Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 4167 Kant
Judgement Date : 11 March, 2022
1
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
KALABURAGI BENCH
DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF MARCH 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. SOMASHEKAR
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.200120/2016
Between:
Dayanand S/o Makkanna Patil
Age: 25 years, Occ: Driver
R/o: Kalakhora Village
Tq: Basavakalyan, Dist: Bidar
... Appellant
(By Sri Shivanand V. Pattanashetti, Advocate)
And:
The State of Karnataka
R/by Addl. SPP High Court of
Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench
(Through Mudabi P.S. Dist:Bidar)
... Respondent
(By Sri Gururaj V. Hasilkar, HCGP)
This Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 374 (2) of
Cr.P.C., praying to set aside the judgment of conviction
and order of sentence dated:22.08.2016 and 25.08.2016
respectively, passed by the II Addl. District & Sessions
2
Court, Bidar sitting at Basavakalyan in S.C.No.189/2014
and acquit the appellant/accused no.1.
This appeal coming on for dictating judgment this
day, the Court delivered the following:
JUDGMENT
This appeal is directed against the judgment of
conviction rendered by the II-Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Bidar, sitting at Basavakalyan in
S.C.No.189/2014 dated 22.08.2016, whereby
rendering conviction against accused No.1 - Dayanand
who is appellant before this Court. This accused was
convicted by the trial Court for the offences
punishable under Sections 504 and 333 of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC')
for short) and sentenced him to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay
a fine of Rs.1,000/- with default clause for the offence
punishable under Section 504 of IPC and to undergo
imprisonment for a period of 5 years and to pay a fine
of Rs.25,000/- with default clause for the offence
punishable under Section 333 of IPC. This appeal is
filed seeking to consider the grounds as urged and to
set aside the conviction held against the
appellant/accused No.1 and to acquit him of the
offences punishable under Sections 504 and 333 of
IPC.
2. Heard the learned counsel Sri Shivanand V.
Pattanshetti for the appellant/accused No.1 and the
learned High Court Government Pleader for the
respondent/State. Perused the judgment of conviction
in S.C.No.189/2014 dated 22.08.2016 in respect of
the accused-Dayanand. The aforesaid judgment
consisting the evidence of PWs-1 to 13 and documents
at Exs.P1 to P-19 inclusive of M.Os.1 to 5.
3. Factual matrix of the appeal are as under:
It transpires in the case of the prosecution that
in pursuance of the order/direction issued by the
superior officer that the accused persons are selling
illegal arrack in the hotel of accused No.2 during Devi
Tanda fair, on 16.01.2014 at 11.00, the complainant
and CW-6 had been to collect some sort of information
against the persons being arraigned as accused, in the
limits of Kalkhora village and they reached to that
place. The complainant and CW-6 were sitting in the
hotel of accused No.2. At that time, accused No.3
identified that they are police and therefore along with
other accused started abusing them in filthy language
saying that since one hour they are sitting in this hotel
causing inconvenience to sell arrack. As such, the
accused have picked up quarrel with the complainant
and CW-6. When they went out of the hotel, accused
No.1 namely Dayanand assaulted CW-6 with means of
stick on his left parietal region as a result of that he
sustained some bleeding injuries. In the course of
that incident, accused No.5 namely Srinath also
assaulted with means of a stick on the left parietal
region of CW-6 and as a result of that he sustained
bleeding injuries. The complainant who came forward
to veil the incident, was assaulted by accused Nos.2,
3, 4 and 6 with means of their hands and legs and
caused injuries. By this act, the accused have caused
obstacle to discharge their duty being a Government
servant. In pursuance of the act of the accused, on
the filing of a complaint by the complainant, criminal
law was set into motion by recording FIR as per
Ex.P11 for the offences punishable under Sections
143, 147, 148, 353, 332, 333, 504 read with Section
149 of IPC. PW-10 being an Investigating Officer in
part who received the complaint at Ex.P-11 filed by
Jagadevappa being a police constable and based upon
his complaint criminal law was set into motion by
recording a FIR as per Ex.P-11.
