Karnataka High Court
Ravi S/O Basavarajappa Kumatagi vs The Principal Secretary on 20 July, 2022
Bench: Krishna S Dixit, P.Krishna Bhat
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WA No. 100139 of 2022
C/W WA No.100062/2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 20 TH
DAY OF JULY, 2022
®
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE KRISHNA S.DIXIT
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE P.KRISHNA BHAT
WRIT APPEAL NO. 100139 OF 2022 (LA-RES)
C/W
WRIT APPEAL NO.100062 OF 2022 (LA-RES)
IN WA NO.100139/2022
BETWEEN:
1. MR. GOPAL S/O GOVIND KARJOL
AGE. 45 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE
R/O. KHB COLONY,MUDHOL
2. MR. UMESH S/O. GOVIND KARJOL
AGE. 43 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE
R/O. KHB COLONY, MUDHOL, MODHOL TALUK
DIST. BAGALKOT
3. MR. ARUN S/O. GOVIND KARJOL
AGE. 45 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE
R/O. KHB COLONY, MUDHOLD, MUDHOL TALUK
AND DIST. BAGALKOT
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. C V ANGADI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally signed
by ANNAPURNA
CHINNAPPA
DANDAGAL
Location: HIGH
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
COURT OF
KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD
REPRESENTED BY THE PRINCIPAL
Date:
2022.07.20
14:24:21 +0530
SECRETARY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
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M S BUILDING, BENGALURU- 560001
2. THE COMMISSIONER
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT (R AND R)
LAND ACQUISITION,
EX- OFFICIO SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
REVENUE DEPARTMENT, UPPER KRISHNA PROJECT
NAVANAGAR BAGALKOT- 587101
3. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
AND GENERAL MANAGER (R AND R)
UPPER KRISHNA PROJECT
NAVANAGAR, BAGALKOT- 587101
4. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
BAGALKOT TOWN DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, NAVANAGAR, BAGALKOT- 587101
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. K. VIDYAVATHI, ADDL. ADV. GENERAL FOR R1-R3)
(SRI. M.R. NAIK, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W SRI. G.K. HIREGOUDAR,
ADV. FOR R4)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S.4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS WRIT APPEAL BY
SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT DATED 10.12.2021 PASSED BY
LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WP.NO.108405/2016 (LA-RES) AND
ALLOW THE SAME IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE & EQUITY.
IN WA NO.100062/2022
BETWEEN:
1. RAVI S / O BASAVARAJAPPA KUMATAGI
AGE : 49 YEARS, OCC : AGRICULTURIST,
R/O : BAGALKOT, NEAR BASAVESHWAR CIRCLE,
TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT-587101 .
2. LOKNATH 5/0 SHANKRAPPA KUMATAGI
AGE : 60 YEARS, OCC : AGRICULTURIST ,
R / O : BAGALKOT, NEAR BASAVESHWAR CIRCLE,
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C/W WA No.100062/2022
TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT - 587101.
3. PRABHAYYA S / O MADIVALAYA PRABHUSWAMIMATH
AGE : 50 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURIST,
R /O: NAVANAGAR,
BAGALKOT, TQ & DIST : BAGALKOT - 587103
4. BASAPPA MUKKANNA SWAGI
AGE : 58 YEARS, OCC : AGRICULTURIST
R/O : BAGALKOT, TQ & DIST : BAGALKOT
MUCHAKANDI TANDA - 587103
5. SHIVAPPA MAHADEVAPPA HERAKAL
AGE : 61 YEARS, OCC : AGRICULTURIST,
R / O : SAL PRINTERS BVV COMPLEX,
TO & DIST : BAGALKOT - 587103
6. BASAPPA MAHADEVAPPA HERAKAL
AGE: 45 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURIST,
R/O: SAI PRINTERS BVV COMPLEX,
TQ & DIST: BAGALKOT-587103.
7. SANGAPPA MAHADEVAPPA
HERAKAL DECEASED BY HIS LRS
7(A) SMT. NEELAVVA W / O LATE SANGAPPA HERAKAL
AGE : 51 YEARS, OCC : HOUSEHOLD
R /O : WARD NO.6, BAGALKOT,
7(B) SHARNAPPA S / O LATE.SANGAPPA HERAKAL
AGE : 41 YEARS, OCC : AGRICULTURIST
R/O : SAL PRINTING NEAR BLOOD BANK,
TQ & DIST : BAGALKOT - 587103.
7(C) MAHADEVAPPA S/O LATE. SANGAPPA HERKAL
AGE: 36 YEARS, OCC: R/O: R/O: WARD NO.6, BAGALKOT,
7(D) KUMARI SHANKRAVVA D/O. LATE. SANGAPPA HERKAL
AGE : 26YEARS, OCC: STUDENT,
R / O : WARD NO.6, BAGALKOT,
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7(E) RAVI S / O LATE. SANGAPPA HERKAL
AGE:24 YEARS, OCC : STUDENT
R / O : WARD NO.6, BAGALKOT,
8. YALLAWA W / O BHEEMAPPA HERAKAL
AGE : 45 YEARS, OCC : AGRICULTURIST,
R/A : SAL PRINTING NEAR BLOOD BANK,
TQ & DIST: BAGALKOT - 587103 .
9. IRRAPPA IRABASAPPA BALAMI
C / O : SANTOSH KUMAR HUDED,
AGE : 69 YEARS , OCC : AGRICULTURIST,
R / O : NAVANAGAR,
TQ & DIST : BAGALKOT - 587103 .
10. KALLAPPA IRAPPA BALAMI
C/O SANTOSHKUMAR HUDED
AGE:69 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURIST
R/O NAVANAGAR, TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT-587103.
11. DR. HANAMANTH RAMANNA KATTI
AGE:49 YEARS, OCC:DOCTOR & AGRICULTURIST
R/O EXTENSION AREA, BAGALKOT,
TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT-587103.
12. SHREEDHAR KESHAPPA KANDAKUR
AGE:55 YEARS, OCC:AGRICULTURIST
R/O KERURU, TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT,
TQ : BADAMI, KERUR-587206.
13. DR. SOMASHAKER BASAVARAJ KERUDI
AGE:65 YEARS, OCC:AGRICULTURIST,
R/O KERUDI HOSPITAL,
TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT-587103.
14. SHASHIDHAR MALLESHAPPA JIGAJINNI
AGE:47 YEARS, OCC:AGRICULTURIST,
R/O ROOP LORD LAYOUT VIDYAGIRI
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TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT-587103.
15. SANGANABASAVVA SAJJAN
AGE:61 YEARS, OCC:AGRICULTURIST
R/O VINAYAKA NAGAR,
OPP:KERUDI HOSPITAL,
TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT-587103
16. LEELABEN W/O VITTALABAI PATEL
AGE:69 YEARS, OCC:AGRICULTURIST,
R/O SECTOR 32, NAVANAGAR,
NEAR HESCOM TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT-587103
17. RAVINDRA MALLAPPA ANTIN
AGE:69 YEARS, OCC:AGRICULTURIST,
RURAL POLICE STATION,
TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT-587103
18. PANDAPPA S/O PEERAPPA LAMANI
AGE:62 YEARS, OCC:AGRICULTURIST,
R/O MUCHAKANDI VILLAGE,
TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT-587103.
