Karnataka High Court
Sri. P Ramaprasad vs Sri. Thyagaraj R on 24 August, 2023
Bench: H.P.Sandesh
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
R
DATED THIS THE 24 DAY OF AUGUST, 2023
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P. SANDESH
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.70/2022 (IO)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI P. RAMAPRASAD
S/O LATE PRAKASH REDDY
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
R/AT FLAT NO.CPH-2
MANTRI SAROVAR APARTMENTS
H.S.R. LAYOUT
BANGALORE-560 102. ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI A.MADHUSUDHANA RAO &
SRI NAVEEN, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. SRI THYAGARAJ R.,
S/O RAJASHEKAR REDDY
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
R/AT NO.608, 15TH CROSS
15TH 'A' MAIN, H.S.R.LAYOUT
BANGLAORE-560 102.
2. SMT GOWRAMMA
W/O LATE MUNIREDDY
AGED ABOUT 83 YEARS
NO.2276 16TH CROSS
21ST MAIN, H.S.R. LAYOUT
BANGALORE-560 102.
2
3. SRI SHIVASHANKAR REDDY
S/O LATE NANJA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS
R/AT NO.1/3, 1ST MAIN
LALJINAGAR, LAKKASANDRA
BANGALORE-560 030.
4. SRI R ANAND
S/O LATE RAJASHEKAR REDDY
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
NO.2276, 16TH CROSS
21ST MAIN, H.S.R.LAYOUT
BANGLAORE-560 102.
5. SRI JAISHEEL REDDY
S/O LATE GOVIND REDDY
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
R/AT HOUSE NO.S7-201
GREEWOOD REGENCY
DODDAKANELI
SARJAPURA ROAD
BANGALORE-560 035.
6. SMT. MANJULA
W/O LATE YOGANAND REDDY
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
7. SRI UDAY JAI PRAKASH
S/O LATE YOGANAND REDDY
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS
8. SRI VIKRAM REDDY
W/O LATE YOGANAND REDDY
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
RESPONDENTS 6 TO 8
ARE ALL R/AT NO.147,
KAIKONDRAHALLI
CARMELARAM POST
3
SARJAPUR MAIN ROAD
BANGALORE-560 035.
9. SRI SHIVARAM REDDY A R
S/O LATE A G RAMAIAH REDDY
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS
R/AT NO.670, 3RD BLOCK
6TH CROSS, KORAMANGALA
BANGALORE-560 034.
10 . SRI SHARATH
S/O LATE SITAAM REDDY
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
R/AT NO.637, 4TH CROSS
3RD 'D' BLOCK, KORAMANGALA
BANGALORE-560 034.
11 . SRI NAGARAJ REDDY
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
R/AT NO.670, 3RD BLOCK
6TH CROSS, KORAMANGALA
BANGALORE-560 034. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI RAJENDRA M.S., ADVOCATE FOR C/R1
SRI SRIHARI A.V., ADVOCATE FOR R1;
R2 TO R11 ARE DISPENSED WITH
VIDE ORDER DATED 21.04.2022)
THIS CRP IS FILED UNDER SECTION 115 OF CPC,
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 18.02.2021
PASSED ON I.A.NO.7 IN O.S.NO.231/2019 ON THE FILE OF THE
XIX ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
BANGALORE CITY, REJECTING THE I.A.NO.7 FILED UNDER
ORDER 7 RULE 11(a) AND (d) OF CPC FOR REJECTION OF
PLAINT.
THIS CRP HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
ORDERS ON 11.08.2023 THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED
THE FOLLOWING:
4
ORDER
Heard the petitioner's counsel and also the counsel
appearing for the respondents.
2. The factual matrix of the case of respondent No.1 before
the Trial Court while filing the suit in O.S.No.231/2019 contend
that, one Nanjareddy had three sons, Ramareddy, Lingareddy
and Munireddy of Agaram Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore. The
said family possessed vast properties in and around Agara
Village and in Bangalore City. There was a family partition
amongst the members of the Nanjareddy Family by virtue of
O.S.No.1/1915-16 on the file of the Court of District Judge at
Bangalore dated 8.10.1923, which got culminated in Final
Decree proceedings vide FDP dated 14.5.1928.
