Karnataka High Court
Deputy Commissioner And Special ... vs M/S S V Global Mill Limited on 21 October, 2022
Bench: B.Veerappa, K.Natarajan
1
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF OCTOBER, 2022
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.VEERAPPA
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.NATARAJAN
REVIEW PETITION No.328/2021
IN
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL No.3806 OF 2019 [LAC]
BETWEEN:
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND
SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
VISHWESHWARAIAH TOWERS,
3RD FLOOR, PODIUM BLOCK,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI DHYAN CHINNAPPA, ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL
A/W SRI KIRAN KUMAR, HCGP)
AND:
M/S. S.V. GLOBAL MILL LIMITED,
THROUGH ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY
AND MANAGER, HAVING ITS
REGISTERED OFFICE
AT NO.106, ARMENIAN STREET, CHENNAI.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
2
AUTHORISED SIGNATORY &
MANAGER, MR.K.JOHNSON.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI UDAY HOLLA, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W
SRI SHIRISH KRISHNA, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT)
I.A. NO.2/2022
R. VIDHYASHANGAR
S/O MR. RAMALINGAM,
H7K, TNHB HIG FLAT,
1ST FLOOR, 70TH FEET ROAD,
SP GARDEN, T. NAGAR,
CHENNAI-600017 ... APPLICANT/INTERVENING
IMPLEADING APPLCIANT
(BY SRI N.G.R. PRASAD, ADVOCATE A/W SRI HITESH SINGHVI &
MS. RAMYA SUBRAMANIAN, ADVOCATE
FOR SRI PARAS PANDEY, ADVOCATE)
*****
THIS REVIEW PETITION IS FILED UNDER ORDER 47 RULE 1
READ WITH SECTION 114 OF CPC, PRAYING TO REVIEW THE
ORDER DATED 25.09.2019 IN MFA No.3806/2019.
I.A. NO.2/2022 IS FILED UNDER ORDER 1 RULE 10 READ
WITH SECTION 151 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908
PRAYING TO PERMIT THE IMPLEADING/INTERVENING APPLICANT
TO INTERVENE IN THIS REVIEW PETITION AND THUS BE
IMPLEADED AS RESPONDENT NO.2.
THIS REVIEW PETITION AND I.A. No.2/2022 HAVING BEEN
HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER THIS DAY, B.VEERAPPA J., MADE
THE FOLLOWING:
3
ORDER
The present review petition is filed to review the order dated
25.09.2019 made in M.F.A. No.3806/2019 on the file of the
Coordinate Bench of this Court, on the basis of the liberty granted
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
2. It is pertinent to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court by
the order dated 11.8.2021 permitted the petitioner to withdraw
Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.10452/2021 and to approach this
Court by filing a review petition. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
relegated the parties back to this Court to argue the point relating
to the maintainability of appeal under Section 54 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 ('1894 Act' for short) as the said point was
not raised and argued before this Court in the appeal.
I. Brief facts of the case
3. On 7.2.2013, the review petitioner being the Special Land
Acquisition Officer issued a preliminary notification under the
provisions of Sections 17(2) and 17(4) r/w Section 4(1) of the 1894
Act to acquire 3.16 acres of land out of 24 acres 4 guntas in
property bearing No.59/1 sitauted at Binny Mill Road, Bengaluru
North taluk, within the BBMP limits, invoking special powers in
cases of urgency and same was published in the official gazette on
14.2.2013 and was affixed at convenient places near the land
indicating the possession being taken without hearing the
objections as contemplated under Section 5A of the 1894 Act and
also given wide publications in the newspapers. Accordingly on
18.11.2013 final notification under section 6(1) r/w Section 17(2) of
the 1894 Act was issued and possession of the land was secured.
On 1.1.2014, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ('2013
Act' for short) came into force. On 8.10.2014 the award came to
be passed under the provisions of the 2013 Act.
4. On 29.4.2015, the respondent objected the award passed
by the present review petitioner and thereby filed an application for
reference. The Special Land Acquisition officer ('SLAO' for short)
after receipt of the said application, has made a reference under
Section 64(1) of the 2013 Act and the reference authority
registered the same in LAC No.33/2017. The reference authority
considering both the oral and documentary evidence on record by
the judgment and award dated 29.10.2018 allowed the reference in
part holding that the respondent is entitled for market value of the
acquired land at the rate of Rs.8624/- per square feet and also
compensation under Section 29 of the 2013 Act with all statutory
benefits.
5. Aggrieved by the Judgment & Award passed by the
reference authority, the review petitioner filed MFA 3806/2019
before this Court. This Court by the judgment & award dated
25.9.2019 dismissed the appeal filed by the review petitioner as
being barred by limitation by considering the appeal to have been
filed under Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
6. Aggrieved by the judgment & award passed by this Court,
the review petitioner filed SLP No.10452/2021. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court by the order dated 11.8.2021 while dismissing the
SLP as withdrawn, has permitted the present review petitioner to
approach this Court by filing a review petition and argue the point
relating to the maintainability of the appeal under Section 54 of the
1894 Act. Hence, the present review petition is filed.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
II. Arguments advanced by Sri Dhyan Chinnappa, learned
Additional Advocate General for the review petitioner
8. Sri Dhyan Chinnappa, learned AAG for the review
petitioner contended that the fundamental issue which arises for
consideration before this Court is the extent to which 2013 Act
applies to acquisitions that have been started under the 1894 Act,
but where award is not made when the 2013 Act came into force.
He would contend that under Section 24(1)(a) of 2013 act, all the
provisions relating to determination of compensation shall apply,
however the question which remains unanswered is whether all
provisions of the 2013 Act would apply or only those provisions
relating to determination of compensation apply.
9. Learned AAG would further contend that the preliminary
notification was issued on 07.02.2013 followed by final notification
on 18.11.2013 and the award came to be passed on 08.10.2014
and the 2013 Act came into force on 01.01.2014 and therefore, the
provisions of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act are applicable only
for determination of compensation, but the reference has to be filed
under Section 18(1) of the 1894 Act. He further contended that
once Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act is applied, the provisions of
Sections 25 to 30 of the 2013 Act will apply and no other provisions
under the 2013 Act are applicable. He would further contend that
the provisions of the 2013 Act which can be applied are only
Sections 25 to 30 and all other provisions of the 1894 LA Act will
continue to apply including the making of an award, request to
make a reference, passing of the award by the reference
Court/authority, a challenge thereto etc. In addition, the
provisions of the 1894 Act continue to apply for taking of
possession, issuance of notification thereto, denotification etc. This
clearly indicates that the provisions of the 1894 Act have not been
totally repealed, but the limited repeal is only for the purposes of
providing a higher compensation as provided for in the 2013 Act by
extending some provisions contained therein to acquisitions that
are done under the 1894 Act.
10. Learned AAG further contended that the only
interpretation possible on a reading of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013
Act is that the repeal of the 1894 Act is limited only to the
provisions relating to determination of compensation. The
provisions of 2013 Act provides for additional compensation and a
requirement to provide for Resettlement and Rehabilitation.
Section 31 of the 2013 Act provides for the entire process of
Resettlement and Rehabilitation. The Collector is required to
provide for various aspects as contemplated under Section 31 as
well as Schedule II to the 2013 Act. This entire Resettlement and
Rehabilitation is part of the compensation mechanism of the 2013
Act. Chapter VI of the Act provides for appointment of an
Administrator in terms of Section 43 of the 2013 Act and
appointment of a Commissioner for the purposes of rehabilitation
and resettlement in terms of Section 44 of the 2013 Act. The entire
Chapter VI ending with Section 47 deals with quantification of the
rehabilitation and resettlement amount. A bare reading of Schedule
II of the 2013 Act indicates very clearly the various sums of money
that is payable to the land losers depending on their status, their
income, their position etc., as well as for the loss of land. He
contended that under the 2013 Act, the compensation payable and
resettlement and rehabilitation forms one package to be distributed
to the land losers.
11. Learned AAG would contend that if the interpretation is
that Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 LA Act applies to provide for the
entirety of the compensation provisions, then the provisions
relating to Resettlement and Rehabilitation would also automatically
apply. The initial draft of Section 24(1)(a) provided for
Resettlement and Rehabilitation where the Award had not been
made. The provisions of Section 24(1)(a) limits the extent of
application of the 2013 Act only to that part which deals with
determination of compensation. Such determination can only
include within its fold. The provisions of Section 24(1)(a) does not
deal with making of an Award. The making of an Award has to be
under Section 11 of the 1894, Act but should apply the provisions
relating to compensation under the 2013 Act. The Legislature in its
wisdom believed that the benefit of compensation under the 2013
Act should be given to those where Awards have not been made as
on the date of coming into force of the 2013 Act i.e., w.e.f.
1.1.2014. If the intention of the law makers was that the
provisions of the 2013 Act should apply to all acquisitions that are
resorted to under the 1894 Act, but where an Award is not made,
then there was no requirement to limit it only to the provisions
relating to compensation. The intention appears to have been only
to extend only the provisions relating to determination of
compensation and not to create a situation where the entire 2013
Act is made applicable to acquisitions.
12. Learned AAG would contend that the reference to be
made under Section 64 of the 2013 Act to the Authority is also a
significant issue. A reference under Section 64 is not merely for the
amount of compensation but also for the rights of rehabilitation and
resettlement. In making a determination under Section 69 of the
2013 Act, the Authority is required to take into consideration the
compensation awarded including the rehabilitation and resettlement
entitlements and also to check whether the Collector has followed
the parameters set out in Section 26 to 30 as well as the provisions
of Chapter V of the Act. He would further contend that an Award
so made under Section 69 can be challenged before this Court
under Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
13. Learned AAG also contended that making of the Award
under the 2013 Act is in terms of Section 23. Section 23 requires
that the Award shall be made by the Collector as follows:
a. True area of the land;
b. Compensation as determined under Section 27
along with the Rehabilitation and Resettlement
award as determined under Section 31;
c. Apportionment of compensation;
14. In view of the above, learned AAG contend that making
of an award under Section 23 can never occur in respect of
acquisitions under the 1894 Act. This is also because of the scheme
of the 2013 Act which is as follows:
a. A preliminary notification is issued under Section
11. Various steps have to be taken in this regard.
Prior to issuance of a preliminary notification, a
social impact assessment report has to be
prepared. The preliminary notification must be
issued within 12 months of the social impact
assessment report.
b. Thereafter under Section 12, a preliminary survey
of the land is carried out and payment is made for
any damage that may result therefrom.
c. Hearing of objections for land notified under
Section 11 is to be done within sixty days of
issuance of preliminary notification under Section
15.
d. After issuance of a preliminary notification, a
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme is to be
made by the Administrator in terms of Section 16
which shall be reviewed under Section 17 by the
Collector and then once it is so approved it is
made public in the local language and duly
published under Section 18. This scheme is then
notified by the Government.
e. A final declaration is made under Section 19(4) of
the Act.
f. Thereafter notice is issued under Section 21 to
take possession of land and to allow claims for
compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement
be made to him. An inquiry is then carried out.
g. Thereafter under Section, an Award is made by
the Collector under Section 23. In making such
award, the provisions of Sections 25 to 30 will
apply for compensation and the Collector is also
required to pass a Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Award in terms of Section 31 of the
2013 Act.
15. Learned AAG would further contend that the provisions of
Sections 11, 12, 13, 13A, 14. 15A, 16, 17, 18 to 22, 25, 26, 28A,
Part IV (Sections 29 to 30) relating to apportionment of
compensation, Part V (Sections 31 to 33) dealing with payment,
Part VI (Sections 35 to 37) dealing with temporary occupation of
land, Part VII dealing with acquisition of land for companies, Part
VIII dealing with service of notices, penalties for obstructing
acquisition of land, Magistrate to enforce surrender; Section 48
which deals with withdrawal from acquisition, Section 49 which
deals with acquisition of part of house/building, Section 50
acquisition for local authority or company and other provisions
including the appellate provision i.e., Section 54 continue to apply
to all notifications for acquisition issued under the 1894 Act. He
would contend that under the 1894 Act, acquisition is completed
only after taking of possession as land vests in the Government
only after such taking of possession.
