Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 1114 Kant
Judgement Date : 25 January, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
R.S.A.NO.2214 OF 2006(DEC)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI BASAVARAJ SHIVALINGAPPA MUTTAGI
(SINCE DECEASD BY HIS LRS)
1(A). SMT.PREMA W/O BASAVARAJ MUTTAGI
AGE 55 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD,
R/O BASAVESHWARANAGAR,
HIREKERUR-581111, DIST: HAVERI
1(B). NAVEEN
S/O BASAVARAJ MUTTAGI
(DECEASED & A1(A), (C) & (D) ARE HIS LEGAL HEIRS)
1(C). VINAYKUMAR S/O BASAVARAJ MUTTAGI
AGE 28 YEARS, OCC: MEDICAL PRACTIONER,
R/O BASAVESHWARANAGAR,
HIREKERUR-581111, DIST: HAVERI
1(D). VIDYA D/O BASAVARAJ MUTTAGI
AGE 25 YEARS, OCC: SERVICE,
R/O BASAVESHWARANAGAR,
HIREKERUR-581111, DIST: HAVERI
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI.DINESH M.KULKARNI, SRI.VENKATESH R.BHAGAT,
SRI.VINITH V.BHAGAT, ADVS.)
2
AND:
1. M/S SHIVALINGAPPA D SHETTER
SONS, PARTNERSHIP FIRM, HIREKERUR-581111
2. SRI SHIVALINGAPPA DUNDEPPA SHETTER
AGED 80 YEARS, OCC:BUSINESS
R/O HIREKERUR-581111
3. SRI KUMARSWAMY SHIVALINGAPPA SHETTER
AGED 59 YEARS, OCC:BUSINESS
R/O HIREKERUR-581111
4. SRI SHADAKSHARAPPA
S/O SHIVALINGAPPA SHETTER
AGED 56 YEARS,OCC:BUSINESS
R/O HIREKERUR-581111
5. SRI MRUTYUNJAYAPPA
SHIVALINGAPPA SHETTER
AGED 49 YEARS, OCC:BUSINESS
R/O HIREKERUR, TALUK HIREKERUR-581111
6. SRI SHIVAYOGEPPA SAVALIGEPPA KUBUSAD,
AGED 69 YEARS, OCC:AGRICULTURE
R/O HIREKERUR, TALUK HIREKERUR-581111
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.T.S.VENKATESH ADV. FOR R1 TO R5,
SRI.MAHESH WODEYAR & SMT.ANURADHA DESHPANDE,
ADV. FOR R3,
SRI.SHARANA BASAVARAJ C. ADV. FOR R6)
THIS APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF CPC PRAYING
TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 22.07.2006 IN
R.A.NO.31/1992 PASSED BY THE LEARNED CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN.)
AND PRINCIPAL JMFC, RANEBENNUR AND CONFIRM THE JUDGMENT
AND DECREE DATED 12.07.1991 IN O.S.NO.148/1989 PASSED BY
THE LEARNED CIVIL JUDGE (JR.DN.) HIREKERUR BY ALLOWING THIS
APPEAL.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD THE RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 04.01.2022 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
3
JUDGMENT
The captioned second appeal is filed by the original
defendant No.1 questioning the divergent judgment and
decree of the Courts below.
2. The facts leading to the case are as under:
The respondent Nos.1 to 5/plaintiffs filed a suit for
declaration and for consequential relief of possession and
also claimed damages against the deceased
appellant/defendant No.1. The respondents/plaintiffs
claimed that they have purchased suit schedule 'A2'
property under registered sale deed dated 17.09.1986 from
defendant Nos.1 to 3 as per Ex.P-7. The
respondents/plaintiffs contended that suit schedule 'A2'
property is in fact sold by all the owners and therefore,
plaintiffs assert and claim that they have acquired valid
right and title over suit schedule 'A2' property and
therefore, have denied the title of the original
appellant/defendant No.1. The respondents/plaintiffs have
contended that defendant No.1 has purchased only from
defendant No.2 'ABCD' portion as annexed in the sketch
which is schedule 'A2' property under registered sale deed
dated 02.09.1985 as per Ex.D-1. The plaintiffs' contention
is since schedule 'A2' property is sold only by defendant
No.2 who is one of the co-owner of the suit schedule
property, defendant No.1 would not acquire any valid right
and title under sale deed dated 02.09.1985 which was
executed by defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1.
3. On receipt of summons, the original
appellant/defendant No.1 contested the proceedings and
has stoutly denied the entire averments made in the plaint.