3. In terms of the said proceedings shares of the
respective parties therein were determined and definite shares
were allotted to the parties therein as per the schedule
appended. The plaintiff herein falls in the branch of Munireddy
who had three sons and plaintiff is the grandson of Nanjunda S/o
Munireddy. Late Munireddy got a definite share as per the
judgment and decree and FDP proceedings and the said
Munireddy died during the pendency of the suit leaving behind
his three sons without getting an inch in suit schedule property
towards his share of 1/3rd which was declared by the Court
towards his legitimate share, which declaration remained un-
assailed in the preliminary decree which too came to be
culminated in the Final Decree Proceedings and there was a
cordial relationship with the parties and possession was
continued with Ramareddy and its members and bonafidely
believed them and there was no room for suspicion and their
behavior also never raised any doubts in the minds of the
plaintiffs' family. But now they have declined to give a share.
Hence, filed a suit for the relief of partition of 1/3rd legitimate
share.
4. The defendant appeared and filed statement of
objections, defendant No.4 also had filed an application under
Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC for rejection of plaint contending that
suit is barred by law. The plaintiff is trying to enforce and
execute the decree passed in favour of his grand father
Nanjundareddy in Final Decree Proceedings dated 14.5.1928
passed in O.S.No.1/1915-16 on the file of the District Judge,
Bangalore and such claim is not maintainable and suit is barred
under Section 47 of CPC. The plaintiff is trying to enforce and
execute the decree passed in favour of his grand father
Nanjundareddy. The present suit is filed after lapse of 90 years
and therefore same is hopelessly barred by limitation and no
cause of action. The plaintiff also appeared and filed the
objection statement before the Trial Court. The Trial Court
formulated the point whether plaint does not disclose the cause
of action to file the suit and it is barred by law. The Trial Court
having considered both pleadings of the plaintiff and also the
grounds urged in the application and statement of objections
filed by the plaintiff comes to the conclusion that Section 47 of
the CPC does not attract and also the suit is not barred by
limitation. The Trial Court given the finding that plaintiff has
sought for relief of partition with respect of the property fallen to
the share of Munireddy and hence the contention of the plaintiff
that suit is barred by law will not holds good. The plaint
averments also reveals that partition among the legal heirs of
deceased Munireddy has not been effected and plaintiff being the
legal heirs of deceased Munireddy is entitled to a share and
hence there is a cause of action for the suit and rejected the
application under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) and (d) of CPC with cost of
Rs.500/-. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present revision
petition is filed.
5. The counsel would vehemently contend in his argument
that when the decree was passed in 1923 and also FDP was
culminated vide order dated 14.5.1928, already there was a
decree of partition and preliminary decree was passed and final
decree was also passed and hence, no question of once again
filing the suit for the relief of partition and according to the plaint
averments itself is clear that already there was a partition and
final decree was passed and once again cannot file any suit for
the relief of partition and hence there is no any cause of action
to file a suit for partition once again.
6. The counsel also vehemently contend that, if physical
possession was not delivered in terms of the preliminary decree
and final decree and he has to seek for an order to execute the
decree. The plaintiff knowing fully well that the decree has to be
enforced within the time stipulation and the same is barred by
law, once again filed the suit for the relief of partition. The
counsel also brought to notice of this Court Section 47 of CPC
and there is a bar to file a suit, only executing Court can
examine the issue involved between the parties and he cannot
file a separate suit and under the provision of Section 47 of CPC,
separate suit is barred. The counsel also vehemently contend
that suit does not discloses any cause of action to seek for a
partition again and nothing stated what is transpired between
the parties from 1928. The counsel would vehemently contend
that, it is a case of suppression of material facts and property
has already been changed to the hands of different persons and
the present 4th defendant is in possession of the property that he
had purchased the same and revenue records are also standing
in the name of the defendant and nothing stated with regard to
the revenue records from 1928 to till date, no pleading of joint
possession while seeking for the relief of partition, the suit is
barred by limitation and within 12 years ought to have filed the
appropriate proceedings to enforce the decree and the same is
not done. The counsel would vehemently contend that the suit is
filed by a clever drafting and the relief is illusory.
