Karnataka High Court
Indocil Silicons Pvt Ltd vs Union Of India on 27 May, 2022
Bench: Chief Justice, S R.Krishna Kumar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 27th DAY OF MAY, 2022
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. RITU RAJ AWASTHI, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
WRIT PETITION No.1920 OF 2021
C/W
WRIT PETITION Nos.8807 OF 2020, 5973 OF 2021,
17402 OF 2021 (GM-MMS)
IN W.P. NO.1920 OF 2021
BETWEEN:
INDOCIL SILICONS PVT. LTD.,
A-56, INDUSTRIAL AREA,
PHASE-1, NARAINA,
NEW DELHI-110028
THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR,
SHRI VARUN AGGARWAL
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI DHRUV MEHTA, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI LOMESH KIRAN N., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. UNION OF INDIA
THROUGH SECRETARY,
MINISTRY OF MINES,
SHASTRI BHAWAN,
NEW DELHI
2. STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH DIRECTOR,
DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND GEOLOGY,
KHANIJA BHAWAN, BANGALORE,
KARNATAKA-560 001
3. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
AND INDUSTRIES
THROUGH SECRETARY (MSME AND MINES)
-2-
VIKAS SOUDHA, BANGALORE
KARNATAKA-560 001
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI SHIVAKUMAR S., CGC FOR R1
SRI S.S.MAHENDRA, AGA FOR R2 & R3)
---
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT,
ORDER OR DIRECTION IN THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS
DIRECTING RESPONDENT NO.1 TO GRANT PRIOR APPROVAL FOR
THE APPLICATION DATED 06/10/2008 OF THE PETITIONER
HEREIN AND ETC.
IN W.P.NO.8807 OF 2020
BETWEEN:
DALMIA CEMENT (BHARAT) LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
DALMIAPURAM
DISTRICT TIRUCHIRAPALI
TAMIL NADU-621 651
AND ALSO HAVING ITS
CORPORATE OFFICE AT
11TH FLOOR, HANSALAYA BUILDING
15, BARAKHAMBA ROAD
NEW DELHI-110 001
THROUGH ITS MANAGER -
LEGAL AND AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE
MR.BHASKARARAO POTHUGUNTLA
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI UDAYA HOLLA, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI GANAPATHY M.S., &
SRI NIKHILESH RAO M., ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
AND INDUSTRIES (MINES)
1ST FLOOR, VIKAS SOUDHA
BENGALURU-560 001
2. DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND GEOLOGY
KHANIJA BHAWAN
RACE COURSE ROAD
BENGALURU-560 001
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3. UNION OF INDIA
THROUGH ITS SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF MINES
SHASTRI BHAWAN,
DR.RAJENDRA PRASAD ROAD
NEW DELHI-110 001
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI G.V.SHASHI KUMAR, AGA FOR R1 TO R3)
---
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECT AGAINST
THE RESPONDENTS TO EXECUTE THE MINE DEVELOPMENT AND
PRODUCTION AGREEMENT AND THE MINING LEASE IN FAVOUR
OF THE PETITIONER, PENDING THE GRANT OF THE EC IN
RESPECT OF THE MINING LEASE AREA OF 995.97 HAS IN
BEERANAHALLI, AREBAMMANAHALLI, KONKANAHALLI,
TARANAHALLI AND SEDAM (SHETTIHUDA) VILLAGE, SEDAM
TALUK, KALABURGI DISTRICT, KARNATAKA IN A TIME BOUND
AND EXPEDITIOUS MANNER AND ETC.
IN W.P.NO.5973 OF 2021
BETWEEN:
SHREE CEMENT LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
BANGUR NAGAR, POST BOX NO.33
BEAWAR-305 901
DIST AJMER (RAJASTHAN)
REPRESENTED BY ITS
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE /
POWER OF ATTORNEY
MR. SHANTI LAL BHANSALI
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI UDAYA HOLLA, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI NIKHILESH RAO M., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
AND INDUSTRIES (MINES)
1ST FLOOR, VIKAS SOUDHA
BENGALURU-560 001
2. THE DIRECTOR
DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND GEOLOGY
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
KHANIJA BHAVAN (SW)
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NO.49, RACE COURSE ROAD
BENGALURU-560 001
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI S.S.MAHENDRA, AGA FOR R1 AND R2
SRI K.A.ARIGA, CGC FOR R3)
---
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS OF ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE
WRIT/DIRECTION/ORDER AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS TO
EXECUTE THE MINE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION
AGREEMENT AND THE MINING LEASE DEED IN FAVOUR OF THE
PETITIONER, PENDING THE GRANT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
CLEARANCE IN RESPECT OF THE MINING LEASE AREA OF
1445.83 Ha IN BALWAD, TILGUL, KIRANGI AND B SARADGI
VILLAGES, TALUK AND DISTRICT, KALABURAGI IN A TIME
BOUND AND EXPEDITIOUS MANNER AND ETC.
IN W.P.NO. 17402 OF 2021
BETWEEN:
SHREE CEMENT LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
BANGUR NAGAR, POST BOX NO 33
BVEAWAR -305 901
DISTT AJMER (RAJASTHAN)
REP BY ITS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE /
POWER OF ATTORNEY -
MR. SHANTHI LAL BANSALI
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI UDAYA HOLLA, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI NIKHILESH RAO M., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE UNION OF INDIA
REP BY ITS SECRETARY (MINES)
MINISTRY OF MINES
SHASTRI BHAVAN
DR RAJENDRA PRASAD ROAD
NEW DELHI -110 001
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
DEPT. OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES (MINES)
1ST FLOOR , VIKAS SOUDHA
BENGLAURU -560 001
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3. THE REGIONAL CONTROLLER OF MINES
OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL CONTROLLER OF MINES
INDIAN BUREAU OF MINES
29 INDUSTRIAL SUBHURB II STAGE
TUMKUR ROAD, GORGUNTAPALYA
YESHWANTHPUR
BENGALURU -560 022
4. THE INDIAN BUREAU OF MINES
THROUGH ITS CONTROLLER GENERAL
INDIRA BAHAVAN
CIVIL LINES
NAGPUR- 440 001 (MAHARASTRA)
5. THE CONTROLLER OF MINES (SZ)
INDIAN BUREAU OF MINES
29, INDUSTRIAL SUBHURB II STAGE
TUMKUR ROAD, GORGUNTAPALAY
YESHWANTHPURA
BENGLAURU -560 022 (KARNATAKA)
6. THE DIRECTOR
DEPT. OF MINES AND GEOLOGY
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
KHANIJA BHAVAN (SW)
NO 49, RACE CURSE ROAD
BENGALURU -560 001
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI S.S.MAHENDRA, AGA FOR R1 AND R2
SRI SHIVAKUMAR S., CGC FOR R3)
---
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO STAY THE IMPUGNED
ORDER/LETTER DATED 01.06.2021 PASSED BY THE R3 UNTIL
THE FINAL ADJUDICATION OF THE INSTANT WRIT PETITION ON
MERITS AND ETC.
THESE PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR 'PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS'
THIS DAY, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, PRONOUNCED THE
FOLLOWING:
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ORDER
The Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation
Act, 1957 (for short 'the MMDR Act') has seen several
amendments including the amendments vide Central Act 10
of 2015 w.e.f. 12.01.2015. One such amendment was
insertion of Section 10A, whereby 3 categories of persons
described in Section 10A(2)(a),(b) and (c) comprising of
reconnaissance permit holders who became entitled to
prospecting licence followed by a mining lease and
prospecting licence holders who became entitled to a
mining lease, as the case may be.
2. Subsequently, by Amendment Act 16 of 2021
which came into force on 28.3.2021, Section 10A(2)(b)
referred to supra was further amended by incorporating 2
provisos to the said provision. It is the interpretation of the
said provisos to Section 10A(2)(b) of the MMDR Act (as
amended by Act No.16 of 2021 w.e.f. 28.03.2021) and
applicability of the same to the petitioners herein which falls
for consideration in the present writ petitions.
Prayers in all the writ petitions
W.P.No.1920/2021 was filed on 28.01.2021 by Indocil
Silicons Private Limited, seeking the following reliefs:
a) Issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of mandamus directing respondent
No.1 to grant prior approval for the application
dated 6.10.2008 of the petitioner herein; and/or
b) Issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of mandamus directing the
respondent authorities to expeditiously grant
mining lease in favour of the petitioner in terms
of the recommendation of the Screening
Committee; and/or
c) In the alternative, issue a writ,
order or direction in the nature of mandamus
directing the respondents to process the
application dated 6.10.2008 of the petitioner
herein and to expeditiously execute the mining
lease within a stipulated time bound manner in
terms of Section 10A(2)(b) of the MMDR Act
read with Rule 7(6)(b) of the MCR, 2016 at
Annexure - D; and/or
d) Award costs of these proceedings in
favour of the petitioner; and
e) Grant such other relief(s) as this
Hon'ble High Court may deem fit and necessary
in the interests of justice and equity.
W.P.No.8870/2020 is filed on 27.06.2020 by Dalmia
Cement (Bharath) Limited, seeking the following reliefs:
(i) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other
appropriate writ / direction / order against the
Respondents to execute the Mine Development
and Production Agreement and the Mining Lease
in favour of the petitioner, pending the grant of
the EC in respect of the mining lease area of
995.97 ha in Beeranahalli, Arebammanahalli,
Konkanhalli, Taranahalli & Sedam (Shettihuda)
Village, Sedam Taluk, Kalaburgi District,
Karnataka in a time bound and expeditious
manner;
(ii) Pass any other order or direction which
this Hon'ble Court deems fit, in the interest of
justice and equity.
W.P.No.5973/2021 is filed on 22.03.2021 by Shree
Cements, seeking the following reliefs:
(i) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other
appropriate writ / direction / order against the
Respondents to execute the Mine Development
and Production Agreement and the Mining Lease
Deed in favour of the petitioner, pending the
grant of the environment clearance in respect of
the mining lease area of 1445.83 Ha. In Balwad,
Tilgul, Kirangi and B Saradgi Villages, Taluk &
Dist. Kalaburagi in a time bound and expeditious
manner;
ii) Pass any other order or direction which
this Hon'ble Court deems fit, in the interest of
justice and equity.
W.P.No.17402/2021 is also filed on 18.09.2021 by
Shree Cements, seeking the following reliefs:
i) Issue a writ in the nature of
certiorari or any other writ, order or direction /
directions quashing the impugned order / letter
dated 01.06.2021 passed by the respondent
No.3 i.e., Regional Controller of Mines, IBM at
Annexure A.
ii) Pass any other order or direction
which this Hon'ble Court deems fit, in the
interest of justice and equity.
Factual Matrix - W.P.No.1920/2021
3. Petitioner was granted a Prospecting License dated
14.8.2007 for iron ore and associated minerals over an area
of 1500 hectares in Sandur Taluk, Bellary District by the
Government of Karnataka, for a period of 3 years. The
prospecting is to be undertaken in accordance with the
requirements of Mineral Conservation and Development
Rules, 1988 and prospecting report is required to be
submitted. In the event that on such prospecting, mineable
quantity of mineral is found in the scientific prospecting and
the prospecting report is found to be in accordance with
law, the licensee has a right in law to apply for the mining
lease in terms of Section 11 of the MMDR Act.
3.1 It is contended that in accordance with the
Prospecting License and the MMDR Act, the petitioner
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undertook detailed prospecting operations in terms of
Prospecting Scheme duly approved by Indian Bureau of
Mines at considerable cost to the petitioner. Based on the
scientific operations undertaken by the petitioner, the
petitioner was able to establish mineable reserves of iron
ore of low grade (35% to 45%) and quartz ore in the
license area. Thereafter, the prospecting report was
submitted by the petitioner to IBM in terms of the MCDR
1988, as well as to the State Government of Karnataka on
06.10.2008.