4. Subsequent to recording the FIR, the case
was taken up for further investigation by PW-13 who
conducted the investigation and laid the charge sheet
against the accused persons. During investigation,
the Investigating Officer conducted spot panchanama
as per Ex.P-3 and also recorded the statement of
witnesses and so also secured the wound certificate at
Ex.P-9 and also opinion report as per Ex.P-10 and also
conducted seizure panchanama as per Ex.P-12
inclusive of issue of sketch map as per Ex.P-13 and
laid the charge sheet against the accused before the
committal Court.
5. Subsequent to laying the charge sheet by
the Investigating Officer whereby the committal
Magistrate had passed the committal order as under
Section 209 of Cr.P.C. by following the requisite
provision of 207 of Cr.P.C. and the case has been
committed to the Court of the Sessions for trial.
Subsequent to committing the case to the Court of
Sessions and whereby heard on charge by the learned
Public Prosecutor for the State and the defence
counsel for the accused and framed the charges
against the accused. The accused did not plead guilty
but claimed to be tried. Accordingly, plea of the
accused have been recorded separately.
6. Subsequently, the prosecution let in
evidence by subjecting to examination of PWs-1 to 13
and so also got marked several documents at Exs.P1
to P19 and marked of M.Os.1 to 5. Subsequent to the
closure of the evidence on the part of the prosecution,
the accused were subjected to examination as
contemplated under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. for
incriminating evidence appeared against the accused,
whereby the accused declined the truth of the
evidence of the prosecution adduced so far.
7. Subsequent to recording the incriminating
statement, accused were called upon to adduce any
defence evidence as contemplated under Section 233
of Cr.P.C. But the accused did not come forward to
adduce any defence evidence as contemplated under
Section 233 of Cr.P.C.
8. Subsequent to closure of the entire case of
the prosecution, the trial Court heard the arguments
advanced by the learned Public Prosecutor and so also
counter arguments advanced by the defence counsel
for the accused. On close scrutiny of the evidence of
PW-1 Jagadevappa being a Police Constable who filed
a complaint as per Ex.P-1 and so also the evidence of
PW-2 and PW-3 being the panch witnesses in respect
of Ex.P-3 and the spot panchanama, so also the
evidence of PW-8 Shankumkha who is a Police
Constable by avocation and also being the injured,
inclusive of their evidence on close scrutiny of the
evidence of PW-9 Dr. Sharnagouda and PW-10
Investigating Officer in part, recording FIR as per
Ex.P-11 and so also the evidence of PW-12 Head
Constable who received the MLC intimation relating to
the injured and so also the evidence of PW-13 being
the Investigating Officer who laid the charge sheet
against the accused persons and on close scrutiny of
the documents which were got marked on the part of
the prosecution, the trial Court has come to the
conclusion that the prosecution miserably failed to
prove the guilt of accused Nos.2 to 6 and ended in
acquittal of the offences punishable under Sections
143, 147, 148, 353, 332, 333, 504 read with Section
149 of IPC but held conviction against the
appellant/accused No.1 for the offences punishable
under Section 504 and 333 of IPC, which is
incorporated in the operative portion of the order. It
is this judgment which is challenged under this appeal
by accused No.1 urging various grounds.
9. It is the contention of the learned counsel
for the appellant/accused No.1 by referring the
evidence of PW-1 who is a complainant as per Ex.P-11
and so also in respect of PW-8 that they are Police
Constables and they were discharging their official
duty according to their contention. But the
prosecution, with a malafide intention, given up the
evidence of CW-17 who has been cited as a witness
who led his evidence as part of the prosecution even
though CW-17 being a material witness. Therefore,
the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the
accused relating to the material ingredients of Section
333 of IPC whereas the trial Court did not give more
credentiality to the evidence of other witnesses but
only considered the evidence of PWs-1 and 8 who are
the Police Constables and also official witnesses.
Strangely, the trial Court rendered an acquittal
judgment of accused Nos.2 to 6 but convicted the
appellant/accused No.1. The role of each one of the
accused is required to be appreciated by the trial
Court in a proper perspective. On this count alone,
the impugned judgment of conviction held against
appellant/accused No.1 for the offences punishable
under Sections 504 and 333 of IPC requires to be
intervened.