19. GOPAL RAMAPPA LAMANI
AGE:70 YEARS, OCC:AGRICULTURIST,
R/O MUCHAKANDI TANDA,
TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT-587103
20. BHIMSINGH MANGALAPPA LAMANI
AGE:52 YEARS, OCC:AGRICULTURIST,
R/O MUCHAKANDI TANDA,
TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT-587103.
21. SURESH GUNAPPA LAMANI
C/O SANTOSH KUMAR HUDED
SECTOR NO.13, PLOT NO.11B,
NAVANAGAR, BAGALKOT
TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT-587103.
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22. SANGAPPA SHIVAPPA RAKARADDI
AGE:56 YEARS, OCC:AGRICULTURIST,
R/O BAGALKOT, TQ & DIST:BAGALKOT,
EXTENSION AREA BAGALKOT-587103.
....APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. ASHOK HARANAHALLI, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W
SRI. BASAVARAJ GODACHI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
MS BUILDING, BENGALURU-560001.
2. THE COMMISSIONER REHABILITATION
& RESETTLEMENT (R & R)
UPPER KRISHNA PROJECT,
NAVANAGAR BAGALKOT-587103.
3. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR
KBJNL, MS BUILDING, BENGALURU-560001.
4. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BAGALKOTE-587103.
5. SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
R & R UPPER KRISHNA PROJECT
NAVANAGAR BAGALKOT-587103.
6. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
BTDA DIVISION NO.1, BAGALKOTE
7. THE SLAO BTDA DIVISION
BAGALKOTE-587103.
8. THE CHIEF ENGINEER BTDA
BAGALKOTE-587103.
9. THE TOWN PLANNING AUTHORITY
BAGALKOTE REP. BY ITS
MEMBER SECRETARY, SECTOR NO.19,
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MUNICIPALITY BUILDING NAVANAGAR,
BAGALKOT-587103.
....RESPONDENTS
(SMT. K. VIDYAVATHI, ADDL. ADV. GENERAL FOR R1 TO R5)
(BY SRI.M.R. NAIK, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W SRI. G.K.
HIREGOUDAR, ADV. FOR C/R6 TO R8)
THIS WRIT APPEAL FILED U/S 4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS WRIT APPEAL BY SETTING
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT DATED 10.12.2021 PASSED BY LEARNED
SINGLE JUDGE IN WP.Nos.112171-2211/2015 (LA-RES) IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THESE WRIT APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 04.07.2022 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY,
P. KRISHNA BHAT J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING.
JUDGMENT
The appellants herein were the petitioners in
W.P.No.112171/2015 & connected matters in which they had
challenged the acquisition of their lands in Muchakandi and
Bagalakote villages of Bagalakote District under two
notifications issued by the respondents. The same came to
be dismissed by the learned Single Judge by a common
judgment dated 10.12.2021. Being aggrieved by the same,
the appellants are before us in these appeals.
2. Under the impugned notifications, about 1275
acres of lands were acquired in Muchakandi & Bagalakote
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villages of Bagalkot District for the purpose of implementing
Unit-III of Upper Krishna Project (for short "UKP"). It is
stated that ever since 1985, lands were being acquired for
implementing UKP which was for the avowed "Public
Purpose" of irrigating large tracts of land in various districts
of North Karnataka extending upto Yadagiri.
3. There is no dispute about the fact that an award
dated 30.12.2010 was passed by the Krishna Water Dispute
Tribunal-II permitting the increase of height of Dam from
523 mtrs to 525 mtrs which in its wake would have
submerged large extents of lands in Bagalkot. The impugned
notifications were issued for establishing township in order to
rehabilitate and resettle people who were going to be
displaced on account of such submergence.
4. The learned Single Judge raised following two
questions for consideration upon hearing the submissions of
the learned counsel on both sides:
"a. Whether the issuance of the declaration under
Section 6(1) notification was issued beyond the
period of one year stipulated in the 1st explanation
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of Section 6 and consequently rendered it a
nullify?
b. Whether the State was justified in acquiring
additional lands of about 1643 acres for
establishing Bagalkote-Navanagar Unit III under
the impugned notifications?"
5. On the first question, by taking note of the
relevant dates and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (for short, 'Act'), the learned Single Judge recorded a
finding in the negative. The discussions in this behalf are at
paragraphs 29 to 43 of the impugned judgment. The
correctness of the said finding has not been seriously
contested before us by the learned Senior Counsel Sri. Ashok
Haranahalli, appearing for the appellants. In any case, the
relevant dates noticed by the learned Single Judge having
not been disputed before us, we are satisfied that no other
conclusion on the said point for consideration in the facts of
the case is possible.
6. Extensive and expansive submissions were made
before us by learned Senior Counsel on both sides.
Submissions for the appellants was led by Sri. Ashok
Haranahalli, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri.
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Basavaraj Godachi, Advocate and learned Counsel Sri. C.V.
Angadi and the submissions for the respondents was led by
learned Senior Counsel Sri. M.R. Naik assisted by Sri. G. K.
Hiregoudar, learned Advocate.
7. After hearing the submissions of learned Senior
Counsel of both sides, we are satisfied that there is no merit
in these appeals and they are liable to be dismissed.
8. The moot points canvassed in extensor before us
necessitate some treatment of the extent of judicial review
permissible under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a
matter of this nature and so also the nature and extent of
power of the State to acquire lands under the umbrella
provision "Public Purpose". Again, we have no doubt in our
mind that law on both these heads admit of no ambiguity
leaving no scope for further elucidation in view of catena of
decisions emanating from the Hon'ble Apex Court; but yet
we are treating the same in some detail largely on account of
deference to the pain-staking submissions made by the
learned Senior Counsel on both sides on the merits of the
case.
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9. Before dealing with the facts of the case, we
deem it appropriate to inform ourselves of the extent of
judicial review permissible in a case of this nature and also
the extent of power available to the State for acquiring lands
in question for "Public Purpose".
10. As we have already noticed, under the impugned
notifications, large extent of lands has been acquired for
rehabilitation of people displaced on account of implementing
Unit-III of UKP. There is no dispute about the fact that the
said project was meant to be implemented in various stages
in order to quench the needs of large tracts of parched lands
which the experts assessed as arable with scientific
irrigation. There is also no dispute that a Dam has been built
several decades ago benefiting tens and thousands of
hectares of land in various districts of North-Karnataka
region and the comprehensive plan envisaged
implementation of what was called as "Unit-III". There was
also a subsequent development sometime in 2010 by which
State Government was permitted to utilize more volumes of
water (303 TMC) for satisfying its local needs arising in the
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adjoining districts of Dam area. Therefore, there was also an
urgent need to utilize the benefits emanating from the award
passed by the Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal-II to promote
public weal.