The defendant No.1 specifically disputed the allegations
averred by the respondents/plaintiffs in the plaint that he
has tresspassed and that defendant No.2 has executed the
sale deed without paying valuable sale consideration and
that it is a concocted document. The defendant No.1
specifically contended that he has purchased scheduled 'A2'
property which is marked as 'ABCD' in the annexed sketch
under registered sale deed dated 02.09.1985 as per Ex.D-1
which is earlier in point of time and therefore, the question
of declaring the respondents/plaintiffs as absolute owner of
the suit schedule 'A2' property on the basis of subsequent
sale deed executed by his vendor/defendant No.2 and
defendant Nos.3 and 4 is not permissible under law and the
same is contrary to Sections 48 and 54 of Transfer of
Property Act and Sections 47 and 49 of Registration Act.
4. The parties to the suit have led in ocular
evidence and have also produced documentary evidence to
substantiate their respective claims. The Trial Court on
appreciation of ocular and documentary evidence answered
issue Nos.1 and 2 in negative and held that
respondents/plaintiffs have failed to prove that they are
owners of the suit schedule property and further held that
the respondents/plaintiffs are not entitled to recover
damages for a sum of Rs.6,000/-. While answering
additional issue No.1, the Trial Court answered the same in
the affirmative and held that defendant No.1 has proved
that defendant No.2 has alienated suit schedule 'A2'
property in his favour for legal necessity.
5. The respondents/plaintiffs being aggrieved by
the judgment and decree of the Trial Court preferred an
appeal before the First Appellate Court in R.A.No.31/1992.
The Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of oral and
documentary evidence, has reversed the findings of the
Trial Court by answering point Nos.1, 4 and 5 in the
affirmative. The Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of oral
and documentary evidence, has laid emphasis on the fact
that defendant No.2 has alienated suit schedule 'A2'
property under registered sale deed dated 02.09.1985
without the consent of other non-alienating family
members and therefore, has proceeded to hold that the
sale deed executed by defendant No.2 in favour of
deceased appellant/defendant No.1 as per Ex.D-1 is null
and void and therefore, the sale deed dated 02.09.1985 in
favor of deceased appellant/defendant No.1 would not
create any right and interest. The Appellate Court has also
held that defendant No.2 had no manner of right to
alienate the suit schedule 'A2' property and therefore, for
want of consent by alienating members, the Appellate
Court has proceeded to declare the sale deed in favour of
deceased appellant/defendant No.1 as null and void and
consequently declared the respondents/plaintiffs as
absolute owners. On these set of reasonings, the Appellate
Court has proceeded to allow the appeal and set aside the
judgment and decree of the Trial Court.
6. It is this judgment which is under challenge by
the original defendant No.1.
7. The material on record reveals that defendant
No.1 who preferred second appeal before this Court died
during the pendency of the second appeal and his legal
representatives were brought on record.
8. This Court while admitting the appeal has
framed the following substantial questions of law:
"1. Whether the learned Appellate Judge was justified in reversing the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court?
2. Whether the Judgment and Decree of the Lower Appellate Court is vitiated for not considering the evidence on record inasmuch as the claim of defendant No.1-appellant is he has purchased only an extent of 600 sq.ft and not the entire area?
3. Whether the Judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court is perverse inasmuch as it does not consider the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties?"
9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants
lamenting the reasons and conclusions recorded by the
Appellate Court would contend before this Court that
deceased appellant/defendant No.1 has purchased suit
schedule 'A2' property for valuable consideration under
registered sale deed dated 02.09.1985 which is much prior
to the sale deed obtained by plaintiffs and therefore, he
would contend before this Court that defendant No.1
acquired valid right and title pursuant to alienation by
defendant No.2 which was in fact for legal necessity and
there is clinching evidence which is placed before the Court
which clearly proves that defendant No.2 for domestic
compulsion was compelled to sell a portion of the property
which is marked as 'ABCD' portion in the sketch and
therefore, he would contend before this Court that the
respondents/plaintiffs who are the subsequent purchasers
have no locus standi to seek relief of declaration and
possession based on a subsequent sale deed. He would
also lay emphasis on the fact that the non-alienating
members i.e., defendant Nos.2 and 3 have not at all
questioned the sale deed executed by the defendant No.2
in favor of deceased defendant No.1.
10. To buttress his arguments, he would take this
Court to the written statement filed by defendant
No.2/vendor. Placing reliance on the averments made in
the written statement of defendant No.2, he would submit
to this Court that defendant No.2 has not at all disputed
the due execution of registered sale deed in favour of
deceased defendant No.1 for valuable sale consideration.