3.2 It is further contended that on successful
completion of the prospecting operations and establishment
of minerals within the license area the Petitioner submitted
an Application for grant of mining lease dated 6.10.2008
along with its detailed Prospecting Report, to the Director,
Department of Mines and Geology, Government of
Karnataka. Along with such application, the petitioner also
submitted a Demand Draft of Rs. 3,500/- for the fees for
the application in terms of Rule 22(3) of the Mineral
Concession Rules, 1960.
3.3 It is contended that on 27.3.2015, the Mines
and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment
Act, 2015 was enacted to amend the MMDR Act with effect
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from 12.1.2015. As per the newly inserted Section 10A (1)
of the said Act, all pending applications for mining leases
were declared to be ineligible other than the exceptions
created in sub-clause 2 of Section 10A. it is contended that
the legislature being alive to the vested rights which had
already accrued to the prospecting licensees who had
undertaken the entire prospecting operations at their own
cost, with a view to seek mining leases, if the availability of
mineral was proved, protected their rights to get mining
leases under Section 10A(2)(b). Accordingly, the
application of the Petitioner herein for grant of mining lease
was valid and saved under the aforesaid provision.
3.4 Pursuant to the said amendment, the
Government of Karnataka issued a Standard Operating
Procedure vide Government Order dated 25.5.2016, to
process applications for grant of mining lease in terms of
Section 10A(2)(b) of the MMDR Act. Moreover, on
27.6.2016, the Government of India directed all State
Governments to expedite the processing and disposal of
concession proposals for seeking approval of the Central
Government under Section 10A(2)(b). It is further
contended that after undergoing the level-by-level scrutiny
of the documents and information submitted as prescribed
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in the said SOP, the petitioner's proposal came to be
approved by the Commissioner, Department of Mines and
Geology for grant of mining lease on 17.8.2016. Thereafter,
the petitioner's proposal was also scrutinized by the
Screening Committee which had been constituted for the
very purpose of ensuring completeness of the proposal
submitted by the applicant and was approved by the
Screening Committee on 19.9.2016.
3.5 It is also contended that the petitioner's
proposal was duly examined by the Ministry of Commerce
and Industries of the State of Karnataka, and thereafter
with the approval of Minister of Mines, State Government of
Karnataka, the same was forwarded to the Central
Government on 21.7.2017. The said letter recorded that
the application was eligible for grant of mining lease under
Section 10A(2)(b) of the MMDR Act, and requested the
Ministry of Mines, Government of India to accord its
approval under the said provision subject to the area finally
available after conducting the total station/ DGPS survey
including all safety margins.
3.6 It is further contended that thereafter, in spite
of the petitioner's proposal having been thoroughly
examined as per the SOP and by the Screening Committee
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which consisted of senior officers of Government of India,
State Government and after receiving approval from
several levels of scrutiny in terms of the SOP, the Ministry
of Mines, Government of India vide letter dated
17.10.2017, raised queries about alleged incomplete
information/ documents in the proposal. In this context,
petitioner has put forth necessary pleadings as to how the
information and documents were complete in all respects.
3.7 Upon receipt of the said letter dated 17.10.2017
from the Government of India, the Director, DMG,
Karnataka sent a para-wise report to the Secretary,
Department of Commerce and Industries, State
Government of Karnataka on 20.12.2017 reiterating that
the queries pointed out by the Central Government stood
addressed by the State Government in its proposal dated
21.07.2017 as forwarded earlier and called upon the
Central Government to re-examine the proposal and accord
prior approval to the case being a case of seamless transfer
under Section 10A(2)(b) of the MMDR Act; thereafter, the
petitioner made repeated attempts to follow up with the
officers of the Ministry of Commerce and Industries, in
order to pursue its application for grant of mining lease.
However, no further action was taken in respect of the
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report dated 20.12.2017 sent by the Director, DMG,
Karnataka or the petitioner's application for grant of mining
lease, which is still pending before the authorities.
3.8 It is further contended that on 26.6.2020, the
Director of the petitioner - Company herein addressed an
email to the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and
Industries, Government of Karnataka highlighting the
inordinate delay in processing of the petitioner's application
and requesting that the report dated 20.12.2017 be
forwarded to the Ministry of Mines at the earliest. As no
response was received from the concerned officials, the
petitioner once again addressed emails dated 20.7.2020,
6.8.2020 and 17.9.2020 for the same purpose; however,
there was no response to these communications.
3.9 It is further submitted that due to continued lack
of responses by the State Government, the petitioner once
again addressed a communication dated 26.10.2020 to the
Secretary, Ministry of Mines, reiterating the factual
background to its application and requesting the Secretary
to advise the State Government of Karnataka to forward
the report of the Director, DMG dated 20.12.2017 to the
Ministry of Mines at the earliest. It is contended that having
regard to the total and complete inaction on the part of the
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Central and State Governments, petitioner preferred the
present petition.
3.10 It is significant to state that in the petition
which was filed on 25.01.2021, petitioner sought for interim
relief's which were not granted for the time being as can be
seen from the order sheet dated 02.02.2021; so also,
though prayers (a) and (b) were given up by the petitioner
vide Affidavit dated 20.03.2021 filed by it, the said prayers
were revived vide Order on I.A.No.2/2021 dated
22.03.2022.
3.11 It is also relevant to state that during the
pendency of the petition, Section 10A(2)(b) of the MMDR
Act was amended vide Amendment Act No.16 of 2021
w.e.f. 28.03.2021 by incorporating two provisos to the said
provision. These are the provisos which are relied upon by
the respondents in order to contend that the petitioner is
not entitled to any of the reliefs sought for in the petition.
3.12 So also, subsequent to 28.03.2021 as stated
supra, the Central Government has addressed a
communication dated 12.04.2021 to the State Government
to the effect that in view of the provisos to Section
10A(2)(b) referred to supra, the petitioner would not be
entitled to the proposal for grant of mining lease, since the
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same has lapsed by virtue of the provisos. The said
communication having come into existence subsequent to
the institution of the present petition and during its
pendency, the legality, validity and correctness of the said
communication dated 12.04.2021 which has been issued
pursuant to the amendment to Section 10A(2)(b) referred
to supra, is also one of the issues on controversy involved
in the present petition.
Objections of the Respondents
4. The 1st respondent - Union of India has filed its
counter affidavit opposing the petition and repudiating the
various contentions and claims put forth by the petitioner.
It is contended that the amendment to Section 10A(2)(b)
vide Act No. 16 of 2021 is within the legislative competence
of the Central Government and since the same has not
been assailed in the petition, the claim of the petitioner is
liable to be rejected. It is contended that in view of the
decision of the Apex Court in the case of Centre for Public
Interest Litigation vs. Union of India1, auction is the only
method of alienation / allocation / distribution of natural
resources including minerals and as such, the amendment
(2012) 3 SCC 1
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to Section 10A(2)(b) in 2021 is inconsonance with the said
decision as well as the aims and objects of the 2015
amendment to the MMDR Act. It is further contended that
as held by the Apex Court in the case of Tamilnadu vs.
Hindstone2, no one has a vested right to a mining lease and
an application for the same has to be decided and dealt
with in accordance with rules in force as on the date of
disposal of the application. It is therefore contended that
though the petitioner had filed an application seeking
mining lease earlier, in view of the amendment to Section
10A(2)(b) w.e.f. 28.03.2021, the right of the petitioner, if
any, to grant of a mining lease stood lapsed on account of
the proviso inserted by way of amendment and
consequently, the claim of the petitioner was liable to be
rejected.
5. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 - State of Karnataka has
also filed its statement of objections denying the various
claims and contentions put forth by the petitioner. It is
contended that the application of the petitioner for grant of
mining lease was a pending case attracting the amendment
to Section 10A(2)(b) w.e.f. 28.03.2021 and accordingly, the
same has lapsed because of the amendment. It is also
AIR 1981 SC 711
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contended that there cannot be grant of mining lease
without previous approval of the Central Government and
consequently, prayers (a) and (b) are not maintainable. So
also, the application filed by the petitioner on 06.10.2008
being a pending application has lapsed by virtue of the
amendment to Section 10A(2)(b) and prayer (c) was also
liable to be rejected.
5.1 The respondents - State have also contended
that technical aspects involved in the present petition,
render the same as not maintainable in law before this
Court. Further, the petitioner having not questioned the
Central Government communication dated 17.10.2017 for
more than three years is not entitled to any discretionary
relief in the present petition. Reliance is placed on the
communication dated 15.07.2020 by the Department of
Mines and Geology to the Industries and Commerce
Department in order to contend that there were many
defects in the proposal of the petitioner for grant of mining
lease. So also, the details as to how the application of the
petitioner was ineligible under Section 10A(2)(b) has been
narrated by the respondents - State, who contend that
since the application was not filed as per the timelines
prescribed in Section 10A(2)(b)(iv), the petitioner was not
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entitled to grant of mining lease. It is also contended that
as per the communication dated 12.04.2021 issued by the
Central Government, in the light of the amendment vide Act
No.16 of 2021 by inserting the provisos to Section
10A(2)(b), the application of the petitioner for grant of
mining lease which was still pending stood lapsed and the
claim of the petitioner was liable to be rejected.
Petitioner's Rejoinder
6. The petitioner has filed its rejoinder to the
statement of objections, interalia denying the various
contentions urged in the statement of objections / counter
affidavit filed by the respondents. Petitioner contends that
so long as the State Government has accorded its
satisfaction by issuing a communication vide Annexure-J
dated 21.07.2017 to the Central Government by coming to
the conclusion that the application of the petitioner for
grant of mining lease was eligible under Section 10A(2)(b),
the application cannot be construed or treated as a pending
application / case as contemplated under the proviso
inserted by way of amendment in 2021 which was not
applicable to the petitioner or its application. It is also
contended that reliance placed on the documents produced
by the respondents is misconceived and the decision of this
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Court in the case of D.Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka3
relied upon by the respondents was not applicable to the
facts of the instant case.
6.1 It is further contended that upon satisfaction
being arrived at by the State Government regarding
eligibility of the application of the petitioner for grant of
mining lease in terms of Section 10A(2)(b), the State
Government becomes functus officio and as such, it was not
open for the State Government to oppose the claim of the
petitioner. Thus, reiterating the various contentions urged
in the petition and denying the defence put forth by the
respondents, petitioner has sought for allowing the petition.
7. We have heard Sri.Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior
counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri.S.Shivakumar,
learned Central Government Counsel for 1st respondent as
well as Sri.S.S.Mahendra, learned Additional Government
Advocate for respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
Petitioner's contentions - W.P.No.1920/2021
8. In addition to reiterating the various contentions
urged in the petition and referring to the material on
record, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submitted
ILR 2020 KAR 1755
- 21 -
that the vested right created in favour of the petitioner by
virtue of Section 10A(2)(b) having been inserted by way of
amendment in 2015 having been recognised, confirmed and
affirmed to the satisfaction of the State Government in its
recommendation vide letter dated 21.07.2017 stands
unaffected and has not been impacted by the amendment
of the year 2021. It is submitted that the provisos to
Section 10A(2)(b) inserted vide Act No.16 of 2021
w.e.f.28.03.2021 is not applicable to the application / claim
of the petitioner since the same was not a pending case as
on the date of the amendment which is prospective and not
retrospective and retroactive in nature or operation.
8.1 It is also pointed out that the vested right that
had accrued in favour of the petitioner by virtue of Section
10A(2)(b) which had been recognised, confirmed and
affirmed to the satisfaction of the State Government in its
recommendation vide letter dated 21.07.2017 had stood
crystallized and become effective and implementable in
favour of the petitioner on 28.01.2021 itself when the
petitioner had filed the petition and any subsequent
amendment, more so during the pendency of the petition
will have no bearing or impact on the said crystallized right,
which entitled the petitioner to grant of mining lease in
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terms of the law that existed prior to 28.03.2021 and
asserted by the petitioner as on the date of filing the
petition itself on 28.01.2021.
8.2 It is therefore submitted that since the
amendment dated 28.03.2021 which has come into
existence subsequent to institution of the present petition
does not apply to the application / claim of the petitioner
for grant of mining lease which has been confirmed and
recognised as being eligible by the State Government, the
petitioner is entitled to grant of mining lease and the
subsequent communication dated 11.04.2021 issued during
the pendency of the petition deserves to be quashed.