11. In Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of
India1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:
227. There are three stages with regard to the
undertaking of an infrastructural project. One is
conception or planning, second is decision to
undertake the project and the third is the
execution of the project. The conception and the
decision to undertake a project is to be regarded
as a policy decision. While there is always a need
for such projects not being unduly delayed, it is
at the same time expected that a thorough
possible study will be undertaken before a
decision is taken to start a project. Once such a
considered decision is taken, the proper
execution of the same should be undertaken
expeditiously. It is for the Government to decide
how to do its job. When it has put a system in
place for the execution of a project and such a
system cannot be said to be arbitrary, then the
only role which a court may have to play is to see
that the system works in the manner it was
envisaged." (underlined by us)
12. When the Irrigation Project is conceptualized and
planned with the avowed objective of benefiting large
number of people, especially since the project is visualized
(2000) 10 SCC 664
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for the purpose of providing irrigation for promoting
agriculture, which is the life-blood of about 60% of the
population of the State and the subject acquisition is for
rehabilitating people displaced as a fallout to the execution of
the irrigation project, the Courts should view curial
challenges to the same with extreme caution and
interference should be limited only where clear case of
violation of the provisions of the Constitution or any other
Statutory Rights is made out.
13. The following observation of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan2 is instructive:
233. At the same time, in exercise of its
enormous power the court should not be called
upon to or undertake governmental duties or
functions. The courts cannot run the Government
nor can the administration indulge in abuse or
non-use of power and get away with it. The
essence of judicial review is a constitutional
fundamental. The role of the higher judiciary
under the Constitution casts on it a great
obligation as the sentinel to defend the values of
the Constitution and the rights of Indians. The
courts must, therefore, act within their judicially
permissible limitations to uphold the rule of law
and harness their power in public interest. It is
precisely for this reason that it has been
consistently held by this Court that in matters of
policy the court will not interfere. When there is a
(2000) 10 SCC 664
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valid law requiring the Government to act in a
particular manner the court ought not to, without
striking down the law, give any direction which is
not in accordance with law. In other words the
court itself is not above the law."
(underlined by us)
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tata Cellular vs.
Union of India3 has observed as under:
"Bernard Schwartz in Administrative Law, 2nd Edn.,
p. 584 has this to say:
"If the scope of review is too broad, agencies are
turned into little more than media for the
transmission of cases to the courts. That would
destroy the values of agencies created to secure
the benefit of special knowledge acquired through
continuous administration in complicated fields. At
the same time, the scope of judicial inquiry must
not be so restricted that it prevents full inquiry into
the question of legality. If that question cannot be
properly explored by the judge, the right to review
becomes meaningless. 'It makes judicial review of
administrative orders 34 (1980) 41 P & CR 255 35
(1989) 88 LGR 73 a hopeless formality for the
litigant.... It reduces the judicial process in such
cases to a mere feint.'
Two overriding considerations have combined to
narrow the scope of review. The first is that of
deference to the administrative expert. In Chief
Justice Neely's4 words :
'I have very few illusions about my own
limitations as a judge and from those
limitations I generalize to the inherent
limitations of all appellate courts reviewing
rate cases. It must be remembered that
1994 (6) SCC 651, paragraph-82
Monongahela Power Co. Vs. Public Service Commision, 276 S.E. 2d 179 (1981),
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, February 10, 1981
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this Court sees approximately 1262 cases a
year with five judges. I am not an
accountant, electrical engineer, financier,
banker, stock broker, or systems
management analyst. It is the height of
folly to expect judges intelligently to review
a 5000 page record addressing the
intricacies of public utility operation.'
It is not the function of a judge to act as a
superboard, or with the zeal of a pedantic
schoolmaster substituting its judgment for that of the
administrator.
The result is a theory of review that limits
the extent to which the discretion of the
expert may be scrutinised by the non-
expert judge. The alternative is for the
court to overrule the agency on technical
matters where all the advantages of
expertise lie with the agencies. If a court
were to review fully the decision of a body
such as state board of medical examiners
'it would find itself wandering amid the
maze of therapeutics or boggling at the
mysteries of the Pharmacopoeia'. Such a
situation as a state court expressed it
many years ago 'is not a case of the blind
leading the blind but of one who has
always been deaf and blind insisting that
he can see and hear better than one who
has always had his eyesight and hearing
and has always used them to the utmost
advantage in ascertaining the truth in
regard to the matter in question'.
The second consideration leading to narrow
review is that of calendar pressure. In
practical terms it may be the more
important consideration. More than any
theory of limited review it is the pressure
of the judicial calendar combined with the
elephantine bulk of the record in so many
review proceedings which leads to
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perfunctory affirmably of the vast majority
of agency decisions."
(underlined by us)
15. The above observation in Tata Cellular5
emphasizes the need for the Courts to caution themselves
and tread carefully in cases where it is demonstrated by the
State that the projects sought to be implemented by
acquisition of the lands in question is pursuant to study by
domain experts, careful weighing of the pros and cons of
acquisition of the lands for implementation of the project and
urgency for the need of the project for the use by the public.
Such a decision takes the colour and complexion of
implementing a policy for promoting public welfare. Once
that is demonstrated, Courts are required to show deference
to the views of the administration.
16. In Jal Mahal Resorts Private Limited Vs. K. P.
Sharma6, it is observed as follows:
"139. In a matter of the instant nature, where the
policy decision was taken way back from 1976
followed by master plans to develop a particular
chunk of land by adopting the mode of private-public
partnership method and a global tender was floated,
1994 (6) SCC 651
(2014) 8 SCC 804
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obviously the private players were bound to
participate specially in an age when private
partnership is not an anathema......... In our considered
view unless the detailed project report, Master Plan of
Jaipur, revenue record indicating the nature of land
that the Project was fraught with risk of
environmental degradation which could establish with
facts and figures that the decision is not in public
interest, interference by the Court adopting an overall
view smelling foul play at every level of
administration is bound to make the governance an
impossibility. Therefore, the courts although would be
justified in questioning a particular decision if illegality
or arbitrariness is writ large on a particular venture,
excessive probe or restraint on the activity of a State
is bound to derail execution of an administrative
decision even though the same might be in pursuance
of a policy decision supported by other cogent
materials like survey and search by a reliable expert
agency of a State after which the State project or
private and public partnership project is sought to be
given effect to." (underlined by us)
17. The governance is a complex task. State is
charged with onerous responsibility of promoting public
welfare. Project in question is of mammoth proportion.
Hon'ble Supreme Court has cautioned that in matters of this
nature, it ill-behoves a Constitutional Court to smell foul-play
on the part of administration merely because small error
here or small infirmity there is pointed out by aggrieved
petitioners appealing for judicial intervention.
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18. The UKP has been conceived on account of severe
drought affecting large parts of North Karnataka. River
Krishna has abundant water which remained unharnessed.
Popular demand for water, science, and received wisdom
cried for some action. The project was the culmination of a
combination of such factors and popular government
naturally has a mandate to implement it. That is a dynamic
of any welfare state and particularly a democratic republic.
Therefore, there can be no gain-saying that the
implementation of the Project of which rehabilitation of
displaced persons is an integral part was a sequel to the
policy put together by the Government as democratic
compulsion.
19. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narmada Bachao
Andolan7 has formulated the limitation on exercise of power
of judicial review by a Constitutional Court when the project
sought to be implemented is pursuant to a policy. The
observation is as follows:
(2000) 10 SCC 664
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234. In respect of public projects and policies which
are initiated by the Government the courts should not
become an approval authority. Normally such
decisions are taken by the Government after due care
and consideration. In a democracy welfare of the
people at large, and not merely of a small section of
the society, has to be the concern of a responsible
Government. If a considered policy decision has been
taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is not
mala fide, it will not be in public interest to require
the court to go into and investigate those areas which
are the function of the executive. For any project
which is approved after due deliberation the court
should refrain from being asked to review the decision
just because a petitioner in filing a PIL alleges that
such a decision should not have been taken because
an opposite view against the undertaking of the
project, which view may have been considered by the
Government, is possible. When two or more options
or views are possible and after considering them the
Government takes a policy decision it is then not the
function of the court to go into the matter afresh and,
in a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision.
240. In the case of projects of national importance
where the Union of India and/or more than one
State(s) are involved and the project would benefit a
large section of the society and there is evidence to
show that the said project had been contemplated
and considered over a period of time at the highest
level of the States and the Union of India and more so
when the project is evaluated and approval granted
by the Planning Commission, then there should be no
occasion for any court carrying out any review of the
same or directing its review by any outside or
"independent" agency or body. In a democratic set-
up, it is for the elected Government to decide what
project should be undertaken for the benefit of the
people. Once such a decision had been taken then
unless and until it can be proved or shown that there
is a blatant illegality in the undertaking of the project
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or in its execution, the court ought not to interfere
with the execution of the project.
(underlined by us)
20. Hon'ble Supreme Court has underlined the need
for careful balancing of interest in cases of exercise of power
of judicial review and has cautioned that where the action
impugned is pursued for implementing a policy seeking to
benefit large sections of population or an important economic
measure, including a measure which is fundamentally
transformative in nature vis-à-vis the segment of population
that is going to be benefited in terms of livelihood, the sword
of judicial intervention should be unsheathed only when it is
demonstrably inevitable.
21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramniklal N
Bhutta and another v. State of Maharashtra and
others8, has observed as under:
"10. Before parting with this case, we think it
necessary to make a few observations relevant
to land acquisition proceedings. Our country is
now launched upon an ambitious programme of
all - round economic advancement to make our
economy competitive in the world market. We
are anxious to attract foreign direct investment
to the maximum extent. We propose to
compete with China economically. We wish to
(1997) 1 SCC 134
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attain the pace of progress achieved by some of
the Asian countries, referred to as "Asian
tigers", e.g., South Korea, Taiwan and
Singapore. It is, however, recognised on all
hands that the infrastructure necessary for
sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully
lacking in our country. The means of
transportation, power and communications are
in dire need of substantial improvement,
expansion and modernisation. These things
very often call for acquisition of land and that
too without any delay. It is, however, natural
that in most of these cases, the persons
affected challenge the acquisition proceedings
in courts. These challenges are generally in the
shape of writ petitions filed in High Courts.
Invariably, stay of acquisition is asked for and
in some cases, orders by way of stay or
injunction are also made. Whatever may have
been the practices in the past, a time has come
where the courts should keep the larger public
interest in mind while exercising their power of
granting stay/injunction. The power under
Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised
only in furtherance of interests of justice and
not merely on the making out of a legal point.
And in the matter of land acquisition for public
purposes, the interests of justice and the public
interest coalesce. They are very often one and
the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of
injunction or other similar orders, more
particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally
discretionary. The courts have to weigh the
public interest vis-à-vis the private interest
while exercising the power under Article 226 -
indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may
even be open to the High Court to direct, in
case it finds finally that the acquisition was
vitiated on account of non compliance with
some legal requirement that the persons
interested shall also be entitled to a particular
amount of damages to be awarded as a lump
sum or calculated at a certain percentage of
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compensation payable. There are many ways of
affording appropriate relief and redressing a
wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is
not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is
ultimately a matter of balancing the competing
interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor
advisable to say. We hope and trust that these
considerations will be duly borne in mind by the
courts while dealing with challenges to
acquisition proceedings."
(underlined by us)
22. To sum-up, when a measure taken by the
Government is for implementing a Mega Infrastructural
Project pursuant to a policy framed embedded with the
opinion of experts, Court should refrain from acting like a
super-accountant and interference with the same should be
extremely rare where it is inevitable. It is primarily the task
of the Government to govern and in the guise of judicial
review, Courts should not seek to run the governments.
Smelling foul-play in the action of the government at a mere
whiff of suggestion would make running the administration
an impossibility and elected governments which are
accountable to the people will be hamstrung in implementing
projects for promoting public weal. Where two options are
possible, it is not for the Court to act as an expert and
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substitute its own view for the view of the executive. In
matters of such nature, an appeal is essentially to the ballot
and not to the Courts. Courts do not have the expertise nor
the political mandate for deciding the comparative merits of
two options. It is relevant to notice that in Ramniklal9 even
goes to the extent of suggesting that moulding the relief in a
suitable manner should be the preferred choice with the
Court rather than striking down the acquisition.
23. We also feel the need to inform ourselves the
scope of power of the State to acquire land for "Public
Purpose". We hasten to add that we have no doubt in our
mind that the law is no longer res-integra and we do so only
on account of the extensive argument presented before us
on this aspect. An illuminating discussion on the true
meaning of "Public purpose" is available in the judgment of
Venkatarama Ayyar J., sitting with Rajamannar, CJ, in
P Thambiran Padayachi & Others Vs. State of Madras10.
We find it irresistible to quote the following observations
(1997) 1 SCC 134
AIR 1952 Madras 756
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made in the above decision for the sheer beauty of its
articulation:
"We have reached this conclusion even without
the aid of the presumption which the law raises
in favour of the existence of public purpose in
such acquisitions. Though the question is a
justiciable one and the ultimate decision must
rest with the courts, the action of the Legislature
in deciding upon the acquisition is itself
considered good proof that the purpose is a
public one. It was observed in United States v.
Welch11 that "When Congress has spoken on the
subject its decision is entitled to deference until it
is shown to involve impossibility. The same
considerations must apply, to notifications issued
by the Government under the powers vested in
them under the Land Acquisition Act for
acquisition of lands.
19. In Hamabai v. Secy. of State12, this is what
the Privy Council observed on this aspect of the
case:
"Prima facie the Government are good Judges of
that. They are not absolute judges. They cannot
say 'sic volo sic jebeo'. But at least the court
would not easily hold them to be wrong."
The acquisition must, therefore, be held to be
valid."
24. However, while not taking radically different view
on the import of "Public Purpose", a Constitution Bench of
(1946) 327 U.S. 546: 90 Law Ed. 843 at p. 848
AIR 1914 PC 20
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Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. Somawanti & Others Vs.
