department"
122. The subsequent Government Order dated April 19,
1988 is on the same lines of the above government order.
123. On the strength of the above government order of
1975, it has been rightly contended that appellant 3 (Inspector
of Police), though not a designated officer has been legally
authorised by the State Government in exercise of its powers
under the first proviso of Section 5-A(1) to investigate the
offences falling under Section 5 of the Act, namely, the offences
enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act.
124. Now what remains for consideration is whether
there is any valid order of the SP permitting appellant 3 to
investigate the offence falling under clause (e) of sub-section
(1) of Section 5. As we have already mentioned in the earlier
part of this judgment, the SP (appellant 2) has given the one
word direction on November 21, 1987 'investigate'. The
question is whether the one word direction 'investigate' would
amount to an 'order' within the meaning of second proviso of
Section 5 2DA(1)."
(Emphasis supplied)
Based upon the aforesaid reasons so rendered by the Apex Court
both on law and facts obtaining before it, it is held as follows:
"131. From the above discussion, we hold that (1)
as the salutary legal requirement of disclosing the
reasons for according the permission is not complied
with; (2) as the prosecution is not satisfactorily
explaining the circumstances which impelled the SP to
pass the order directing the SHO to investigate the case;
(3) as the said direction manifestly seems to have been
granted mechanically and in a very casual manner,
regardless of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court, probably due to blissful ignorance of the legal
mandate and (4) as, above all, the SHO has got neither
any order from the Magistrate to investigate the offences
under Sections 161 and 165 IPC nor any order from the
SP for investigation of the offence under Section 5(1)(e)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act in the manner known
to law, we have no other option, save to quash that order
of direction, reading "investigate" which direction suffers
from legal infirmity and also the investigation, if any, so
far carried out. Nevertheless, our order of quashing the
direction of the SP and the investigation thereupon will
not in any way deter appellant 1, the State of Haryana to
pursue the matter and direct an investigation afresh in
pursuance of the FIR, the quashing of which we have set
aside, if the State so desires, through a competent police
officer, clothed with the legal authority in strict
compliance with Section 5-A(1) of the Act."
(Emphasis supplied)
The FIR was quashed only on the ground that authorization to
investigate the case has been granted in a very casual manner
regardless of the principles of law enunciated by the Apex Court as
observed in the previous paragraph of the order. Quashing of the
FIR resulted in reserving liberty to the State to act through a
competent Police Officer clothed with legal Authority in strict
compliance with Section 5-A(1) of the 1947 Act which is akin to
Section 17 of the present Act. The Apex Court has further at
paragraphs 140 and 141 observes as follows:
"In summation
140. We set aside the judgment of the High Court
quashing the first information report as not being
legally and factually sustainable in law for the reasons
aforementioned; but, however, we quash the
commencement as well as the entire investigation, if
any, so far done for the reasons given by us in the
instant judgment on the ground that appellant 3 (SHO)
is not clothed with valid legal authority to take up the
investigation and proceed with the same within the
meaning of Section 5-A(1) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act as indicated in this judgment. Further we
set aside the order of the High Court awarding costs
with a direction that the said costs is payable to
respondent 1 (Shri Bhajan Lal) by respondent 2
(Dharam Pal).
141. In the result, the appeal is disposed of
accordingly but at the same time giving liberty to the
State Government to direct an investigation afresh, if it
so desires, through a competent police officer
empowered with valid legal authority in strict
compliance with Section 5 2DA(1) of the Act as
indicated supra. No order as to costs."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court has set registration of crime itself aside, in a case
arising out of Prevention of Corruption Act, on the ground that the
authorization granted by the Officer did not bear application of mind
inter alia. This is further amplified by a subsequent judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of STATE INSPECTOR OF POLICE v.
SURYA SANKARAM KARRI2 wherein the Apex Court has held as
follows:
"13. Provisions of the 1988 Act, no doubt, like the
1947 Act seek to protect public servant from a vexatious
prosecution. Section 17 provides for investigation by a
person authorised in this behalf. The said provision
contains a non obstante clause. It makes investigation
only by police officers of the ranks specified therein to be
imperative in character. The second proviso appended to
Section 17 of the Act provides that an offence referred to
in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13, shall not be
investigated without the order of a police officer not
below the rank of a Superintendent of Police.
Authorisation by a Superintendent of Police in favour of
an officer so as to enable him to carry out investigation in
terms of Section 17 of the Act is a statutory one. The
power to grant such sanction has been conferred upon
the authorities not below the rank of a Superintendent of
Police. The proviso uses a negative expression. It also
uses the expression "shall". Ex facie it is mandatory in
character. When the authority of a person to carry out
(2006) 7 SCC 172.
investigation is questioned on the ground that he did not
fulfil the statutory requirements laid down therefor in
terms of the second proviso, the burden, undoubtedly,
was on the prosecution to prove the same. It has not been
disputed before us that the investigating officer, PW 41, did not
produce any record to show that he had been so authorised.
Shri K. Biswal, the Investigating Officer, while examining himself
as PW 41, admitted that he had not filed any authorisation letter
stating:
"I have received the specific authorisation
from SP, CBI, to register a case but I have not filed
the said authorisation letter.""
(Emphasis supplied)
What would unmistakably emerge from both the judgments of the
Apex Court is that proviso to Section 17 becomes mandatory and
application of mind while drawing up source information report
again becomes mandatory.
12. In the light of admitted fact that the Superintendent of
Police delegated his authority for scrutinizing the document i.e., the
source report to his subordinate and has not independently applied
his mind, it runs foul of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case
of BHAJAN LAL while interpreting the same provision under the old
Prevention of Corruption Act. Therefore, on this score the petition
deserves to succeed, albeit in part, not that the petitioner is
absolved of any proceeding, but only a temporary reprieve. Liberty
is reserved in the respondents/Lokayukta to draw up a source
report in an appropriate manner, bearing in mind the observations
made in the course of the order, and the Superintendent of
Police/competent authority to apply his mind and direct registration
of the crime.
13. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following:
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition is allowed in part.
(ii) Crime in Crime No.6 of 2022 pending before the
Principal District and Sessions and Special Court, Koppal
stands quashed.
(iii) Liberty is reserved in the respondents/Lokayukta to
draw up an appropriate source report, scrutinize the
same and direct registration of crime, if it becomes
necessary. While so doing, the respondents shall bear in
mind the observations made in the course of the order.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Bkp
CT:SS