He would also refer to the ocular evidence of DW.3 who is
none other than the son of defendant No.2. Now coming to
the dispute in regard to two conflicting sale deeds, he
would submit to this Court that defendant No.2 has only
sold a small portion of the property and the extent which is
sold under Ex.D-1 by defendant No.2 in favour of
defendant No.1 is well within the legitimate share of
defendant No.2 in the suit schedule properties. Therefore,
he would submit to this Court that the grievance which is
being agitated by the subsequent purchasers i.e.,
respondents/plaintiffs herein cannot be entertained as it is
only the co-owners who were not party to the sale deed
were aggrieved persons and therefore, the present suit for
declaration and consequential relief of possession by
subsequent purchasers is not at all maintainable.
11. Learned counsel would also take this Court to
paragraph 4 of the written statement and would contend
before this Court that defendant No.2 is a signatory to the
second sale deed executed by his brothers. However, he
has offered an explanation which finds place at paragraph
4 of the written statement wherein he has clearly stated
that inspite of sale by him in favour of defendant No.1, he
still had share in the suit schedule 'A2' property and his
brothers were pressurizing that unless he does not sign the
sale deed, he would not be entitled to the sale
consideration. It is in this background that defendant No.2
has even signed the sale deed in respect of suit schedule
'A2' property also. He would also submit to this Court that
the respondents/plaintiffs have in fact purchased larger
share under sale deed dated 17.09.1986. The
respondents/plaintiffs have purchased the entire extent
under two separate sale deeds on the same day. One sale
deed refers to schedule 'A1' property and the second sale
deed as per Ex.P-7 pertains to the present suit property
which is referred as 'ABCD' portion in the sketch annexed
to the plaint.
12. Questioning the reasons recorded by the
Appellate Court, he would submit to this Court that the
finding of the Appellate Court that a co-parcener cannot
sell his undivided interest without consent of other co-
parceners is perverse and contrary to the principles laid
down under Mitakshara Law. He would submit to this
Court that it is trite law that a co-parcener has every right
to sell his undivided share or a specific property forming
part of a joint family property. On these set of grounds, he
would submit to this Court that the entire basis on which
the Appellate Court has reversed the well considered
judgment and decree of the Trial Court is that the
alienation by defendant No.2 in respect of suit schedule
'A2' property is without the consent of defendant Nos.3 and
4. He would further conclude his arguments by contending
that the finding of the Appellate Court in declaring the sale
deed dated 02.09.1985 executed by the defendant No.2 in
favour of defendant No.1 as null and void is perverse,
palpably erroneous and in absence of any prayer to that
effect.
13. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents/plaintiffs refuting the contentions canvassed
by the learned counsel for the appellants would submit to
this Court that there is no need to seek cancellation of sale
deed in favour of defendant No.1 executed by defendant
No.2 as per Ex.D-1. He would submit to this Court that
since the plaintiffs were in possession of the entire extent,
sale deed in favour of defendant No.1 executed by
defendant No.2 does not create any right and title as the
lease was in subsistence. He would submit to this Court
that the respondents/plaintiffs were in possession of the
entire extent from the date of lease i.e., 25.01.1977 till the
date of execution of sale deed in their favour. He would
further submit to this Court that since all the owners have
come forward and executed sale deed in favour of the
respondents/plaintiffs as per Ex.P-7 and same is supported
by the ocular evidence of PWs.2 to 5, the judgment and
decree of the Appellate Court in declaring the
respondents/plaintiffs as absolute owners is in accordance
with law and does not suffer from any perversity and
therefore, may not warrant any interference at the hands
of this Court.
14. In support of his contention, learned counsel for
the respondents/plaintiffs has placed reliance on a
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Faqirchand vs. Sardarni Harnamkaur1. Placing
reliance on this judgment, he would submit to this Court
that defendant No.2 had no authority to alienate the suit
1967 (1) SCR 68
schedule property except for legal necessity or for payment
of an antecedent debt.
15. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and
learned counsel for the respondents. I have bestowed my
anxious consideration to the reasons assigned by the Trial
Court as well as Appellate Court and have gone through
the judgment rendered by both the Courts below and have
also examined the ocular and documentary evidence led in
by both the parties in support of their case.