10. The second limb of argument of the learned
counsel for the appellant/accused No.1 is that the
prosecution ought to have produced the X-ray report
to prove the grievous injuries, if sustained or inflicted
to the injured person. But in the instant case the
prosecution has failed to produce the X-ray report
relating to the injured PW-8, being the police
constable. Non-production of X-ray report of the
injured creates doubt in the prosecution case. The
same has not been appreciated by the trial Court in a
proper perspective. It is further contended that
looking to the further statements of the complainant
who is examined as PW-1 that complainant came to
know the name of the appellant and other accused
after filing the complaint dated 17.01.2014. But
looking to the complaint averments complainant
specifically mentioned the name of appellant and
other accused which clearly goes to show that the
complainant with malafide intention colluding with the
police personnel who were accused in P.C.No.20/2012
filed by the appellant and just to take revenge against
the appellant the instant case has been filed. This fact
has not been properly appreciated by the trial Court.
Therefore, in this appeal it requires to be intervened,
if not intervened by re-appreciation of the evidence,
certainly the accused would be the sufferer and also
there shall be some substantial miscarriage of justice.
11. Lastly the counsel submitted that the
conviction judgment rendered by the trial Court is
liable to be set aside because the trial Court has given
more credentiality to the evidence of PWs.1, 8, 10, 12
and 13 and they are the interested witnesses and so
also official witnesses but their evidence are required
to be appreciated in a proper perspective and there is
required to be evaluated keeping in view the role of
each one of the accused and so also the credibility of
the evidence of PWs-1 and 8 who are the official
witnesses. But the trial Court failed to appreciate the
evidence in a proper perspective even though the
evidence facilitated by the prosecution are found to be
inconsistent and also lot of improvements have been
found in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
Therefore, in this appeal it requires re-appreciation of
the evidence as the trial Court misdirected and
misinterpreted the evidence. On all these grounds,
the learned counsel for the appellant seeks for
intervention with the judgment of conviction rendered
against the appellant/accused No.1 by the trial Court.
On all these premises seeking for allowing the appeal
and consequently setting aside the judgment of
conviction rendered against the appellant/accused
No.1 in S.C.No.189/2014 dated 22.08.2016 whereby
held conviction for the offences punishable under
Sections 504 and 333 of IPC.
12. Learned High Court Government Pleader
for State taken me through the evidence of PW-1
Jagadevappa who is a police constable and has filed a
complaint as per Ex.P-1 and based upon his complaint
PW-10 recorded an FIR as per Ex.P-11 whereby PW-1
Jagadevappa and PW-8 Shanmukha as per the
instructions issued by his superior, went for securing
some information about the person being an accused
and accordingly went to the hotel of accused No.2
Jyoti on 16.01.2014 whereby in the limit of Kalkhora
village there will be a fair of local tanda as they had
the information that in that hotel arrack is being sold
illegally. PW-1 who is the complainant and PW-8 who
is the injured were sitting in that hotel of accused
No.2. At that time, accused No.3 identified that they
are police and therefore along with other accused
started abusing them in filthy language saying that
since one hour they are sitting in this hotel causing
inconvenience to sell arrack. As such, the accused
have picked up quarrel with the complainant and CW-
6. When they went out of the hotel, accused No.1
namely Dayanand assaulted CW-6 with means of stick
on his left parietal region as a result of that he
sustained some bleeding injuries. In the course of
that incident, accused No.5 namely Srinath also
assaulted with means of a stick on the left parietal
region of CW-6 and as a result of that he sustained
bleeding injuries. The complainant who came forward
to veil the incident, was assaulted by accused Nos.2,
3, 4 and 6 with means of their hands and legs and
caused injuries. By this act, the accused have caused
obstacle to discharge their duty being a Government
servant. In pursuance of the act of the accused, on
the filing of a complaint by the complainant, criminal
law was set into motion by recording FIR as per
Ex.P11 for the offences punishable under Sections
143, 147, 148, 353, 332, 333, 504 read with Section
149 of IPC. These are all the evidence facilitated by
the prosecution by subjecting to examination of PW-1
Jagadevappa, who is a police constable by avocation
and also who is an author of the complaint at Ex.P-1
and his evidence is corroborated with the evidence of
PW-8 Shanmukha by avocation is a police constable
and also he is an injured and whereby sustained with
injuries as indicated at Ex.P-9 and also in his report in
terms of a letter at Ex.P-10 and so also the OPD Form
issued by Kalaburagi District Hospital at Ex.P-18 and
chemical analysis report as per Ex.P-19 and so also
the spot mahazar Ex.P-3 and inclusive of cloth seizure
mahazar as per Ex.P-12. All these evidences have
been facilitated by the prosecution whereby the trial
Court rightly came to the conclusion that accused
No.1 Dayanad assaulted PW-8 Shanmukha with
means of club/stick as a result of that he sustained
injuries as disclosed at Ex.P-9 wound certificate
issued by PW-9 doctor who provided treatment to
him.
