Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 5444 Kant
Judgement Date : 25 March, 2022
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF MARCH 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
R.S.A.No.395 of 2015 [PAR]
BETWEEN:
1. SRI CHIKKA ANJINAPPA
SON OF LATE PILLAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
RESIDING AT KUDUVATHI VILLAGE,
NANDI HOBLI - 562103
CHIKKABALLAPUR TALUK AND DISTRICT
...APPELLANT
(By Sri D. P. MAHESH ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . ANJINAPPA
SON OF MUNISHAMAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
2 . SMT. CHIKKA AKKAYYAMMA
W/O LATE PILLAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS,
3 . P. NARAYANA SWAMY
S/O LATE PILLAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
R1 TO RE ARE RESIDING AT
KUDUVATHI VILLAGE- 562103
CHIKKABALLAPURA TALUK & DISTRICT
2
4 . V. SRINIVASA RAJU
S/O OF VARADARAJU,
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS,
R/AT NO.115/A, 9THMAIN ROAD,
RAJAMAHAL VILAS EXTENSION,
SADASHIVANAGARA,
BANGALORE 560080
...RESPONDENTS
(By SRI.V.B.SHIVAKUMAR ADVOCATE FOR R4;
NOTICE TO R1 TO R3 DISPENSED WITH)
THIS APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF THE
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT
& DECREE DATED 02.08.2014 PASSED IN R.A. NO.80 OF
2009 ON THE FILE OF THE PRL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE & CJM,
CHIKKBALLAPUR, ALLOWING THE APPEAL AND SETTING
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DTD 29.6.2009 PASSED
IN O.S. NO.476 OF 2006 ON THE FILE OF THE ADDL. CIVIL
JUDGE (JR.DN) & JMFC, CHIKKBALLAPUR.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 11.03.2022, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENTTHIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for partition
which was instituted by the appellant in respect of an
agricultural land bearing Sy.No.141 measuring 3 acres 26
guntas.
2. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court and the
plaintiff was granted 1/6th share.The Appellate Court has,
however, reversed the decree and dismissed the suit.
3. The facts as ascertained by both the Courts and
which are not in serious dispute, are as follows:
a. The suit property belonged to one Smt. Thippe
Hanumakka @ Hanumakka, who was the
grandmother of the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to
3. Thippe Hanumakka had purchased the suit
property under a registered sale deed dated
21.12.1937 (Ex.D-2).
b. On 31.01.1961, her two sons Munishamappa (i.e.,
the father of defendant No.1) and Pillaiah (the
husband of defendant No. 2, the father of plaintiff
and defendant No. 3) sold the property to one
Kyathappa under Ex.P-7, a registered sale deed.
c. Thereafter, on 25.01.1973, Kyathappa sold the
property to the father of defendant No.1 vide
Ex.D-5.
d. Thereafter, defendant No.1 executed a sale deed on
26.09.1984 in favour of defendant No.4 (Ex D-6).
Thippe Hanumakka, had in the meantime, passed
away on 25.11.1980.
4. Thus, as per the facts as ascertained by the Courts
below, the suit property belonged to Thippe Hanumakka
and during her life-time, her sons sold the property to
Kyathappa and Kyathappa in turn re-conveyed the
property to the father of defendant No.1 and thereafter,
defendant No.1 sold the property in favour of defendant
No.4.
5. The Trial Court on consideration of the evidence
took the view that the sale deed dated 31.01.1961,
whereby the two sons of Thippe Hanumakka sold the
property to Kyathappa, was a void document inasmuch
as they themselves did not possess any title in order to
convey title to Kyathappa. The Trial Court noticed that as
on 31.01.1961, Thippe Hanumakka was very much alive
and therefore, the sale deed executed by her sons in
respect of the property owned by their mother who was
very much alive, was invalid and could not convey title to
Kyathappa.
6. The Trial Court thereafter came to the conclusion
that since the initial conveyance by the father of
defendant No.1 and Pillaiah, (the husband of defendant
No. 2, the father of plaintiff and defendant No. 3) was
itself void, all subsequent transactions including the re-
conveyance to the father of defendant No.1 was of no
consequence.