16. This Court while admitting the appeal has, in all,
formulated three substantial questions of law. The second
substantial question of law would have a direct bearing on
the lis between the parties. Admittedly, the suit schedule
property is a co-parcenery property. The material on
record clearly indicates that the family owned large extent
of lands i.e., 40 acres of land apart from the present suit
schedule property. The Appellate Court has observed in its
judgment that the defendant No.2 has sold 20 guntas of
land in favour of defendant No.1 under registered sale
deed dated 02.09.1985 vide Ex.D-1. This finding is
factually incorrect and is contrary to the extent shown in
the registered sale deed executed by the defendant No.2 in
favour of defendant No.1 as per Ex.D-1. On perusal of
Ex.D-1, this Court would find that what is sold by the
defendant No.2 in favour of deceased defendant No.1 is
only an extent of 600 sq.ft. while the entire extent
measures 20 1/2 guntas and the same is shown in two parts
as schedule 'A1' and schedule 'A2'. Schedule 'A1' property
is a larger extent and what is sold under Ex.D-1 is a small
portion which is referred as 'ABCD' portion as shown in the
sketch annexed to the plaint. Therefore, the findings of the
Appellate Court that defendant No.2 has sold 20 1/2 guntas
is perverse and contrary to the clinching evidence on
record. Therefore, the substantial question of law
formulated at Sl.No.2 would be relevant and this Court has
to examine the right of a co-parcener in selling his
undivided interest.
17. This Court has to also bear in mind that the
parties are admittedly governed by Bombay School of Law.
According to Mitakshara Law as administered in Bombay
School, a co-parcener may sell, mortgage, or otherwise
alienate for value his undivided interest in the co-parcenery
property without the consent of other co-parceners. Where
the sale is for consideration, there could be no bar against
the joint owner against selling his undivided share and
therefore, the question of setting at naught the sale would
not arise at all. It is also trite law that under Mitakshara
Law, as applied in Bombay School of Law, a co-parcener
may alienate his undivided interest in the entire joint
family property or his undivided interest in a specific
property forming part of joint family properties. If these
principles are taken into consideration, then I am of the
view that the finding of the Appellate Court in virtually
declaring the sale deed executed by defendant No.2 in
favour of defendant No.1 as null and void only on the
premise that defendant No.2 being a co-parcener has
alienated undivided share without the consent of other co-
parceners is perverse, palpably erroneous and contrary to
settled proposition of law.
18. Even if the vendor of defendant No.1 i.e.,
defendant No.2 has joined his brothers and has
subsequently executed the sale deed in respect of the
entire extent, that in itself would not nullify a registered
document which is executed by a member of a co-
parcenery family who has admittedly undivided interest.
The defendant No.2 who is the transferor in no way can
prejudice the right of defendant No.1. The Appellate Court
has virtually lost sight of the fact of alienation done by the
defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 under
registered document for a valuable sale consideration.
Even if there is a subsequent transfer of the very same
property, the latter transfer is subject to the prior transfer.
Therefore, this Court is of the view that the findings arrived
at by the Appellate Court in not only declaring the
respondents/plaintiffs as absolute owners of suit schedule
'A2' property but consequently declaring the sale deed
dated 02.09.1985 executed by the defendant No.2 in
favour of defendant No.1 as null and void is one without
jurisdiction and in absence of prayer to that effect. This
Court has to also bear in mind that non-alienating co-
parceners have not questioned the sale deed executed by
the defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1.
19. The clinching evidence on record would also
indicate that the defendant Nos.3 and 4 were in fact
Government employees and that they were serving at
different places while the defendant No.2 is an agriculturist
and was managing the entire family affairs. It has come in
evidence that on account of draught, the defendant No.2
had no resources to support his family and therefore, he
was compelled to sell the suit land to meet out the family
needs as well as the education expenses of his two sons.
DW.3 has stated in unequivocal terms in his ocular
evidence that his father was compelled to sell the land as
they were studying at Dharwad. Therefore, the clinching
ocular evidence on record led in by defendant Nos.1 and 2
would clearly demonstrate that in fact defendant No.2 was
compelled to sell suit schedule 'A2' property for valuable
consideration and the same was for legal necessity.
20. Be that as it may, the defendant No.2 has not
alienated the entire extent. What is sold is only portion of
the property in Sy.No.234/A2/3/1, totally measuring 201/2
guntas. Therefore, the question of legal necessity would
also lose its vigor and would be of no consequence in the
light of the discussion made in the preceding paragraph,
wherein I have referred to the principles under Mitakshara
Law which permits a co-parcener to sell his undivided
interest in a co-parcenery property. Therefore, in this
background, I am of the view that the Appellate Court has
erred in setting at naught the sale deed executed by the
defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 as per Ex.D-1
which is impermissible under law. Since the sale deed in
favour of defendant No.1 was earlier in point of time, that
was best cause of action that had accrued to defendant
Nos.3 and 4 to seek appropriate remedy before a
competent civil Court by filing a partition suit.