13. It is the contention of learned counsel for
the appellant/accused No.1 that PW-3 who is a panch
witness of Ex.P-3 in respect of spot panchanama being
conducted by Investigating Officer in his presence and
also in the presence of PW-2 did not support the case
of the prosecution in respect of the fulcrum of the spot
mahazar to even PW-4 - Manikappa, PW-5 Bheemsha,
PW-6 Sharnappa, PW-7 Pandurang and PW-11
Mahesh. They have been subjected to examination on
the part of the prosecution and they did not support
the case of the prosecution. Merely because they did
not support the case of the prosecution even though
they are the independent witnesses but the evidence
of PW-1 Jagadevappa in respect of Ex.P-1 complaint
so also the evidence of PW-8 Shanmukha who is an
injured while they were proceeding on their duty being
Government servant and the accused persons coming
in the way by causing some obstacle to discharge
their duty, the same has been seen in the evidence of
PW-1 and PW-8 and their evidence is corroborated
with the evidence of PWs.10, 12, 13. PW-13 being
the Investigating Officer who laid the charge sheet
against the accused and further supported their
evidence that the evidence of PW-9 being a doctor
who issued the injury certificate Ex.P-9. These are all
the evidence that has been let in by the prosecution.
Merely because the aforesaid witness PWs.4, 5, 6, 8
have not been withstood with their statement, the
evidence of PW-1 and so also the evidence of PW-8
Shanmukh cannot be brushed aside and they are the
Police Constable and while they were proceeding to
their duty being a Government servant these accused
as well as other accused caused some obstacle to
discharge their duty. The same has been seen in the
evidence of PWs-1 and 8 whereby they were present
in the hotel of accused No.2 as they had information
that in the hotel of accused No.2 arrack was being
sold illegally. These are all the evidence facilitated by
the prosecution. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly
appreciated the evidence and rendered a judgment of
conviction against accused No.1 and also sentenced
accused No.1/appelant in the instant case in
S.C.No.189/2014 for the offences punishable under
Sections 504 and 333 of IPC. Therefore, this appeal
deserves to be dismissed being devoid of merits and
whereby the trail Court has rightly appreciated the
evidence and arrived at a proper conclusion and the
prosecution has proved the guilt against this
appellant/accused No.1 beyond all reasonable doubt.