7. The counsel in support of his argument relied upon the
judgment of the Apex Court reported in 2019 SCC OnLine KAR
3090 in the case of Durga Projects and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.
Vs. S. Rajagopala Reddy and Others and referring this judgment
the counsel would vehemently contend that this Court while
allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11 a, c and d r/w
Section 151 of CPC comes to the conclusion that the clever
drafting of plaint and suppression of material facts itself is a
ground for rejection of plaint. Plaintiff is duty bound in law to
disclose the material facts in terms of Order 6 Rule 2, omission
of a single material facts leads to an incomplete cause of action
and in such a case plaint becomes bad. If it is a bogus and
irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order 7 Rule 11 of
the CPC can be exercised.
8. The counsel also relied upon the judgment in the case of
Dr.Dhiranji Lal (D) by Lrs. Vs. Hari Das (D) by Lrs. reported
in (2005) 10 SCC 746. Referring this judgment, the counsel
would vehemently contend that the rules of limitation and the
purpose of limitation is also held that meant to see that the
parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy
promptly. The counsel also referring this judgment contend that
Article 136 is starting point of period of limitation for execution
of decree (for partition), when decree becomes enforceable,
whether from the date the decree is made or when it is
engrossed on stamp paper, held, decree becomes enforceable
from the date it is made and not when it is engrossed on stamp
paper, starting point of limitation cannot be made contingent
upon engrossment of the decree on stamp paper which is an
uncertain act within the domain and purview of the party.
9. The counsel also referring this judgment would
vehemently contend that, the date of decree is a starting point
for enforcement of a decree and in the case on hand, for 90
years kept quiet and now come up with a suit for partition even
though there was already a decree and hence, same is barred by
limitation.
10. The counsel also relied upon the judgment passed by
this Court in RSA No.1837/2017 dated 26.5.2023 and
brought to notice of this Court the principle of doctrine of
acquiescence and this Court held that when the party kept quiet
for a longer period without seeking the appropriate relief and the
conduct of indifference or acquiescence and held that, it is
settled law that an estoppel may arise as against persons who
have not willfully made any misrepresentation, and whose
conduct is free from fraud or negligence, but as against whom
inferences may reasonably have been drawn upon which others
may have been inducted to act. If a person having a right, and
seeing another person about to commit, or in the course of
committing, an act infringing upon that right, stands by in such a
manner as really to induce the person committing the act, and
who might otherwise have abstained from it, to believe that he
assents to it being committed, he cannot afterward be heard to
complain of the act. This is the proper sense of the term
acquiescence, under such circumstances, that assent may be
reasonably inferred from it, and is no more than an instance of
the law of estoppel by words or conduct. The counsel referring
this judgment would contend that the plaintiff had acquiesced his
right keeping quiet for a period of 90 years and hence, not
entitled for any relief and plaint is liable to be rejected.
11. The counsel relying upon the judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of Canara Bank Vs. P.Selathal and Others
reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 245, wherein also the Apex
Court held that suits filed after a period of 15 years from the
date of mortgage and after a period of 7 years from the date of
passing of decree by DRT. In the plaint, it is averred that
plaintiffs came to know about mortgage and judgment and
decree passed by DRT only six months back. However, said
averments can be said to be too vague. Nothing has been
averred when and how plaintiffs came to know about judgment
and decree passed by DRT and mortgage of property. Only with
a view to get out of the law of limitation and only with a view to
bring suit within period of limitation, such vague averments are
made. On such vague averments, plaintiffs cannot get out of the
law of limitation. The counsel referring this judgment would also
vehemently contend that, for a period of 90 years kept quiet and
now to avoid the limitation and to get out of the law of limitation
clever drafting has been made in the plaint and hence, suit is
barred by limitation and no cause of action.