7. The Trial Court has also taken note of the fact that
the general power of attorney holder of defendant No.4,
who was examined as DW-1, clearly admitted that the
possession was not delivered to defendant No.4 and
defendant No.4 had not cultivated the property at all. It
also noticed that he had given a categorical admission
that the plaintiff continued to be in possession of the
property.
8. It has also recorded a finding that, right from 1965
to 1972, the name of Thippe Hanumakkahad been
entered in the revenue records and this indicated that
the alienation was not to the notice of Thippe
Hanumakka. The Trial Court accordingly concluded that
the suit property, on the death of Thippe Hanumakkain
1980,devolved on to both her sons and thereafter, after
their death, it had devolved on to the plaintiff and
defendant Nos.1 to 3.
9. The plaintiff, being the son of Thippe Hanumakka's
second son, Pillaiah, and one of this three legal heirs,
defendant No 2 and 3 being the other two legal heirs,
was thus entitled to 1/6th share in the suit property. The
Trial Court further held that defendant No.4 was entitled
to succeed to the entire half shareof defendant No.1 by
virtue of the sale deed 26.09.1984 executed by him in
his favour. It also held that the sale deed dated
26.09.1984 executed in favour of defendant No.4 did not
bind the plaintiff.
10. Defendant No.4, being aggrieved, preferred an
appeal. The Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the
evidence,concluded that Thippe Hanumakka during her
lifetime and right till her death in the year 1980, had not
chosen to challenge the sale deed executed by her sons
and since, she had slept over her rights, she had lost title
over the suit property.
11. The Appellate Court heldthat thereafter defendant
No.1 had purchased the suit property for a valuable
consideration and had became its absolute owner. It also
held that the sale made by defendant No.1 in favour of
defendant No.4 was therefore valid.
12. The Appellate Court stated that the suit property
was the Sthridhana property of Thippe Hanumakka, but
however, her sons had without any right, title or interest
in the same, had sold it to Kyathappa. It took the view
that since the sale deed executed by her sons in favour
of Kyathappa was not challenged by Thippe Hanumakka,
she had lost her title in the year 1961 itself and
therefore, the subsequent sale deeds in favour of
defendant No.1 and defendant No.4 were valid and
defendant No.4 had acquired valid title over the suit
property. The Appellate Court accordingly allowed the
appeal and dismissed the suit.
13. This second appeal was admitted to consider the
following substantial questions of law:
"(i) When it was the admitted case of all the
parties that the suit property belonged to
Smt.Thippe Hanumakka (grandmother of
the plaintiffs and defendant No.2)
(wrongly typed as defendant No 3 in the
order sheet) who had purchased the
property under a registered sale deed
dated 21.12.1937, whether the sons
Sri.Anjinappa and Sri.Pillaiah could have
alienated the property on 31.01.1961?
(ii) Whether defendant No.1 on re-purchasing
the property on 25.01.1973 could have
acquired any title to the suit property?
(iii) Whether the alienations made by the sons
of Smt.Thippe Hanumakka had any
consequence on the divesting of title of
Smt.ThippeHanumakka who was alive
when the property was alienated on
31.01.1961 and was re-purchased by
defendant No.1 on 25.01.1973?"
14. As noticed above, it is not in dispute that Thippe
Hanumakka purchased the suit property under a
registered sale deed dated 21.12.1937 and it was thus
her absolute property. It is not in dispute that on
31.01.1961, her sons Munishamappa--the father of
defendant No.1 and Pillaiah (the husband of defendant
No. 2, the father of plaintiff and defendant No. 3), sold
the property in favour of one Kyathappa.
15. In the light of the admitted fact that the suit
property was purchased by Thippe Hanumakka in 1937
and the further admitted fact that she was very much
alive in 1961, it is inconceivable that the sons of Thippe
Hanumakka could have alienated the property in favour
of Kyathappa. Admittedly, their mother possessed title
over the property and she was very much alive and it is
thus as clear as day that they did not possess any
title/transferable interest in the suit property in favour of
Kyathappa. As rightly held by the Trial Court, this sale
deed was non estand did not convey any title at all in
favour of Kyathappa. As a further consequence, it is also
clear that the title had always remained with Thippe
Hanumakka.