14. It is in this context of the contention made
by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused-
Dayanand and so also the counter argument advanced
by the learned High Court Government Pleader for the
respondent/State and based upon the evidence of
P.W.1 who is the complainant in respect of the
complaint at Ex.P.1 and so also the evidence of P.W.8
who is the injured and both P.Ws.1 and 8 by avocation
as Police Constables and they have been discharging
their duties on 16.01.2014 at around 6.30 p.m. But,
on the aforesaid date at around 11 hours, there was
some local fair in the Kalkhora village of Devi Thanda
and whereby accused No.2 in her hotel alleged to
have been engaged in selling the arrack and therefore
P.Ws.1 and 8 were deputed and they have collected
the information about the activities of selling of arrack
in their hotel. Therefore, P.Ws.1 and 8 had been to
the hotel of accused No.2 and whereby they sat hours
together in the hotel. Therefore, accused No.3, who
identified them as police constables when they were in
the hotel, but remaining accused have unlawfully
assembled and abused them in filthy language saying
that they sat in the hotel hours together by causing
convenience to their business of sale of arrack. When
the accused persons alleged abusing P.Ws.1 and 8
and thereafter they have come out from the hotel and
in the meanwhile, accused No.1 who is an appellant
herein alleged to assaulted with means of stick by
chosing the left partial region and that P.W.8 alleged
to have been sustained some bleeding injuries, in the
meanwhile remaining accused No.5 who alleged to
have assaulted on the temporal region of P.W.8 and
as a result of that he sustained bleeding injuries.
When the complainant come forward to telling the
incident and also rescuing P.W.8 from the clutches of
the accused person and in the meanwhile, remaining
accused Nos.2 to 4 and 6 were also alleged to have
assaulted with means of hand and given a blow over
his persons. In pursuance of the act of the accused,
criminal law was set into motion by registering the
crime against the accused for the offences punishable
under Sections 143, 147, 148, 353, 332, 333, 504 r/w
Section 149 of IPC.
15. C.W.17 who is cited as an witness in the
charge-sheet laid by P.W.13 and who is a superior
officer of P.W.1 and P.W.8 and they have been
deputed for discharging their official duties to
ascertain or to collect the information regarding
business of illicit liquor and also to watch over the
aforesaid business of illicit liquor activities as there
was a fair at Kalkora, but after receipt of a credible
information regarding selling of illicit liquor i.e., arrack
in the hotel of accused No.2 and according to the
credible information and so also the deputation made
by C.W.17 being the superior officer and that P.Ws.1
and 8 went to the hotel of accused No.2 in a civil
dress and they have placed an order of brining tea
and water bottle, at that time accused No.3 refused to
supply tea and also the water bottle and that even
though they have been placed order, but the accused
Nos.2, 3 and 4 have been suspected their activities
and identified they are as police constables and
abused them in a filthy language saying as they were
coming in the way of selling of arrack in the hotel of
accused No.2, when there was such kind of incident
alleged to have been taken in the hotel of accused
No.2 by abusing in a filthy language towards the
police personnel and P.Ws1. and 8, who have come
out from the hotel and thereby all the accused
persons formed into an unlawful assembly and at that
time accused No.1 alleged to have assaulted with
means of a stick upon the left side partial region of
P.W.8 and so also alleged to have assaulted by
accused No.5 with means of another stick which was
lying on the ground on the left side temporal region of
P.W.8. As a result of that, P.W.8 sustained injuries, in
the meanwhile, P.W.1 who is the complainant by
avocation as police constable and he intervened to
pacify the incident taken place between P.W.8 who is
also one of the police constable and he was also
deputed subordinate staffs for securing the
information about some sort of a business activities
was taken inside the hotel of accused No.2, at that
time accused Nos.2, 3, 4 and 6 alleged to have been
assaulted with means of their hands and given a kick
over the stomach part of P.W.8 and also caused some
injuries over his person.
16. This allegation made against the accused
persons by filing a complaint as per Ex.P.1 and based
upon complaint, criminal law was set into motion by
recording the FIR as per Ex.P.11, but entire case was
revolving around the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.8 and
so also the injury sustained over a person of P.W.8
indicates at Ex.P.9 of the wound certificate issued by
P.W.9 being a doctor who is subjected to provide a
treatment to him.
17. Whereas, the trial Court rendered an
acquittal judgment in respect of co-accused Nos.2 to 6
even though alleged to have been participated with
the accused No.1 who is arrayed as an appellant
before this Court. But the role of each one of the
accused in respect of the offences has been lugged
against them. But, M.Os.1 and 2 clubs two in
numbers and M.Os.3 and 4 being packet containing
mud which were collected from the scene of crime and
M.O.5 is cloth and all these material objects have
been seized by investigating officer P.W.13 who
investigated the case and laid the charge sheet
against the accused persons.
