Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 1290 Kant
Judgement Date : 31 January, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
R
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 31ST DAY OF JANUARY 2022
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S.G. PANDIT
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE
WRIT PETITION NO.110912 OF 2017(S-KAT)
BETWEEN:
SRI. M.S. KADKOL S/O. SRISHAIL KADAKOL
AGE:44 YEARS, OCC: NIL, R/O.
C/O. C. D. HIREMATHMANAGER,
M J BANK, RANI CHENAMMA NAGAR, DHARWAD.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI.V.M.SHEELVANT, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS UNDER SECRETARY
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
PWD (SERVICE-C), M S BUILDING
DR AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BANGALURU.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI.G.K.HIREGOUDAR., ADVOCATE)
THIS PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING THIS HON'BLE
COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER
APPROPRIATE WRIT, ORDER OR DIRECTION AND QUASH THE
ORDERS DATED 7.9.2004 AND 1.6.2016 PRODUCED AT
ANNEXURE-F AND K AND TO ISSUE A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF
MANDAMUS DIRECTING THE RESPONDENT TO REINSTATE THE
PETITIONER WITH BACK WAGES AND WITH ALL
CONSEQUENTIAL BENEFITS IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND
EQUITY.
2
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR 'PRONOUNCEMENT OF
ORDERS', THIS DAY, ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE J., MADE
THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
Rs.50 currency, which is said to have been found in
the most unlikely place, i.e, in the socks worn by the
petitioner, has landed the petitioner in the soup.
2. The trap laid, based on the complaint dated
16.01.1998, filed by Mr Chandrachari, the Assistant
Executive Engineer, was aimed at trapping another
employee in the same department where the petitioner
was working. The trap aimed at nabbing another
employee, DGO-1 ( Delinquent Government Official -1)
also caught the present petitioner in possession of Rs.50,
the tainted money.
3. The complainant Mr Chandrachari, was
transferred from Byadagi to Dharwad. DGO-1 who was
supposed to dispatch the service records, sat on it,
expecting a bribe of Rs.150.00 for dispatching the service
records.
4. Acting on the aforementioned complaint which
was filed before Deputy Superintendent of Police
Lokayukta, the case was registered in Crime No.2/1998 for
the offence under Section 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of
Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 and a raid was
conducted. The petitioner who happened to be with the
delinquent government official (DGO -1) at the time of the
raid, was also found to have Rs.50.00 the tainted
currency. This currency of Rs.50.00 is admittedly paid by
DGO-1 to the petitioner. According to the contesting
respondents, this currency of Rs.50.00 is part of
Rs.150.00 paid to DGO-1 by the complainant.
5. Subsequently, the departmental enquiry is also
initiated. A charge memo was issued to the petitioner as
well as DGO-1. In the departmental enquiry, the accused
in the original complaint dated 16.01.1998, is DGO-1 and
the present petitioner is referred to as DGO-2. Petitioner
contested the matter. The enquiry officer submitted his
report holding that charges against both the delinquent
government officials are established. Pursuant to the
report dated 14.08.2003, the disciplinary authority
imposed a penalty of compulsory retirement vide order
dated 07.09.2004. Said order is called in question by the
petitioner. Karnataka Administrative Tribunal in terms of
its order dated 01.06.2016 in application No.5791/2014,
rejected the challenge.
6. The petitioner is before this court invoking
Article 226 of the Constitution of India impugning the order
passed by the disciplinary authority and the Administrative
Tribunal. At the time of the trap, the petitioner was
working as a Second Division Assistant in the Public Works
Department, Byadagi.
7. Narrative in the petition can be summarized as
under.
7.1 One H.R.Naikar, DGO -1 who was also
working as Second Division Assistant in the
office where the petitioner was discharging
duty, was assigned the task of dispatching the
service records of complainant-Mr
Chandrachari. The complainant alleged that Mr
Chandragiri was repeatedly approaching DGO-
1, requesting him to dispatch his service
records. Despite repeated requests, the DGO-1
did not dispatch the service records. However,
DGO-1 demanded Rs.150=00 for work to be
done file.
7.2 Just before the trap, Rs.50/- was handed over
to the petitioner by DGO-1 which according to
the petitioner was the hand loan advanced by
DGO -1.