21. It is trite law that a non-alienating co-parcener
need not challenge the sale deed and it would be sufficient
if they file a suit for partition and separate possession on
the ground that undivided interest is being alienated by a
member of the co-parcenery family. This exercise was not
done by the defendant Nos.3 and 4. On the contrary, the
defendant Nos.3 and 4 pressurized the defendant No.2 and
they executed one more sale deed in respect of the entire
extent in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs by registered
sale deed dated 17.09.1986 as per Ex.P-7. It is this act of
defendant Nos.3 and 4 which has in fact lead to future
complications and the parties are virtually driven to
litigation and both the parties are litigating since 1989.
22. The Appellate Court by declaring the sale deed
in favour of defendant No.1 as null and void has virtually
taken away the right and title which stood transferred in
favour of defendant No.1. Pursuant to registered sale deed
under Ex.D-1, there was valid transfer of right and title to
an extent of 600 guntas and the same cannot be taken
away, more particularly when defendant No.2 has admitted
that he has alienated suit schedule 'A2' property for
valuable consideration for the benefit of the family. The
defendant No.1 cannot be left remedyless. If defendant
No.1 has purchased an undivided interest, he has every
right to seek and retain the property which was alienated.
However, his right to seek any specific portion of a co-
parcenery property is not permissible as against non-
alienating co-parceners. But if the litigation is between the
purchasers, then he has got every right to retain the
property which was the subject matter of alienation under
registered sale deed. All these significant details are not at
all examined by the Appellate Court.
23. As discussed above, law permits a co-parcener
to sell his undivided share. Law permits a stranger to
purchase the undivided share from a co-parcener.
Admittedly, in the present case on hand, defendant Nos.3
and 4 who were not signatories to Ex.D-1 ought to have
filed a partition suit on account of alienation by defendant
No.2 in favour of defendant No.1. On the contrary, what
emerges from the records is that there is a partition
subsequent to sale deed executed by defendant No.2 in
favour of defendant No.1 in respect of remaining 40 acres.
Had defendant Nos.3 and 4 filed a suit for partition and
separate possession, the defendant No.1 had every right to
seek equities and work out his rights in a final decree
proceedings. On the contrary, the defendant Nos.3 and 4
have executed one more sale deed and defendant No.2 has
joined his brothers and the entire extent is sold. Merely
because all the co-parceners have agreed to sell the entire
extent in favour of respondents/plaintiffs, that would in no
way nullify the valuable right and title that was passed on
in favour of defendant No.1 under registered sale deed
which was earlier in point of time. Therefore, under
Section 8 of Transfer of Property Act, the sale deed
executed by defendant No.2 in respect of Schedule 'A2'
property which is referred as 'ABCD' portion under
registered sale deed dated 02.09.1985 as per Ex.D1 would
create right and title in favour of defendant No.1 forthwith.
There would be transfer of property forthwith in favour of
defendant No.1 and transfer would be of all the interest
which the transferor was then capable of passing in the
property and in the legal incidents thereof. Under Section
48 of T.P.Act, neither defendant No.2 nor the plaintiffs
vendor can prejudice the rights of defendant No.1. In the
present case there are successive transfer of same
property and therefore, the latter transfer which is in
favour of the plaintiffs by defendant No.2 and also by
vendor of plaintiffs would be subject to the earlier
registered sale deed dated 02.09.1985 executed by
defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1. There are
registered sale deeds in respect of same property. Priority
of rights created by transferor under Section 48 of the
T.P.Act would clearly establish right and title of defendant
No.1. The right and title which is passed on pursuant to
registered sale deed cannot be nullified, more particularly
at the instance of subsequent purchasers.
24. In view of the findings arrived at the preceding
paragraphs, I am of the view that the substantial questions
of law formulated by this Court have to be answered in the
affirmative. The Appellate Court erred in reversing the
judgment and decree of the Trial Court which does not
suffer from any perversity and the reasons and conclusions
arrived at by the Trial Court is based on evidence on
record. The judgment and decree of the Appellate Court in
declaring the sale deed in favour of the defendant No.1 as
null and void is perverse, palpably erroneous and contrary
to Sections 8 and 48 of T.P.Act and the same stands
vitiated as the same is contrary to clinching evidence on
record. In that view of the matter, I am of the view that
the substantial questions of law formulated by this Court
are liable to be answered in the affirmative. Accordingly,
the same are answered in the affirmative and the judgment
and decree of the Appellate Court, for the reasons stated
supra, is liable to be set aside.
25. Hence, I pass the following:
ORDER
The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of
the Appellate Court passed in R.A.No.31/1992 by the Civil
Judge (Sr.Dn.) at Principal JMFC, Ranebennur is set aside.
Consequently, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court
passed in O.S.No.148/1989 by the Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.),
Hirekerur is confirmed.
Sd/-
JUDGE CA
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