18. In pursuance of the complaint filed by
P.W.1, criminal law was set into motion by recording
FIR as under Section 154 of Cr.P.C., but subsequent
recording an FIR, the investigation officer has taken
up the case for investigation and laid the charge sheet
against the accused. But there was delay in filing of a
complaint in narrating the incident. It was alleged to
be taken place at the scene of crime. Even there was
a delay in lodging FIR, it is not fatal to the case of the
prosecution but it should explain the delay by giving
acceptable reasons, even the fact that the report was
lodged belatedly, it is relevant factor to which the trial
Court must take notice and take into consideration for
arrival of a conclusion of the incident narrated in the
complaint and so also substances made in the FIR said
to have been recorded by the police having
jurisdiction.
19. The FIR is the primary object to set the law
into motion. When the criminal law was set into
motion, then the investigation officer who has taken
up the case for investigation by following the
provisions of Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. Even FIR itself
is not a proof of the case initiated against the accused.
Even though it is the case of evidence but it could be
used for corroborating the case of the prosecution. It
is the domain vested with the investigating agency
that keeping in view Section 154 of Cr.P.C. relating to
the nature of the offences register the crime and also
proceeding with the case for investigation. But in the
instant case, P.W.1 who is the police constable and
P.W.8 who is also a police constable and also an
injured, but the delay in filing the complaint relating
to the incident it was occurred at the scene of crime
i.e., hotel belongs to accused No.2. Strangely, in the
instant case, the trial Court rendered the acquittal
judgment in respect of the remaining accused Nos.2
to 6, but the conviction held against the appellant who
is arrayed as accused No.1 by the trial Court is under
clouds of doubts.
20. To attract section 504 of Indian Penal
Code, 1860, the prosecution must satisfy the
intentional insult with intent to prove breach of the
peace. To attract this offence, the important
ingredients to be proved, they are;
a) intentional insult;
b) Insult must be such as to give some provocation to the person insulted; and
c) The accused must intent or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offences.
21. However, the intentional insult must be of
such a degree that should provoke a person to break
the public peace or to commit any other offences.
These ingredients must be satisfied by the prosecution
to prove the guilt against the accused by facilitating
the worthwhile evidence even one of the essential
elements constituting the offences that there should
have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional
insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the
complainant does not sufficient by itself to saying
that the ingredient of Section 504 of IPC has been
established by the prosecution, this issue has been
extensively addressed by the Hon'ble Suprme Court in
the case of Fiona Shrikhande Vs. State of
Maharashtra reported in AIR 2014 SC 957.
22. Insofar as Section 333 of Indian Penal
Code, 1860, it reveals that voluntarily causing
grievous hurt to deter public servant in the discharge
of his duty as such public servant. Even each one of
the ingredients have been voluntarily causes grievous
hurt and the injuries inflicted over the person and it is
the domain vested with the prosecution and it has to
establish through the evidence of injured by
facilitating the worthwhile evidence relating to deter
that discharging of his duty as a public servant or with
an intent to prevent or deter that person or any other
public servant from discharging his duty as such public
servant.
23. Whereas, in the instant case, Section 143
of IPC has been lugged against the accused relating to
the unlawful assembly. As per the prosecution case,
in the hotel of accused No.2, the alleged incident was
taken place. What is unlawful assembly is explained
in Section 141 of IPC. An assembly of five or more
persons is designated an "unlawful assembly", if the
common object of the persons composing that
assembly. Section 142 of IPC explains about being
member of unlawful assembly. Whoever, being aware
of facts which render any assembly an unlawful
assembly, intentionally joins that assembly, or
continues in it, is said to be a member of an unlawful
assembly. Further, Section 143 of IPC explains about
punishment of committing an offence of unlawful
assembly. Similarly, the offence under Section 147
itself provides for punishment clause for committing
an offence of rioting. But, unlawful assembly that
assemble even prior to that incident alleged to be
taken as according to their meeting of minds and even
the evidence on the part of the prosecution in respect
of Sections 143, 147, 148, 504 and 333 of IPC has
been ended in acquittal in respect of accused Nos.2 to
6. But, the conviction has been rendered against the
accused No.1, who is arrayed as appellant in the
aforesaid case whereby all the accused have faced the
trial, but there must be some nexus between the
common object and the offence committed. But,
strangely, the trial Court rendered the conviction
against the present appellant. But, Section 149 of IPC
reveals and more so it does not create a separate
offence but only declares vicarious liability of all the
members of an unlawful assembly for the act done in
the common object, this issue has been extensively
addressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel Vs. Rajivbhai
Dudabhai Patel reported in AIR 2018 SC 2472.