7.3 The petitioner claims that he unsuspectingly
received Rs.50/- as a hand loan from DGO -1,
being unaware that the currency handed over
to him was tainted.
7.4 Petitioner never demanded money from Mr
Chandrachari and never received money from
him.
8. As narrated above, in the departmental
enquiry, the charge against the petitioner is held to be
proved and consequently, he is compulsorily retired from
service. The challenge to the said order, before the
Karnataka Administrative Tribunal, turned out to be futile.
Hence the present petition.
9. Heard Sri.V.M.Sheelavant, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner and Sri. G.K.Hiregoudar,
learned Government Advocate appearing for the
respondents.
10. The question that needs to be answered in this
petition is,
whether the petitioner has made out a case to interfere with the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority and the Administrative Tribunal in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?
11. Scope of enquiry under Article 226 of
Constitution of India in a matter relating to the disciplinary
enquiry, quantum of punishment imposed and scope of
judicial review of the order passed by the Tribunals or
appellate authorities before which the validity of finding of
departmental enquiry is tested, is well settled. The Hon'ble
Apex Court in a catena of decisions has held that the High
Court shall not venture into re-appreciation of evidence.
The Apex Court has held that the high court can only look
into whether:-
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is a violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very fact of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also gone to the
extent of holding that the High Court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in
a matter relating to the departmental enquiry to,
(i) re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted following the law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
13. Keeping in mind the above said well-
established principles, this court has considered the
contentions raised at the bar.
14. There is no dispute over the fact that the
enquiry officer has followed the procedure while
conducting the departmental enquiry. Submission of Sri.
Sheelavant, appearing for the petitioner mainly centered
around the point that there is no demand for a bribe by
the petitioner. Referring to the contents of the charge, it is
urged that even according to the complainant, the bribe of
Rs.150/- was demanded by DGO-1 and not the petitioner.
It is also forthcoming from the records that Rs.50/- was
paid to the petitioner by DGO-1. According to the learned
counsel for the petitioner, the demand by the petitioner for
a bribe of Rs.50/- from the complainant cannot be inferred
at all. Based on these submissions, it is urged that both
the enquiry officer and the Tribunal failed to take note of
these vital aspects.
15. The learned counsel for the petitioner would
further urge that punishment of compulsory retirement
imposed on the petitioner is disproportionate to the nature
and gravity of the allegation against the petitioner. It is
also urged that no work of the complainant was pending
with the petitioner. Without a complaint against the
petitioner and a demand made by the petitioner and in the
absence of any illegal favour done or promised by the
petitioner, he could not have been compulsorily retired
from service, even if he is found with tainted money is the
submission on behalf of the petitioner.
16. It is further submitted by Sri.V.M.Sheelvant
that the petitioner is acquitted in the criminal trial and the
benefit of finding in a criminal trial should be extended in
this case also.
17. Sri. G.K.Hiregoudar learned Government
Advocate defending the order of the disciplinary authority
as well as the administrative tribunal would contend that
the case on hand does not call for any interference by this
Court considering the well-settled principles governing the
scope of judicial review in a matter like this. Learned
counsel would urge that the finding arrived at by the
disciplinary authority was based on unimpeachable
evidence. It is also submitted by the learned Government
Advocate that acquittal in a criminal proceeding initiated
against the delinquent employee is not a ground to set
aside the finding of the departmental enquiry. He would
submit the degree of proof required in a criminal
proceeding under criminal law and departmental enquiry
are entirely different and judgment in a criminal case in
favour of accused ipso facto does not lead to the
conclusion that delinquent employee is not guilty. The
learned counsel in support of his submission has placed
reliance on the following judgments of the Hon'ble Apex
Court.
17.1 Karnataka Power Transmission Power Corporation vs. C. Nagaraju and another (2019) 10 SCC 367
17.2 Praveenkumar vs. Union of India 2020 9 SCC 471
17.3 Deputy General Manager vs. Ajaykuar Srivatsav 2021 2 SCC 612
17.4 This court perused the records and considered the contentions raised at the bar.
18. The petitioner has taken a defence that he has
received Rs.50/- from DGO-1 as a hand loan. Thus,
possession of tainted currency with the petitioner is
admitted. The explanation that the amount was paid as a
hand loan does not appeal at all. No man of ordinary
prudence would believe that Rs.50 received as a hand loan
should find its way to the socks worn by the loanee. In the
normal and natural sequence of things, the Rs.50-00 note
should have found the place either in the purse or pocket
of the petitioner. Thus, the band loan theory is rightly
rejected by the and the Tribunal.