State of Punjab & Others has observed as follows:
"30. It is, however, said that that does not
mean that insofar as the meaning to be given
to the expression public purpose is concerned
the courts have no power whatsoever. In this
connection the decision of the Privy Council in
Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary of
State for India14 was referred to. In that case
certain land in Malabar Hill in Bombay was
being acquired by the Government of Bombay
for constructing residences for government
officers and the acquisition was objected to by
the lessee of the land on the ground that the
land was not being taken or made available to
the public at large and, therefore, the
acquisition was not for a public purpose. When
the matter went up before the High Court
Batchelor, J., observed:
"General definitions are, I think, rather to
be avoided where the avoidance is possible,
and I make no attempt to define precisely
the extent of the phrase "public purpose" in
the lease; it is enough to say that, in my
opinion, the phrase, whatever else it may
mean, must include a purpose, that is, an
object or aim, in which the general interest
of the community, as opposed to the
particular interest of individuals, is directly
and vitally concerned."
In that case what was being considered was a
re-entry clause in a lease deed and not
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. That
AIR 1963 SC 151
AIR 1914 PC 20
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clause left it absolutely to the lessor, the East
India Company to say whether the possession
should be resumed by it if the land was required
for a public purpose. It was in this context that
the question whether the land was needed for a
public purpose was considered. The argument
before the Privy Council rested upon the view
that there cannot be a "public purpose" in
taking land if that land, when taken, is not in
some way or other made available to the public
at large. Rejecting it they held that the true
view is that expressed by Batchelor, J., and
observed:
"That being so, all that remains is to
determine whether the purpose here is a
purpose in which the general interest of the
community is concerned. Prima facie the
Government are good judges of that. They
are not absolute Judges. They cannot say
'sic volo sic jebeo', but at least a court
would not easily hold them to be wrong.
But here, so far from holding them to be
wrong, the whole of the learned Judges,
who are thoroughly conversant with the
conditions of Indian life, say that they are
satisfied that the scheme is one which will
redound to public benefit by helping the
Government to maintain the efficiency of its
servants. From such a conclusion Their
Lordships would be slow to differ, upon its
own statement it commends itself to their
judgment."
Mr. Pathak strongly relied on these
observations and said that the Privy Council
have held that the matter is justiciable. It is
enough to say that that was not a case under
the Land Acquisition Act and, therefore,
conclusiveness did not attach itself to the
satisfaction of the Government that a particular
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purpose fell within the concept of public
purpose."
25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further struck a
note of caution that though the Courts are generally not
entitled to go behind the declaration of the Government to
the effect that the acquisition is for "public purpose", an
exercise of judicial review is permissible where power of
acquisition is exercised in a colourable manner or if it is a
fraud on power. The following observation in
Somawanti's15 case bears reference:
"40. Though we are of the opinion that the
courts are not entitled to go behind the
declaration of the Government to the effect that
a particular purpose for which the land is being
acquired is a public purpose we must
emphasise that the declaration of the
Government must be relatable to a public
purpose as distinct from a purely private
purpose. If the purpose for which the
acquisition is being made is not relatable to
public purpose then a question may well arise
whether in making the declaration there has
been, on the part of the Government a fraud on
the power conferred upon it by the Act. In other
words the question would then arise whether
that declaration was merely a colourable
exercise of the power conferred by the Act,
AIR 1963 SC 151
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and, therefore, the declaration is open to
challenge at the instance of the party
aggrieved. To such a declaration the protection
of Section 6(3) will not extend. For, the
question whether a particular action was the
result of a fraud or not is always justiciable,
provisions such as Section 6(3)
notwithstanding." (underlined by us)
26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Daulat Singh
Surana Vs. First Land Acquisition Collector16, after
elaborate survey of the case laws on "Public Purpose" has
observed as follows:
"71. A seven-Judge Bench of this Court
in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha
Reddy17 explained the expression "public
purpose" in the following words:
"6. It is indisputable and beyond the pale of any
controversy now as held by this Court in several
decisions including the decision in the case
of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of
Kerala --popularly known as Fundamental
Rights case--that any law providing for
acquisition of property must be for a public
purpose. Whether the law of acquisition is for
public purpose or not is a justiciable issue. But
the decision in that regard is not to be given by
any detailed inquiry or investigation of facts.
The intention of the legislature has to be
gathered mainly from the Statement of Objects
and Reasons of the Act and its Preamble. The
(2007) 1 SCC 641
(1977) 4 SCC 471
(1973) 4 SCC 225
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matter has to be examined with reference to
the various provisions of the Act, its context
and set up, the purpose of acquisition has to be
culled out therefrom and then it has to be
judged whether the acquisition is for a public
purpose within the meaning of Article 31(2) and
the law providing for such acquisition.
61. When we ascertain the content of 'public
purpose', we have to bear the above factors in
mind which mean that acquisition of road
transport undertakings by the State will
undoubtedly be a public purpose. Indeed, even
in England, 'public purposes' have been defined
to mean such 'purposes' of the administration
of the Government of the country (p.
228, Words & Phrases Legally Defined, IInd
Edn.). Theoretically, or even otherwise, there is
no warrant for linking up public purpose with
State necessity, or in the court throwing off the
State's declaration of public purposes to make
an economic research on its own. It is indeed
significant that in Section 40(b) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, the concept of 'public
use' took in acquisition for the construction of
some work even for the benefit of a company,
provided such work as likely to prove useful to
the public. Even the American Constitution, in
the 5th Amendment, uses the expression 'public
use' and it has been held in India
in Kameshwar19 that 'public purpose' is wider
than 'public use'."
27. As can be noticed from the above, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that power of acquisition for "public
AIR 1952 SC 252
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purpose" is wider than that under the doctrine of "public use"
in America.
28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sooraram Pratap
Reddy Vs. Collector20 has considered the exercise of
eminent domain power in US Jurisdiction as well as British
Jurisdiction and observed as follows:
58. In Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff , the Court held that, no doubt
there is a role for courts to play in reviewing a
legislature's judgment of what constitutes a
public use, even when the eminent domain
power is equated with the police power. But the
Court in Berman22 made clear that it is
"extremely narrow". The Court emphasised that
any departure from this judicial restraint would
result in courts deciding on what is and what is
not a governmental function and in their
invalidating legislation on the basis of their view
on that question. And the court would not
substitute its judgment for a legislature's
judgment as to what constitutes a public use
"unless the use be palpably without reasonable
foundation".
59. Recently, in Susette Kelo v. City of New
London23 the landowners challenged the city's
exercise of eminent domain power on the
ground that it was not for public use. The
project in question was a community project for
economic revitalisation of the city of New
(2008) 9 SCC 552
81 L Ed 2d 186 : 467 US 229 (1984)
99 L Ed 27 : 348 US 26 : 75 S Ct 98 (1954)
162 L Ed 439 : 545 US 469 : 125 S Ct 2655 (2005)
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London for which the land was acquired. It was
submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondents that the facts in Kelo were similar
to the facts of the present case. For that the
counsel relied upon the integrated development
project. Dealing with the project, the Court
stated:
"The Fort Trumbull area is situated on a
peninsula that juts into Thames River. The area
comprises approximately 115 privately owned
properties, as well as the 32 acres of land
formerly occupied by the naval facility
(Trumbull State Park now occupies 18 of those
32 acres). Parcel 1 is designated for a
waterfront conference hotel at the center of a
'small urban village' that will include
restaurants and shopping. This parcel will also
have marinas for both recreational and
commercial uses. A pedestrian 'riverwalk' will
originate here and continue down the coast,
connecting the waterfront areas of the
development. Parcel 2 will be the site of
approximately 80 new residences organised into
an urban neighbourhood and linked by public
walkway to the remainder of the development,
including the State park. This parcel also
includes space reserved for a new US Coast
Guard Museum. Parcel 3, which is located
immediately north of the Pfizer facility, will
contain at least 90,000 sq ft of research and
development office space. Parcel 4A is a 2.4
acre site that will be used either to support the
adjacent State park, by providing parking or
retail services for visitors, or to support the
nearby marina. Parcel 4B will include a
renovated marina, as well as the final stretch of
the riverwalk. Parcels 5, 6 and 7 will provide
land for office and retail space, parking, and
water-dependent commercial uses."