12. Per contra, the counsel appearing for the respondents
would vehemently contend that the Trial Court while rejecting an
application has given the reason that the suit is not barred by
limitation and also there is a cause of action and legal heirs of
said Munireddy are having a right in respect of the property and
entitled for the relief of partition and not committed any error in
passing such an error. The very contention of the petitioner's
counsel cannot be accepted.
13. The counsel in support of his arguments relied upon
the judgment of this Court in the case of
S.K.Lakshminarasappa, since deceased by his L.Rs. Vs.
Sri.B.Rudraiah and Others reported in ILR 2012 KAR 4129
and brought to notice of this Court paragraph Nos.45 and 46,
wherein discussed with regard to filing of suit for partition which
was dismissed for default. The Court observed that, the reason is
that the right to enforce a partition is a continuous right, which
is a legal incident of a joint tenancy and which enures so long as
the joint tenancy continues. Cause of action is continuous in
partition cases which subsists so long as the property is held
jointly. The counsel referring this judgment also vehemently
contend that, the High Court observed that the property
continues to be joint. The co-sharers right to seek partition of
the property held jointly, continues. It is a recurring cause of
action. The cause of action comes to an end only after partition
of the property held in joint, is severed and the share to which
each co-sharer is entitled to, is put in possession of their
respective share. The counsel referring this judgment would
vehemently contend that, the same is aptly applicable to the
case on hand since possession has not been handed over to the
respondent in terms of the decree passed in the earlier suit.
14. The counsel also in support of his argument relied
upon the judgment in the case of Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and
Others Vs. Owners & parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express
and Others reported in (2006) 3 SCC 100, wherein also the
Apex Court in detail discussed with regard to Order 7 Rule 11
and also Order 6 Rule 16, wherein held such rejection is
permissible only if the suppressed fact is material, in the sense
that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on
the merits of the case, whatever view the Court may have taken,
to obtain such rejection defendant must show that plaintiff could
not possibly succeed on the basis of the pleadings and in the
circumstances of the case, given the suppression of the facts in
question.
15. The counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in
(2006) 5 SCC 658 in the case of Balasaria Construction (P)
Ltd. Vs. Hanuman Seva Trust and Others, wherein also the
Apex Court while discussing Order 7 Rule 11(d) comes to the
conclusion that suit is barred by limitation, cannot be rejected as
barred by limitation without proper pleadings, framing of issues
of limitation and taken the evidence. Question of limitation is a
mixed question of law and fact and ex facie on reading of the
plaint, suit cannot be held to be barred by limitation.
16. The counsel also relied upon the judgment of this
Court reported in 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 6782 in the case of
Prameela N. Vs. L.Mahadevaiah, wherein also dealing with
Order 7 Rule 11 an observation is made that the Court is not
obliged to look into the case of the defendant and the pleadings
of the defendant, but the Court is bound to look into the whole
plaint averments and on meaningful and complete reading of the
plaint if the Court is of the opinion that, there is no cause of
action or the cause of action pleaded is illusory then also the
Court can reject the plaint.
17. It is also observed that when the plaintiff pleads that
the sale deed is not binding upon her and she continues to be
the joint owner of the said property with first defendant, again
this has to be tested whether she has to seek for cancellation or
for setting aside the sale deed or simply she can seek that the
sale transaction is not binding upon her.
18. Having heard the petitioner's counsel and also counsel
appearing for the respondents, the points that would arise for
consideration of this Court are:
i) Whether the Trial Court committed an error in
rejecting application filed under Order 7 Rule 11
(a) and (d) of CPC?
ii) What Order?
19. Having perused the pleadings found in the plaint, it is
not in dispute that earlier a suit was filed for the relief of
partition and preliminary decree was granted in O.S.No.1/1915-
16 before the Court of District Court at Bangalore and the said
decree was granted on 8.10.1923 and the same was culminated
in final decree proceedings vide FDP dated 14.5.1928.
20. Having perused the averment of the plaint in
paragraph No.2 it is clear that suit was filed for the relief of
partition and preliminary decree was passed and final decree
was also passed. It is also settled law, in view of principles laid
down in the judgment referred supra that while the Court
considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC, look
into the averments of the plaint and not the defence, and
defence is immaterial.