8.3 In support of his contentions, learned senior
counsel has placed reliance upon the following judgments:-
1. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur &
others Vs. Society for the Promotion of
Education, Adventure Sport &
Conservation of Environment, Allahabad4;
2. Society for the Promotion of Education
Adventure Sport & Conservation of
Environment Vs. Commissioner of Income
Tax, Central & others5;
3. St. Johns Teachers Training Institute Vs.
Regional Director, National Council for
Teacher Education and another6;
4. Naresh Kumar Agarwal Vs. State of
Odisha and others7;
(2017) 11 SCC 480
2008 SCC Online All 1578
(2003) 3 SCC 321
Order dated 09.03.2021 in W.P.(C) No.36935/ 2020 before the Hon'ble Orissa
High Court
- 23 -
5. M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons Vs. Balbir Nath
Mathur & others8;
6. The South Gujarat Roofing Tiles
Manufacturers Association and another Vs.
The State of Gujarat and another9;
7. Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. and another Vs.
State of U.P. and others10;
8. Tahsildar Singh & Another Vs. State of
U.P.11;
9. Casio India Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of
Haryana12;
10. A.A. Haja Muniuddin Vs. Indian
Railways13;
11. Kusheshwar Prasad Singh Vs. State of
Bihar & Others14;
12. Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Ors.
Vs. Union of India and others15;
13. Natural Resources Allocation, In
Re.Special Reference No.1 of 201216;
14. Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal
Secretary and others17;
15. Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd. Vs. S.L. Seal,
Additional Secretary (Steel & Mines),
State of Odisha and others18;
16. S.B. International Ltd., and others Vs.
Asst. Director General of Foreign Trade
and others19;
(1986) 2 SCC 237
(1976) 4 SCC 601
(2005) 2 SCC 515
AIR 1959 SC 1012
(2016) 6 SCC 209
(1992) 4 SCC 736
(2007) 11 SCC 447
(2012) 3 SCC 1
(2012) 10 SCC 1
(2014) 9 SCC 516
(2017) 2 SCC 125
(1996) 2 SCC 439
- 24 -
17. Comptroller and Auditor-General of India,
Gian Prakash, New Delhi and another Vs.
K.S.Jagannathan and another20;
18. The Cheran Transport Co. Ltd. Vs. Kanan
Lorry Service and another21;
19. G.J.Raja Vs. Tejraj Surana22;
20. Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd., Vs.
Amrit Lal & Co. and another23;
Contentions of the Respondents
9. Per contra, learned Central Government Counsel
and learned Additional Government Advocate for the
respondents would reiterate the various contentions urged
in the statement of objections and submit that there is no
merit in the petition and that the same is liable to be
rejected. In support of their contentions, reliance is placed
on the following decisions:-
1. Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd.,
Vs. Commercial Tax Officer and others24;
2. Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma Vs.
Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories25;
3. Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula Vs. Motibhai
Nagjibhai26;
4. Dattatraya Govind Mahajan & others Vs.
State of Maharashtra and another27;
(1986) 2 SCC 679
(1977) 1 SCC 604
(2019) 19 SCC 469
(2001) 8 SCC 397
AIR 1966 SC 12
AIR 1965 SC 980
AIR 1966 SC 459
(1977) 2 SCC 548
- 25 -
5. S. Sundaram Pillai and others Vs. V.R.
Pattabiraman and others28;
6. K. Thirumalesh and others Vs. State of
Karnataka & others29;
7. D. Ramesh Vs. State of Karnataka &
others30;
8. Howrah Municipal Corporation and others
Vs. Ganges Rope Company Limited and
others31;
9. Geomin Minerals and Marketing Private
Limited Vs. State of Orissa and others 32;
10. State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M/s. Hind Stone
and others33
Factual Matrix - W.P.No.8807/2020
10. The petitioner - Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd.,
was granted a Prospecting License on 02.08.2007 for a
period of two years and the Deed of licence was executed in
favour of the petitioner on 21.08.2007. On 09.05.2008, the
petitioner submitted an application for grant of mining lease
in its favour. The various events that transpired between
09.05.2008 and 12.01.2015 when the amendment to the
MMDR Act came into force have been narrated in the
petition. So also, it is contended that the petitioner was
(1985) 1 SCC 591
WP Nos.10601/2019 & connected matters (Order dated 16.08.2019)
ILR 2020 KAR 1755
(2004) 1 SCC 663
(2013) 7 SCC 571
(1981) 2 SCC 205
- 26 -
eligible to obtain a mining lease in terms of Section
10A(2)(b) which came into force on 12.01.2014 and all the
events including clearances, permissions, correspondence
etc., that occurred subsequent to 12.01.2015 till
16.07.2019 on which date, mining lease was sanctioned in
favour of the petitioner have also been pleaded in the
petition.
10.1 It is contended that pursuant to mining lease
having been sanctioned / granted in favour of the petitioner
communicated vide letter dated 25.07.2019, the State
Government issued an Addendum dated 19.08.2019,
subsequent to which, petitioner paid a sum of
Rs.49,79,850/- on 05.09.2019. It is also contended that
despite the aforesaid facts and circumstances and
compliance made by the petitioner, respondents are not
taking any steps to execute the Mine Development and
Production Agreement as well as the mining lease in favour
of the petitioner, who is before this Court by way of the
present petition.
10.2 It is significant to state that in the petition
which was filed on 25.01.2021, petitioner sought for interim
relief's which were not granted for the time being as can be
seen from the order sheet dated 02.02.2021; so also,
- 27 -
though prayers (a) and (b) were given up by the petitioner
vide Affidavit dated 20.03.2021 filed by the petitioner, the
said prayers were revived vide Order on I.A.No.2/2021
dated 22.03.2022.
10.3 It is also relevant to state that during the
pendency of the petition, Section 10A(2)(b) of the MMDR
Act was amended vide Amendment Act No.16 of 2021
w.e.f. 28.03.2021 by incorporating two provisos to the said
provision. These are the provisos which are relied upon by
the respondents in order to contend that the petitioner is
not entitled to any of the reliefs sought for in the petition.
10.4 So also, subsequent to 28.03.2021 as stated
supra, the Central Government has addressed a
communication dated 12.04.2021 to the State Government
to the effect that in view of the provisos to Section
10A(2)(b) referred to supra, the proposal of the petitioner
would not be entitled to grant of mining lease since the
same has lapsed by virtue of the provisos. The said
communication having come into existence subsequent to
institution of the present petition and during its pendency,
the legality, validity and correctness of the said
communication dated 12.04.2021 which has been issued
pursuant to the amendment to Section 10A(2)(b) referred
- 28 -
to supra, is also one of the issues on controversy involved
in the present petition.
11. In this petition also, both Central Government as
well as State Government have filed their statement of
objections putting forth identical contentions in support of
their defence.
Factual Matrix - W.P.No.5973/2021 and
W.P.No.17402/2021
12. Both these petitions are filed by M/s.Shree
Cement Limited. It is contended that prospecting licence
having been granted in favour of the petitioner on
31.08.2007 and 20.11.2007 for a period of two years, an
application for grant of mining lease was filed on
09.11.2009.
12.1 The various events that transpired between
09.11.2009 and 12.01.2015 when the amendment to the
MMDR Act came into force have been narrated in the
petition. So also, it is contended that the petitioner was
eligible to obtain a mining lease in terms of Section
10A(2)(b) which came into force on 12.01.2015 and all the
events including clearances, permissions, correspondence
etc., that occurred subsequent to 12.01.2015 till
16.07.2019 on which date, mining lease was sanctioned in
- 29 -
favour of the petitioner have also been pleaded in the
petitions.
12.2 It is contended that pursuant to mining lease
having been sanctioned / granted in favour of the petitioner
communicated vide letter dated 03.12.2019. It is also
contended that despite the aforesaid facts and
circumstances and compliance made by the petitioner,
respondents are not taking any steps to execute the Mine
Development and Production Agreement as well as the
mining lease in favour of the petitioner who is before this
Court by way of the present petitions.
12.3 It is significant to state that in W.P.5973/2021
which was filed on 22.03.2021, during the pendency of the
petition, Section 10A(2) (b) of the MMDR Act was amended
vide Amendment Act No.16 of 2021 w.e.f. 28.03.2021 by
incorporating two provisos to the said provision. These are
the provisos which are relied upon by the respondents in
order to contend that the petitioner is not entitled to any of
the reliefs sought for in the petition.
12.4 So also, insofar as W.P.No.17402/2021 which
was filed on 18.09.2021 is concerned, it is relevant to state
that on 01.06.2021, the Central Government has addressed
a communication intimating the petitioner that in view of
- 30 -
the provisos to Section 10A(2)(b) referred to supra, the
proposal of the petitioner would not be entitled to grant of
mining lease since the same has lapsed by virtue of the
provisos. The legality, validity and correctness of the said
communication dated 01.06.2021 which has been issued
pursuant to the amendment to Section 10A(2)(b) referred
to supra, has been assailed by the very same petitioner
Shree Cement Limited in this petition.
13. In these petitions also, both Central Government
as well as State Government have filed their statement of
objections putting forth identical contentions in support of
their defence.
14. We have heard Sri.Udaya Holla, learned Senior
counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri.S.S.Mahendra,
learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent
Nos. 1 and 2 as well as Sri.S.Shivakumar, learned Central
Government Counsel for 3rd respondent.
Petitioner's contentions - W.P.No.8807/2020,
W.P.No.5973/2021 and W.P.No.17402/2021
15. In addition to reiterating the various contentions
urged in W.P.No.8807/2020, W.P.No.5973/2021 and
W.P.No.17402/2021 and referring to the material on
- 31 -
record, learned Senior counsel for the petitioners submitted
that the vested right created in favour of the petitioners by
virtue of Section 10A(2)(b) having been inserted by way of
amendment in 2015 having been recognised, confirmed and
affirmed by the State Government which has passed orders
dated 16.07.2019 and 03.12.2019 respectively granting
mining leases in favour of the petitioners stand unaffected
and have not been impacted by the amendment of the year
2021.
15.1 It is submitted that the provisos to Section
10A(2)(b) inserted vide Act No.16 of 2021 w.e.f.28.03.2021
is not applicable to the applications / claims of the
petitioners, since the same were not pending cases as on
the date of the amendment which is prospective and not
retrospective and retroactive in nature or operation. It is
also pointed out that the vested rights that had accrued in
favour of the petitioners by virtue of Section 10A(2)(b)
which had been recognised, confirmed and affirmed by the
State Government who had sanctioned / granted leases in
favour of the petitioners vide orders dated 16.07.2019 and
03.12.2019 respectively stood crystallized and become
effective and implementable in favour of the petitioners on
27.06.2020 and 22.03.2021 itself when the petitioners had
- 32 -
filed the petitions and any subsequent amendment more so
during the pendency of the petitions, will have no bearing
or impact on the said crystallized rights which entitled the
petitioners to grant of mining leases in terms of the law
that existed prior to 28.03.2021 and asserted by the
petitioners as on the date of filing the petitions.
15.2 It is submitted that the State Government
which is the competent authority to grant mining lease had
already passed orders in favour of the petitioners
sanctioning / granting mining leases in their favour and the
execution of a lease deeds were a mere formality and a
mini serial / administrative act which has no nexus or
connection whatsoever to the amendment to Section
10A(2)(b) which is not applicable to the claim of the
petitioners.
15.3 It is therefore submitted that since the
amendment dated 28.03.2021 which has come into
existence subsequent to institution of the present petitions
does not apply to the applications / claims of the petitioners
for execution of the mining leases in their favour which
have been confirmed and recognised as being eligible by
the State Government, which has already sanctioned the
same and consequently, the petitioners are entitled to
- 33 -
obtain the lease deeds in their favour and the
communication dated 01.06.2021 which is assailed in
W.P.No.17402/2021 deserves to be quashed.
In support of his contentions, learned senior counsel
has placed reliance upon the following judgments:-
1. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others Vs.