16. Learned AAG would further contend that Section 114
deals with repeal of the 1894 Act. Section 114 preserves the
general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. A
right to approach a Court or to file an appeal is a valuable right and
would have to be specifically repealed.
17. Learned AAG would further contend that Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Authority constituted under Section 51 of the
2013 Act is not a Court much less a Civil Court, given the bar on
jurisdiction of Civil Courts under Section 63. When the right to
approach a Court is taken away, the same has to be specifically
done. The right to approach a Court is a valuable right and cannot
be taken away, especially where the repeal is a limited one as
contemplated under Section 114 of the 2013 Act. He would further
contend that the right to file an appeal is an equally valuable right
which cannot be taken away unless specifically so done. The mere
fact that the Government of Karnataka has issued a notification
declaring the Authority to be one of the Judges of a Civil Court does
not make the Judge the "Civil Court". That will be violative of
Section 63 of the 2013 Act. In the circumstances, learned AAG
would contend that the appeal lies under Section 54 of the 1894 Act
and not under Section 74 of the 2013 Act and sought to allow the
review petition.
18. In support of his contentions, learned AAG relied upon
the following judgments;
(i) Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and
paragraphs - 125, 126, 162, 191, 284, 287, 288 and
295.
(ii) Others reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129 {relevant (ii) The
Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd v. Mahesh and others
reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1034 (relevant
paragraphs - 7, 8, 10 and 18)
iii) Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry (AIR 1957
SC 540), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court
recognised that a right to appeal is a substantive right,
is a vested right and exists on the date of initiation of
the proceeding first. Such vested right can be taken
away only by a subsequent enactment if it so provides
expressly or by necessary intendment and not
otherwise (relevant paragraphs - 23,24).
III. Arguments advanced by Sri Udaya Holla, learned Senior
Counsel for the respondent
19. Per contra, Sri Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel for
the respondent brought to the notice of the Court that under the
2013 Act -
(i) Section 11 provides for preliminary notification;
(ii) Section 19 provides for final notification;
(iii) Award under Section 23 includes rehabilitation
etc;
(iv) Under Section 25, twelve (12) months time is
prescribed to pass Award.
(v) Section 69 provides for determination of
compensation, as contemplated under Sections
26 to 30.
20. Sri Udaya Holla further contended that once Reference
Petition is made to the Authority under Section 64, determination
has to be made under Section 69. Once the Reference Authority
determines the compensation under Section 69, appeal lies to this
Court under Section 74 within 60 days from the date of the
reference. He further referred to Rule 29 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation,
and Resettlement (Karnataka) Rules, 2015. He also contended
that under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, all the provisions
relating to determination of compensation shall apply. Thereby
learned senior counsel would contend that the provisions of Section
74 of the 2013 Act would apply to the appeal in question and
sought to dismiss the review petition.
21. In support of his contentions, Sri Udaya Holla, learned
Senior Counsel relied upon the following judgments:
(i) Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal
and others reported in (2020)8 SCC 129
(relevant paragraphs - 26, 96, 165, 191, 366.1,
366.2)
(ii) Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi,
Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation
Development Corporation reported in (2022)2
SCC 772 ( paragraphs 18, 20, 21, 22, 23).
(iii) Pune Municipal Corporation vs. Rajeev
L.Sangtani and others reported in (2019)5
MahLJ 889 (Full Bench) .. (relevant paragraphs-
83, 84, 85, 87, 88,89).
IV. Point for determination
22. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions urged by the
learned counsel for the parties, the only point that would arise for
our consideration in the present Review Petition is:
"Whether the Miscellaneous First Appeal
No.3806/2019 filed by the review petitioner before
this Court under Section 54 of the 1894 Act is
maintainable, when the award came to be passed on
8.10.2014 i.e., after 2013 Act came into force w.e.f
1.1.2014, in the facts and circumstances of the
present case ?"
V. Consideration
23. It is not in dispute that the review petitioner/Special
Land Acquisition Officer ('SLAO' for short) has proposed for
acquisition of land measuring 3 acres 16 guntas in property bearing
No.59/1, Ward No.29, within the limits of Bruhat Bengaluru
Mahangara Palike, out of the larger extent of 24 acres 4 guntas,
belonging to the respondent, situated on Binny Mill Road, Bengaluru
North taluk. Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner issued
preliminary notification on 7.12.2013 under the provisions of
Section 17(2) and 17(4) r/w Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, invoking
special powers in cases of urgency and the same was published in
official gazette on 14.2.2013. Subsequently, final notification under
Section 6(1) r/w 17(2) of the 1894 Act came to issued on
18.11..2013 and possession of the land was secured on the same
day.
24. It is also not in dispute that 2013 Act came into force
w.e.f 1.1.2014. Thereafter, the SLAO proceeded to pass the award
on 8.10.2014 fixing the market value of the acquired land at
Rs.4,620/- per square feet with all statutory benefits. The
respondent being not satisfied with the market value fixed by the
SLAO in respect of the acquired land, has filed an application
(protest petition) to make reference to the authority contemplated
under Section 64 of the 2013 Act for determination of the market
value for the acquired land. The SLAO on receipt of the
application, has made reference under Section 64(1) of the 2013
Act and the reference authority registered the same in L.A.C.
No.33/2017. Before the reference authority, the landlord examined
as PW.1 and got marked the documents as per Ex.P1 to Ex.P34 and
the present review petitioner/respondent has not adduced any
evidence nor produced any documents. The reference authority
considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, has
allowed the reference and fixed the market value of the acquired
property at the rate of Rs.8624/- per square feet instead of
Rs.4,620/- per square feet, awarded by the Special LAO with all
statutory benefits.
25. It is an undisputed fact that though the acquisition
proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, the award came to be
passed on 8.10.2014 after the 2013 Act came into force w.e.f
1.1.2014. Thereby, the provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act
are applicable, which reads as under:
"24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of
1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in
any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,--
(a) where no award under section 11 of the
said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then,
all provisions of this Act relating to the
determination of compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11 has
been made, then such proceedings shall
continue under the provisions of the said Land
Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been
repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),
where an award under the said section 11 has been
made five years or more prior to the commencement of
this Act but the physical possession of the land has not
been taken or the compensation has not been paid the
said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and
the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall
initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh
in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and
compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings
has not been deposited in the account of the
beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the
notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said
Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation
in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Provided further that in computing the period referred
to in this sub section, any period or periods during
which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were
held up on account of any order, stay, suspension or
injunction issued by any Court or the period specified in
the award of a Tribunal for taking possession or such
period where possession has been taken but the
compensation is lying deposited in a Court or in any
designated account maintained for this purpose, shall
be excluded.
26. A careful perusal of the said provisions make it clear that
where no award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made,
all provisions of 2013 Act relating to the determination of
compensation shall apply. Where an award under Section 11 of
the 1894 Act has been made before the 2013 Act came into force,
then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the
1894 Act as if the said Act has not been repealed. Sub-section (2)
of Section 24 of the 2013 Act contemplates that in case of land
acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, where an
award under the said section 11 has been made, five years or more
prior to the commencement of 2013 Act but the physical possession
of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been
paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the
appropriate Government, if it is so chooses, shall initiate the
proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the
provisions of 2013 Act.
27. The 1st proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 24
contemplates that where the award has been made five years or
more prior to the commencement of 2013 Act and compensation in
respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the
account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the
notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act, shall be
entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the
2013 Act. The 2nd proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 24
contemplates that in computing the period referred to in this sub-
section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for
acquisition of the land were held up on account of any order, stay
or suspension or injunction issued by any Court or the period
specified in the award of a Tribunal for taking possession or such
period where possession has been taken, but the compensation is
lying deposited in a Court or in any designated account maintained
for this purpose, shall be excluded.
28. It is not in dispute that 2013 Act operates prospectively.
Further, Section 114 of the 2013 Act effects a repeal but with
certain savings, in accordance with Section 24. Thus, the acquisition
proceedings are preserved under the 1894 Act till the stage of
making of the award. Where an award is not made, the provisions
relating to determination of compensation under the 2013 Act
would apply; where the award is made, proceedings would continue
under the provisions of the 1894 Act as if the said Act has not been
repealed.
29. By examination of phrasing of clause (a) to Section 24(1)
of the 2013 Act, we would prefer to read the words "all provisions
of this Act relating to the determination of compensation" in said
section as including the period of limitation in Section 25 of the
2013 Act. To elaborate, the word "all" and the expression "relating
to" used in Section are required to be given a wide meaning to
ensure the legislative intent. The expression "relating to" or "in
relation to" are words of comprehensiveness which may have a
direct as well as indirect significance depending on the context.
The expression "relating to" when used in legislation normally refers
to "stand in some relation, to have bearing or concern, to pertain,
to refer, to bring into association with or connection with".
Therefore, the expression "relating to" when used in legislation has
to be construed to give effect to the legislative intent when required
and necessary by giving an expansive and wider meaning. Given
this trend in interpretation, the words "all the provisions of this Act
relating to the determination of compensation" must not be
imputed a restricted understanding of the word "relating" only to
the substantial provisions on calculation of compensation, that is,
Sections 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act. Rather, the expression should be
given an expansive meaning. From the above, it is clear that the
intention of the Legislature is to provide expansive and wider
application in relation to applicability and scope of Section 24 of the
2013 Act.
30. It is also not in dispute that the respondent/landlord
being not satisfied with the market value fixed by the SLAO in
respect of the acquired land, has filed an application (protest
petition) to make reference to the authority contemplated under
Section 64 of the 2013 Act for determination of the higher market
value for the acquired land. Accordingly, the SLAO on receipt of
the application, has made reference under Section 64(1) of the
2013 Act and the reference authority registered the same in LAC
No.33/2017.
31. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to Section 64 of
the 2013 Act, which reads as under:
"64. Reference to Authority.-(1) Any person
interested who has not accepted the award may, by
written application to the Collector, require that the
matter be referred by the Collector for the
determination of the Authority, as the case may be,
whether his objection be to the measurement of the
land, the amount of the compensation, the person to
whom it is payable, the rights of Rehabilitation and
Resettlement under Chapters V and VI or the
apportionment of the compensation among the persons
interested:
Provided that the Collector shall, within a period
of thirty days from the date of receipt of application,
make a reference to the appropriate Authority:
Provided further that where the Collector fails to
make such reference within the period so specified, the
applicant may apply to the Authority, as the case may
be, requesting it to direct the Collector to make the
reference to it within a period of thirty days.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on
which objection to the award is taken:
Provided that every such application shall be made--
(a) person making it was present or
represented before the Collector at the time
when he made his award, within six weeks
from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the
receipt of the notice from the Collector under
section 21, or within six months from the date
of the Collector's award, whichever period shall
first expire:
Provided further that the Collector may entertain
an application after the expiry of the said period, within
a further period of one year, if he is satisfied that there
was sufficient cause for not filing it within the period
specified in the first proviso."