21. Having perused the plaint averments it is clear that
already suit was filed since the family propositous Nanjareddy
having three sons Ramareddy, Lingareddy and Munireddy and
also pleading is clear that there was a family partition among the
members of the Nanjareddy by virtue of the decree. Hence, it is
clear that there was a partition among the family members and
plaintiff is the grand son of Nanjunda S/o Munireddy and also it
is specific case of late Munireddy got a definite share as per the
judgment and decree and FDP proceedings and also specifically
pleaded that suit schedule properties are subject matter of the
said proceedings which fell to the share of late Munireddy, but
he died leaving behind his three sons. But the fact is that,
already there was a decree of partition and final decree was also
attained its finality. There is a force in the contention of the
petitioner's counsel that physical possession is not delivered in
terms of the judgment and decree, option is to seek for an order
to execute the decree. But instead of executing the decree, filed
one more suit for the relief of partition and hence, one more suit
is barred by law only to enforce the decree by filing execution
petition. It has to be noted that the Apex Court also in the
judgment referred by the petitioner's counsel in the case of
Dr.Chiranji Lal (D) by Lrs. referred supra made it clear that
starting point of period of limitation for execution of decree (for
partition) and the same become enforceable from the date of
decree and not engrossing the same on the stamp paper and
engrossing of the stamp paper is uncertain. Starting point of
limitation cannot be made contingent upon engrossment of the
decree on stamp paper which is an uncertain act within the
domain and purview of the party. Hence, it is clear that, in order
to avoid law of limitation one more suit is filed for the relief of
partition. If possession is not delivered in terms of the
preliminary decree and final decree, ought to have enforced the
same within the period of limitation and the same is not been
done and in order to oust the law of limitation, the present suit is
filed.
22. The judgment of the Court in Canara Bank Vs.
P.Selathal and Others referred supra is also clear that only with
a view to get out of the law of limitation and only with a view to
bring suits within a period of limitation, such vague averments
are made. On such vague averments, plaintiffs cannot get out of
the law of limitation. There must be specific pleadings and
averments in the plaint on limitation. The said judgment is apply
applicable to the case on hand, since the same is not been
enforced by filing execution petition after the decree.
23. The other contention of the petitioner's counsel is also
that the plaintiff acquiesced their right, the doctrine of law of
acquiescence is applicable to the facts of the case on hand and
relied upon the judgment of this Court referred supra in
G.Nagaraju Vs. Mr.Ramesh and others case, the same was
discussed earlier with regard to the application of law of
acquiescence and the said judgment is also aptly applicable to
the case on hand since the plaintiffs have acquiesced their right,
kept quiet for a period of 90 years even though the final decree
was passed on 14.5.1928. The suit is also hopelessly barred by
limitation by filing a separate suit.
24. This Court also would like to refer Section 47 of CPC
which reads as follows:
47. Questions to be determined by the
Court executing decree-(1) All questions arising
between the parties to the suit in which the decree
was passed, or their representatives, and relating to
the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the
decree, shall be determined by the Court executing
the decree and not by a separate suit.
25. Having referred Section 47 of CPC, it is clear that when
there was a decree between the parties and relating to the
execution, discharge of satisfaction of the decree, shall be
determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a
separate suit. In the case on hand, already there was a decree in
respect of the Munireddy's share and pleading of the plaintiff
also clear that share has been determined and final decree also
was drawn on 14.5.1928 and instead of executing the final
decree by filing execution petition, a separate suit is filed before
the Court and hence, it is clear that it is nothing but clever
drafting of the plaint while filing the suit for the relief of seeking
once again for partition.