State of Maharashtra and others34;
2. Gujarat Pottery Works Vs. B.P. Sood,
Controller of Mining Leases for India and
others35;
3. Meena Lakhotia Vs. State of Karnataka &
others36;
4. Aane Mines and Minerals Vs. State of
Karnataka37;
5. J.K.Cement (Western) Limited Vs. The
State of Karnataka and others38
Respondent's Contentions
16. Per contra, learned Central Government Counsel
and learned Additional Government Advocate for the
respondents would reiterate the various contentions urged
in the statement of objections and submit that there is no
merit in the petition and that the same is liable to be
rejected. In support of their contentions, reliance is placed
on the following judgments:-
(1994) 4 SCC 602
AIR 1967 SC 964
WP No.302020/2017 (D.D.31.05.2019)
WP No.15824/2018 (D.D.23.07.2019)
W.P.No.13674/2020 (D.D.08.02.2021)
- 34 -
1. S.B. International Ltd., and others Vs.
Asst. Director General of Foreign Trade
and others39;
2. Commissioner of Municipal Corporation,
Shimla Vs. Prem Lata Sood and others40;
3. Shanti Sports Club and another Vs. Union
of India and others41
17. We have given our anxious consideration to the
rival submissions and perused the material on record.
18. Upon consideration of the rival submissions and
perusal of the material on record, the following point that
arises for consideration in the present petitions;
"Whether the provisos to Section
10A(2)(b) of the Mines and Minerals
Development Act, 1957 as inserted vide
amendment Act No.16 of 2021
w.e.f.28.03.2021 are applicable to the writ
petitioners insofar as the claim for mining
leases are concerned?"
FINDINGS
19. As stated supra, Section 10A was inserted in the
MMDR Act w.e.f.12.01.2015. The said provision comprised
of Section 10A(1) and 10A(2) (a) to 10A(2)(c). By
Amendment Act No.16 of 2021, the provision was amended
(1996) 2 SCC 439
(2007) 11 SCC 40
(2009) 15 SCC 705
- 35 -
by incorporating two provisos to Section 10A(2)(b) as well
as an additional clause as Section 10A(2)(d) w.e.f.
28.03.2021. For easy reference, 10A(2) as it stood prior to
2021 Amendment and subsequently are extracted
hereunder:-
Section 10A prior to Amendment Section 10A subsequent to
Act No.16 of 2021 Amendment Act No.16 of 2021
w.e.f.28.03.2021
(1) All applications received (1) All applications received
prior to the date of prior to the date of
commencement of the Mines commencement of the Mines
and Minerals (Development and and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Amendment Act, Regulation) Amendment Act,
2015 shall become ineligible. 2015 shall become ineligible.
(2) Without prejudice to subs (2) Without prejudice to subs
section (1), the following shall section (1), the following shall
remain eligible on and from the remain eligible on and from the
date of commencement of date of commencement of
Mines and Minerals Mines and Minerals
(Development and Regulation) (Development and Regulation)
Amendment Act, 2015 - Amendment Act, 2015 -
(a) applications received under (a) applications received under
Section 11A of this Act. Section 11A of this Act.
(b) where before the (b) where before the
commencement of the Mines commencement of the Mines
and Minerals (Development and and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Amendment Act, Regulation) Amendment Act,
2015, reconnaissance permit or 2015, reconnaissance permit or
prospecting licence has been prospecting licence has been
granted in respect of any land granted in respect of any land
for any mineral, the permit for any mineral, the permit
holder or the licensee shall holder or the licensee shall
have a right for obtaining a have a right for obtaining a
prospecting licence followed by prospecting licence followed by
a mining lease, or a mining a mining lease, or a mining
lease, as the case may be, in lease, as the case may be, in
respect of that mineral in that respect of that mineral in that
land, if the State Government land, if the State Government
is satisfied that the permit is satisfied that the permit
holder or the licensee, as the holder or the licensee, as the
- 36 -
case may be, - case may be, -
(i) has undertaken (i) has undertaken
reconnaissance operations or reconnaissance operations or
prospecting operations as the prospecting operations as the
case may be, to establish the case may be, to establish the
existence of mineral contents in existence of mineral contents in
such land in accordance with such land in accordance with
parameters as may be parameters as may be
prescribed by the Central prescribed by the Central
Government; Government;
(ii) has not committed any (ii) has not committed any
breach of the terms and breach of the terms and
conditions of the conditions of the
reconnaissance permit or the reconnaissance permit or the
prospecting licence; prospecting licence;
(iii) has not become ineligible (iii) has not become ineligible
under the provisions of this Act under the provisions of this Act
and and
(iv) has not failed to apply for (iv) has not failed to apply for
grant of prospecting licence or grant of prospecting licence or
mining lease, as the case may mining lease, as the case may
be, or within such further be, or within such further
period nor exceeding six period nor exceeding six
months as may be extended by months as may be extended by
the State Government; the State Government;
(c) where the Central Provided that for the cases
Government has communicated covered under this clause
previous approval as required including the pending cases,
under sub section (1) of the right to obtain a
Section 5 for grant of a mining prospecting licence followed by
lease, or if a letter of intent (by a mining lease or a mining
whatever name called) has lease, as the case may be, shall
been issued by the State lapse on the date of
Government to grant a mining commencement of the Mines
lease before the and Minerals (Development and
commencement of Mines and Regulation) Amendment Act,
Minerals (Development and 2021:
Regulation) Amendment Act,
2015, the mining lease shall be Provided further that the holder
granted subject to the of a reconnaissance permit or
fulfilment of conditions of the prospecting licence whose
previous approval or of the rights lapsed under the first
letter of intent within a period proviso shall be reimbursed the
of two years from the date of expenditure incurred towards
commencement of the said Act: reconnaissance or prospecting
operations in such manner as
- 37 -
Provided that in respect of any may be prescribed by the
mineral specified in the First Central Government.
Schedule, no prospecting
licence or mining lease shall be (c) where the Central
granted under clause (b) of this Government has communicated
sub section except with previous approval as required
previous approval of the under sub section (1) of
Central Government. Section 5 for grant of a mining
lease, or if a letter of intent (by
whatever name called) has
been issued by the State
Government to grant a mining
lease before the
commencement of Mines and
Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Amendment Act,
2015, the mining lease shall be
granted subject to the
fulfilment of conditions of the
previous approval or of the
letter of intent within a period
of two years from the date of
commencement of the said Act:
Provided that in respect of any
mineral specified in the First
Schedule, no prospecting
licence or mining lease shall be
granted under clause (b) of this
sub section except with
previous approval of the
Central Government.
(d) in cases where the right to
obtain a licence or lease has
lapsed under clauses (b) and
(c), such areas shall be put up
for auction as per the
provisions of this act:
Provided that in respect of
minerals specified in Part-B of
the First Schedule where the
grade of atomic mineral is
equal or greater than the
threshold value, the mineral
concession for such areas shall
be granted in accordance with
the rules made under Section
11B.
- 38 -
20. As stated supra, the interpretation and
applicability of the provisos to Section 10A(2)(b) as
amended in 2021 falls for consideration in the present
petitions.
21. Before adverting to the rival contentions, the
undisputed facts borne out from the material on record in
W.P.No.1920/2021 are that the petitioner had been granted
a prospecting licence and had applied for grant of mining
lease in 2007 prior to 12.01.2015 when the amendment to
MMDR Act took effect by incorporation of Section
10A(2)(b); subsequently, after following the prescribed
procedure, the State Government was satisfied that the
petitioner's application was eligible and qualified for grant
of mining lease under Section 10A(2)(b) and recommended
to the Central Government for approval vide letter dated
21.07.2017. Thereafter, though the Central Government
issued a letter dated 17.10.2017 raising certain queries,
pursuant to which, there was correspondence between the
State government departments, no further steps in this
regard was taken by the Government and the petitioner
approached this Court by filing the present petition on
28.01.2021. It is also not in dispute that during the
pendency of the petition, Act No.16 of 2021 was enacted by
- 39 -
incorporating the provisos to Section 10A(2)(b), which is
the subject matter of the present petition.
22. Insofar as W.P.No.8807/2020 filed by Dalmia
Cement (Bharat) Limited and W.P.No.5973/2021 and
W.P.No.17402/2021 filed by Shree Cements Limited are
concerned, the respective petitioners were granted
prospective licences and had applied for mining leases prior
to 12.01.2015. However, in these cases, the State
Government has granted / sanctioned mining leases in
favour of the petitioners vide orders dated 16.07.2019 and
03.12.2019 respectively after the Central Government has
granted its approval and the only thing that remained to be
done was execution of mining lease deeds in favour of the
petitioners.
23. In our considered opinion, the said provisos to
Section 10A(2)(b) incorporated vide Amendment Act No.16
of 2021 w.e.f. 28.03.2021 are not applicable to the
petitioners or their claim for grant of mining leases and
execution of mining lease deeds under Section 10A(2)(b)
prior to amendment for the following reasons:-
- 40 -
(i) In the case of Bhushan Power and Steel Limited
vs. State of Orissa42, the Apex Court has held that the right
to obtain a mining lease by prospecting licence holders
under Section 10A(2)(b) is a vested right. In the said
judgment, it was held as under:-
17. Undoubtedly, as per sub-section (1) of
Section 10-A, all applications received prior to
coming into force of the Amendment Act, 2015,
become ineligible. Reason for interpreting such a
provision is not far to seek. Before the passing of
the Amendment Act, 2015, it was the Central
Government which had the ultimate control over
the grant of licences insofar as mining of major
minerals is concerned. As per the procedure then
existing, the State Government could
recommend the application submitted by any
applicant for grant of mining lease to the Central
Government and the Central Government was
given the power to grant or refuse to grant the
approval. Thus, "previous approval" from the
Central Government was essential for grant of
lease, without which the State Government could
not enter into any such lease agreement with
the applicant. Shortcomings of this procedure
were noticed by this Court in its judgment
rendered in Centre for Public Interest Litigation
v. Union of India [Centre for Public Interest
Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1] (for
short "CPIL case") and also in Natural Resources
Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of
2012 [Natural Resources Allocation, In re,
Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC
1] . In these judgments, this Court expressed
that allocation of natural resources should
normally be by auction. Judgment in CPIL case
[Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of
India, (2012) 3 SCC 1] had a direct relevance to
the grant of mineral concessions as the
Government found that it was resulting in
multipurpose litigation which was becoming
counterproductive. Mining Ordinance, 2015 was
(2017) 2 SCC 125
- 41 -
passed on 12-1-2015 which was ultimately
replaced when Parliament enacted the
Amendment Act, 2015.
18. The exhaustive Statement of Objects
and Reasons reveals that the extensive
amendment in the Act were effected after
extensive consultations and intensive scrutiny by
the Standing Committee on Coal and Steel, who
gave their Report in May 2013. As is evident
from the Statement that difficulties were
experienced because the existing Act does not
permit the auctioning of mineral concessions. It
was observed that with auctioning of mineral
concessions, transparency in allocation will
improve; the Government will get an increased
share of the value of mineral resources; and that
it will alleviate the procedural delay, which in
turn would check slowdown which adversely
affected the growth of mining sector.
19. The Amendment Act, 2015, as is
evident from the objects, aims at: (i) eliminating
discretion; (ii) improving transparency in the
allocation of mineral resources; (iii) simplifying
procedures; (iv) eliminating delay on
administration, so as to enable expeditious and
optimum development of the mineral resources
of the country; (v) obtaining for the Government
an enhanced share of the value of the mineral
resources; and (vi) attracting private investment
and the latest technology.
20. The Amendment Act, 2015 ushered in
the amendment of Sections 3, 4, 4-A, 5, 6, 13,
15, 21 and First Schedule; substitution of new
sections for Sections 8, 11 and 13; and,
insertion of new Sections 8-A, 9-B, 9-C, 10-A,
10-C, 11-B, 11-C, 12-A, 15-A, 17-A, 20-A, 30-B,
30-C and Fourth Schedule.