32. A careful perusal of Section 64 of the 2013 Act depicts
that any person interested who has not accepted the award may,
by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be
referred by the Collector for the determination of the Authority, as
the case may be, whether his objection be to the measurement of
the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is
payable, the rights of Rehabilitation and Resettlement under
Chapters V and VI or the apportionment of the compensation
among the persons interested: Provided that the Collector shall,
within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of application,
make a reference to the appropriate Authority
33. At this stage, it is also relevant to refer to Sections 23,
69 and 74 of the 2013 Act, which read as under:
"23. Enquiry and land acquisition award by
Collector.-On the day so fixed, or on any other day to
which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector
shall proceed to enquire into the objections (if any)
which any person interested has stated pursuant to a
notice given under section 21, to the measurements
made under section 20, and into the value of the land
at the date of the publication of the notification, and
into the respective interests of the persons claiming the
compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement, shall
make an award under his hand of--
(a) the true area of the land;
(b) the compensation as determined under
section 27 along with Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Award as determined under section
31 and which in his opinion should be allowed
for the land; and
(c) the apportionment of the said compensation
among all the persons known or believed to be
interested in the land, or whom, or of whose
claims, he has information, whether or not they
have respectively appeared before him.
[23-A. Award of Deputy Commissioner without
enquiry in case of agreement of interested persons. (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 23, if at
any stage of the proceedings, the Deputy Commissioner
is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land
who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the
matters to be included in the award of the Deputy
Commissioner in the form prescribed by rules made by
the State Government, he may, without making further
enquiry, make an award according to the terms of such
agreement.
(2) The determination of compensation for any land
under sub-section (1) shall not in any way affect the
determination of compensation in respect of other land
in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the
other provisions of this Act.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Registration Act, 1908 (Central Act 16 of 1908), no
agreement made under sub-section (1) shall be liable to
registration under that Act.]
69. Determination of award by authority.-(1) In
determining the amount of compensation to be awarded
for land acquired including the Rehabilitation and
Resettlement entitlements, the Authority shall take into
consideration whether the Collector has followed the
parameters set out under section 26 to section 30 and
the provisions under Chapter V of this Act.
(2) In addition to the market value of the land, as
above provided, the Authority shall in every case award
an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per cent. per
annum on such market value for the period
commencing on and from the date of the publication of
the preliminary notification under section 11 in respect
of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or
the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is
earlier.
Explanation.--In computing the period referred to
in this sub-section, any period or periods during which
the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held
up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of
any Court shall be excluded.
(3) In addition to the market value of the land as
above provided, the Authority shall in every case award
a solatium of one hundred per cent. over the total
compensation amount.
74. Appeal to High Court.-(1) The Requiring Body
or any person aggrieved by the Award passed by an
Authority under section 69 may file an appeal to the
High Court within sixty days from the date of Award:
Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied
that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause
from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to
be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.
(2) Every appeal referred to under sub-section (1)
shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and
endeavour shall be made to dispose of such appeal
within six months from the date on which the appeal is
presented to the High Court.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, ―High
Courtǁ means the High Court within the jurisdiction of
which the land acquired or proposed to be acquired is
situated."
34. Once the Authority as contemplated under the provisions
of Section 64 decides the reference and award the compensation
based on the material evidence on record, the requiring body or
any person aggrieved by the award passed by the authority under
the provisions of Section 69 of the 2013 Act may file an appeal to
the High Court under Section 74 of the 2013 Act within sixty days
from the date of award: Provided that the High Court may, if it is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from
filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a
further period not exceeding sixty days. Sub- section (2) of Section
74 contemplates that every appeal referred to under sub-section
(1) shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and endeavor shall
be made to dispose of such appeal within six months from the date
on which the appeal is presented to the High Court.
35. As stated supra, 2013 Act came into force w.e.f 1.1.2014
and the award passed in the present case on 8.10.2014. Thus, the
award came to be passed subsequent to the 2013 Act came into
force, thereby automatically the provisions of Section 24 (1)(a) of
the 2013 Act are applicable. Once the SLAO determines the
compensation under the 2013 Act, the aggrieved party may request
the authority to make reference to the authority as contemplated
under Section under Section 64.of the 2013 Act for determination of
market value for the acquired land. Once the reference authority
determines the compensation under section 69, then the aggrieved
party has to file an appeal under section 74 of the 2013 Act within
the time stipulated. Thereby the MFA filed by the review
petitioner before this Court under Section 54 of the 1894 Act was
not maintainable.
36. Our view is fortified by the dictum of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority -
vs- Manoharlal reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129, wherein at
paragraphs - 26, 96, 165, 191, 366.1, 366.2 it is held as under:
"26. The context of Section 24, the learned counsel
urged, is to provide for a transitory provision viz. to take
care of the pending land acquisition proceedings which are
ongoing under the LA Act when the 2013 Act is brought
into force w.e.f. 1-1-2014. The purpose and object of
making this provision is to balance the competing rights of
public projects vis-à-vis holders of the land. The object and
purpose was to ensure that where acquisition proceedings
under the LA Act have reached an advanced stage and
investment of public money had already been made,
firstly, the lapsing of such ongoing projects should be
avoided and secondly as far as possible, the landowners
also can, without disturbing the process of acquisition, be
given the compensation under the 2013 Act.
96. Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act read with the non
obstante clause provides that in case of proceedings
initiated under the 1894 Act the award had not been made
under Section 11, then the provisions of the 2013 Act,
relating to the determination of compensation would apply.
However, the proceedings held earlier do not lapse. In
terms of Section 24(1)(b), where award under Section 11
is made, then such proceedings shall continue under the
provisions of the 1894 Act. It contemplates that such
pending proceedings, as on the date on which the 2013
Act came into force shall continue, and taken to their
logical end. However, the exception to Section 24(1)(b) is
provided in Section 24(2) in case of pending proceedings;
in case where the award has been passed five years or
more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act, the
physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the
compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be
deemed to have lapsed, and such proceedings cannot
continue as per the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) of the
2013 Act.
165. Debates in the Lok Sabha on 29-8-2013, were
referred to during the hearings, to cite various reasons
given in respect of the question why effect should be given
retrospectively in cases where acquisition has not been
completed. Shri Jairam Ramesh, Minister concerned at the
relevant time, replied to debate about the retrospective
part with respect to Section 24 thus:
"... The Hon'ble Member has also raised
question about retrospective clause. This is about
Section 24 under which it has been provided that
if the award has not been passed under the
previous law than the new law will be applicable.
Secondly, if the award has been passed and no
compensation has been given and no physical
possession has been taken the new law will be
applicable. The third situation where this clause
will be applicable is when award has been passed
but farmer has not been given more than 50%
compensation which will entail enforcement of this
law. The Hon'ble Member and several others have
raised this apprehension that this Act will
ultimately give vast powers to the bureaucracy. In
regard to this apprehension I would like to say
that we have fixed time-limit at every level of the
procedure and I hope that the States will adhere
to these timelines."
191. Section 24(1)(a) operates where no award is
made in a pending acquisition proceeding; in such event all
provisions of the new Act relating to determination of
compensation would apply. Section 24(1)(b) logically
continues with the second situation i.e. where the award
has been passed, and states that in such event,
proceedings would continue under the 1894 Act. Section
24(2) -- by way of an exception, states that where an
award is made but requisite steps have not been taken for
five years or more to take possession nor compensation
has been paid then there is lapse of acquisition. If one of
the steps has been taken, then the proviso can operate.
Time is the essence. It is on the basis of time-lag that the
lapse is provided and in default of payment for five years
as provided on failure to deposit higher compensation is to
be paid. It is based on that time-lag higher compensation
has to follow. It is not the mere use of colon under Section
24(2) but the placement of the proviso next to Section
24(2) and not below Section 24(1)(b). Thus, it is not
permissible to alter a placement of the proviso more so
when it is fully in consonance with the provisions of
Section 24(2). Section 24(2) completely obliterates the
old regime to the effect of its field of operation. Under
Section 24(1)(a), there is a partial lapse of the
old regime because all proceedings, till the stage of award
are preserved. The award, in such proceedings, made after
coming into force of the 2013 Act has to take into account
its provisions, for determination of compensation. Thus,
proceedings up to the stage of the award are deemed final
under the old Act. In the case under Section 24(1)(b), the
old regime prevails. The proviso is an exception to Section
24(2) and in part the new regime for payment of higher
compensation in case of default for 5 years or more after
award.
366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case
the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of
commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of
proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under
the provisions of the 2013 Act.
366.2. In case the award has been passed within the
window period of five years excluding the period covered
by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall
continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013
Act under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed."
37. Our view is also fortified by the judgment in the case of
Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corpn. v.
Mahesh reported in (2022)2 SCC 772, wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 24(1)(a),
25(1) and 114(1) & (2) of the 2013 Act and Sections 4 and 6 of
the 1894 Act, has held at paragraphs 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 as under:
"18. In para 295 of Indore Development Authority,
the Constitution Bench held that the 2013 Act operates
prospectively. Further, Section 114 of the 2013 Act
effects a repeal but with certain savings, in accordance
with Section 24. Thus, the acquisition proceedings are
preserved under the 1894 Act till the stage of making of
the award. Where an award is not made, the provisions
relating to determination of compensation under the
2013 Act would apply; where the award is made,
proceedings would continue under the provisions of the
1894 Act as if the said Act has not been repealed. Our
interpretation of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act
respectfully follows this precedent.
20. We begin by examining the phrasing of clause
(a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. We would prefer
to read the words "all the provisions relating to
determination of compensation" in Section 24(1)(a) as
including the period of limitation specified in Section 25
of the 2013 Act. To elaborate, the word "all" and the
expression "relating to" used in Section 25 are required
to be given a wide meaning to ensnare the legislative
intent. The expressions "relating to" or "in relation to"
are words of comprehensiveness which may have a
direct as well as indirect significance depending on the
context. [State Wakf Board v. Abdul Azeez Sahib, 1966
SCC OnLine Mad 80 : AIR 1968 Mad 79]
21. Similarly, interpreting Section 129-C of the
Customs Act, 1962, this Court while giving the phrase
"in relation to" a narrower meaning of direct and
proximate relationship to the rate of duty and to the
value of goods for purpose of assessment, did observe
that ordinarily the phrase "in relation to" is of a wider
import. [Navin Chemicals Mfg. & Trading Co.
Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, (1993) 4 SCC 320] Several
cases assigning a wider import to the expression
"relating to", in view of the contextual background, find
reference in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit
Gupta [Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta,
(2021) 7 SCC 209 : (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 1] .
In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co
(1984) 4 SCC 679] , this Court held that the term "in
relation to", when used in the context of arbitration
clause, is of widest amplitude and content.
