Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 7670 Kant
Judgement Date : 30 May, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF MAY 2022
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. RITU RAJ AWASTHI, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK S. KINAGI
WRIT APPEAL NO.408 OF 2022 (LB-ELE)
BETWEEN:
1 . SRI. K. SRINIVAS
S/O KRISHNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
R/A NO.12, 1ST CROSS,
WEAVERS COLONY,
THIMMAIAH LAYOUT, ANEKAL 562 106,
BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT,
2 . SMT. S. LALITHA
W/O LAKSHMINARAYAN,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
R/A NO.188/2, CHIKKA KERE,
BRAHMINS STREET, ANEKAL 562 106,
BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT.
3 . SMT. HEMALATHA C K
W/O SURESHA A,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
R/A NO.41, WARD NO.11,
NEAR ANJENEYA TEMPLE,
HOSUR BAGILU, ANEKAL 562 106,
BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. M.R. RAJAGOPAL, SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. H N BASAVARAJU, ADVOCATE)
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AND:
1. THE KARNATAKA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION
NO.8, 1ST FLOOR, KSCMF BUILDING,
CUNNINGHAM ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 052,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT,
KANDAYA BHAVANA, K.G.ROAD,
BENGALURU-560009.
3. TAHASILDAR
ANEKAL TALUK, ANEKAL 562106,
BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT.
4. THE CHIEF OFFICER
TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL,
ANEKAL 562106,
BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT.
....RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K.N. PHANINDRA, SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SMT. VAISHALI HEDGE, ADVOCATE FOR R-1
SRI. R. SUBRAMANYA, AAG A/W
SRI. G.V. SHASHIKUMAR, AGA FOR R-2 AND 3)
-----
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF
THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO
SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 18.04.2022 PASSED BY
THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WP No.3415/2022(LB-
ELE) 2 CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW WP No.3415/2022 (LB-
ELE) FILED BY THE APPELLANTS HEREIN AS PRAYED.
THIS WRIT APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS
DAY, ASHOK S. KINAGI, J., DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
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JUDGMENT
This is an intra court appeal filed by the
appellants challenging the order dated 18th April 2022
passed in W.P.No.3415/2022.
2. Brief facts giving rise to the filing of this
appeal are as under : .
The appellants were elected as Councilors to
respondent No.4-Municipal Council from the
respective wards. Respondent No.1 issued a notice
on 27.1.2022 calling upon the appellants to submit
the explanation in writing for non submission of
details of election expenditure spent in the election
and directed the appellants to furnish the details to
respondent No.3. In pursuance to the aforesaid
notice issued by respondent No.1, the appellants
submitted details of expenditure to respondent No.3.
The appellants have not replied to the said show
cause notice of respondent No.1. Respondent No.1,
considering the records, has passed an order dated
15.11.2021 under Section 16-C of the Karnataka
Municipalities Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the
Act of 1964), disqualifying the appellants as
Councilors of the respective wards on the ground that
they have failed to lodge true and correct account of
expenditure with the Returning Officer within the time
prescribed under Section 16-B of the aforesaid Act of
1964. The appellants aggrieved by the disqualification
order dated 15.11.2021 have filed the writ petition in
W.P.No.3415/2022. The writ Court after hearing the
parties dismissed the writ petition. Hence, this writ
appeal.
3. Heard Sri M R Rajagopal, learned Senior
counsel for the appellants, Sri N. Phanindra, learned
Senior counsel for respondent No.1 and Sri R
Subramanya, learned Additional Advocate General.
4. Learned Senior counsel for the appellants, Sri
M.R.Rajagopal submits that notices were issued by
respondent No.1 in respect of non submission of
details of election expenditure and also directed the
appellants to submit full details of the election
expenditure to the Tahsildar of the concerned Taluk.
He submits that the appellants have replied to the
said show cause notices. He submits that before
passing an order of disqualification, no enquiry was
held. He further submits that respondent No.1
without considering the reply has proceeded to pass
the order of disqualification. He further submits that
the said order is in violation of the principles of
natural justice. Further, he has placed reliance on the
judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the following
cases :
1. D Sanjeevayya v. the Election Tribunal, Andra Pradesh and Others (AIR 1967 SC 1211)
2. Thomasmates Gudinho v. The Election Commission of India and Others (ILR 2002 KAR 3078;
3. Election Commission of India v. Telangana Rashtra Samithi And Another (2011) 1 Supreme Court Cases 370
3. ASHOK SHANKAR RAO CHAWAN V. MADHAV RAO KINHALKAR (2014) 7 SCC 99.
He further submits that the writ court without
considering the material placed on record, dismissed
the writ petition. The impugned order is arbitrary and
erroneous. He submits that after dismissal of the writ
petition, respondent No.1 issued notification dated
28.4.2022. The issuance of said notification does not
set the process of election into motion. He submits
that this court can interfere even after issuance of
notification dated 28.4.2022. Hence, on these
grounds he prays to allow the writ appeal.