21. These amendments brought in vogue:
(i) auction to be the sole method of allotment;
(ii) extension of tenure of existing lease from the
date of their last renewal to 31-3-2030 (in the
case of captive mines) and till 31-3-2020 (for
the merchant miners) or till the completion of
renewal already granted, if any, or a period of
50 years from the date of grant of such lease;
(iii) establishment of District Mineral Foundation
for safeguarding interest of persons affected by
- 42 -
mining related activities; (iv) setting up of a
National Mineral Exploration Trust created out of
contributions from the mining lease-holders, in
order to have a dedicated fund for encouraging
exploration and investment; (v) removal of the
provisions requiring "previous approval" from the
Central Government for grant of mineral
concessions in case of important minerals like
iron ore, bauxite, manganese, etc. thereby
making the process simpler and quicker; (vi)
introduction of stringent penal provisions to
check illegal mining prescribing higher penalties
up to Rs 5 lakhs per hectare and imprisonment
up to 5 years; and (vii) further empowering the
State Government to set up Special Courts for
trial of offences under the Act.
22. Newly inserted provisions of the
Amendment Act, 2015 are to be examined and
interpreted keeping in view the aforesaid method
of allocation of mineral resources through
auctioning, that has been introduced by the
Amendment Act, 2015. Amended Section 11 now
makes it clear that the mining leases are to be
granted by auction. It is for this reason that sub-
section (1) of Section 10-A mandates that all
applications received prior to 12-1-2015 shall
become ineligible. Notwithstanding, sub-section
(2) thereof carves out exceptions by saving
certain categories of applications even filed
before the Amendment Act, 2015 came into
operation. Three kinds of applications are saved:
22.1. First, applications received
under Section 11-A of the Act. Section
11-A, under new avatar is an exception
to Section 11 which mandates grant of
prospecting licence combining lease
through auction in respect of minerals,
other than notified minerals. Section 11-
A empowers the Central Government to
select certain kinds of companies
mentioned in the said section, through
auction by competitive bidding on such
terms and conditions, as may be
prescribed, for the purpose of granting
reconnaissance permit, prospecting
licence or mining lease in respect of any
area containing coal or lignite.
Unamended provision was also of similar
- 43 -
nature except that the companies which
can be selected now for this purpose
under the new provision are different
from the companies which were
mentioned in the old provision. It is for
this reason, if applications were received
even under unamended Section 11-A,
they are saved and protected, which
means that these applications can be
processed under Section 11-A of the Act.
22.2. Second category of
applications, which are kept eligible
under the new provision, are those
where the reconnaissance, permit or
prospecting licence had been granted
and the permit-holder or the licensee, as
the case may be, had undertaken
reconnaissance operations or
prospecting operations. The reason for
protecting this class of applicants, it
appears, is that such applicants, with
hope to get the licence, had altered their
position by spending lot of money on
reconnaissance operations or
prospecting operations. This category,
therefore, respects the principle of
legitimate expectation.
22.3. Third category is that
category of applicants where the Central
Government had already communicated
previous approval under Section 5(1) of
the Act for grant of mining lease or the
State Government had issued letter of
intent to grant a mining lease before
coming into force of the Amendment Act,
2015. Here again, the raison dêtre is
that certain right had accrued to these
applicants inasmuch as all the necessary
procedures and formalities were
complied with under the unamended
provisions and only formal lease deed
remained to be executed.
22.4. It would, thus, be seen that
in all the three cases, some kind of right,
in law, came to be vested in these
categories of cases which led Parliament
- 44 -
to make such a provision saving those
rights, and understandably so.
(ii) As held by the Apex Court in the aforesaid
judgment, it is clear that the petitioner who has been held
to be eligible and qualified to obtain a mining lease as can
be seen from the State Government recommendation /
report dated 21.07.2017 has a vested right to obtain a
mining lease in terms of Section 10A(2)(b). As a corollary,
it follows there from that the said vested right having been
created and stood accrued in favour of the petitioner by
virtue of Section 10A(2)(b) and confirmed, affirmed and
recognised by the State Government on 21.07.2017, the
said vested right to obtain a mining lease cannot be taken
away or effaced or nullified by subsequent amendment by
insertion of the provisos w.e.f. 28.03.2021.
(iii) In the case of Shankar Lal Nadani vs. Sohan Lal
Jain43, after reviewing the earlier law on the issue, the Apex
Court has reiterated that rights of parties stand crystallized
on the date of institution of the lis and therefore, the law
applicable on the date of filing / institution of the lis will
continue to apply till the same is disposed of or adjudicated
and change of law will not impact or affect the vested right
2022 SCC Online SC 442
- 45 -
of a party that had accrued and stood crystallized in his
favour as on the date of institution of the lis; in this
context, it is relevant to state that the right to obtain a
mining lease and the right to get a lease deed executed in
favour of the respective petitioners which are vested rights
stood crystallized when the respective writ petitions were
filed by the petitioners undisputedly prior to 28.03.2021
when the amendment came into force. In other words, the
right to obtain a mining lease and get the lease deed
executed got crystallized much prior to the amendment
which came into force on 28.03.2021 and consequently, the
said vested right which stood crystallized cannot be said to
have been taken away by the amendment and on this
ground also, in the peculiar and special facts and
circumstances of the instant cases, wherein the respective
petitioners had exercised their right to obtain a mining
lease and lease deed which had become implementable and
executable, the proviso which came into force on
28.03.2021 neither applies nor affects or impacts the right
of the respective petitioners to grant of the reliefs sought
for by them.
(iv) As rightly contended by the learned Senior
counsel for the petitioners, in the context of the proviso
- 46 -
inserted by way of amendment in 2021 and considering the
scheme of the Act and Rules, the words "provided that for
the cases covered under this clause including pending
cases" do not mean any word of extension so as to include
two categories of cases; needless to say that the word
"lapse" occurring in the proviso can mean only pending
cases and not concluded cases and consequently, the
aforesaid words can only be said to mean and include
pending cases where no vested right are accrued in favour
of the parties and not concluded cases. In this context,
useful reference may be made to decision of the Apex Court
in the cases of South Gujarath Roofing Tiles Manufacturers
Association44 and Godfrey Philips India Limited vs. State of
U.P.45.
(v) It is well settled that a proviso to a provision
cannot control the main provision nor be interpreted in a
manner which renders the main provision nugatory or
otiose as held in various judgments including the decisions
of the Apex Court in the cases of Tahsildar Singh vs. State
of U.P.46, Casio India Company Private Limited vs. State of
(1976) 4 SCC 601
(2005) 2 SCC 515
AIR 1959 SC 1012
- 47 -
Haryana47 and Indoor Development Authority vs. Manohal
Lal48. In this context, a valuable right having been created
in favour of the petitioners by 2015 amendment to the
MMDR Act, the proviso which was inserted on 28.03.2021
cannot be interpreted, construed or treated as taking away
the said valuable right which had become a vested right in
favour of the petitioners and confirmed and recognised by
the State Government as stated supra. Viewed from this
angle also, the proviso to Section 10A(2)(b) is not
applicable to the claim of the petitioners for grant of mining
leases and execution of lease deeds.
(vi) As held by the Apex Court in the case of Giridari
Lal vs. Balbir Nath Mathur49, any interpretation /
construction of a provision that would lead to anomalies,
injustice or absurdity should not be adopted and the
interpretation that would advance the object of the
provision should be given effect to. In this context, it has to
be stated that the proviso to Section 10A(2)(b) inserted in
2021 cannot be interpreted in such a narrow or restricted
manner so as to wipe out or nullify all cases where the
lease deeds have not been executed in favour of the
prospecting licence holders who had applied for grant of
(2016) 6 SCC 209
(2020) 8 SCC 12
(1986) 2 SCC 237
- 48 -
mining lease prior to 12.01.2015 which were saved by
virtue of Section 10A(2)(b). The scheme of MMDR Act as
well as the aims and objects of the amendment in 2015,
are a clear pointer to the fact that the proviso inserted in
2021 will not affect cases where vested rights have been
created prior to 28.03.2021 and the said proviso can apply
only to the cases where no such vested rights had been
created prior to 28.03.2021. Such an interpretation will
have to be given to the proviso by dividing the cases
enumerated therein into two categories viz., (i) cases which
stand lapsed on account of no vested right having accrued
or created prior to 28.03.2021 (ii) cases which do not stand
lapsed and are saved on account of vested rights having
accrued or created prior to 28.03.2021. Whilst the former
category stand lapsed, the latter category continued to
remain eligible and their rights to obtain a mining lease and
a lease deed continued to subsist and are not affected by
the proviso to Section 10A(2((b). In the instant cases, as
stated supra, vested rights had already been created in
favour of all the writ petitioners and consequently, the
amendment vide amendment Act no.16 of 2021 w.e.f.
28.03.2021 is not applicable to the rights of the petitioners
to obtain mining leases and lease deeds and on this ground
- 49 -
also, petitioners are entitled to succeed in the instant
cases.
(vii) A perusal of the statement of objects and
reasons to the amendment Act No.16 of 2021 will indicate
that at 4(vi)of the same reads as under:-
"to close pending cases of non - auctioned
concession holders which have not resulted in grant
of mining leases despite passage of considerable
time of more than 5 years..........."
(viii) It is well settled that the statement of objects
and reasons can be used as an extrinsic aid to construction
and interpretation of a statutory provision; the aforesaid
statement indicates that the intention of the legislature was
to close the cases which were pending for more than five
years, thereby indicating that it was not the intention of the
legislature to close cases which were pending for a period
less than five years and such cases which were pending for
a period less than five years were not intended to be closed
or lapsed on account of passage of time by inserting the
proviso to Section 10A(2)(b).
(ix) In the instant cases, undisputedly the period of
five years had not expired prior to 28.03.2021 since the
State Government has submitted its recommendation on
21.07.2017 and lease was sanctioned on 2019 in favour of
the respective petitioners, within the aforesaid period of
- 50 -
five years. Under these circumstances, insofar as the writ
petitioners in the present petitions are concerned, since
their rights had been recognised and confirmed and vested
within a period of five years prior to 28.03.2021, in the light
of the statement of objects and reasons to the amendment
Act no.16 of 2021, it cannot be said that in the peculiar
facts and circumstances, the proviso which came into force
on 28.03.2021 is applicable to the petitioners and that their
application stand lapsed. Viewed from this angle also, the
claim of the petitioners to grant of mining leases and
execution of lease deeds deserve to be upheld.
(x) Yet another significant factor which has to be
taken into account for the purpose of upholding the claims
of the petitioners is the complete and total inaction on the
part of the State Government and Central Government to
ensure that mining leases are granted in favour of the
petitioners and lease deeds being executed in their favour.
Undisputedly, all the petitioners have done all necessary
acts, deeds and things for the purpose of obtaining mining
leases and execution of lease deeds in their favour and the
delay in granting mining leases and executing lease deeds
is not attributable to the writ petitioners; on the other
hand, the material on record clearly discloses that the delay
- 51 -
in doing so is fully and completely attributable to the
respondents and in the light of the well settled principle of
law that state / executive action ought to be done within
reasonable time and that the State cannot take advantage
of its own wrong / inaction / delay, the contention of the
respondents that the proviso inserted in 2021 takes away
the vested rights of the petitioners cannot be countenanced
under any circumstances. Under these circumstances also,
the proviso inserted w.e.f. 28.03.2021 cannot be relied
upon by the respondents to contend that the petitioners are
not entitled to grant of mining lease and execution of lease
deeds, particularly when the respondents themselves are
guilty and responsible of long and inordinate delay in not
taking any steps in this regard till 28.03.2021. The oft
quoted Maxim "Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria
sua propria" (no man can take advantage of his own wrong)
which is a primordial tenet of equity and has also been well
recognised by the Apex Court in a series of decisions is
directly and squarely applicable to the facts of the instant
case, particularly when the State owes a duty to act fairly,
rationally and reasonably in all its spheres of activity and
consequently, the respondents having failed in their legal
and statutory duties to take necessary steps pursuant to
- 52 -
the State Government's approval of the year 2017 and / or
the mining lease sanctioned in 2019, the respondents are
not entitled to take advantage of their own mistake / wrong
and seek shelter under the amendment of the year 2021
which is not applicable to the facts of the instant case on
this ground also.