22. In Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath Vithal
Ogale [1995) 2 SCC 665] the expression "relating to"
in the context of the Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 has
been held to be comprehensive in nature that would
take in its sweep all types of suits and proceedings
which are concerned with recovery of possession. Broad
and wider interpretation was again preferred in Doypack
Systems (P) Ltd.v. Union of India [ (1988) 2 SCC 299] ,
observing that the expression "in relation to" is a very
broad expression which presupposes another subject-
matter. In Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. [Doypack Systems
(P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 299] , in the
context of Section 3 of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills
Company Ltd. (Acquisition and Transfer of
Undertakings) Act, 1986, the expression "relating to"
was held to mean "bring into association or connection
with". [Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. v. Union of India,
(1988) 2 SCC 299, para 50] The words are
comprehensive and might have both direct as well as
indirect significance. The decision in Gujarat Urja Vikas
Nigam Ltd. [Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit
Gupta, (2021) 7 SCC 209 : (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 1] refers
to Corpus Juris Secundum, wherein the expression
"relating to" has been held to be equivalent to or
synonymous with as to "concerning with" and
"pertaining to". It has been observed that the
expression "pertaining to" is an expression of expansion
and not of contraction.
23. The expression "relating to" when used in
legislation normally refers to "stand in some relation, to
have bearing or concern, to pertain, to refer, to bring
into association with or connection with". [ See
judgment of Mitter, J. (para 308) in Madhav Rao Jivaji
Rao Scindia v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85.]
Therefore, the expression "relating to" when used in
legislation has to be construed to give effect to the
legislative intent when required and necessary by giving
an expansive and wider meaning. Given this trend in
interpretation, the words "all the provisions of this Act
relating to the determination of compensation" must not
be imputed a restricted understanding of the word
"relating" only to the substantial provisions on
calculation of compensation, that is, Sections 26 to 30
of the 2013 Act. Rather, the expression should be given
an expansive meaning so as to include the provision on
limitation period for calculation of compensation, that
is, Section 25 of the 2013 Act."
38. Our view is further fortified by the judgment in the case
of Pune Municipal Corporation v. Rajeev L. Sangtani, reported
in 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1492, wherein the Full Bench of the
Bombay High Court while considering the provisions of Section
24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act has held at paragraphs 83, 84, 85, 86,
87, 88, 89 as under
"83. Shri Dhakephalkar would then urge that the
Act, 2013 takes away an accrued right of appeal to the
Supreme Court, against a decree passed by the High
Court, which was available under section 54 of the Old
Act. Under section 74 of the Act, 2013, only one appeal is
provided to the High Court against an award passed by
the Authority under section 69 of the Act. If the right to
make a reference is construed to be a vested right, which
accrues to a land owner upon the acquisition of land,
then right of appeal to the Supreme Court, provided
under section 54 deserves to be recognized and
protected. Thus, reference to the Authority under section
64 would take away this vested right of appeal, urged
Shri Dhakephalkar.
84. Though the aforesaid submission appears alluring
at the first blush yet, on a close scrutiny, it does not
carry much conviction. Under section 54 of the Old Act, it
was provided that from a decree of the High Court, on
appeal against an award by the Reference Court, an
appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the
provisions contained in section 110 of the Code. It would
be suffice to note that section 110 of the Code was
omitted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment Act)
1973. It would be contextually relevant to note that in
the case of Garikapatti Veeraya (supra), it was observed
that having regard to the contents of Article 135 and
sections 109 and 110 as adapted, it may be stated that,
broadly speaking, matters in respect of which, appeal
would have been competent under section 109 and 110
of the Code, will now be governed by Article 133, if the
judgment, decree or final order, appealed against is
made after the Constitution, and other matters by Article
135. Moreover, the basis of the value of the subject-
matter of the suit, which gave a right to appeal was also
omitted from Article 133, which had been amended by
the Constitution (30th Amendment Act, 1972), with
effect from 27th February, 1973. Thus, the later part of
the provisions of section 54 of the Old Act, which
envisaged a further appeal to the Supreme Court, subject
to the provisions contained in section 110 of the Code,
was a spent provision. To sum up, no such right of appeal
to the Supreme Court existed and could be enforced
under section 54 of the Old Act.
85. The conspectus of the aforesaid consideration is
that a cumulative reading of the provisions of section
24(1)(a) with section 114; the provisions of sections 28
to 30, which have incorporated significant changes in the
matter of determination of compensation by the
Collector; the provisions of section 51, which have
provided a new forum; the provisions of section 69,
which again herald a material departure in the approach
of the Authority adjudicating the claim, raising objection
to the award, and the provisions of section 63, which
expressly bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, leads to
an irresistible inference that under the Act, 2013, there is
a clear and unmistakable intendment to provide a new
forum constituted under section 51 read with section 64
of the Act, 2013, instead of Reference Court. We are,
therefore, of the view that even in the cases where an
award is passed after the enforcement of the Act, 2013,
though the acquisition was initiated under the provisions
of the Old Act, reference objecting to the award made by
the Collector is required to be made to the Authority
constituted under the Act, 2013.
87. We have observed that the words, "all provisions"
are required to be construed in their plain, natural and
common sense. There is no quarrel over the proposition
that the Collector is enjoined to consider the parameters
prescribed in sections 26 to 30 while determining the
compensation. We have indicated that such restricted
interpretation of the expression, "all provisions would do
violence to the plain and literal meaning of the said
expression. If the parameters of determination of
compensation, provided in sections 26 to 30, indubitably
fall within the ambit of the said expression, the
controlling and enabling provisions under section 23,
which empower the Collector to make an award, inter
alia, providing for the compensation as determined under
section 27, and apportionment thereof, a priori would fall
within the ambit of the said expression.
88. The matter can be looked at from another angle.
If the submission that only the parameters provided in
sections 26 to 30 are to be taken into account while
determining the compensation, and the award is to be
passed under the Old Act, and a reference objecting to
such an award is to be made before the Reference Court
under section 18 of the Act, then clause (a) of sub-
section (1) of section 24 would be required to be read
and construed in completely different manner. To accord
with such construction, clause (a) should read as under:
(a) where no award under section 11 of the
Land Acquisition Act has been made, then such
proceedings shall continue under the
provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as
if the said Act has not been repealed. Provided
that the provisions of sections 26 to 30 of this
Act relating to determination of compensation
shall apply.
89. Such a course is simply impermissible and fraught
with hazards. Firstly, there is no authority for such
substitution of the legislative prescription; secondly,
there would be no effect to the will of the legislature to
repeal the Old Act; and thirdly, the distinction between
the clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 24
would be completely obliterated. We have, therefore,
extracted above, under the caption interplay between
clauses (a) and (b), the judgments of the Supreme Court
pointing out the well marked distinction between clauses
(a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 24."
39. Learned AAG while arguing with regard to the extent to
which 2013 Act applies to the acquisitions that have been started
under the 1894 Act, but where award is not made when the 2013
Act came into force, has mainly contended that the provisions of
the 2013 Act which can be applied are only Sections 25 to 30 and
all other provisions of the 1894 Act will continue to apply relating to
making of an award, request to make reference, award by the
reference Court/authority and challenge thereto etc., According to
the learned AAG, in the present case, though award passed after
the 2013 Act came into force, the reference has to be made only
under Section 18(1) of the 1894 Act and after passing of the award
by the reference Court, the aggrieved party may file an appeal
before this Court under Section 54 of the 1894 Act and the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable.
40. The contentions of the learned AAG cannot be accepted
in view of the words, "all provisions of this Act relating to the
determination of compensation shall apply" used in Section
24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. Admittedly, in the present case, the
preliminary notification came to be issued on 7.2.2013 followed by
final notification on 18.11.2013 under the provisions of the 1894
Act and the award came to be passed on 8.10.2014 under the
provisions of 2013 Act and therefore, the provisions of Section
24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act are applicable, thereby all provisions of
2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply.
Therefore, in the present case, the reference has to be made only
under the provisions of Section 64 of the 2013 Act and not under
Section 18 of the 1894 Act and after passing of the award by the
reference authority under Section 69 of the 2013 Act, the aggrieved
party may file an appeal before this Court under Section 74 of the
2013 Act and not under Section 54 of the 1894 Act. Hence, the
contention of the learned AAG that appeal lies under Section 54 of
the 1894 Act, cannot be accepted.
41. As stated supra, once the provisions of Section 24(1)(a)
of the 2013 Act applies to the case on hand, then the provisions of
2013 Act to pass award, request to make a reference, award by the
reference authority and challenge thereto, automatically applies.
Admittedly in the present case, the Special Land Acquisition Officer
has made reference under Section 64(1) of the 2013 Act and the
reference authority passed the award as contemplated under
Section 69 of the 2013 Act and therefore, automatically the
provisions of Section 74 of the 2013 Act applies for filing the appeal
before this Court. Thereby, the contention of the learned AAG
that 1894 Act is applicable for all other purposes, is without any
basis and cannot be accepted.
42. Learned AAG relied upon the dictum of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah
Choudhry, reported in AIR 1957 SC 540, wherein the question that
was referred to the Full Bench is:
"Does the appeal against the decree in a suit
in which the valuation of the relief claimed according
to the law in force at the date of the plaint was more
than Rs.5000 but, at the time of appeal is less than
Rs.5000 owing to the amendment of the Court Fees
Act, lie to the High Court or to the district Court ?".
The Hon'ble Supreme Court answered the said reference at
paragraph-23 of the judgment as under:
"23. From the decisions cited above the following
principles clearly emerge:
(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal
and second appeal are really but steps in a series of
proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are
to be regarded as one legal proceeding.
(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of
procedure but is a substantive right.
(iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the
implication that all rights of appeal then in force are
preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the
career of the suit.
(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a
right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant
and exists as on and from the date the lis commences
and although it may be actually exercised when the
adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be
governed by the law prevailing at the date of the
institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law
that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of
the filing of the appeal.
(v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away
only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides
expressly or by necessary intendment and not
otherwise."
43. The said proposition of law has no application to the facts
and circumstances of the present case. In the present case, the
question that arose for consideration is as to whether the appeal
lies under Section 74 of the 2013 Act or Section 54 of the 1894 Act.
2013 Act came into force w.e.f 1.1.2014. Admittedly, in the
present case, the award came to be passed on 8.10.2014 under the
provisions of 2013 Act i.e., after the new Act came into force.
Therefore, the provisions of Section 24 (1)(a) of the 2013 Act are
applicable and the reference has to be made only under Section 64
of the 2013 Act to the reference authority and the reference
authority has to determine the compensation under Section 69 of
the 2013 Act. Then the appeal lies to this Court under section 74 of
the 2013 Act. Therefore, the said judgment is no way helpful to the
review petitioner.