16. Defendant No.1 claimed to have re-purchased the
property on 25.01.1973 from Kyathappa. If Kyathappa--
the purchaser had acquired no title in the suit property
by virtue of the sale in his favour, the question of
Kyathappa conveying the title to defendant No.1 under
this sale deed dated 25.01.1973 would not at all arise.
Consequently, since defendant No.1 had no title to the
suit property, the question of him conveying the title of
the suit property to defendant No.4 would also not arise.
17. Section 7 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882categorically states that every person competent to
contract and entitled to transferable property, or
authorised to dispose of transferable property not his
own, is competent to transfer the property either in
whole or in part. Thus, to have the competence to
transfer, the transferor is required to be not only
competent to contract, but more importantly he should
be entitled to a transferable interest in the property.
________________
7. Persons competent to transfer.- Every person competent to contract and entitled to transferable property, or authorized to dispose of transferable property not his own, is competent to transfer such property either wholly or in part, and either absolutely or conditionally, in the circumstances, to the extent and in the manner, allowed and prescribed by any law for the time being in force.
18. Admittedly, since Thippe Hanumakka had
purchased the property under a registered sale deed
dated 21.12.1937 and had not transferred her interest in
favour of her sons nor had she authorised them to
dispose off the property, it is clear that the conveyance
of the suit property by the sons of Thippe Hanumakkain
favour of Kyathappa would have absolutely no
consequence. Consequently, the re-purchase by
defendant No 1 and the subsequent sale in favour of
defendant No.4 would also be non est.
19. The Trial Court has noticed that there was a clear
admission on the part of defendant No.4 that the plaintiff
continued to be in possession of the suit property and the
possession was never delivered to defendant No.4. It
also noticed that defendant No.4 had admitted that
Thippe Hanumakka was very much alive when the first
sale deed of the year 1961 was executed and also when
the property was said to have been re-purchased by
defendant No.1 in the year 1973. Having regard to
theseclear findings that Thippe Hanumakka's property
was sought to be dealt with by her sons during her life-
time, which were of no consequence at all, the Trial
Court was absolutely justified in coming to the conclusion
that the sale deed relied upon by defendant No.4 would
also be of no consequence and that the said sale deed
did not bind the plaintiff in any manner.
20. The Trial Court has held that the sale in favour of
defendant No.4 insofar as it related to the share of
defendant No.1 was concerned, was valid. The Trial Court
was, therefore, justified in granting the plaintiff only 1/6th
share.
21. As a result, the questions of law framed in this
appeal would have to be answered in favour of the
appellant/plaintiff and it will have to be held that the
sons of Thippe Hanumakka could not have alienated the
property on 31.01.1961 and consequently, the alleged
re-purchase by defendant No.1 on 25.01.1973 which was
of no consequence,did not vest any title in favour of
defendant No.1. As a further consequence, the
subsequent alienation made by defendant No. 1 in favour
of defendant No.4 would also be of no consequence in so
far as the plaintiff is concerned.
22. The learned counsel for the purchaser
Sri.V.B.Shivakumar, however, sought to contend that
there was no plea regarding the alienation made in the
plaint and no issue had been framed regarding the
alienation and the suit could not therefore be maintained.
He also contended that there was no issue framed
regarding the limitation despite a specific plea being
raised by defendant No.4. He submitted thatthe pleaof
the plaintiff was that the suit property was a joint family
property and in the light of the fact that the property was
acquired by Thippe Hanumakka, the entire plea by the
plaintiff was misconceived and the suit could not
therefore have been decreed.
23. He also submitted that Thippe Hanumakka had lost
possession and title, and after her death, there were no
inheritance proceedings initiated by her legal
representatives and since at no pint of time there was
challenge made to the sale deed executed in favour of
Kyathappa, either by Thippe Hanumakka or the plaintiff,
the Appellate Court was justified in dismissing the suit.