19. It is also relevant to note that the charge
framed in the enquiry against the present petitioner is that
he has received Rs.50/- from a delinquent government
official No.1 Mr H.R.Naikar out of Rs.150/- which was
received by Mr Naikar as a bribe from the complainant and
thereby petitioner failed to maintain absolute integrity
which makes the petitioner unbecoming of a government
servant and on account of such misconduct petitioner
contravened Rule 3(1) (i) and (iii) r/w Rule 16(4) of
KCS(Conduct) Rules, 1966 which is punishable under Rule
8 of KCS(CCA) Rules, 1957". The enquiry officer has
returned the finding of guilty based on supporting evidence
on record. The enquiry officer by following all the
procedures, affording ample opportunity to the petitioner
to defend his case has returned a verdict of guilty against
the petitioner. The departmental enquiry in question does
not suffer from any of the infirmities to call for interference
by the High Court in the exercise of its power under
Articles 226 of the Constitution of India.
20. The Karnataka Administrative Tribunal has
considered all the contentions in the application filed by
the petitioner and has not found reason to interfere with
the finding in the departmental enquiry. Since the finding
of guilty returned by the enquiry officer does not call for
any interference viewed from the parameters set by the
Hon'ble Apex court.
21. Based on the finding in the departmental
enquiry the appointing authority has decided to impose a
penalty of compulsory retirement. Then the question is, to
what extent the High Court can interfere in the decision
taken by the appointing authority in punishing the
delinquent employee? Law in this regard is more than well
settled is an understatement. The ratio laid down in the
case of Union of India and Others vs.P.Gunasekaran
reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 and the ratio laid down in
the judgments cited by the learned Government Advocate
for the respondents, needs to be borne in mind while
considering the legality of punishment imposed.
22. In terms of the ratio laid down in the
judgments referred above, the High Court can interfere
with the quantum of punishment imposed only in a
situation where the punishment shocks the conscience of
the Court or if it is disproportionate to the offence
committed.
23. The disciplinary authority while punishing the
petitioner has exercised the powers vested under Rule 8 of
the Karnataka Civil Services (C.C.A.) Rules, 1957. The said
Rule would read as under:
"8. Nature of penalties.- One or more of the following penalties for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, may be imposed on Government servants, namely.-
(i) Fine in the case of Government servants belonging to State Civil Services, Group-D;
(ii) Censure;
(iii) "Withholding of increments;
(iii-a) Withholding of promotion"
(iv) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by negligence or breach of orders to the State Government or the Central Government, any other State Government, any person, body or authority, to whom the service of the Officer had been lent;
(iv-a) Reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a period with a specific direction as to whether or not the Government servant will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction with reference to the reduced pay or whether the pay shall remain constant and with a further direction whether on the expiry of the period of penalty the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay;
(v) "Reduction to a lower time scale of pay, grade, post or service which shall, unless otherwise directed, be a bar to the promotion of the Government servant to the time scale of pay, grade, post or service from which he was reduced, with or without further directions regarding:-
(a) Seniority and pay in the scale of pay, grade, post or service to which the Government servant is reduced;
(b) Conditions of restoration to the scale of pay grade or post of service from which the Government servant was reduced and his seniority and pay on such restoration to that scale of pay, grade, post or service;
(vi) Compulsory retirement;
(vii) Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment;
(viii) Dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment:
[Provided that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in the order of the disciplinary authority, no penalty other than those specified in clauses (vi) to (viii) shall be imposed for an established charge of corruption.]
[Explanation 1.-For purposes of this proviso the expression "corruption" shall have the meaning assigned to the expression "Criminal misconduct by a public servant" in section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Central Act 49 of 1988).]