44. The limited scope and issue in the instant review petition
is relating to maintainability of appeal under Section 54 of the 1894
Act alone. In pursuance of the directions issued by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal No.10452/2021, this
Court considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel
for the parties and taking into consideration that the award passed
under the provisions of 2013 Act, is of the considered opinion that
the appeal filed under section 54 of the 1894 Act is not
maintainable and the aggrieved party has to file appeal under
Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
45. This Court by the judgment & award dated 26.9.2019
rightly dismissed MFA No.3806/2019 as being barred by limitation
by considering the appeal to have been filed under Section 74 of
the 2013 Act. There is no error apparent on the face of the record
as contemplated under the provisions of Order 47 Rule 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
46. Our view is fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of S. Madhusudhan Reddy, vs. V.
Narayana Reddy and Others reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC)
685, wherein at paragraph-26 it is held as under:
"26. As can be seen from the above exposition of
law, it has been consistently held by this Court in
several judicial pronouncements that the Court's
jurisdiction of review, is not the same as that of an
appeal. A judgment can be open to review if there is a
mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record,
but an error that has to be detected by a process of
reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on
the face of the record for the Court to exercise its
powers of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the
guise of exercising powers of review, the Court can
correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken
earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking
two views in a matter. A judgment may also be open to
review when any new or important matter of evidence
has emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to
the condition that such evidence was not within the
knowledge of the party seeking review or could not be
produced by it when the order was made despite
undertaking an exercise of due diligence. There is a
clear distinction between an erroneous decision as
against an error apparent on the face of the record. An
erroneous decision can be corrected by the Superior
Court, however an error apparent on the face of the
record can only be corrected by exercising review
jurisdiction. Yet another circumstance referred to in
Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment has been
described as "for any other sufficient reason". The said
phrase has been explained to mean "a reason sufficient
on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the
rule"
47. Our view is also fortified by the judgment in the case of
Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions
of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure has held at
paragraphs 15, 18, 19 20.1. and 20.2 held as under:
15. An error which is not self-evident and has to be
detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said
to be an error apparent on the face of the record
justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A
review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies
only for patent error. This Court in Parsion
Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] held as under
: (SCC pp. 718-19, paras 7-9)
"7. It is well settled that review
proceedings have to be strictly confined to the
ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of
A.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1372] this Court opined :
(AIR p. 1377, para 11)
'11. What, however, we are now
concerned with is whether the statement
in the order of September 1959 that the
case did not involve any substantial
question of law is an "error apparent on
the face of the record". The fact that on
the earlier occasion the court held on an
identical state of facts that a substantial
question of law arose would not per se
be conclusive, for the earlier order itself
might be erroneous. Similarly, even if
the statement was wrong, it would not
follow that it was an "error apparent on
the face of the record", for there is a
distinction which is real, though it might
not always be capable of exposition,
between a mere erroneous decision and
a decision which could be characterised
as vitiated by "error apparent". A review
is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is
reheard and corrected, but lies only for
patent error.'
8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari
Choudhury [(1995) 1 SCC 170] while quoting with
approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar
Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC
389] this Court once again held that review
proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have
to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may
be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake
or an error apparent on the face of the record. An
error which is not self-evident and has to be
detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be
said to be an error apparent on the face of the
record justifying the court to exercise its power of
review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of
the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is
not permissible for an erroneous decision to be
'reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it must
be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot
be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'."
18. Review is not rehearing of an original matter.
The power of review cannot be confused with appellate
power which enables a superior court to correct all
errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of
old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen
concluded adjudications. This Court in Jain Studios
Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., [(2006) 5 SCC
501] held as under : (SCC pp. 504-505, paras 11-12)
"11. So far as the grievance of the
applicant on merits is concerned, the learned
counsel for the opponent is right in
submitting that virtually the applicant seeks
the same relief which had been sought at the
time of arguing the main matter and had
been negatived. Once such a prayer had been
refused, no review petition would lie which
would convert rehearing of the original
matter. It is settled law that the power of
review cannot be confused with appellate
power which enables a superior court to
correct all errors committed by a subordinate
court. It is not rehearing of an original
matter. A repetition of old and overruled
argument is not enough to reopen concluded
adjudications. The power of review can be
exercised with extreme care, caution and
circumspection and only in exceptional cases.
12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator
by the applicant herein had been made at the
time when the arbitration petition was heard
and was rejected, the same relief cannot be
sought by an indirect method by filing a
review petition. Such petition, in my opinion,
is in the nature of 'second innings' which is
impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be
granted."
19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal
and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit
of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere
disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be
the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point
is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not
entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the
guise that an alternative view is possible under the
review jurisdiction.
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter
or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence, was not within knowledge of the
petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face
of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words "any other sufficient reason" have been
interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA
144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and
approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR
1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean "a reason
sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those
specified in the rule". The same principles have been
reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron
Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT (2013) 8 SC 275]
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not
enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the
original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material
error, manifest on the face of the order,
undermines its soundness or results in
miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and
corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject
cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record
should not be an error which has to be fished out
and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully
within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot
be permitted to be advanced in the review
petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief
sought at the time of arguing the main matter
had been negatived."
VI. Conclusion
48. For the reasons stated above, we answer the point
raised in the present review petition in the negative holding
that the Miscellaneous First Appeal No.3806/2019 filed by
the present review petitioner before this Court is not
maintainable under Section 54 of the 1894 Act and the
appeal lies under Section 74 of the 2013 Act in the facts
and circumstances of the present case. Accordingly, the
review petition is liable to be dismissed as devoid of any
merit.
VII. ORDERS ON I.A. No.2/2022 FOR IMPLEADING
49. The present application is filed by the impleading
applicant (Mr. R. Vidhyashangar s/o Mr. Ramalingam, H7K, TNHB
HIG Flat, 1st Floor, 70 Feet Road, SP Garden, T. Nagar, Chennai)
under Order 1 Rule 10 r/w Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure praying to implead him as Respondent No.2 in the
present Review Petition.
50. The Hon'ble Supreme Court by the order dated
11.08.2021 made in Special Leave to Appeal © No.10452/2021 has
given liberty to the applicant to file an application for
impleadment/intervention in the Review Petition, which shall be
considered subject to the objections that may be raised by the
respondent.
VIII. Case of the impleading applicant
51. In the affidavit accompanying the application, the
impleading applicant has stated that the reference authority by the
judgment & award dated 29th October 2018 made in L.A.C.
No.33/2017, has allowed the reference made by the SLAO under
Section 64(1) of the 2013 Act in the following terms:
(a) Respondent is entitled for market value of its
acquired property measuring 3 acres 16 guntas
at the rate of Rs.8624/- per sq ft instead of
Rs.4620/- per sq.ft. awarded by the Review
Petitioner/SLAO;
(b) Under Section 29 of the 2013 Act, Respondent is
entitled for compensation of Rs. 55,53,400/- as
determined by the Review Petitioner/SLAO for
the building and things attached to the acquired
property such as compound wall etc.;
(c) Market value is to be multiplied in this case with
factor 'one' (1)as per Section 26(c) of the 2013
Act as contemplated in First Schedule appended
to the Act; and
(d) Respondent is entitled to additional compensation
of 75% of the total compensation as determined
under Section 27 of the 2013 Act and 100%
solatium of the total compensation under
Section 30 of the 2013 Act. An interest, on the
amount calculated at the rate of 12% under
Section 69(2) of 2013 Act from the date of
publication of notification, until passing of award
or taking of possession of acquired property,
which-ever is earlier, was also awarded. Further,
interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the
excess amount from the date of taking over of
possession of the acquired property i.e., from
16.01.2014 for the first year and interest at the
rate of 15% per annum for the subsequent
years till deposit of entire compensation amount
under Sections 72 and 80 of 2013 Act was
awarded.
52. It is further case of the impleading applicant that the
review petitioner filed appeal before this Court and this Court
dismissed the appeal on the issue of limitation without rendering
any findings on merits. By way of the present application, the
applicant seeks to intervene in the review petition to bring to the
notice of the Court certain vital factors, for just and proper
adjudication of the present matter. The Applicant contends
that the facts enumerated hereinunder will also save hundreds of
crores of public funds or even thousands of crores from being
squandered in a clandestine and illegal manner. It is further
contended that the Applicant, a long-standing shareholder of M/s
Binny Limited and its demerged entities including the Respondent
herein, believes that companies should make profit only through
ethical means and not at the cost of public exchequer. Further, it is
clarified that the instant Application is not being filed by the
Applicant in the capacity of the shareholder of the Respondent. The
present Application has been filed purely in the public interest. In
this regard, it is respectfully submitted that, if public interest
demands, intervention by third parties would be permitted by the
courts.
53. It is further contended that M/s Binny Ltd. had its textile
mill in the city of Bengaluru right from the year 1900. The textile
mill originally owned a land admeasuring 4,45,448 sq. meters (110
Acres) for the mill, staff quarters and ancillary facilities, and
attracted the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act,
1976 (ULCRA Act') after its enactment. That pursuant to the
enactment of the ULCRA Act, an exemption under section 20(1) of
Act was sought by M/s Binny Ltd by making an application before
the State of Karnataka. It is learnt that the State of Karnataka vide
its order dated 15.12.1978 granted the exemption subject to
following conditions:
"(a) the exemption is operative as long as the land is
utilised for industrial purpose.
(b) the entire land utilisation should be completed
within a period of five years from the date of this
order.
(c) any deviation in implementing the project proposed
or land utilisation should have the prior approval of
the Director, Commerce and Industries, Bangalore.
(d) this exemption is granted based on the facts and
information furnished by the applicant. If any of the
facts and information etc. are found to be false or
incorrect, the exemption so granted stands
cancelled.
(e) the applicant should not transfer by way of sale,
mortgage, gift, lease of otherwise the lands
exempted without prior permission of the
Government and such permission shall be subject
to such conditions as Government may deem fit to
impose".
54. That the State of Karnataka considered the request for
exemption under the UCLRA Act only because the land was utilized
for manufacturing of textile goods and readymade garments which
is expedient in the public interest. This is evident from the fact that
the order for exemption is only valid until such the time the land is
used for industrial purposes. Therefore, the time period of the
exemption granted was limited, it was from the date of the
exemption till such time the land was used for industrial purposes.
When land is put to any other use, the time period for the
exemption ends and the exemption is no longer operative.
55. It is further contended that over the years, it appears
that, M/s Binny Limited had sold the major portion of the very same
land for which exemption under section 20 of ULCRA Act was
granted by the State of Karnataka. Further, the operations of the
textile mill ceased way back in the year 1998-99. At the time of
closure of the Mill, it was left with about 28 Acres of land. It is
apposite to note that neither the Review Petitioner nor the
Respondent have brought this most significant fact to the notice of
the Courts.
56. Subsequently, the Madras High Court sanctioned a
scheme of demerger of M/s Binny Ltd. Accordingly, the applicant
believes, the said land of about 28 Acres came to be vested with
the respondent herein, which was also one of the demerged
entities of M/s Binny Ltd. It is submitted that even though the
Respondent styled itself as 'SV Global Mill Limited', in reality, it is a
company primarily operating in Real Estate activities. Thus, by no
stretch of imagination, the Respondent can be said to be a "Mill"
engaged in textile production. More importantly, there is no income
from any industrial activity in the Respondent company.
57. Subsequently, the Special Land Acquisition Officer
(SLAO) exercising the powers vested in him under the provisions of
the 1894 Act, issued a notification dated 07.02.2013 under section
4(1) for acquisition of 3 Acres and 16 Guntas of land out of 23.44
Acres purportedly owned by the Respondent. The SLAO fixed the
market value of the land @ Rs. 4620/- per square feet, awarding a
total compensation of Rs.142.56 crore and an addition of interest
on delayed compensation amounting to Rs.12.26 crore. The
Applicant has strong reasons to believe that this acquisition
process, which is highly questionable, glossed over Section 3 of the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999.
58. It is learnt that the respondent accepted the valuation
and received the amount under protest and, thereafter, filed a
protest petition before SLAO, requesting to make a reference to the
Authority contemplated under the 2013 Act. Thereafter on the
reference made, the Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bangalore by
the judgment & award dated 29.10.2018 valued the land @ Rs.
8624/- per square feet and granted the additional compensation
along with damages, etc. amounting to Rs. 207.76 Crores and
further interest on the additional compensation. The same is in
contravention of Section 26 read with Section 11 of the 2013 Act.
It is contended that the Review Petitioner, before the learned
Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, had pointed out that the
compensation fixed was as per the 2013 Act which will not apply to
the present case. However, it is submitted that the same was not
appreciated in the right perspective by the Learned Trial Court.