26. The Supreme Court also referred supra in Canara Bank
case held that, it is nothing but clever drafting to file the suit for
the relief of partition once again and the same is illusory and
nothing is there to determine the issues between the parties
since suit has been decreed and final decree has been passed,
only enforcement of the decree was pending even according to
the contention of the plaintiff. When such being the case, in
order to avoid the limitation for execution of the decree, the
present suit is filed once again seeking for the relief of partition
and hence, there is a force in the contention of the counsel for
the revision petitioner that there is no cause of action to file a
suit and even on perusal of the plaint also, cause of action is
pleaded of the year 1923 and 1928 and subsequently demands
as and when made by the plaintiff's family repeatedly, and also
when plaintiff met defendant Nos.4 to 11 along with well wishers
and when the defendant denied in 2018 and no specific
averment is made and also no question of making any demand,
when already there was a decree, there is a preliminary decree
and final decree, as stated in paragraph No.10 of the plaint itself
mentioned in the cause of action and when such being the case,
it is a fit case as observed by the Apex Court that in order to
bring the suit within the law of limitation once again for the relief
of partition, the same has not been examined by the Trial Court.
27. No doubt, the counsel appearing for the respondent
relied upon the judgment of this Court in ILR 2012 Kar 4129
referred supra brought to notice of this Court paragraph Nos.45
and 46, wherein discussed with regard to the fact that, it is a
recurring cause of action. The cause of action comes to an end
only after partition of the property held in joint, is severed and
the share to which each co-sharer is entitled to, is put in
possession of their respective share.
28. The case involved is a case of dismissal of the suit. But
here is a case already determined the rights of the parties and
preliminary decree was passed and final decree was also passed
and no doubt it is the contention that possession was not
delivered, but the same ought to have been enforced by filing an
execution petition and to seek for an order to execute the decree
and comes to know about the same is barred by limitation, the
present suit is filed cleverly drafting the plaint and the same is
nothing but illusory.
29. No doubt the counsel is also relied upon the judgment
of the Apex court reported in Mayor(H.K) case referred supra,
the judgment is also very clear that to obtain such rejection
defendant must show that plaintiff would not possibility succeed
on the basis of the pleadings and in the circumstances of the
case, even the suppression of the facts in question. But in the
case on hand also it is very clear that there was a preliminary
decree and final decree and the same is not enforced within the
limitation as held in the judgment of the Apex Court relied upon
by the petitioner's counsel.
30. No doubt, the other judgment of the High Court in
Prameela N. Vs. L.Mahadevaiah referred supra, it is clear that
defence of the defendant cannot be looked into while considering
Order 7 Rule 11 and the same is also a settled law and very
clear that under Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d), there must be
cause of action and also if it is barred by limitation within the
meaning of Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC, the same cannot be
entertained.
31. Having perused the plaint averments, I have already
pointed out that it is clear that already there was a partition by
granting preliminary decree. Final decree was also passed on
14.5.1928 and instead of filing execution petition and obtain
possession, after lapse of 90 years, once again suit is filed for
the relief of partition and nothing is there to determine, when
already a share of Munireddy was granted in the earlier suit and
the present plaintiff claims that he is the legal heir of
Munireddy's Branch and when there was a decree of partition
and final decree in favour of Munireddy's Branch, ought to have
been enforced within the period of limitation and instead, filed
one more suit for partition and hence the Trial Court fails to take
note of the said fact into consideration that there is no cause of
action to file a suit and also not discussed anything with regard
to the limitation aspect also, though point is raised by the Court
whether the plaint does not disclose the cause of action to file
the suit and it is barred by law and committed an error in
considering the very plaint averments made in the application
and also erroneously comes to the conclusion that Section 47 of
the CPC does not press into the aid of the defendant, but fails to
take note of the very proviso of Section 47 of CPC and there
must be a separate suit and the right has to be adjudicated only
in execution petition. But instead of filing execution petition, filed
a separate original suit and the same has not been appreciated.
32. Regarding law of limitation also, the Trial Court
committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the law of
limitation urged by the petitioner was not considered and comes
to an erroneous conclusion that suit is not barred by limitation
and the very approach is erroneous and hence it requires
interference. Hence, I answer the point as affirmative.
33. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the
following:
ORDER
Revision petition is allowed.
The impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the
application filed under Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) of CPC before
the Trial Court is allowed and as a result plaint is rejected.
Sd/-
JUDGE
AP