(xi) Similarly, the Maxim, "Actus curiae neminem
gravabit" (act of court should prejudice no man / no party
should suffer due to the act of court) is also applicable to
the facts of the instant case; as stated supra, the right to
obtain a mining lease and to get the lease deed executed in
their favour had accrued and stood crystallized in favour of
the petitioners as on the date of filing the respective writ
petitions prior to the amendment Act 16 of 2021 w.e.f.
28.03.2021; viewed from this angle also, delay on the part
of the Court in enforcing, implementing and giving effect to
the accrued / crystallized rights of the petitioners cannot
result in causing prejudice or detriment to the petitioners or
their rights; it is therefore clear that the amendment of the
year 2021 to the MMDR Act cannot be interpreted or
construed in a manner so as to cause prejudice or
detriment to the petitioners or their rights, particularly
- 53 -
when this Court had undisputedly taken seisin of the lis
between the parties prior to amendment.
(xii) The reliance placed on the decision of the Apex
court by the respondents in Hindstone's case (supra), is not
correct in the light of the subsequent judgment of the Apex
Court in Bhushan Steel's case (supra), which was dealing
with Section 10A(2)(b), while Hindstone's case was dealt
with other different statutory provisions under the MMDR
Act and Rules and obviously, not Section 10A(2)(b) which
came into force only on 12.01.2015; so also, the other
decisions relied upon by the respondents are clearly
distinguishable on facts and the same are not applicable to
the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant writ
petitions.
(xiii) Insofar as the contention urged by the
respondents with regard to grant of prior approval by the
Central Government is concerned, grant / non-grant of
prior approval has no nexus or connection whatsoever with
regard to interpretation of the applicability / non-
applicability of the proviso inserted in Section 10A(2)(b) by
Amendment Act No.16 of 2021 w.e.f. 28.03.2021; to put it
differently, for the purpose of interpretation of the said
proviso to Section 10A(2)(b) which only deals with
- 54 -
satisfaction of the State Government, the issue regarding
prior approval of the Central Government is neither
germane or relevant to ascertain or adjudicate or decide
the applicability of the said proviso to the claims /
applications of the petitioners and consequently, even this
contention urged by the respondents cannot be accepted.
24. If seen in the light of purposive construction as
well as the mischief rule, it is evident that Parliament was
wanting to eliminate discretion as well as administrative
delay while enacting the 2015 amendment. The MCR, 2016
were enacted pursuant to the said 2015 Amendment and
the time period was prescribed to eliminate the
administrative delay and as such non-adherence to the time
period by the statutory authority cannot be reason to make
the citizens suffer as held in Society for Promotion of
Education Adventure Sport & Conservation of environment
vs CIT50 coupled with the fact that the scheme of Rule 7
whereunder once the State has taken a decision about
satisfaction of the conditions under Section 10A(2)(b), the
State is rendered functus officio. The public interest if any,
is accordingly safeguarded on the State taking a decision
(2017) 11 SCC 480
- 55 -
whereafter the matter cannot be allowed to be kept in a
limbo.
25. We are also persuaded to take this view
keeping in view the objects and reason of the 2021
Amendment Act wherein it has been noticed as under:-
"4. The Mines and Minerals {Developmen t
and Regulation) Amendmen t Bill, 2021, inter
alia, provides for the following, namely :-
(i)- (v).......
(vii) to close the pending cases of non-
auctioned concession holders which have
not resul ted in grant of mining leases
despite passage of a considerable time of
more than five years. The existence of
these cases is anachron istic and
antagonistic to the auction reg ime. The
closure of the pending cases would
facilitate the government to put to
auction a large number of mineral blocks
in the interest of nation resulting in early
operationalization of such blocks and
additional revenue to the state
governments .
26. If the aforesaid objects and reasons and the
amended statute is to be interpreted in the manner being
sought by the Respondents, it would result in absurdities
and anomalies which are to be avoided while interpreting
statutes. Apart from the fact that it would never have been
the intention of Parliament to punish the applicants whose
rights they had originally recognised and protected in the
2015 amendment, for faults and inaction of its own
- 56 -
officers, such an interpretation inter alia would expose the
amendment to challenge as being manifestly arbitrary. As
noticed above, the court should resort to an interpretation
which renders the provision constitutional and not
otherwise. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the
Central Government having failed to take a decision within
the statutorily prescribed period under Rule 7 of MCR,
2016, the recommendation of the State Government was
deemed to be approved for grant of mining lease to the
Petitioner and the execution of the mining lease is merely
a ministerial act which will be done in accordance with law.
Under these circumstances, the said contention of the
respondents cannot be accepted.
27. It is settled law that though legislature can
always make retrospective law, however the presumption
is always that the law is to apply prospectively, unless it
has expressly or impliedly been made retrospective. The
intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the
language of the provisions and external aid can also be
resorted to in the form of objects and reasons of the
amendment. It is equally well settled that an interpretation
- 57 -
which would result in absurdities and anomalies should be
avoided.
28. The Supreme Court in Shyam Sunder v. Ram
Kumar51 discussed in detail the law on the effect of
amendment and retrospective applicability of such law, if
any. The relevant observations are as under:-
" 21. It was also argued that the amending
Act being retrospective, whatever the right the
plaintiff possessed on the date of adjudication of
the suit, the same stood extinguished during
pendency of appeal and therefore, the plaintiff's
suit must fail. Since both the arguments are
overlap ping, we shall consider the effect of the
decision in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar
Lal Chaudhuri (AIR 1941 FC 5 : 1940 FCR 84)
slightly later. Before that, it is necessary to consider
the effect of substituted Section 15 introduced by
the amending Act of 1995 on the substantive rights
of the parties. We would now proceed to examine
whether the said provision of the amending Act is
retrospective as urged by learned counsel for the
appellant.
22. In Maxwell on the Interpretation of
Statutes, 12th Edn., the statement of law in this
regard is stated thus:
"Perhaps no rule of construction is more
firmly established than thus - 'that a retrospective
operation is not to be given to a statute so as to
impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise
than as regards matters of procedure, unless that
effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to
the language of the enactment. If the enactment
is expressed in language which is fairly capable of
either interpretation, it ought to be construed as
prospective only'. The rule has, in fact, two
aspects, for it, 'involves another and subordinate
rule, to the effect that a statute is not to be
construed so as to have greater retrospective
operation than its language renders necessary'."
(2001) 8 SCC 24
- 58 -
6. In Francis Bennion's Statutory
Interpretation, 2nd Edn., the statement of la w is
stated as follows:
"The essential idea of a legal system is that
current law should govern current activities .
Elsewhere in this work a particular Act is
likened to a floodlight switched on or off, and
the general body of law to the circumambient
air. Clumsy though these images are, they
show the inappropriateness of retrospective
laws. If we do something today, we feel that
the law applying to it should be the law in
force today, not tomorrow's back ward
adjustment of it. Such, we believe, is the
nature of law. Dislike of ex post facto law is
enshrined in the United States Constitution
and in the Constitution of many American
States, which forbid it. The true principle is
that lex pros picit non respicit (law looks
forward not back). As Willes,J. said
retrospective legislation is 'contrary to the
general principle that legislation by which the
conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought,
when introduced for the first time, to deal
with future acts, and ought not to change the
character of past transactions carried on upon
the faith of the then existing law'."
24 . In Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah
Chaudhry ( AIR 1957 SC 540 : 1957 SCR
488) this Court observed as thus: (A I R p.
553, para 25)
"The golden rule of construction is that,
in the absence of anything in the
enactment to show that it is to have
retrospective operation, it cannot be so
construed as to have the ef fect of
altering the law applicable to a claim in
litigation at the time when the Act was
passed ."
25. In Da yawati v. lnderjit (AIR 1966 SC
1423 : (1966) 3 SCR 275) it is held thus:
(AI R p . 1426, para 10)
"10. Now as a general proposition , it
may be admitted that ordinarily a court
- 59 -
of appeal cannot take into account a new
law, brought into existence after the
judgment appealed from has been
rendered, because the rights of the
litigants in an appeal are determined
under the law in force at the date of the
suit. Even before the days of Coke,
whose maxim - a new law ought to be
prospective, not retrospective in its
operation - is oft-quoted, courts have
looked with disfavour upon laws which
take away vested rights or affect pending
cases. Matters of procedure are,
however, different and the law affecting
procedure is always retrospective . But it
does not mean that there is an absolute
rule of inviolability of substantive rights.
If the new law speaks in language,
which, expressly or by clear intendment,
takes in even pending matters, the court
of trial as well as the court of appeal
must have regard to an intention so
expressed, and the court of appeal may
give effect to such a law even after the
judgment of the court of first instance."
26. In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of
Maharashtra [(1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC
(Cri) 1087] this Court laid down the ambit
and scope of an amendin g Act and its
retrospective operation as follows: (SCC p .
633, para 26)
"(i) A statute which affects substantive
rights is presumed to be prospective in
operation unless made retrospective,
either expressly or by necessary
intendment, whereas a statute which
merely affects procedure, unless such a
construction is textually impossible, is
presumed to be retrospective in its
application, should not be given an
extended meaning and should be strictly
confined to its clearly-defined limits.
(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation
is procedural in nature, whereas law
relating to right of action and right of
- 60 -
appeal even though remedial is
substantive in nature.
(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in
substantive law but no such right exists
in procedural law.
(iv) A procedural statute should not
generally speaking be applied
retrospectively where the result would be
to create new disabilities or obligations
or to impose new duties in respect of
transactions already accomplished.
(v) A statute which not only changes the
procedure but also creates new rights
and liabilities shall be construed to be
prospective in operation, unless
otherwise provided, either expressly or
by necessary implication."
27 . In K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala
[(1994) 5 SCC 593] (SCC at p.636) this Court
while considerin g the effect of amendment
in the Land Acqui sition Act in pending
proceedings held thus: (SCC para 67)
"67. In the instant case we are
concerned with the ap plication of
the provisions of sub-sect ion (1-A) of
Section 23 as introduced by the
amending Act to acquisition proceedings
which were pending on the date
of commencement of the amendin g Act.
In relation to pending proceedings, the
approach of the courts in England is
that the same are unaf fected by the
changes in the law so far as they
relate to the determination of the
substantive rights and in the absence
of a clear indication of a contrary
intention in an amendin g enactment,
the substantive rights of the parties to
an action fall to be determined by the
law as it existed when the action was
commenced and this is so whether the
law is changed before the hearin g of
the case at the first instance or while an
ap peal is pending. (See Halsbury's
- 61 -
Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, para
922.)"
28. From the aforesaid decisions the legal
position that emerges is that when a repeal
of an enactment is followed by a fresh
legislation, such legislation does not af fect
the substantive rights of the parties on
the date of the suit or adjudication of
the suit unless such a legislation is
retrospective and a court of ap peal cannot
take into consideration a new law broug ht
into existence after the judgment
ap pealed from has been rendered because
the rights of the parties in an appeal are
determined under the law in force on the
date of the suit. However, the position in
law would be different in the matters
which relate to procedural law but so far
as substantive rights of parties are
concerned, they remain unaf fected by
the amendment in the enactment. We are,
therefore , of the view that where a repeal
of provisions of an enactment is followed
by fresh legislation by an amending Act,
such legislation is prospective in operation
and does not affect substant ive or vested
rights of the parties unless made
retrospective either expressly or by
necessary intendment. We are further of
the view that there is a presumption
against the retrospective operation of a
statute and further a statute is not to be
construed to have a greater retrospective
operation than its language renders
necessary, but an amending Act which
af fects the procedure is presumed to be
retrospective, unless the amendin g Act
provides otherwise. We ha ve carefully
looked into the new substituted Section 15
brought in the parent Act by the
Amendment Act, 1995 but do not find
it either expressly or by necessary
implication retrospective in operation
which may affect the rights of the parties
on the date of adjudication of the suit and
the same is required to be taken into
consideration by the ap pellate court. In
Shanti Devi v. Hukum Chand [(1996) 5
SCC 768] this Court had occasion to
- 62 -
interpret the substituted Section 15 with
which we are concerned and held that on
a plain reading of Section 15, it is clear
that it has been introduced prospectively
and there is no question of such section
affecting in any manner the judgment
and decree passed in the suit for pre-
emption affirmed by the High Court in
the second ap peal. We are respectfully in
agreement with the view expressed in the
said decision and hold that the substituted
Section 15 in the absence of anything in it
to show that it is retrospective, does not
affect the right of the parties which
accrued to them on the date of the suit or
on the date of passing of the decree by
the court of first instance. We are also of
the view that the present appeals are
unaf fected by change in law insofar it
related to determination of the
substantive rights of the parties and the
same are required to be decided in the
light of the law of pre-emption as it existed
on the date of passing of the decree."