59. In the light of the above factual background, the
applicant seeks to bring to the notice of the Court the following
aspects:
a) First and foremost, it is submitted that the entire
parcel for land was allowed to be held by the M/s
Binny Ltd., the predecessor of the Respondent, in
the city of Bangalore solely on account of the
exemption granted vide Notification dated
15.12.1978 under Section 20(1) of ULCRA Act.
Most importantly, the exemption was granted on
a condition that it will operate only for industrial
activity. It is submitted that the Respondent
undisputedly ceased the industrial activities
several years back.
b) Secondly, neither the State of Karnataka nor the
Review Petitioner have brought to the notice of
the court, the lapse of the time period of the
exemption granted under Section 20(1) of ULCRA
Act, which survives even after the repeal of the
said Act by virtue of Section 3 of the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999.
Section 3 of Repeal Act, reads as under:
3. Savings (1) the repeal of the principal Act
shall not affect (a) the vesting of any vacant
land under sub-section
(3) of section 10, possession of which has
been taken over by the State Government
or any person duly authorised by the State
Government in this behalf or by the
competent authority;
(b) the validity of any order granting
exemption under sub-section (1) of section
20 or any action thereunder, taken
notwithstanding any judgment of any Court
to the contrary;
(c) any payment made to the State
Government as a condition for granting
exemption under sub section (1) of section
20.
(2) Where -
(a) any land is deemed to have vested in
the State Government under sub-section
(3) of section 10 of the principal Act but
possession of which has not been taken
over by the State Government or any
person duly authorised by the State
Government in this behalf or by the
competent authority; and
(b) any amount has been paid by the State
Government with respect to such land,
then, such land shall not be restored unless
the amount paid, if any, has been refunded
to the State Government.
c) It is submitted that in view of the clear mandate
of the Savings provision under Section 3(1)(b) of
the abovementioned Repeal Act, the Review
Petitioner or the State of Karnataka, was
statutorily bound to repossess the land which was
in illegal possession of the Respondent, when the
industrial activity in the land ceased. As stated in
the earlier paragraphs, the exemption ceased to
be operative and the time period during which the
exemption was valid concluded, once the
industrial activity was no longer being carried out
in the company. Needless to state, the usage of
land by the Respondent for any other purpose,
other than for which the exemption was granted,
clearly violate or breach the conditions of
exemption. Hence, the Review Petitioner ought
not to have acquired 3.16 Acres from the
Respondent for such an exorbitant price of over
Rs. 400 Crores, when the land would have
perforce vested in the State on account of
violation of the conditions of the exemption order.
d) The act of the Review Petitioner has thereby
caused a huge loss to the public exchequer and,
in turn, unduly benefited the Respondent. More
importantly, the failure on the part of the State
and the Review Petitioner to act as the custodian
of public interest, at the threshold, has given
teeth to the Respondent to seek further
compensation of over Rs.250 Crores.
e) The Applicant bonafide believes that the issue of
non-compliance or breach of the exemption
conditions, as stated above, was never raised at
any stage before the Court below as both the
judgments do not record any such discussions on
the same.
f) It is most respectfully submitted that on strict
interpretation of Repeal Act of 1999,
harmoniously read along with the exemption
Notification dated 15.12.1978, the entire parcel of
land with the Respondent ought to have been
vested with the State Government, especially
when the industrial activity ceased to operate for
which exemption was granted in the very first
place.
g) The Applicant submits that the Respondent in
collusion with the Government officials, was in
illegal possession of the land of about 24 Acres
and it has received more than Rs. 160 Crores as
compensation for the parcel of land which it is not
entitled to and is further pursuing for getting
additional compensation at the cost of the
taxpayers and the public. This is nothing but a
malfeasance by the Authorities.
h) It is submitted that the Hon'ble High Court in 1st
Order, has clearly observed the laxity on the part
of the State and its officers for the delay in filing
the MFA. It is further submitted that the latches
on the part of the State and its officials for
extraneous reasons is writ at large, as the
financial implication to the exchequer is over Rs.
400 Crores which only benefits a private party.
Further, the Applicant has strong reasons to
believe and doubt that several high-ranking
officials could be hand in glove with the
Respondent and the said actions of the Authorities
are marred by the malafide.
i) The role of the private party for causing the delay
in filing the appeal and the latches on behalf of
the Review Petitioner also deserves to be looked
into thoroughly. If there is any culpability on the
part of the Respondent or the Review Petitioner,
the same should be dealt with accordingly. Under
the given circumstances, the issue of limitation
ought to be reconsidered in public interest.
60. It is further case of the applicant that the Review
Petitioner has acquired the 3.16 Acres of land in public interest to
decongest the railway infrastructure in the city of Bengaluru, which
was necessitated by the growing population of the city and the
urgent need for better public transport. It is unfortunate that the
State instead of enforcing its rights under the law with the
strongest case, is agitating peripheral grounds.
61. It is also contended that disturbingly, the Review
Petitioner Authority, for reasons best known to it, has not been
diligent in defending/pursuing the underlying case. In this regard,
the findings of the High Court are as under:
a. There has been laxity on the part of the Appellant
in appearing before the concerned Officer in the
reference court so as to receive the certified copy
of the award for the purpose of filing the appeal.
b. The application seeking condonation of delay is
not filed under the proviso to Section 74 (1) of
the 2013 Act. It is under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. Ignorance of law is no excuse. In
the instant case, there is a blatant ignorance of
law on the part of the Department.
62. In the circumstances, the impleading applicant prays to
implead him as Respondent No.2 in the present review petition.
IX. Objections to the impleading application on
behalf of the respondent
63. The respondent filed objections and contended that the
application and the accompanying affidavit consist of false,
vexatious and frivolous averments and therefore, the impleading
application deserves to be dismissed in limine with exemplary costs.
64. It is contended that the present review petition has been
filed by the Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition
Officer seeking review of the Judgment dated 25.09.2019 in MFA
No. 3806/2019 passed by this Court, pursuant to the directions of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide Order dated 11.08.2021 in SLP No.
10452/2021.
65. It is contended that the expression "person interested" is
defined under Section 3(x) of the 2013 Act as including the
following categories:
"(i) all persons claiming an interest in compensation to
be made on account of the acquisition of land under this
Act;
(ii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest
dwellers, who have lost any forest rights recognised
under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest
Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (2 of
2007);
(iii) a person interested in an easement affecting the
land;
(iv) persons having tenancy rights under the relevant
State laws including share-croppers by whatever name
they may be called; and
(v) any person whose primary source of livelihood is
likely to be adversely affected;"
66. In terms of Section 21 of the Act, the collector is required
to notice and hear only the persons interested before passing
orders in respect of the acquisition. This is clearly indicative of the
fact that it is only a person interested who can maintain an
objection to the land acquisition proceedings, under the scheme of
the Act.
67. Admittedly, the intervening/impleading applicant here is
not a person interested in terms of the Act. Consequently, the
intervening/impleading applicant neither has a legitimate interest
nor is a necessary or proper party to the proceedings. The
Applicant who falsely claims himself to be a 'public spirited person
has not approached this Court with clean hands. The Applicant is
holding 1 (one) share together with his wife in folio no, 12033200
08872884 has been making various false allegations against the
company without any basis in various forums since last 3 years. All
such frivolous complaints made have been closed by various
authorities upon hearing the response of the Respondent herein.
Hence, the intervention application is not maintainable and
deserves to be dismissed in limine.
68. It is further contended that the claim of the intervening
applicant that he is a shareholder in the respondent company also
does not entitle him to intervene in the land acquisition proceedings
pertaining to the property of the company. It is settled law that a
shareholder does not have any interest in the property of the
company while the company is a going concern and hence cannot
be termed to be a necessary or proper party or a person interested
in proceedings pertaining to the property of a company.
69. It is contended that the instant Review Petition deals
specifically with only one point, i.e., the question of maintainability
of the appeal under section 54 of 1894 Act. It is contended that
a completely incorrect and unrelated factual aspects cannot be
raised in review proceedings, either in the petition itself or by way
of an intervention/impleading application, and that too by a person
who was not a party in any of the earlier proceedings in relation to
the dispute at hand.
70. It is contended that ownership of land is undisputed. No
issue of ownership of the land in question arose before the learned
Courts below or this Court or before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Consequently, a non-existent and irrelevant issue cannot be raised
in review proceedings, and that too at the instance of an intervenor
who is not even a 'person interested' in terms of the Act.
71. The claim of the applicant that he is a 'public-spirited
person' is denied. On the contrary, the Applicant along with his
wife jointly holding only 1(one) share in the equity capital of the
Respondent company. The Applicant has been making various false
allegations against the company without any basis in various
forums since last 3 years. All such frivolous complaints made have
been closed by various authorities upon hearing the response of the
Respondent herein. Recently, the Applicant made one such frivolous
complaint making false allegations against the Respondent before
SEBI on 08.01.2021. Thereafter, a detailed Response was filed by
the Respondent herein vide Response dated 11.02.2021. Upon
examining the same, SEBI was pleased to close the complaint vide
e-mail acknowledgement dated 23.03.2021. As such, the very
baseless allegations made in the instant application itself shows
that the Applicant has not approached this Court with clean hands
and has filed the instant application with malafide intention.
Further, since the instant application itself is not maintainable, the
application for direction also is liable to be rejected at the outset.
72. The Applicant has approached this Court only to mislead
this Court by suppressing various facts. The Respondent is the
resultant Company from Binny Limited, based on the Scheme of
De-merger as approved by the High court of Judicature of Madras.
The Respondent Company was incorporated in 2007 under the
Companies Act, 1956 and is listed with Bombay Stock Exchange
Ltd. The Respondent is the owner of various properties in Bangalore
and in Chennai also was the owner of the property in question prior
to its acquisition. The larger property including the property in
question ie., Municipal. Nos.59/1 and small portion of Municipal
No.59 (which were acquired by the government) were initially
purchased by The Bangalore Wollen Cotton and Silks Mills Ltd., a
textile manufacturing company through various sale deeds between
the periods 1885 and 1978. Pursuant to the purchase, the
properties were converted from agricultural to non-agricultural
purpose and the said property was in the ownership and possession
of The Bangalore Wollen Cotton and Silks Mills Ltd. During 1969,
the then High Court of Mysore at Bangalore vide Order dated
03.10.1969 was pleased to sanction the scheme of amalgamation
wherein "The Bangalore Woollen and Cotton Silk Mills Ltd., merged
to 'Binny Limited'. As such, all the properties of "The Bangalore
Woollen and Cotton Silk Mills Ltd.' including the Property in question
stood transferred to 'M/s. Binny Limited'. Further, on 26.04.1979
M/s. Binny Limited made an ex-change cum sale deed with
Bangalore Mahanagara Palike for an extent of 12834 Sq.ft; thus the
total extent coming to 10,20,528 sq.ft. Pursuant to the
aforementioned merger, M/s. Binny Limited continued to be the
lawful owner and in peaceful possession of all its properties
including the Property in question. Meanwhile, the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'ULC
Act') came into force and as such, an exemption order dated
15.12.1978 under Section 20 (1) of the ULC Act was issued in
favour of M/s. Binny Ltd. It is pertinent to note that the ULC Act
was repealed vide Repealing Act, 1999. However, pursuant to the
repeal of ULC Act coming into force, M/s. Binny Ltd., underwent
loss of business and was declared a sick industrial company under
Section 3 (1) (o) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special
Provisions) Act, 1985. As such, as per directions of the High Court
of Madras, the Board for Industrial & Financial Reconstruction
(hereinafter referred to as BIFR) vide Order dated 22.10.2003
sanctioned the scheme for rehabilitation Subsequently, the High
Court of Judicature at Madras vide Order dated 22.04.2010 was
pleased to sanction the scheme of arrangement wherein 'M/s. Binny
Limited' demerged into 'M/s. Binny Limited', "M/s, S.V. Global Mill
Ltd.' and M/s. Binny Mills Limited'. In view of the said scheme of
arrangement being sanctioned, all the properties in Bangalore
belonging to M/s. Binny Limited including the Property in question
were transferred to the Respondent herein. As such, the
Respondent in pursuance to the said scheme of arrangement
sanctioned by the Madras High Court during 2010 became the
lawful owner and was in possession of the Property in question. The
Respondent has remained in peaceful possession and enjoyment of
the larger Property including the Property in question from the date
of execution of the scheme of arrangement as sanctioned by High
Court of Judicature at Madras during 2010. However, it was only
pursuant to the initiation of acquisition of the property in question
that the possession of 3 Acre and 16 Guntas was taken by the
Petitioner only on 16.01.2014. Further, the relevant Khatha
certificate and the encumbrance certificate depict the name of the
Respondent as the lawful owner of the Property. Therefore, the
Applicant by suppressing material facts is trying to mislead this
Court and hence the instant application deserves to be rejected at
the outset. Copy of the Order dated 22.04.2010 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Madras alongwith the Scheme of
Arrangement is also produced along with the objections.