[Explanation 2.-The following shall not amount to a penalty within the meaning of this rule:-
(i) Withholding of increments of a Government servant for failure to pass a departmental examination in accordance with the rules or orders governing the Service or post or the terms of his appointment;
(ii) Stoppage of a Government servant at the efficiency bar in the time scale on the ground of his unfitness to cross the bar;
(iii) Non-promotion, whether in a substantive or officiating capacity, of a Government servant, after consideration of his case, to a Service, grade or post for promotion to which he is eligible;
(iv) Reversion to a lower Service, grade or post of a Government servant officiating in a higher Service, grade or post on the ground that he is considered, after trial to be unsuitable for such higher Service, grade or post or on administrative grounds unconnected with his conduct (such as the return of the permanent incumbent from leave or deputation, availability of a more suitable officer and the like);
(v) Reversion to his permanent Service, grade or post of a Government servant appointed on probation to another Service, grade or post during or at the end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing probation:
(vi) Compulsory retirement of a Government servant in accordance with the provision relating to his superannuation or retirement;
(vii) Termination of services:-
(a) Of a person employed under an agreement, in accordance with the terms of such agreement; or
(b) Of a Government servant appointed in probation, during or at the end of the period of his probation, in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing such probation; or
(c) Of a temporary Government servant in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Karnataka State Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1967."
24. The expression 'One or more of the following
penalties for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter
provided, may be imposed on Government servants,
namely' on plain reading seems to suggest that the power
on the disciplinary authority is very wide. However, it is to
be borne in mind that every wide power has its own
inherent or inbuilt limitations. The limitations may be
either express or implied. When it comes to provisions
dealing with the power to impose a penalty conferring
power to impose any one or more of the wide range of
penalties provided in the provisions, as found in Rule 8
referred above, then the limitation on the exercise of such
power is to be read into the provisions keeping in the mind
the doctrine of proportionality of punishment. Merely
because statute invests the authority with the power to
choose any of the several prescribed punishments, it
cannot be said that the authority has the unfettered power
to impose any of the prescribed punishments. When the
statute confers a wide range of choices while imposing
punishment, the authority imposing punishment should
exercise discretion with utmost caution. While the
authority is deciding on the punishment, the doctrine of
proportionality should be the background score till the
exercise is completed. If punishment imposed is
disproportionate to the offence alleged, then it violates the
right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India.
25. The expression 'good and sufficient reasons'
found in rule 8 referred to above, is an express limitation
imposed on the power that unerringly leads to the
conclusion that the punishment imposed necessarily has to
be, proportionate to the offence committed, logical and
convincing.
26. From the records, it is apparent that
delinquent government official No.1 in the departmental
enquiry paid Rs.50/- to the petitioner. Admittedly, the
demand of Rs.150/- for dispatching the file of Mr
Chandragiri was made by delinquent No.1. The
complainant has not paid any amount to the petitioner.
Admittedly, the petitioner did not demand money from the
complainant. From the finding arrived at by the enquiry
officer, it is apparent that the role of the petitioner was
passive. It is only delinquent No.1 who played an active
role in demanding the bribe. It is also not forthcoming
from the evidence that the petitioner demanded the bribe
from delinquent No.1. It is not even alleged by the
complainant that the petitioner demanded the money.
Moreover, it is borne out from the record that no work of
the complainant was pending with the petitioner. It is also
an admitted fact that the complaint is not lodged against
the petitioner. The PW1-the complainant in his evidence
has not stated anything against the petitioner. No word is
uttered by the complainant about the role of the present
petitioner. The entire evidence of the complainant was
against DGO-1 H.R.Naikar. Nevertheless, the fact that the
petitioner has received Rs.50/- from DGO No.1 is admitted
by the petitioner. The circumstances under which the
money is received as stated earlier, facts that the money
was traced in the socks worn by the petitioner by
themselves speak a few things which can be easily termed
as misconduct. And this misconduct cannot escape
punishment. What would be the appropriate punishment
for this misconduct? Though it is not for the high court to
decide on the quantum of punishment, the high court can
nevertheless review the quantum on the doctrine of
proportionality. If punishment imposed is disproportionate
to the misconduct or if it shocks the conscience of the
Court same can be interdicted as held in the case of Ranjit
Thakur v/s. Union of India. (1987) 4 SCC 611
27. Does the punishment of compulsory retirement
imposed on the petitioner pass the test of doctrine of
proportionality is the question? As noted above, the
complaint was against DGO-1. The trap laid was intended
to catch DGO-1. Petitioner was found with part of the
tainted money in the circumstances already discussed
supra. Both delinquent employees are found guilty and
have been retired compulsorily. However, what is strikingly
evident is role and involvement of both differed
significantly. Under these circumstances, the question is
whether the punishment to both the employees should be
the same or should it differ? The main accused against
whom the complaint is filed has met with the punishment
of compulsory retirement. When the present petitioner
whose role appears to be extremely passive in the entire
episode and more particularly in a situation where there is
no complaint against the petitioner, he could not have
been saddled with the same punishment imposed on
another delinquent employee against whom there was a
complaint regarding the demand for illegal gratification of
Rs.150/-.