24. The plaintiff in his plaint clearly stated that the suit
property belonged to his grandmother--
ThippeHanumakkaandon her death her two sons--
Munishamappaand Pillaiah had succeeded to the suit
property and on their death, the plaintiff and defendant
Nos.1 to 3 had succeeded to the suit property as the
legal heirs. This plea by itself establishes that the
plaintiff was essentially laying a claim over the suit
property on the basis that,the property was that of his
grand-mother and his father had inherited a share, and
on the death of his father, he had inherited his father's
share. In my view, this plea is more than adequate in a
suit for partition.
25. As far as the argument that there was no issue
regarding the limitation, it has to be stated here that the
plaintiff pleaded that he was in joint possession.
Defendant No.4 categorically stated as follows in his
deposition:
"...zÁªÁ ¸ÀévÀÛ£ÀÄß Rjâ¸ÀĪÁUÀ ºÀ£ÀĪÀÄPÀÌ EªÀgÀÄ §zÀÄQzÀÝgÄÀ . ºÀ£ÀĪÀÄPÀÌ EªÀgÀÄ fêÀAvÀªÁVgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ UÉÆwÛzÀÄÝ, CªÀjUÉ ¸ÉÃjzÀ zÁªÁ ¸ÀévÀÛ£ÀÄß 1£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ PÀqɬÄAzÀ Rjâ¹gÀÄvÉÛÃ£É CAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. ºÀ£ÀĪÀÄPÀÌ EªÀgÀÄ zÁªÁ ¸ÀéwÛ£À ¸Áé¢üãÀªÀ£ÀÄß ©lÄÖ PÉÆqÀ°®è CAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. £ÁªÀÅ zÁªÁ ¸ÀévÀÛ£ÀÄß Rjâ¹zÁUÀ ºÀ£ÀĪÀÄPÀÌ EªÀgÉà zÁªÁ ¸ÀéwÛ£À ¸Áé¢üãÀzÀ°èzÀÝgÀÄ CAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. ..."
26. In the light of this clear admission by DW-1 that
possession was not delivered to defendant No.4 and even
when hehad purchased the property,the fact that Thippe
Hanumakkawas in possession would by itself prove that
the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property and
therefore, the question of the suit being barred by
limitation would never arise.
27. The learned counsel also sought to contend that it
was necessary for Thippe Hanumakka to have challenged
the sale deed executed in favour of Kyathappa, since it
was by way of a registered document. He submitted that
a registered instrument, even if it is executed by a
person who does not possess title, would have to be
impugned before the Court and only then could the effect
of the sale deed be nullified.
28. It has to be stated here that the requirement of
seeking for cancellation of an instrument or for a
declaration that the sale deed would not be binding on a
person would arise only if that person is a party to the
document. If a person is not a party to the document,
the question of him seeking for a declaration that a
document executed by a third party does not bind him
would not arise at all.
29. The facts of the present case clearly goes to show
that despite the so-called sale deed in favour of
Kyathappa, the revenue entries for the years 1965 to
1972 continued in the name of Thippe Hanumakka. This
also proves that Thippe Hanumakka would have no
knowledge about the sale deed and even if she did have
any knowledge, it was not necessary, in law, for her to
seek for a declaration that the sale deed was not binding
on her.
30. It is a settled position of law that a person who
does not possess a title cannot convey title to another
person and such an act would be a nullity in law. An act
which is a nullity in law, can be ignored by the Courts
and is not required to be challenged in a Court of law.
The argument of the learned counsel in this regard is
hence without any merit and is accordingly rejected.
31. In view of the discussion made above, the
questions of law have to held in favour of the
appellant/plaintiff and consequently this second appeal
deserves to be allowed and it is accordingly allowed.
The judgment and decree passed by the Appellate
Court is set aside and the judgment and decree passed
by the Trial Court shall stand restored.
Sd/-
JUDGE
RK CT:SN
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!