73. It is contended that in the instant case, the land to the
extent of 3 Acre and 16 Guntas has been acquired by the State and
pursuant to the Award made by the SLAO dated 24.11.2014, an
amount of Rs. 153,59,63,348/- was paid by the Government to the
Respondent. However, the Respondent received the said amount
under protest and thereafter reference was made under Section 64
of the 2013 Act for enhancement. The very act of the State in
acquiring the land and disbursing part of the compensation itself
shows that there is no dispute as regards ownership and
entitlement for compensation. The Applicant without having any
locus cannot approached this Court on such grounds especially at
this stage of proceedings and hence the instant application is liable
to be rejected on this ground alone.
74. It is further contended that the Applicant has no locus to
question the legality of the proceedings either before this Court or
Hon'ble Supreme Court or the Trial Court in the instant matter
inasmuch as the Applicant is neither an 'interested party' under the
2013 Act nor is a necessary or proper party to the instant
proceedings.
75. The entire basis on which the Applicant has approached
this Court is misconstrued and with malafide intention and hence
the application deserves to be dismissed in limine. The Applicant in
guise of being an intervener is trying to convert the instant private
lis into public interest litigation which is impermissible and illegal
and contrary to the rule of law, more particularly in matter dealing
with subject matters of land acquisition. The Applicant has no locus
to question the veracity or legality of the actions of the State or any
Court or Authority in the instant lis inasmuch as the Applicant was
neither a party nor an interested party. The Applicant is neither the
owner nor claims any interest over the property in question nor has
any nexus in any manner relating to the acquisition proceedings.
On this ground alone, the impleading application deserves to be
rejected.
76. It is further contended that the Applicant has suppressed
the fact before this Court that the Applicant has already filed a
representation to the Petitioner - state on 11.06.2021 which the
Applicant had stated in his Application before the Supreme Court.
This is a deliberate exercise of suppressio veri suggestio falsi and
this itself is sufficient cause to reject the instant application. On
these among other grounds, the respondent sought to reject the
impleading application.
77. The State Government has not filed any objections for
the impleading application.
78. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties on the
application for impleading.
X. Arguments advanced by Sri N.G. R. Prasad for Sri Paras
Pandey, learned counsel for the impleading applicant.
79. Sri N.G.R. Prasad for Sri Paras Pandey, learned counsel
for the impelading applicant while reiterating the averments made
in the impleading application, has contended that the applicant is
share holder of the respondent/company and present application is
filed in public interest since in the name of the acquisition, the
respondent is going to benefit crores of rupees meant for public.
He filed the written submissions in the office on 26.9.2022, which
reads as under:
"I. The following issues are being brought to light by the
Intervening Applicant
a) First and foremost, it is submitted that the entire
parcel for land was allowed to be held by the M/s Binny
Ltd., the predecessor of the Respondent, in the city of
Bangalore solely on account of the exemption granted
vide Notification dated 15.12.1978 under Section 20(1)
of ULCRA Act (Ref Page No:38 to the documents
submitted along with the intervening application filed by
the intervening applicant). Most importantly, the
exemption was granted on a condition that it will
operate only for industrial activity. It is submitted that
the Respondent undisputedly ceased the industrial
activities several years back. A specific assertion to this
effect was made by the Intervening Applicant and the
same is not disputed or denied by the Petitioner and the
Respondent.
b) Secondly, neither the State of Karnataka nor the
Review Petitioner have brought to the notice of the
court, the lapse of the time period of the exemption
granted under Section 20(1) of ULCRA Act, which
survives even after the repeal of the said Act by virtue
of Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Repeal Act, 1999.
c) It is submitted that in view of the clear mandate of
the Savings provision under Section 3(1)(b) of the
abovementioned Repeal Act, the Review Petitioner or
the State of Karnataka, was statutorily bound to
repossess the land which was in illegal possession of the
Respondent, when the industrial activity in the land
ceased. As stated in the earlier paragraphs, the
exemption ceased to be operative and the time period
during which the exemption was valid concluded, once
the industrial activity was no longer being carried out in
the company. Needless to state, the usage of land by
the Respondent for any other purpose, other than for
which the exemption was granted, clearly violate or
breach the conditions of exemption. Hence, the Review
Petitioner ought not to have acquired 3.16 Acres from
the Respondent for such an exorbitant price of over Rs.
400 Crores, when the land would have perforce vested
in the State on account of violation of the conditions of
the exemption order.
d) The act of the Review Petitioner has thereby caused
a huge loss to the public exchequer and, in turn, unduly
benefited the Respondent. More importantly, the failure
on the part of the State and the Review Petitioner to act
as the custodian of public interest, at the threshold, has
given teeth to the Respondent to seek further
compensation of over Rs. 400 Crores.
e) The Applicant bona fide believes that the issue of
non-compliance or breach of the exemption conditions,
as stated above, was never raised at any stage before
the Court below as both the judgements do not record
any such discussions on the same.
f) It is most respectfully submitted that on strict
interpretation of Repeal Act of 1999, harmoniously read
along with the exemption Notification dated
15.12.1978, the entire parcel of land with the
Respondent ought to have been vested with the State
Government, especially when the industrial activity
ceased to operate for which exemption was granted in
the very first place.
g) The Applicant submits that the Respondent, in
collusion with the Government officials, was in illegal
possession of the land of about 24 Acres and it has
received more than Rs. 160 Crores as compensation for
the parcel of land which it is not entitled to and is
further pursuing for getting additional compensation at
the cost of the taxpayers and the public. This is nothing
but a malfeasance by the Authorities.
h) It is submitted that the Hon'ble High Court in 1st
Order, has clearly observed the laxity on the part of the
State and its officers for the delay in filing the MFA. It is
further submitted that the latches on the part of the
State and its officials for extraneous reasons is writ at
large, as the financial implication to the exchequer is
over Rs. 400 Crores which only benefits a private party.
Further, the Applicant has strong reasons to believe
that several high-ranking officials could be hand in
glove with the Respondent and the said actions of the
Authorities are marred by the malafide.
i) The role of the private party for causing the delay in
filing the appeal and the latches on behalf of the Review
Petitioner also deserves to be looked into thoroughly. If
there is any culpability on the part of the Respondent or
the Review Petitioner, the same should be dealt with
accordingly. Under the given circumstances, the issue of
limitation ought to be reconsidered in public interest.
II. For the sake of brevity, the Intervening Applicant
has out forth the objections raised by the Respondent
and the responses provided by the Intervening
Applicant.
Objection by Respondent Response by intervening applicant
Only "person interested" as 1) The term "person interested" has
defined under Section 3(x) nowhere been used in relation to the
of the Right to Fair right to intervene.
Compensation and
"person interested" throughout the
Transparency in Land
Act has only been used in reference
Acquisition, Rehabilitation
to notices to be sent by the
and Resettlement Act, 2013
collector, enquiries to be raised by
can object and maintain
the collector and objections to be
objections to the land
made by such person interested.
acquisition proceedings
The Act does not restrict, by this
definition, the right to intervention
by a person, such as the Applicant
seeking to bring to light facts crucial
in public interest.
The Intervening Applicant came to
know about the extent of
proceedings and the award
compensation only subsequent to
the MFA 3806 of 2019, the Order of
the High Court which publicly made
available. Subsequent to the
Intervening Applicant coming to
know about the compensation and
the violations of exemption, the
Intervening Applicant pursued the
matter by filing an intervention
application before the Hon'ble
Supreme court of India in SLP No.
10452 of 2021, Therefore, from the
date of knowledge, the intervening
applicant has pursued the matter.
The Intervening Applicant Under Order 1 Rule 8A of the Code
holds one share and has of Civil Procedure 1908, a person in
approached the Hon'ble public interest may be permitted to
Court with unclean hands. intervene and take part in the
The Applicant is neither a proceedings, irrespective of whether
proper or necessary party. they are a necessary and proper
party. Therefore, the contention of
the Respondent that the Applicant is
not a necessary and proper party
and that the Applicant is an
"interested party" since the
Applicant holds one share is
irrelevant to the instant case. The
instant case is not a public interest
litigation and therefore the fact that
the Applicant holds one share would
not hold relevant. The test therefore
for permitting the Applicant to
intervene would be as per Order 1
Rule 8A of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.
The above named Applicant/
Intervening Applicant is a senior
citizen and a public-spirited person.
The Applicant is also a renowned
social activist and crusader against
corruption. The Applicant is a
member of Anti-Corruption
Movement', which is a registered
entity fighting against corruption for
the past more than two decades. In
this respect, it is pertinent to point
out that the complaints filed by the
Applicant with the
regulators/authorities against the
statutory violations, non-transparent
manner of functioning and related
party transactions of companies has
ensured due compliance of the law
by several companies.
Ownership of the land is These judgments have passed sub-
undisputed. No issue of silentio, because this fact has never
ownership has arisen been brought to light. Therefore, the
before, either before the issue of ownership not being
lower courts or the disputed is a non-starter, given that
Supreme Court. the Courts were not aware of the
same.
Applicant has made several While it is correct to state that the
allegations against the Applicant had approached SEBI on
Respondent. Even a 08.02.2021 by way of a complaint
complaint before SEBI was regarding a related party transaction
filed and SEBI closed the entered by the Respondent, it may
complaint. Applicant has be relevant to state that the
not approached with clean complaint was closed only after the
hands. Respondent explained its position
including that "even though the
transaction has been approved, the
same has not yet been implemented
due to various reasons".
Pursuant to the scheme of The Scheme of Arrangement does
arrangement passed by the not guarantee title to the said
Madras High Court, the properties. In any event, as stated
Respondent became the earlier, the issue of the exemption
lawful owner of the order no longer being valid passed
properties in question sub-silentio before the lower courts.