"34. During the course of argument, a
half-hearted argument was raised that a
substituted section in an Act introduced
by an amending Act is to be treated
having retroactive operation. According
to the learned counsel for the appellant,
the function of a substituted section in
an Act is to obliterate the rights of the
parties as if they never existed . This
argument is noted only to be rejected .
A substituted section in an Act is the
product of an amending Act and all the
effects and consequences that follow in
the case of an amending Act, the same
would also follow in the case of a
substituted section in an Act.
36. Learned counsel then argued that
since the amending Act being a
beneficial legislation, retrospectivity is
implied in it. Assuming for the sake
of argument that right of pre-emption
being a feudal or archaic law and
therefore, the amending Act is a
beneficial legislation meant for the
- 63 -
general benefit of citizens but there is
no such rule of construction that a
beneficial legislation is always
retrospective in operation, even though
such legislation either expressly or by
necessary intendment is not made
retrospective. In the case of Moti
Ram v. Suraj Bhan [AIR 1960 SC 655 :
(1960) 2 SCR 896] it was held thus:
[AIR p.658, para 8]
" It is clear that the amendment mad e is
not in relation to any procedure and
cannot be characterized as procedural. It
is in regard to a matter of substantive
law since it affects the substantive rights
of the landlord. It may be conceded that
the Act is intended to provide relief to
the tenants and in that sense is a
beneficial measure and as such its
provision should be liberally construed;
but this principle would not be material
or even relevant in deciding the question
as to whether the new provision is
retrospective or not. It is well settled that
where an amendment affects vested
rights the amendment would operate
prospectively unless it is expressly made
retrospective or its retrospective operation
follows as a matter of necessary
implication . The amending Act obviously
does not make the relevant provision
retrospective in terms and we see
no reason to accept the suggestion
that the retrospective operation of the
relevant provision can be spelt out as a
matter of necessary implication."
29. The aforesaid principles have also been
reiterated in GJ Raja vs Tejraj Surana52.
30. Similarly, in Suhas H. Pophale v. Oriental
Insurance Co.Ltd53, the Court has observed as under:
(2019) 19 SCC 469
(2014) 4 SCC 657
- 64 -
"45. It has been laid d own by this Court time
and again that if there are rights created in
favour of any per son, whethe r they are
property rights or rights arising from a
transaction in the na ture of a contract, and
particularly if they are protected under a
statute, and if they are to be taken away by
any legislation, that legislation will have to say
so specifically by gi ving it a retrospective
effect. This is because prima facie every
legislation is prospective (see para 7 of the
Constitution Bench judgment in Janardhan
Reddy v. State [AIR 1951 SC 124 : (1951) 52 Cri
LJ 391) ) . In the instant case, the ap pellant
was undoubtedly protected as a "deemed
tenant" under Section 15-A of the Bomba y
Rent Act, prior to the merger of the erstwhile
Insurance Company with a government
company, and he could be removed only by
following the procedure available under the
Bombay Rent Act. A "deemed tenant " under
the Bombay Rent Act, continued to be
protected under the succeeding Act, in view
of the definition of a "tenant" under Section
7(15)(a )(ii ) of the Maharashtra Rent Control
Act, 1999. Thus, as far as the tenants of the
premises which are not covered under the
Public Premises Act are concerned, those
tenants who were deemed tenants under the
Bombay Rent Act continued to ha ve their
protection under the Maharashtra Rent Control
Act, 1999. Should the coverage of their
premises under the Public Premises Act make
a difference to the tenants or occupants of
such premises , and if so, from which date?
46. It has been laid down by this Court
through a number of judgments rendered over
the years, that a legislation is not to be given a
retrospective effect unless specifically provided
for , and not beyond the period that is provided
therein. Thus, a Constitution Bench held in
Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Chaudhry [AI
R 1957 SC 540] that in the absence of any
thing in the enactment to show that it is to be
retrospective, it cannot be so constructed, as to
ha ve the effect of altering the law applicable
to a claim in litigation at the time when the
Act was passed . In that ma tter, the Court was
concerned with the issue as to whether the
- 65 -
appellant's right to file an appeal continued to
be available to him for filing an appeal to the
Andhra Pradesh Hig h Court after it was created
from the erstwhile Madras High Court. The
Constitution Bench [AIR 1957 SC 540] held that
the right very much survived, and the vested
right of appeal can be taken away only by a
subsequent enactment, if it so provides
expressly or by necessary intendment and not
otherwise.
47. Similarly, in Mahadeolal Kanodia v.
Administrator General of W.B. [AI R 1960 SC
936] , this Court was concerned with the
retrospectivity of law passed by the West
Bengal Legislature concerning the rights of
tenants and in para 8 of the judgment the
Court held that: [AIR p. 939]
"8.The principles that ha ve to be applied for
interpretation of statutory provisions of this
nature are well established . The first of these is
that statutory provisions creating substantive
rights or taking away substantive rights are
ordinaril y prospective; they are retrospective
only if by express words or by necessary
implication ...."
48. In Amireddi Raja Gopala Rao v. Amireddi
Sitharamamma [AI R 1965 SC 1970 : (1965) 3
SCR 122), a Constitution Bench was concerned
with the issue as to whether the rights of
maintenance of illegitimate sons of a Sudra
as available under the Mitakshara School of
Hindu law were affected by introduction of
Sections 4, 21 and 22 of the Hindu Ado ptions
and Maintenance Act, 1956. The Court held
that they were not, and observed in para 7 as
follows : (AIR p . 1973)
" 7. ... a statute should be interpreted, if
possible, so as to respect vested rights,
[ Ed.: The words between asterisks are found
in AIR but not in SCR.] and if the words are
open to another construction, such a
construction should never be adopted [Ed.:
The words between asterisks are found in AIR
but not in SCR.]"
- 66 -
49. The same has been the view taken by a
Bench of three Judges of this Court in /TO v.
lnduprasad Devshanker Bhatt [AIR 1969 SC
778] in the context of a provision of the
Income Tax Act, 1961, in the matter of
reopening of assessment orders. In that
matter the Court was concerned with the issue
as to whether the Income Tax Officer could
reopen the assessment under Sections
297(2)(d)(ii) and 148 of the Income Tax Act,
1961, although the right to reopen was barred
by that time under the earlier Income Tax Act,
1922. This Court held that the same was
impermissible and observed in para 5 as
follows: (AIR pp.781-82)
" 5. ... The reason is that such a
construction of Section 297(2)(d)(ii ) would
be tantamount to giving of retrospective
operation to that section which is not
warranted either by the express language of
the section or by necessary implication. The
principle is based on the well-known rule of
interpretation that unless the terms of the
statute expressly so provide or unless there
is a necessary implication, retrospective
operation should not be given to the statute
so as to af fect, alter or destroy any right
already acquired or to revive any remed y
already lost by efflux of time."
49. In Arjan Singh v.
State of Punjab [AI R 1970 SC 703] this Court
was concerned with the issue of d ate of
application of Section 32-KK added into the
Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1955. This Court held in para 4 thereof as
follows: (AIR p. 705)
"4. It is a well-settled rule of construction
that no provision in a statute should be given
retrospective effect unless the legislature by
express terms or by necessary implication
has made it retrospective and that where a
provision is made retrospective, care should
be taken not to extend its retrospective
effect beyond what was intended."
50. In K.C. Arora v. State of Haryana
[(1984) 3 SCC 281 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 520] this
- 67 -
Court was concerned with a service matter and
with the issue as to whether an amendment in
the law could take away the vested rights
with retrospective effect. The Court held that
such an amendment would be invalid if it is
violative of the present acquired or accrued
fundamental rights of the af fected persons.
51. In K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala
[(1994) 5 SCC 593 : AIR 1995 SC 1012], a
Constitution Bench of this Court was concerned
with the retrospective effect of Section 23(1-A)
introduced in the Land Acquisition Act. While
dealing with this provision, this Court has
observed as follows: [SCC pp. 634-35, para
64)
"64. A statute dealing with substantive rights
differs from a statute which relates to
procedure or evidence or is declaratory in
nature inasmuch as while a statute dealing
with substantive rights is prima facie
prospective unless it is expressly or by
necessary implication made to ha ve
retrospective effect, a sta tute concerned
mainly with matters of procedure or evidence
or which is declaratory in nature has to be
construed as retrospective unless there is a
clear indication that such was not the intention
of the legislature. A statute is regarded as
retrospective if it operates on cases or facts
coming into existence before its commencement
in the sense that it af fects, even if for the
future only, the character or consequences of
transactions previously entered into or of other
past conduct. By virtue of the presumption
ag ainst retrospective applicability of laws
dealing with substantive rights transactions are
neither invalidated by reason of their failure to
comply with formal requirements subsequentl y
imposed, nor open to attack under powers of
avoidance subsequently conferred. They are
also not rendered valid by subsequent
relaxations of the law, whether relating to form
or to substance . Similarly, provisions in which
a contrary intention does not appear neither
impose new liabilities in respect of events taking
place before their commencement, nor relieve
persons from liabilities then existing, and the
view that existing obligations were not
- 68 -
intended to be affected has been taken in
varying degrees even of provisions expressly
prohibiting proceedings. (See Halsbury's Laws
of England, 4th Edn ., Vol. 44, paras 921, 922,
925 and 926)"
52. In Gajraj Singh v. S TAT [(199 7) 1 SCC
650 : AIR 1997 SC 412], the Court was
concerned with the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act and repealing of some of its
provisions. In para 29 referring to Southerland
on Statutory Construction (3rd Edn.) Vol. I,
the Court quoted the following observations:
(SCC p . 668)
"29. ... '... Effect on vested righ ts Under
common law principles of construction and
interpretation the repeal of a statute or the
abrogation of a common law principle
operates to divest all the rights accruing
under the repealed statute or the abrogated
common law, and to halt all proceedings not
concluded prior to the repeal. However, a
right which has become vested is not
dependent upon the common law or the
statute under which it was acquired for its
assertion, but has an independent existence.
Consequently, the repeal of the statute or
the abrogation of the common law from
which it originated does not ef face a vested
right, but it remains enforceable without
regard to the repeal.
In order to become vested, the right must be a
contract right, a property right, or a right
arising from a transaction in the nature of a
contract which has become perfected to the
degree that the continued existence of the
statute cannot further enhance its acquisition."
31. The MMDR Amendment Act 2021 has to be
interpreted keeping in view the principles laid down by
the Supreme Court in Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar
and Suhas H. Pophale v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.
- 69 -
According to the respondents, all cases under Section
10A(2)(b) would stand covered by the said provision.
The argument though attractive at first does not merit
acceptance. To accept the said submission would result
in completely rendering Section 10A(2)(b) otiose. The
said section protected rights of a certain category of
persons who would stand vested with rights to obtain
the mining concession on satisfaction being arrived at by
the State Government. If the contention is accepted
then all those cases where the satisfaction of the State
has been arrived at, including where previous approval
of the Central Government, where necessary, has also
been given and the mining lease has not been executed
awaiting the grant of statutory permissions like mining
lease, environmental clearances, forest clearances etc,
the same would also stand lapsed. This would be
contrary to the objective being sought to be achieved
viz., to avoid delay. The lapsing of such rights and
auctioning the lease would not result in immediate
production of minerals as even after auction the
successful bidder would have to obtain the clearances
and permissions in terms of Rule 10 of the Mineral
(Auction) Rules, 2015 and considering that t he taking of
- 70 -
permissions is time consuming a period of 5 years is
provided to execute the lease deed. In effect, if all cases
which would fall within Section 10A(2)(b) are to be
considered to be covered by the proviso then it would
necessarily lead to another 5 years or even more taking
into account the process of auction would also take
some time, before mineral production can start. This
would never have been the intention of the legislature or
the effect contemplated.