28. In the backdrop of these facts and
discussions referred above on the scope and ambit of rule
8 of Karnataka Civil Services (C.C.A.) Rules, 1957 referred
above, this Court finds that the punishment of compulsory
retirement imposed on the petitioner is disproportionate to
the nature and gravity of the offence. The said punishment
treats the offence committed by the present petitioner on
par with the offence committed by DGO-1 despite
circumstances that are glaringly different.
29. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of
Rajendra Yadav vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013)
3 SCC 73, has held that if the role of a person in the
commission of an offence is less and passive in comparison
with another playing an active role in its commission, then
the person playing lesser role should not be imposed
higher penalty than the one imposed on a person whose
role and involvement is active. The logical corollary of the
said ratio would mean punishment should be imposed
considering the involvement of the accused in the
commission of the offence. Applying the said ratio, the
petitioner whose involvement in the commission of the
offence is extremely passive, awarding the same
punishment as awarded on delinquent government official
No.1 who is the main accused, does not stand to reason.
The involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the
offence in comparison to the involvement of DGO-1 is
significantly less. Thus, two un equals have been treated
equally by imposing the same penalty. This violates the
protection guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. If the administrative action of punishment
imposed, violates rights guaranteed under Article 14 of
the constitution of India and the court finds it
discriminatory and irrational then the order of punishment
needs to be set aside in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226. It is also borne out from the record that the
petitioner was having 15 years of service as on the date of
compulsory retirement. Thus this Court is of the view that
the punishment is shockingly disproportionate. This Court
has come to this conclusion keeping in mind the
involvement of the petitioner in the entire episode
discussed supra. Since the punishment imposed violates,
the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner, this
Court would step in and exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and set aside the order of
penalty of compulsory retirement.
30. It is the well-settled proposition of law that the
Court cannot decide on the quantum of punishment to be
awarded. This power exclusively lies with the appointing
authority. The court can only say whether the punishment
is disproportionate to the offence committed. If it is
shockingly disproportionate then the Court can only remit
the matter back to the disciplinary authority to enable it to
impose appropriate punishment which necessarily has to
be less than the punishment imposed earlier which is
interdicted by this Court.
31. It is not the case of the respondents that the
petitioner's service record is tainted. As already observed
the petitioner's right under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India is violated. By setting aside the penalty of
compulsory retirement, the matter is remitted to the
disciplinary authority to decide on the quantum of
punishment to be imposed on the petitioner. The
remaining portion of the impugned orders is upheld.
32. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed in part.
Order dated 01.06.2016 in Application No.5791/2004
passed by the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal is set
aside. The finding dated 14.08.2003 returned by the
enquiry officer on the charges on the petitioner is
confirmed. The punishment of compulsory retirement
imposed on the petitioner under order bearing No.¯ÉÆÃE
231 ¸ÉÃE« 2001, ¨ÉAUÀ¼Æ À gÀÄ dated 07.09.2004 is set aside
and the matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority to
pass appropriate order of punishment on the petitioner,
which necessarily has to be lesser than the punishment
imposed in terms of order dated 07.09.2004 in the light of
what is discussed above.
33. Since the disciplinary enquiry was initiated in
the year 2002, the disciplinary authority shall pass the
appropriate order of punishment within two months from
the date of receipt of the copy of the order.
No order as to cost.
SD/-
JUDGE
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JUDGE sh
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