5. Per contra, learned Senior counsel for
respondent No.1 Sri K N Phanindra, submits that
respondent No.1 issued notice to the appellants
calling upon them to furnish details of election
expenditure to the Tahsildar. He further submits that
the matter is covered by the decision of a Co-ordinate
Bench of this court in W.A.2634/2015 disposed of on
18th March 2019. He submits that after the disposal
of the writ petition, respondent No.1 issued
notification dated 28.4.2022 notifying the calendar of
events. He further submits that the writ appeal was
filed after issuance of calendar of events. He places
reliance on Article 243ZG of Constitution of India and
submits that no election to any Municipality shall be
called in question except by an election petition
presented to such authority and in such manner. He
submits that the writ court was justified in passing the
impugned order. Hence, prayed to dismiss the writ
appeal.
6. Learned Additional Advocate General adopts
the arguments of the learned counsel for respondent
No.1.
7. Perused the records and considered the
submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.
8. Admittedly, the appellants were elected as
councilors to the Town Municipal Council, Anekal on
31.5.2019 for the respective wards. Consequently,
they were required to submit to the Returning Officer
the account of election expenses. The appellants
have not submitted the account of election expenses
to the Returning Officer. Respondent No.1 issued
notices to the appellants dated 27.1.2022. The
appellants have replied to the said notices issued by
respondent No.1. The appellants have stated in
their reply that they were busy in attending to the
problems of the electoral constituencies and they
were not aware of the requirements of lodging
accounts of electoral expenditure and prayed to
condone the delay in filing accounts. In order to
consider the case on hand, it is necessary to examine
the provisions of the Act of 1963. Sections 16-B and
16-C of the said Act reads as under :
"16B. Lodging of account with
the returning officer.- Every contesting
candidate at the election under this Act shall, within thirty days from the date of election of the returned candidate or, if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of the election are different, the later of those two dates lodge with the Returning Officer appointed at an election under this Act an account of his election expenses which shall be a true copy of the account kept by him or by his election agent under section 16A.
16C. Failure to lodge an account of election expenses.- If the State Election Commission is satisfied that any person,-
(a) has failed to lodge an account of election expenses within the time and in the manner required by or under this Act; and
(b) has no good reason or justification for the failure;
The State Election Commission shall by order published in the official Gazette declare him to be disqualified and any such person shall be disqualified for a period of three years from the date of the order."
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9. A bare perusal of the said provisions clearly
reveals that it is the duty of the contesting candidate
to submit the account of election expenses with the
returning officer within 30 days of the declaration of
result. In case there is a failure, according to Section
16-C of the Act, the candidate must show a good
reason or justification for such failure. But, in case
the candidate fails to submit the election expenses
within a period of 30 days, according to Section 16-C
of the Act respondent No.1 has sufficient power to
declare the elected person as 'disqualified'. Co-joint
reading of Section 16-B and Section 16-C of the Act of
1963 clearly reveals that Section 16-B is a mandatory
provision and Section 16-C clearly stipulates the
consequences of flouting the mandate of Section 16-B
of the said Act of 1963. Thus, duty has been imposed
by the law upon the contesting candidate to submit
the election expenses within the period of 30 days.
The learned Single Judge considering the aforesaid
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provision, in paragraph No.3(f) and 3(g) has recorded
a finding as follows :
"(f) In their parrot like reply to the notices as aforementioned, petitioners have given two reasons for not lodging the accounts of electoral expenses in time and with the Returning Officer:
(i) they were busy in attending to the problems of the electoral constituencies and
(ii) that they were not aware of the requirement of lodging the accounts of electoral expenditure. They have specifically prayed for accepting the delayed filing of these accounts. The first explanation offered by the petitioners that they were busy and preoccupied in attending to the problems of the electors, cannot be said to be plausible. To qualify an exemption from this obligation, a strong ground has to be made out. The explanation offered is unreasonable to say the least and, if countenanced would lay a very bad precedent with abundant potential for abuse. It also militates against the very intent of legislature prescribing such an obligation. Fortunately, they have not sought refugee under the umbrella of COVID-19, the pandemic having significantly receded by that
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time. Indisputably, it is the duty of every elected representative to cater to the cause of constituency. Other elected members have not defaulted, quoting similar grounds. In matter like this, no leniency is admissible. An argument to the contrary offends the policy content of the provision. Therefore, such an explanation hardly constitutes a ground for the condonation of lapse.