24. Insofar as applicability of the offence under
Section 149 of IPC relating to the common object, it
must be shown that the incriminating act was done to
accomplish the common object of unlawful assembly.
It must be within the knowledge of the other members
as one likely to be committed in prosecution of
common object. If members of the assembly knew or
were aware of the likelihood of a particular offence
being committed in prosecution of a common object,
they would be liable for the same under Section 149.
But, in the instant case, the charges were framed
against all the accused by holding as a common object
to commission of an offence, but co-accused Nos.2 to
6 and their case was ended in acquittal, but the
inference of common object even has to be drawn
from various factors such as the weapon of offence,
the act of violation committed by them and as a result
of which reveals the charge sheet even filed by the
investigating officer even jointly liable of a members
of unlawful assembly. It is settled position of law that
once a member of unlawful assembly is established, it
is incumbent on the prosecution to establish whether
any specific overtact has been assigned to any
accused. Even more membership of the unlawful
assembly is sufficient. But in the instant case, co-
accused Nos.2 to 6 have been taken a particular role,
but accused Nos.2 to 6 and their case has been ended
in acquittal, but this appellant is convicted for the
offence under Section 333 of IPC. But, when once the
benefit of doubt arise in the mind of the Court, such
benefit must be extended to the accused. But, in the
instant case, the appellant who is arrayed as accused
No.1 and more so alleged that he was assaulted with
means of M.Os.1 and 2 used for causing injuries over
the person of P.W.8. Therefore, in this appeal, it
requires for re-appreciation of the evidence, if not, the
accused No.1, who is arrayed as appellant No.1 would
suffer from miscarriage of justice and whereby the
prosecution did not establish the guilt of the accused
beyond all reasonable doubt.
25. Insofar as the overtact attributed against
the accused whether it is inadequate or even
adequate evidence has been facilitated by the
prosecution it is also an important factor on the part
of the prosecution to be assessed, but in the instant
case even at a cursory glance of evidence of P.Ws.1
and 8 in consonance with the averments at Ex.P.1 and
whereby the instant incident is narrated by P.W.1
being a Police Constable has to be assessed.
26. Insofar as ingredients of Section 149 of
IPC, there must be specific ingredients. Even
according to Section 141 of IPC, the assembly of five
or more person is designated as common object. If
the common object is specifically stated it should be
by means of a criminal force or it shows a criminal
force to compel any person so to do what he is not
legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally
entitled to do. But mere presence in the assembly is
not sufficient and does not make such a person as a
member of an unlawful assembly unless it shows that
he had done something. As according to some sort of
a prior meeting to do the activities as a member of
unlawful assembly as even the scope of Section 149 of
IPC. Section 149 of IPC even thought it is a wider
scope and the membership and inferring the common
object and various circumstances have to be taken
into consideration and having regard to the omnibus
allegation, it is not safe to convict everyone of them
by applying Section 149 of IPC. But in the instant
case, the co-accused Nos.2 to 6 and their case was
ended in acquittal. Therefore, the benefit of doubt
which was arises in the mind of the Court by
appreciating the evidence of the prosecution and even
the doubt that would arise in the mind of the benefit,
it should be accrued on the part of the accused alone
and none else.
27. At this juncture, it is relevant to place
reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda Vs.