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The Court also stated:
"Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On
the one hand, it has long been accepted that
the sovereign may not take the property
of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to
another private party B, even though A is paid
just compensation. On the other hand, it is
equally clear that a State may transfer property
from one private party to another if future 'use
by the public' is the purpose of the taking; the
condemnation of land for a railroad with
common-carrier duties is a familiar example."
The Court noted the contention of the
petitioners that "using eminent domain for
economic development impermissibly blurs the
boundary between public and private takings".
It also conceded that quite simply, the
Government's pursuit of a public purpose might
benefit individual private parties, but rejected
the argument by stating:
"When the legislature's purpose is legitimate
and its means are not irrational, our cases
make clear that empirical debates over the
wisdom of other kinds of socio-economic
legislation are not to be carried out in the
Federal Courts." (underlined by us)
29. In both Daulat Singh Surana24 & Sooraram
Pratap Reddy25, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has extensively
surveyed the English Law, American Law and authorities like
Nichols on "Eminent Domain", Cooley on "Constitutional
Limitations", Hugo Grotius, and Willis on "Constitutional Law"
and also construct put on "Public Purpose" in India from
(2007) 1 SCC 641
(2008) 9 SCC 552
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Hamabai Vs. Secretary of State26 onwards and has finally
referred to the following interesting observations of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs.
Ranganatha Reddy :
"57. ... There may be many processes of
satisfying a public purpose. A wide range of
choices may exist. The State may walk into the
open market and buy the items, movable and
immovable, to fulfil the public purpose; or it
may compulsorily acquire from some private
person's possession and ownership the articles
needed to meet the public purpose; it may
requisition, instead of resorting to acquisition; it
may take on loan or on hire or itself
manufacture or produce. All these steps are
various alternative means to meet the public
purpose. The State may need chalk or cheese,
pins, pens or planes, boats, buses or buildings,
carts, cars, or eating houses or any other of the
innumerable items to run a welfare-oriented
administration or a public corporation or answer
a community requirement. If the purpose is for
servicing the public, as governmental purposes
ordinarily are, then everything desiderated for
subserving such public purpose falls under the
broad and expanding rubric. The nexus
between the taking of property and the public
purpose springs necessarily into existence if the
former is capable of answering the latter. On
the other hand, if the purpose is a private or
non-public one, the mere fact that the hand
that acquires or requires is Government or a
public corporation, does not make the purpose
automatically a public purpose. Let us illustrate.
AIR 1914 PC 20
(1977) 4 SCC 471, per, Krishna Iyer J.,
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If a fleet of cars is desired for conveyance of
public officers, the purpose is a public one. If
the same fleet of cars is sought for fulfilling the
tourist appetite of friends and relations of the
same public officers, it is a private purpose. If
bread is 'seized' for feeding a starving section
of the community, it is a public purpose that is
met but, if the same bread is desired for the
private dinner of a political maharajah who
may pro tem fill a public office, it is a private
purpose. Of course, the thing taken must be
capable of serving the object of the taking. If
you want to run bus transport you cannot take
buffaloes."
30. On a meaningful reading of the various decisions
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, more particularly, in
Somawanti28, Daulat Singh Surana29 and Sooraram
Pratap Reddy30, the following conclusions are inescapable:
i) 'Public Purpose' is bound to vary with times and
prevailing conditions in the community or locality and,
therefore, the legislature has left it to the State
(Government) to decide what 'Public Purpose' is and
also to declare the need of a given land for the
purpose. The legislature has left the discretion to the
Government regarding 'Public Purpose'. The
Government has the sole and absolute discretion in
the matter.31
ii) 'Public Purpose' cannot and should not be precisely
defined and its scope and ambit be limited as far as
acquisition of land for the 'Public Purpose' is
AIR 1963 SC 151
(2007) 1 SCC 641
(2008) 9 SCC 552
Paragraph-44 in Daulat Singh Surana's case
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concerned. 'Public Purpose' is not static. It also
changes with the passage of time, needs and
requirements of the community. Broadly speaking,
'Public Purpose' means the general interest of the
community as opposed to the interest of an
individual.32
iii) The power of compulsory acquisition as described by
the term "eminent domain" can be exercised only in
the interest and for the welfare of the people. The
concept of 'Public Purpose' should include the
matters, such as, safety, security, health, welfare and
prosperity of the community or public at large.33
iv) A "Public Purpose" is thus wider than a "Public
Necessity". Purpose is more pervasive than urgency.
That which one sets before him to accomplish, an
end, intention, aim, object, plan or project, is
purpose. A need or necessity, on the other hand, is
urgent, unavoidable, compulsive. Public Purpose
should be liberally construed, not whittled down by
logomachy.34
v) Though..................the courts are not entitled to go
behind the declaration of the Government to the
effect that a particular purpose for which the land is
being acquired is a public purpose................the
declaration of the Government must be relatable to a
public purpose as distinct from a purely private
purpose. If the purpose for which the acquisition is
being made is not relatable to public purpose then a
question may well arise whether in making the
declaration there has been, on the part of the
Government a fraud on the power conferred upon it
by the Act. In other words the question would then
arise whether that declaration was merely a
colourable exercise of the power conferred by the Act,
and, therefore, the declaration is open to challenge at
the instance of the party aggrieved. To such a
paragraph-73 in Daulat Singh Surana's case
paragraph-74 in Daulat Singh Surana's case
Paragraph-79 in Sooraram Pratap Reddy's case
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declaration the protection of Section 6(3) will not
extend. For, the question whether a particular action
was the result of a fraud or not is always justiciable,
provisions such as Section 6(3) notwithstanding."35
Declaration of "Public Purpose" in the acquisition
notification is final so far as curial challenge to the same is
concerned, except in the rare cases where colourable
exercise of such power or fraud on power is demonstrated
before a Constitutional Court.
31. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. Ashok Haranahalli
has assailed the legality of the acquisition on two principal
grounds. Firstly, he contended that an opportunity was given
to the appellants by virtue of directions given by a learned
Single Judge in collateral proceedings (WP Nos.102180-
102221 of 2014, disposed of on 25.06.2014) to raise
objections to 4(1) notification by filing statement of
objections before the SLAO. His contention was that the said
objection was not considered by the SLAO in accordance with
law. Secondly, he submitted that the subject acquisition was
not supported by "Public Purpose" and in fact it was
Paragraph-40 in Somawanti's case
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colourable exercise of power and therefore, it is illegal. On
the second aspect of his contention, he made several
ancillary submissions which will be taken note of at a later
stage.
32. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. M.R Naik was equally
vehement that both the contentions and ancillary
submissions made in support thereof are factually incorrect
and bereft of legal basis.
33. On account of a direction given by the learned
Single Judge of this Court in collateral proceedings initiated
by the appellants, State treated the notification initially
issued under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(for short, 'Act') as one under Section 4(1) of the Act and
permitted the parties to submit their objections which is in
the nature of objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act.
There is no dispute on this aspect from either side. Drawing
our attention in extenso to the objections filed by the
appellants herein to the acquisition, Sri. Ashok Haranahalli,
learned Senior Counsel made pain-staking efforts to
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substantiate his contention that the objections more
particularly in the nature of disproportionately large extent of
land being acquired for the supposed fulfillment of objectives
of "Public Purpose" and therefore, it being patently irrational,
irrationality of acquiring fertile agricultural lands for the
purpose of rehabilitation when alternative dry lands equally
suitable for the purpose of rehabilitation being available and
the alike were not considered by the competent authority.
34. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. M.R.Naik, on the
other hand, took us through individual objections filed by the
appellant-land losers and also a report of the competent
authority on the same. He further submitted that the
objections taken are vague and general in nature and
therefore, the competent authority was handicapped in
meeting the said objections. By way of illustration, he
submitted that the objections taken by the appellants by
merely stating that alternative lands are available which are
non-agricultural in nature, for rehabilitation purpose, without
giving further particulars about the location or area of the
same or such similar particulars by which the land is capable
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of being identified is impossible of being considered by the
competent authority and therefore, it was not unnatural that
the competent authority has not dealt with it in great detail.
In this behalf, reliance was placed on behalf of the
respondents on a decision of learned Single Judge of this
Court in N. Somashekar & Others Vs. State of Karnataka &
Others36. The relevant observations are as follows:
"27. It cannot be disputed that each objection raised
by a landowner or person interest in the land sought
to be acquired must be considered and disposed of by
the Land Acquisition Officer fairly and objectively, but
then that proposition of law is subject to an all
important caveat viz., that the objection must be one
of substance and must be stated with sufficient clarity
and supportive material. The requirement of
consideration of all the objections raised before the
Land Acquisition Officer is not ritualistic nor would the
Court interfere just because each objection raised
before the Officer concerned has not been considered
by him howsoever irrelevant funny or even foolish the
objection may be. It is only when the Court finds that
a fair and proper consideration of the objection raised
may have changed the course of events that the
Court may view non-consideration with concern.
Where the objections are just for the sake of
objections without any substance or wholly irrelevant
or insufficient to outweigh the compulsions of
compulsory acquisition meant to satisfy a public
purpose, the failure to deal with or consider ad
seriatum each objection raised would make no
difference. The decision of this Court in K.S.
1997 (7) Kar.L.J. 410
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Chandrashekhar and Others v The Special Land
Acquisition Officer, Karnataka Industrial Areas
Development Board, Bangalore and Others37,
relied upon by Counsel for the petitioners does not, in
my opinion, lay down a different proposition of law.
That was a case where the objection raised was that
the proposed acquisition was unnecessary having
regard to the fact that a vast extent of the
Government land was available which was suited for
satisfying the public purpose in view. Non-
consideration of the said aspect by the Land
Acquisition Officer was considered by this Court to be
improper. Reference may also be made to a Division
Bench decision of this Court in Writ Petition Nos. 1808
to 1822 of 1996, dated 31-5-1996, where this Court
held that in order that an objection on the ground of
availability of Government land is considered, it is
essential for the objector to identify the Government
land that is available, indicate the extent thereof and
provide such other details to enable the Land
Acquisition Officer to consider the objections by
reference to the same". (underlined by us)
35. We have carefully perused the above
observations of the learned Single Judge and we are in
respectful agreement with the proposition of law stated by
him. Perusal of the statement of objections filed by the
petitioners before the competent authority raising various
objections to the acquisition shows that they are extremely
bald and general in nature and lacking in specificity, and
incapable of being dealt with by the competent authority. As
1991 ( 2 ) Kar. L.J. 38 (DB) : ILR 1991 Kar. 1314 (DB)
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in N. Somashekar38, so in these cases while the petitioners
have taken the contention that other non-agricultural
suitable lands are available, they have given no particulars
thereof for being considered by the competent authority.
Insofar as the need, the suitability and advantages arising
from acquisition of subject lands notwithstanding they being
agricultural lands for the purpose of rehabilitating project
displaced persons on account of submergence is concerned,
that essentially is a matter of policy and therefore, so long as
the acquisition itself is not shown to be violative of provisions
of the Act or essentially in colourable exercise of power, it
cannot be frowned upon for lack of detailed consideration of
the same in the 5-A report. That, the project proposal was
backed up by vision document of considerable vintage and
further subject acquisition is supported by report from
Experts is demonstrated before the Court by producing the
same. It is also evident that this vision document and the
opinion of the experts were prepared long anterior to the
subject acquisition and they are not the outcome of the
1997 (7) Kar.L.J. 410
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subsequent efforts by the State to justify and substantiate
what has already been done by it. In view of the same, we
have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of Sri. Ashok
Haranahalli in this behalf.
36. It is the grievance of the appellants that the
subject acquisition is not supported by "Public purpose" and
the specific "Public Purpose" stated in the notification was
deviated and therefore, it is illegal. Learned Senior Counsel
Sri. Ashok Haranahalli in order to substantiate his contention
that there was no "public purpose" supporting the subject
acquisition had raised several ancillary contentions. He
submitted that the State had frittered away large extent of
lands namely 4544 acres acquired during previous
acquisition and in this behalf, he drew our attention to the
acquisition made in 1985-86. He also submitted that this
was supposed to cover the requirement of Unit-I to Unit-III
of UKP and the subject acquisition being the one supposedly
to meet the requirement of implementing Unit-III which
having been already served in the acquisition made during
1985-86, there is total absence of "public purpose" for the
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subject acquisition. In support of his submission, he read
out to us the vision document and various annexures
produced along with the writ papers.
37. We notice that the document relied by the
learned Senior Counsel to support his contention is the vision
document prepared before the acquisition of 4544 acres
during 1985-86 showing the extent of land required for
implementation of each of the project namely Unit-I, Unit-II
and Unit-III. The subject acquisition is for implementing
Unit-III of the Project. However, learned Senior Counsel
does not dispute the fact that the legality of the earlier
acquisition is not in challenge now and that the lands
required for the implementation of Unit-III is simply not
available as of now except a measly extent of slightly more
than 100 acres which is much less than the land required for
the execution of the current project and therefore, the
existence of the "public purpose" for the subject acquisition
to meet the current needs cannot be gainsaid. And what are
the reasons advanced by the learned Senior Counsel to
demonstrate his legal contention that on account of,
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according to him, the State frittering away the lands earlier
acquired, again according to him, by utilizing the lands so
acquired for unauthorized purposes, foul-play should be
smelled regarding the present acquisition also so as to
conclude that there is demonstrable lack of public purpose?