While the Intervening Applicant has sought a limited prayer of
permitting the Intervening Applicant to intervene in the said
matter and put forward the above positions, the Intervening
Applicant submits that the circumstances necessitate that this
Hon'ble Court also directs for an investigation to commence
against the Respondent pertaining to the validity of the
exemption of the properties exempted under the exemption
order 15.12.1978."
XI. Arguments advanced by Sri Udaya Holla, learned senior
counsel for the respondent on the impleading application
80. Sri Udaya Holla, learned senior counsel for the
respondent while reiterating the averments made in the objections
filed to the impleading application, has contended that the applicant
has no locus to file the impleading application in the present review
petition and he has not challenged the order dated 22.4.2010
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Annexure-R1)
along with the scheme of arrangement declaring the respondent as
the lawful owner in possession of the land in question. He would
further contend that the impleading applicant has neither
challenged the initiation of the acquisition proceedings by the State
in the year 2013 nor challenged the award and he is only a holder
of one share in the company and therefore, the impleading
application is not maintainable. The ownership of the respondent is
not questioned either by the State while acquiring the land in
question or the impleading applicant. The present impleading
application is filed in the present review petition in collusion with
the review petitioner only to deprive the respondent from taking the
benefit of the award passed by the reference authority though the
respondent is legally entitled for the same. The applicant has not
come to the Court with clean hands and suppressed the material
facts of the case and he has no locus to question the legality of
action of the State or any authority of acquiring the land and
passing the award. In the present review petition, the only point to
be determined is with regard to maintainability of the appeal under
Section 54 of the 1894 Act as per the directions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the SLP. Further, the applicant is not a 'person
interested' as defined under Section 3(x) of the 2013 Act.
Therefore, learned senior counsel sought to dismiss the application
with exemplary costs.
XII. Point for Determination
81. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions urged by the
learned counsel for the parties, the only point that would arise for
consideration is:
"Whether the impleading application filed by the
impleading applicant under Order 1 Rule 10 r/w 151
CPC is maintainable and as to whether the impleading
applicant has made out any case to implead him in the
present review petition in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the present case?"
XIII. Consideration
82. It is an undisputed fact that the respondent - M/S S.V.
Global Mill Limited is originally owner of larger extent of land
measuring 110 acres as admitted by the impleading applicant in
paragraph-11 of the application. It is also not in dispute that the
respondent has alienated some of its properties and as on the date
of the notification issued to acquire the land of the respondent, 24
acres 4 guntas belong to the respondent - M/s S.V. Global Mill
Limited. The preliminary notification issued by the SLAO on
7.2.2013 for acquisition of 3 acres 16 guntas out of 24 acres 4
guntas in Sy.No.59/1 invoking urgency clause followed by the final
notification dated 18.11.2013 and subsequently the award came to
be passed on 8.10.2014 i.e., after the 2013 Act came into force
w.e.f. 1.1.2014 and the SLAO awarded the compensation at the
rate of Rs.4,620/- per square feet. Admittedly, the present
applicant, who is holding one share together with his wife in the
respondent company has not challenged the acquisition proceedings
initiated by the State Government admitting the ownership of the
respondent in respect of the property in question nor challenged the
award passed by the SLAO under the provisions of 2013 Act. It is
also not in dispute that the respondent being aggrieved by the
award, has filed the protest petition to make reference to the
authority contemplated under Section 64 of the 2013 Act for
determination of the higher market value for the acquired land.
The SLAO on receipt of the application, has made reference under
Section 64(1) of the 2013 Act and the reference authority
registered the same in L.A.C. No.33/2017. The applicant if really
interested in the property, he should have filed an application for
impleading before the reference authority. Admittedly, the
reference authority considering the oral and documentary evidence
on record, has proceeded to award compensation at the rate of
Rs.8624/- per square feet. The said award passed by the reference
authority has not been challenged by the applicant. The SLAO
being aggrieved by the judgment & award passed by the reference
authority, has filed MFA No.3806/2019 before this Court. This
Court by the judgment & award dated 25.9.2019, has dismissed
the appeal filed by the present review petitioner on the ground of
limitation. From the date of initiation of acquisition proceedings in
the year 2013 till the proceedings ended in MFA No.3806/2019 at
the instance of the State Government/DC & SLAO, the applicant
was fence-sitter. On that ground also, the present application is
liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs.
83. It is also not in dispute that the scope of the present
review petition is limited only to decide the question with regard to
maintainability of the appeal under Section 54 of the 1894 Act, in
pursuance of the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
SLP No.10452/2021. In the application, the applicant at one breath
has stated that he is a share holder and in another breath, he has
stated that the application is filed purely in public interest. It is not
the case of the State Government or the applicant that the
respondent is not the owner of the property in question. Once the
State Government admitting the ownership of the respondent in
respect of the property in question, has initiated the acquisition
proceedings and passed the award and paid the compensation to
the respondent in terms of the award passed by the SLAO, the
applicant is estoped to contend that the respondent is not entitled
to the compensation amount. Though the applicant contended the
exemption order passed by the State Government under Section 20
of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 subject to
certain conditions, no document is produced for violation of any
conditions.
84. Throughout it is the case of the State Government
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that appeal lies under section 54
of the 1894 Act before this Court against the order passed by the
reference Court/authority and not under Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
The applicant except stating that the present application filed in
public interest, has not stated what is the locus standi to question
the acquisition proceedings when the payment of the compensation
amount as per the award having been allowed and the proceedings
under the 1894 Act and 2013 Act attained finality. As stated supra,
the applicant is a fence-sitter till disposal of the MFA before this
Court and when the matter reached the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
applicant sought for permission to file an application for
impleadment/intervention in the review petition. Accordingly,
while dismissing the SLP as withdrawn, applicant is given liberty to
file an application for impleadment/intervention before this Court
which shall be considered subject to objections that may be raised
by the respondent.
85. At this stage, it is relevant to state that 'person
interested' is defined under the provisions of Section 3(x) of the
2013 Act, which reads as under:
"3(x) ―person interestedǁ means--
(i) all persons claiming an interest in compensation
to be made on account of the acquisition of land
under this Act;
(ii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest
dwellers, who have lost any forest rights
recognised under the Scheduled Tribes and Other
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest
Rights) Act, 2006 (2 of 2007);
(iii) a person interested in an easement affecting the
land;
(iv) persons having tenancy rights under the relevant
State laws including share-croppers by whatever
name they may be called; and
(v) any person whose primary source of livelihood is
likely to be adversely affected;"
86. By careful perusal of the said provisions, it makes it clear
that the applicant has not come under any of the categories as
contemplated under Section 3(x) of the 2013 Act. On that ground
also, the application is liable to be rejected.
87. It is well settled that the applicant who is a share holder
of the company does not have any interest in the property of the
company while the company is going a concern and hence he
cannot be termed to be necessary and proper party or interested
party in the proceedings, at this stage of the review petition filed
by the petitioner under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
88. Throughout the proceedings, the ownership of the
respondent in respect of the land in question is not in dispute. No
issue of ownership was raised either before the acquisition or after
the acquisition. In fact, the issue of ownership was not raised
either in the reference proceedings or before this Court in the MFA
and the applicant was a fence-sitter and for the first time, he filed
an impleading application in the present review petition just to
harass the respondent though, he has no locus standi and wasted
precious public time. The conduct and attitude of the applicant has
to be deprecated.
89. In the objections, it is specifically contended by the
respondent that the applicant has been making various false
allegations against the company without any basis in various
forums since last three years and all such frivolous complaints
made have been closed by various authorities. In fact one frivolous
complaint filed by the applicant against the respondent before the
SEBI on 8.1.2021 and the SEBI closed the complaint on 23.3.2021.
90. It is also to be stated that the respondent in pursuance
of the scheme of arrangement sanctioned by the Madras High Court
on 22.4.2010 became the lawful owner and was in possession of
the property in question till the date of acquisition by the petitioner.
The same has been suppressed by the applicant in the present
application. The assertions made by the respondent in the
objections to the impleading application including the order dated
22.4.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras
(Annexure-R1) so also the Scheme of Arrangement and receipt of
the acquisition amount by the respondent before the LAO, have not
been challenged by the impleading applicant. According to the
appellant, the present application for impleading is filed in public
interest, but the applicant has not shown how the public interest is
involved when the acquisition proceedings in respect of property of
the respondent were initiated in the year 2013 itself. In the
absence of the same, the application for impleading is not
maintainable in the present review petition filed by the review
petitioner/Deputy Commissioner & SLAO under Order 47 Rule 1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
91. Learned counsel for the impleading applicant relied upon
the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Smriti
Madan Kansagra -vs- Perry Kansagra reported in 2021 SCC
OnLine 909 with regard to 'fraud vitiates everything'. Admittedly
in the present case, the State has admitted the ownership of the
respondent in respect of the property in question and the
impleading applicant has not made out any fraud on the part of the
State Government in its action to initiate the acquisition
proceedings in respect of the property belonging to the respondent,
thereby the said judgment has no application to the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
92. Learned counsel for the impleading applicant also relied
upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the
case of Ramaiah -vs- Shivalingaiah reported in 2016 SCC OnLine
kar 4501 with regard to scope of intervention. In the said
judgment, the learned Single Judge of this Court dealt with power
of the Court to permit a person or body of persons to present
opinion or to take part in the proceedings. The said judgment has
only persuasive value and not applicable to the facts and
circumstance of the present case.
93. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the
applicant in respect of exemption granted under Section 20 of the
Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976, have no application to the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
94. The present application is filed by the impleading
applicant, who all along the fence-sitter only to harass the
respondent and wasted precious time of the Court. The experience
of this Court depicts that in recent years there has emerged a trend
of filing speculative litigations before various Courts of law, not just
in the Court of first instance, but also in the High Court as well as
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is the duty of the Courts to
ensure that such litigations shall be weeded out at the first instance
rather than allowing to be festered and thereby coming in the way
of genuine litigants seeking justice treating the Court as "Temple of
Justice" and to protect precious public & judicial time of the court.
"This augurs ill for the health of our judicial system".
95. Like any other organ of the State, the Judiciary is also
manned by human beings - but the function of the judiciary is
distinctly different from other organs of the State - in the sense its
function is divine. Today, the judiciary is the repository of public
faith. It is the trustee of the people. It is the last hope of the
people. After every knock at all the doors fail, people approach the
judiciary as the last resort. It is the only temple worshipped by
every citizen of this nation, regardless of religion, caste, sex or
place of birth. It is high time the judiciary must take utmost care
to see that the temple of justice does not crack from inside, which
will lead to a catastrophe in the justice-delivery system resulting in
the failure of public confidence in the system. We must remember
that woodpeckers inside pose a larger threat than the storm
outside.
96. Viewed from any angle, the applicant has no locus standi
to come on record in the present Review Petition. Thereby, the
application is liable to dismissed with costs.
XIV. Conclusion
97. For the reasons stated above, the point raised is
answered in the negative holding that the impleading application
filed by the impleading applicant under Order 1 Rule 10 r/w 151
CPC is not maintainable and the applicant has not made out any
case to implead him in the present Review Petition, in the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the present case.
XV. Result
98. In view of the above, we pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The Review Petition is dismissed as devoid of any
merit.
(ii) I.A. No.2/2022 filed by the impleading applicant is
hereby dismissed with costs of Rs.2,00,000/-
(Rupees two lakhs only) payable by the
'impleading applicant/R. Vidhyashangar' to the
Advocates' Welfare Fund within a period of four
weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of
this order.
SD/-
JUDGE
SD/-
JUDGE
Gss/-