State of Maharashtra reported in 1984(4) SCC 116,
wherein the Hon'ble Apex extensively addressed the
issues of circumstantial evidence and held that
circumstantial evidence should be conclusive and even
the benefit of doubt and further held that if the
circumstances in the case are consistent either with
the innocence of the accused or with his guilty, then
the accused is entitled to be benefit of doubt. Legal
principles are not magic incantations and their
importance lies more in their application to a given set
of facts than in their recital in the judgment.
28. Whereas, at para No.163, it is held that;
we then pass on to another important point which
seems to have been completely missed by the High
Court. It is well settled that where on the evidence
two possibilities are available or open, one which goes
in favour of the prosecution and the other which
benefits an accused, the accused is undoubtedly
entitled to the benefit of doubt.
29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Kali Ram V. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in
SCC (Crime) P. 1060, held as under:
"Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted This principle has a special relevance in cases where in the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence."
was ended in acquittal and more so they faced trial
along with the accused No.1, who is arrayed as an
appellant before this Court. But the trial Court was
held in conviction against this appellant for the
offences punishable under Sections 504 and 333 of
Indian Penal Code. Even at a cursory glance of
evidence of P.Ws.1 and 8 and so also the averments
made in the complaint at Ex.P.1 so also FIR at Ex.P.11
and inclusive of injuries inflicted over P.W.8 indicates
at Ex.P.9, wound certificate issued by the doctor, but
on close scrutiny of the evidence and even at a
cursory glance of the entire material evidence
inclusive of the evidence of P.W.13, the clouds and
doubt arise in the mind of the Court, but it is the
domain vested with the trial Court to appreciate the
evidence in a proper prospective and if not the
accused would be sufferer and more so there shall be
some substantial miscarriage of justice would cause
on the part of the accused.
31. It is in the instant case, it is relevant to
refer even Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 relating to the quality of the evidence and not
the quantity of the evidence. It is settled law that the
merit of the statement is important and also it is well
known principle of law that reliance can be based on
the solitary statement of a witness if the Court comes
to the conclusion that the said statement is the true
and correct version of the case of the prosecution. It
was extensively addressed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Raja v. State reported in (1997)
2 Crimes 175.
32. In the matter of appreciation of evidence of
witnesses, it is not number of a witnesses, but quality
of their evidence which is important, as there is no
requirement in law of evidence that any particular
number of witnesses is to be examined to
prove/disprove a fact. It is a time-honoured principle,
that evidence must be weighed and not counted. The
test is whether the evidence has a ring of trust, is
cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The
legal system has laid emphasis on value provided by
each witness, rather than the multiplicity or plurality
of witnesses. It is quality and not quantity, which
determines the adequacy of evidence as has been
provided by Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act.
The said principles has been extensively held by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Laxmibai (Dead)
through LRs v. Bhagwantbura (Dead) through
LRs reported in AIR 2013 SC 1204, whereas in the
instant case, it is said that the trial Court was
misdirected and misinterpreted the evidence of P.Ws.1
and 8 insofar as the appellant/accused No.1. It is the
domain vested with the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused by facilitating the material evidence. If
there is no evidence as facilitated by the prosecution
even by proving the ingredients of each one of the
offences, then the clouds would arise in the mind of
the Court and the benefit of doubt shall be extended
to all accused. Therefore, after having gone through
the entire material and after re-appreciating the
evidence of the prosecution both oral and
documentary and after considering totality of the
circumstances, the impugned judgment of conviction
insofar as accused No.1, who is appellant herein is
concerned, needs for interference at the hands of this
Court in extending the benefit of doubt in favour of
the appellant herein.
33. In terms of the aforesaid reasons and
findings, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER The appeal filed by the accused No.1 under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is hereby allowed.
Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence rendered against the appellant/accused No.1 in S.C.No.189/2014 dated 22.08.2016 is hereby set aside. Consequent upon setting aside the impugned judgment, the accused is hereby acquitted of the offences under Sections 504 and 333 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.
In the event appellant/accused No.1 executed any personal bond, the same shall stand cancelled.
Fine amount, if any, deposited by the appellant/accused No.1 shall be returned to him with due identification.
SD/-
JUDGE
swk/BL
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