It needs to be noticed that he seeks to substantiate his
contention by pointing out that the lands acquired during
1985-86 were allotted to Karnataka Industrial Areas
Development Board; for establishing various other public
institutions; and also for establishing Agri-techno-park etc..
It was also suggested during submission that some parcels
of lands earlier acquired found their way through to the
hands of some private parties which had a characteristic of
"shady deals". We agree with the submission of learned
Senior Counsel Sri. M.R. Naik that this last submission is not
supported by any specific pleading before the learned Single
Judge thereby depriving the respondents of an opportunity of
meeting them and rightly, as a result thereof, was not dealt
with by the learned Single Judge as well. In that view of the
matter, it is not prudent on our part to go into the factual
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merits of the said contention. However, in light of limitations
on exercise of judicial review in matters of this nature as
adumbrated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various
decisions referred to supra, it needs to be observed with
reference to the objections of this nature taken by the
learned Senior Counsel for the appellants both in regard to
the past acquisition as a ground to doubt the bonafides of
the current one emanating from the alleged mis-utilization of
the lands so acquired and concerning the subject acquisition
as to the possible mis-utilization of the extent of lands
acquired in comparison with the alleged need to sub-serve
the purpose of rehabilitation of the displaced persons, we
only need to be guided by the sage advice of Chief Justice
Neely39 that our intervention is called for in this jurisdiction
only when violation of the constitutional right of a citizen is
demonstrated or as cautioned in Somawanti40, only when
colourable exercise of power or fraud on power is
Monongahela Power Co. Vs. Public Service Commision, 276 S.E. 2d 179 (1981),
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, February 10, 1981
AIR 1963 SC 151
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demonstrated. We are not satisfied that the learned Senior
Counsel could make out any such case before us.
38. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that
the acquisition proposal was not supported by sufficient data
as to the number of families that are going to be displaced
on account of submergence as a fallout to increasing the
height of Dam from 523 mtrs to 525 mtrs and therefore, the
acquisition is irrational. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. M.R.
Naik produced large number of reports including the survey
report which were available with the authorities when the
subject acquisition proposal was mooted. We are satisfied
from the material made available during the submissions
that the government had collected materials regarding the
number of families going to be displaced and once we are
satisfied about the same, we cannot go into sufficiency of the
material for supporting the extent of acquisition made by the
respondents.
39. It is necessary for us to remind ourselves that
subject acquisition for rehabilitation of people displaced due
to implementation of Unit-III UKP cannot be seen in isolation
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and it is to be viewed from the overall perspective. The
implementation of UKP was an ongoing project meant to
promote public weal by irrigating tens and thousands of
hectares of lands extending upto Yadagir District. By any
measure, it is a mammoth project. The State was bound to
factor in while acquiring the lands for the purpose of a
project of ongoing nature of this kind, various other aspects
like area of submergence, possible number of families going
to be displaced, since inevitably in the very nature of the
project execution taking a number of years more number of
families requiring rehabilitation due to passage of time and
the impossibility of rehabilitating from the old habitat in the
same manner in the new habitat going to be built in the
acquired land on account of the compulsion warranted by
new methods of town planning and concomitant requirement
for civic amenities. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. M.R. Naik
gave graphic details of the challenges before the respondents
on account of interjection, as he put it, of supervening
circumstance of a new district being formed albeit in the year
1997 and the attendant need to develop Bagalkot into a well
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regulated township. He also submitted that this cannot also
be seen in isolation from worldwide development like
liberalization of the economy and the need to accommodate
industries, government offices and the views of funding
agencies like World Bank for overall planned development of
Bagalkot. He also brought to our notice that on account of
emerging scenario especially the new culture of planned
development of the habitats, new laws have also come in for
regulating town planning and in consonance with the same
Bagalkot Town Development Authority (BTDA) was also
constituted. The said BTDA is created to effectuate the
purpose of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities
Act, 1987. Therefore, all the requirements under the same
should be met in the land acquired where the displaced
persons would be resettled.
40. After hearing the elaborate submissions of both
sides, we are completely satisfied that the subject acquisition
has to be seen as in fulfillment of the requirement of
execution of ongoing project of rehabilitating the project
displaced families as part of integral development of
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Bagalkot Town under BTDA which, perforce, should fulfill
overlapping requirements and overlapping objectives. In that
view of the matter, the purpose being demonstrably one to
promote public welfare, we are not in a position to agree
with the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that there
is no public purpose in the acquisition. We cannot don the
hat of a town planner or that of an Accountant to minutely
examine whether a slightly lesser extent of land would have
fulfilled the objective or whether the project could have been
implemented satisfactorily at another location. Such an
exercise by us would tantamount to substituting our views to
that of the State which has the advantage of expert advice.
There is absolutely no material to support the contention
that the acquisition is colourable exercise of power and
therefore, illegal. Once that is not demonstrated, no case is
made out for our interference under the writ jurisdiction. As
held in Ramaniklal N Bhutta41 quashing of acquisition of
lands made for a project of such public importance as in the
current one should be a rare one and only when it is
(1997) 1 SCC 134
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inevitable. We are not satisfied that this is not one such
instance where such a case is made out. There may be
some error here or some minor infractions there, but then in
any human endeavour, infractions and violations of minor
nature are inevitable; but, we are conscious that it is not for
us to do nit picking and smell foul-play at mere whiff of a
suggestion.
41. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. Ashok Haranahalli
contended that the acquisition of large extent of fertile
agricultural lands for rehabilitation purpose amounts to
depriving livelihood of affected parties including the present
appellants and the same has been frowned upon by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court. In this behalf, he invited our
attention to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Vs. State of Haryana &
Others42. We have carefully perused the said decision
rendered by a two-judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case was
considering 4(1) notification dated 22.06.2022 issued by the
(2012) 1 SCC 792
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Government of Haryana for acquisition of 3183 Kanals 17
marlas (476 acres 5 kanals 17 marlas) in Sonepath District
fo development of Industrial Sector-28. In the facts and
circumstances of the said case, certain observations were
made regarding massive acquisition of agricultural lands for
the purpose of industry. Observations made therein were
particular to the facts of the said case and no law was laid
down to the effect that no agricultural property should be
acquired for rehabilitation purpose.
42. As already noticed, subject acquisition and the
purpose sought to be achieved therefrom has to be seen in
the overall circumstances of ongoing project of
implementation of various phases of UKP and rehabilitation
of displaced persons as a part of integral development of
Bagalkot town. In that view of the matter, this contention of
Sri. Ashok Haranahalli also does not assist him. We are not
satisfied that merely because the properties acquired are
agricultural in nature, there is no "public purpose" sought to
be sub-served or that there was otherwise fraud on power or
colourable exercise of power which alone provide us an
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occasion to interdict the acquisition. Accordingly, the appeals
are devoid of merits and they are dismissed.
Pending applications, if any, do not survive for
consideration and accordingly, they are disposed off. Costs
made easy.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE
YAN/JTR