(g) The second explanation offered by the petitioners for not lodging the account is that they were not much aware of its legal requirement. It is dangerous to countenance such a contention, to say the least. The sages of law since centuries have said:
'Ignorantia legis nemimem excusat'. Any standard treatise of law like
BROOM'S LEGAL MAXIMS, Tenth Edition, page 169-171 tells that ignorance of law is no excuse. This age old norm obtaining in all civilized jurisdictions applies equally if not more to the elected representatives, as the trustees of public offices. An argument to the contrary cannot be sustained on any count."
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10. An identical issue came up for consideration
in W.P No.34978/2015 before this Court in the case of
Smt.Khamar Nizami vs. State
Election Commission, Karnataka and others
wherein the court has held as follows :
"8. Section 16-B and Section 16-C of the Act have specific purpose for the submission of the election expenses. Since one of the bane of elections in India is the amount of unaccounted money which is pumped into an election, therefore, Section 16-B and Section 16-C of the Act are merely an attempt to wipe out corruption which has crept into the election process. Such a beneficial purpose of Section 16-B and Section 16-C cannot be lost sight of while examining the legal validity of the impugned order. Since the petitioner has failed to submit any good reason or justification for her failure, the learned Commissioner was very well justified in declaring the petitioners as disqualified under Section 16C of the Act".
11. The said writ petition was dismissed by the
writ court vide order dated 19.8.2015. The said order
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was challenged in Writ appeal No.2634/2015. The
Division Bench dismissed the aforesaid writ appeal
vide order dated 18th March 2019. The issue involved
in the present writ appeal is squarely covered in the
aforesaid writ petition. Thus, the appellants are
bound to submit the list of election expenses before
the State Election Commission within 30 days from
the date of declaration of election. Admittedly, the
appellants have failed to do so. The appellants have
not shown any good reasons or justification for failure
to do so. The reasons assigned by the appellants are
not justified. The writ court considering the material
on record and also the law laid down by the Hon'ble
Apex court has dismissed the writ petition filed by the
appellants. We do not find any illegality in the
impugned order.
12. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants
submits that by mere issuance of notification dated
28.4.2022, process of election cannot be deemed to
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have commenced. It is well established principles of
law that the election process commenced with
publication of the provisional list of voters. In the
instant case, after the dismissal of the writ petition,
respondent No.1 has notified the calendar of events
dated 28.4.2022. From the perusal of the
notification, it discloses that the date and time of
issuance of election notification by the Deputy
Commissioner is on 2.5.2022 and if voting is
necessary, the date and day of conducting voting is
on 20.5.2022. Thus, the election process has set in
motion. The Hon'ble Apex Court in N.P.PONNUSWAMI
VS. THE RETURNING OFFICER, NAMAKKAL
CONSTITUENCY, NAMAKKAL, SALEM DIST. AND
OTHERS reported in AIR 1952 SUPREME COURT 64
held that interference in the process of election once
the calendar of events are notified would fall foul of
the law. Same view has been reiterated by the
Hon'ble Apex court in the case of State of Goa and
another v. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh and Anr.
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reported in (2021) 8 SCC 401, wherein the Hon'ble
Apex Court has held as follows :
"65. A conspectus of the aforesaid judgments in the context of municipal elections would yield the following results.
1. Under Article 243 ZG(b), no election to any municipality can be called in question except by an election petition presented to a Tribunal as is provided by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. This would mean that from the date of notification of the election till the date of the declaration of result a judicial hands-off is mandated by the non-obstante clause contained in Article 243ZG debarring the writ court under Articles 226 and 227 from interfering once the election process has begun until it is over. The constitutional bar operates only during this period. It is therefore a matter of discretion exercisable by a writ court as to whether an interference is called for when the electoral process is "imminent" i.e., the notification for elections is yet to be announced."
13. As observed above, respondent No.1 has
notified the calendar of events on 28.4.2022 and the
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appellants filed this writ appeal on 4.5.2022. By the
time writ appeal was filed, the process of election was
set in motion. Therefore, in our considered view, the
writ appeal filed by the appellants cannot be
entertained at this stage.
14. The learned senior counsel for the
appellants has contended that the fault committed by
the appellants could be condoned. However, in the
case of Balaji Yadav C.M. v. State Election
Commission, Writ Petition No.26662/2013, decided
on 13th July 2015, this Court has clearly held that
once the law mandates a particular action to be taken
by the State Election Commissioner, and once the law
imposes certain duty upon the elected candidate, the
delay in submitting the election expenses cannot be
condoned by this Court. Since the provisions of
Section 16-B and Section 16-C of the Act are
mandatory in nature, any deviation from the
mandate of Section 16-B of the Act can be justified
only under Section 16-C of the Act. The explanation
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offered by the appellants does not fulfill the
requirement of Section 16-C of the Act.
The judgments relied upon by the learned
counsel for the appellants are not applicable to the
case on hand.
15. In the above circumstances, we proceed to
pass the following order :-
ORDER
The writ appeal is dismissed.
Sd/-
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
JUDGE
rs
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