32. Being conscious of the outcome that the
legislature desired the term "cases covered under this
clause" was qualified by "including pending cases". The
use of the word "includes" or "including" though
generally used as a means of extension, however this is
not an inflexible rule and depending on the context in
which it is used, it can also refer to "means".
33. In South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers
Association and Anr. vs State of Gujarat & Anr.,54 the
Supreme Court while considering explanation to entry 22
to Schedule of Minimum Wages Act and considering the
context in which it was used arrived at the findings that
(1976) 4 SCC 601
- 71 -
the word "includes" had not been used as a word of
extension but rather as a word of limitation and in the
sense of "means". The said conclusion was arrived at by
the Court as though the entry 22 was couched in wide
terms as "employment in pottery industry" vide the
explanation it was mentioned that the entry would
include manufacture of 9 articles of pottery. As such no
purpose would have been achieved by use of the term
'includes' as it is generally understood as a word of
extension. It would be worthwhile to produce the
reasoning of the Hon'ble Court:
"3. The question turns on a true construction
of the explanation to entry 22 which says that for
the pur pose of this entry potteries industry
"includes" the manufacture of the nine "articles of
pottery" specified therein. Pottery in a wide sense
will take in all objects that are made from clay and
hardened by fire, from crude earthen pots to
delicate porcelain. Mr Patel appearing for the
respondent, State of Gujarat, contends that the
explanation indicates that potteries ind ustry in
Entry 22 is intended to cover all possible
articles of pottery includin g Mang alore pattern
roofing tiles. Referring to the well-known use of
the word 'include' in interpretation clauses to
extend the meaning of words and phrases
occurring in the body of the statute, Mr Patel
submits that the explanation, when it says that
potteries industry "includes" the nine named
objects, what is meant is that it includes not only
these objects but other articles of pottery as well.
It is true that "includes" is generally used as a word
of extension, but the meaning of a word or phrase
is extended when it is said to include things that
would not properly fall within its ordinary
- 72 -
connotation. We may refer to the often quoted
observation of Lord Watson in Dilworth v.
Commissioner of Stamps [1899 AC 99, 105-106 :
79 LT 473 : 15 TLR 61] that when the word
"include" is used in interpretation clauses to
enlarge the meaning of words or phrases in the
statute
"these words or phrases must be construed
as comprehending, not only such things as they
signify accordin g to their natural import but also
those things which the interpretation clause
declares that they shall include."
Thus where "includes" has an extending
force, it adds to the word or phrase a meanin g
which does not naturally belong to it. It is difficult
to agree that "includes" as used in the
explanation to Entry 22 has that extendin g force.
The explanation says that for the pur pose of Entry
22, potteries industry includes the manufacture of
the nine "articles of pottery" specified in the
explanation. If the objects specified are also
"articles of pottery", then these objects are
alread y comprised in the expression "potteries
industry". It hardly makes any sense to say that
potteries industry includes the manufacture of
articles of pottery, if the intention was to enlarge
the meanin g of potteries industry in any way."
"5............................. Pottery is an expression
of very wide import, embracing all objects made of
clay and hardened by heat. If it had been the
legislature's intention to bring within the entry all
possible articles of pottery, it was quite
unnecessary to add an explanation.
................................... It seems to us therefore
that the legislature did not intend everything that
the potteries industry turns out to be covered by
the entry. What then could be the purpose of the
explanation. The explanation says that, for the
pur pose of Entry 22, potteries ind ustry "includes"
manufacture of the nine articles of pottery named
therein. It seems to us that the word "includes"
has been used here in the sense of 'means'; this is
the only construction that the word can bear in
the context. In that sense it is not a word of
extension, but limitation; it is exhaustive of the
meaning which must be given to potteries industry
- 73 -
for the pur pose of Entry 22. The use of the word
"includes" in the restrictive sense is not unknown."
34. Similarly in the present case the term "cases
covered under this clause" was sufficient and wide
enough to cover all cases however the use of word
"including" reflects that the legislature wished to
restrict the proviso only to "pending cases" and not all
cases to avoid the anomaly it would result in, as
noticed above. The word "including" in the proviso to
Section 10A(2)(b) as such is used as a limiting word
and not as an extension or expansion and is to be
understood in the sense of "means" .
35. The intention of the legislature not to cover all
cases covered by Section 10A(2)(b) can also be deduced
from sub-clause (d) inserted in Section 10A(2) by the
very same amending Act . The said sub-clause reads as
under:
"( d) in cases where right to obtain licence or
lease has lapsed under, clauses (b) and (c), such
areas shall be put up for auction as per the
provisions of this Act:"
The use of the phrase "in cases where right to obtain
licence or lease has lapsed .........such areas" clearly
shows that the right does not lapse in all cases covered
- 74 -
by Section 10A(2)(b) and that certain cases would be
saved from the proviso. Otherwise, the legislature
would have simply stated that the "areas in cases
covered by clause (b) and (c) shall be put up for auction
as per the provisions of this Act :"
36. This brings us to the next logical question as to
which cases would be covered under the term "pending
cases". The answer to the said question is also in the
language of Section 10A(2)(b) which provides that a
person shall have a right for obtaining the mining lease
on satisfaction of the State Government of the
conditions mentioned in clause (i) to (iv). The relevant
extract of the Section reads as under :
"(b) where before the commencement of the Mines
and Minerals (Development and Regulation)
Amendment Act, 2015 a reconnaissance permit or
prospecting license has been granted in respect of
any land for any mineral, the permit holder or the
licensee shall have a right for obtaining a prospecting
license followed by a mining lease, or a mining lease,
as the case may be, in respect of that mineral in that
land, if the State Government is satisfied that the
permit holder or the licensee, as the case may be- "
Therefore, where the satisfaction of the State
Government has been arrived at, the State is rendered
functus officio and the right stands crystallized. The
proviso seems to have an effect of lapsing the right to
- 75 -
obtain, which could only be referable to cases where the
satisfaction is not yet/yet to be arrived at and not to
cases where satisfaction is already arrived at by the
State Government.
37. Further the term "lapse" as used in the
proviso to Section 10A(2)(b)is generally used for
reverting .of a right from a party which has failed to
fulfill its obligations or conditions under which such
right was given. The said term "lapse" is also used in
Section 4A(4) of the MMDR Act where again the right
lapses on failure of the lessee to start mining
operations. Parliament has employed the said term
also in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
whereunder on the failure of the statutory authority to
compete the acquisition process within the statutorily
prescribed time period, the acquisition proceedings
lapse. The said term is defined in Black's Law Dictionary
(8th edn, 2004) as under:-
"the termination of a right or privilege because of
failure. to exercise it within some time limit or
because the contingency has occurred or not
occurred"
- 76 -
38. Therefore, keeping in view the aforesaid
principles and the use of specific terms, it is evident that
the legislature was desirous of applying the proviso to
only a certain class of persons within Section 10A(2)(b)
viz ., those who had either till date not completed the
reconnaissance or prospecting operations despite 5
years from 2015, which was the outer limit provided by
the Act under unamended Section 7 or those whose
applications were yet to be processed and the State had
not arrived at the satisfaction. Any other interpretation
would do violence to the language and intention of
the legislature . It would never have been the intention
of the legislature to punish a party who had complied
with the law or to allow the executive to defeat the rights
of parties by delaying performing their duties.
39. We are also persuaded to interpret the
proviso as aforesaid on the well recognized principles of
effects of proviso as propounded in a recent
constitutional bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal55:
"192. A proviso has to be construed as a part of the
clause to which it is ap pended. A proviso is added
(2020) 8 SCC 12
- 77 -
to a principal provision to which it is attached. It
does not enlarge the enactment. In case the
provision is repugnant to the enacting part, the
proviso cannot prevail ............ :
194.................
R. v. Dibdin {R. v. Dibdin, 1910 P 57 (CA)], held as
under : (P p . 125)
"The fallacy of the proposed method of
interpretation is not far to seek. It sins against the
fundamental rule of construction that a proviso
must be considered with relation to the principal
matter to which it stands as a proviso. It treats it as
if it were an independent enacting clause instead of
being dependent on the main enactment. The
courts ... have refused to be led astray by
arguments such as those which have been
addressed to us, which depend solely on taking
words absolutely in their strict literal sense,
disregarding the fundamental consideration that
they are ap pearing in the proviso."
"198. In keeping with the ratio in the aforesaid
decisions, this Court is of the considered view that
the proviso cannot nullify the provision of Section
24{1){b ) nor can it set at naught the real
object of the enactment, but it can further
by providing higher compensation, thus dealing
with matters in Section 24 (2) ............"
40. If the legislature was desirous of revoking the
said vested rights, the amendment would have been
made to the main provision or the said provision could
have been omitted with retrospective effect. Having not
done so and rather having opted the legislative tool of
a proviso being inserted to the main provision, the
well settled principles of the object and purpose of a
proviso would come into play. The Respondents have
- 78 -
also relied on a large number of judgments with regard
to effect of a proviso, however none of the said
judgments support the view that the proviso can have
the effect of nullifying the main provision itself, as such
the present judgment is not being burdened with the
said judgments which have otherwise been considered
by the constitution bench in Indore Development
(supra).
41. As the proviso does not take away vested
ri ghts with retrospective effect, the writ petition which
has been filed by the petitioner claiming that the right
under Section 10A(2)(b) of the Mines and Minerals
(Development and R egulation) Act, 1957 as already
fructified and being a vested right, has to be proceeded
with based on the law as it stood then and taken to its
logical conclusion.
42. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances,
we are of the considered opinion that the provisos to
Section 10A(2)(b) of the MMDR Act, 1957 as inserted vide
Amendment Act No.16 of 2021 w.e.f. 28.03.2021 are not
applicable to the applications, claims etc., of the petitioners
who are entitled to obtain mining leases and lease deeds
- 79 -
from the State Government without reference to the said
amendment or the proviso inserted thereby.
43. We accordingly answer the point formulated
above in favour of the petitioners.
44. In the result, we pass the following:-
ORDER
(i) W.P.No.1920/2021 is allowed. The respondent
No.1 as well as respondent Nos.2 and 3 are directed to
issue the necessary orders for grant of lease under sub-
clause (9) of Rule 7 of Mineral Concession Rule, 2016 within
a period of 6 weeks whereafter the petitioner will be
entitled to execution of the lease deed on satisfying the
conditions stipulated in clause (10) of Rule 7 of Mineral
Concession Rule, 2016.
(ii) W.P.No.8807/2020 is hereby allowed and the
respondents are directed to take necessary steps to
execute Mine Development and Production Agreement and
Mining Lease in favour of the petitioner and do all
necessary acts, deeds and things pursuant thereto in
accordance with law without reference to the provisos to
Section 10A(2)(b) of the MMDR Act, 1957 as inserted vide
Amendment Act No.16 of 2021 w.e.f. 28.03.2021 as
- 80 -
expeditiously as possible and within a period of six weeks
from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
(iii) W.P.No.17402/2021 is hereby allowed and the
impugned order / letter dated 01.06.2021 passed / issued
by the 3rd respondent is hereby quashed.
(iv) W.P.No.5973/2021 is hereby allowed and the
respondents are directed to take necessary steps to
execute Mine Development and Production Agreement and
Mining Lease in favour of the petitioner and do all
necessary acts, deeds and things pursuant thereto in
accordance with law without reference to the provisos to
Section 10A(2)(b) of the MMDR Act, 1957 as inserted vide
Amendment Act No.16 of 2021 w.e.f. 28.03.2021 as
expeditiously as possible and within a period of six weeks
from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Sd/-
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
JUDGE
Srl/SJ
