K G Rajamma vs Karnataka State Industrial
2022 Latest Caselaw 3308 Kant

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

     DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2022

                        PRESENT

           THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE S.SUJATHA

                          AND

     THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI V. HOSMANI

                M.F.A.No.7303/2019 (SFC)

BETWEEN:

K.G.RAJAMMA
(WRONGLY MENTIONED AS
M.M.RAJAMMA, IN TRIAL COURT)
W/O LATE M.R.JAYADEVA
AGED ABOUT 83 YEARS
R/AT NO.202, 37TH 'A' CROSS
8TH BLOCK, JAYANAGAR
BENGALURU-560 082.
                                           ...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. VISHWANATH P.D., ADVOCATE (PH))

AND:

1.     KARNATAKA STATE INDUSTRIAL
       INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
       CORPORATION LTD.,
       HAVING ITS REGISTERED
       OFFICE AT MSIL HOUSE
       NO.36, CUNNINGHAM ROAD
       BENGALURU-560 052
       REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER.

2.     M.J.ARUN
       S/O LATE M.R.JAYADEVA
       AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
       R/AT NO.202, 37TH 'A' CROSS
       8TH BLOCK, JAYANAGAR
       BENGALURU-560 082.
                                 2




3.     K.M.GEETHA
       MAJOR
       R/AT NO.202
       37TH 'A' CROSS
       8TH BLOCK, JAYANAGAR
       BENGALURU-560 082.

4.     M/s. ARJAY EXTRUSIONS PVT. LTD.,
       COMPANY INCORPORATED
       UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956
       HAVING ITS REGISTERED
       OFFICE AT
       NO.202, 37TH 'A' CROSS
       8TH BLOCK, JAYANAGAR
       BENGALURU-560 082.
                                               ...RESPONDENTS

     THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 32(9) OF THE STATE FINANCIAL
CORPORATION ACT, 1951 AGAINST THE ORDER DATED
13.02.2015 PASSED IN MISC. CASE No.43/2010 ON THE FILE
OF THE II ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDE,
TUMAKURU, ALLOWING THE PETITION FILED UNDER
SECTION 31(1)(aa) OF THE STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION
ACT, 1951.

      THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY,
S. SUJATHA J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:


                       JUDGMENT

This appeal is directed against the order dated

13.02.2015 passed in Misc. Case No.43/2010 on the file

of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge,

Tumakuru (Trial Court), whereby the petition filed by the

respondent no.1 under Section 31(1)(aa) of the State

Financial Corporations Act, 1951 has been allowed with

costs. It has been held that the respondents no.1 to 4

therein are jointly and severally liable to pay the amount

with interest as prayed in application and further

Karnataka State Industrial Infrastructure Development

Corporation Limited is at liberty to proceed against the

petition schedule property to recover the amount due, is

the essence of the order impugned herein. The appellant

herein was arrayed as respondent no.3 before the trial

Court. This appeal is filed by this appellant along with an

application (I.A.No.1/2019) seeking for condonation of

delay of 1630 days in filing the appeal.

2. The affidavit filed along with the said

application would disclose that the appellant underwent

treatment for her eyes i.e., cataract surgery of her left eye

during 2015 and on the right eye during the March 2016.

It is submitted that the appellant suffered from heart

problem and was under treatment for the same

considerably. Thus, on these vague grounds, the

appellant has sought for condonation of delay of 1630

days which is not supported with any material. Making

such obscure statements cannot be construed as

sufficient cause and the same suffers from lack of

bonafides.

3. It is well settled principle that law of

limitation is a substantive law and has repercussions and

consequences on the rights and obligations of the parties.

A valuable right accrued to the other side cannot be set

aside merely on vague plea made in the affidavit seeking

for condonation of huge delay. Sufficient cause is sine qua

non for condoning the delay. In the absence of sufficient

cause shown by the appellant to condone the inordinate

delay, we are not inclined to consider I.A. in a liberal

sense. At this juncture, it would be beneficial to refer to

the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Director of

Raghunathpura Nafar Academy and others reported in

(2013) 12 SCC 649, the Hon'ble Apex Court has

summarised the legal principles and the same is quoted

hereunder:

21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

21.1.(i) There should be a liberal pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms " sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.8.(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11 (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

21.12 (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion

which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

4. In the light of this judgment, without any

hesitation we can conclude that the cause shown by

the appellant cannot be considered as sufficient

cause for condonation of inordinate delay of 1630

days.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant has

placed reliance on the decision of the coordinate

bench of this Court in the case of Mallaiah

Basalingayya Hiremath Vs. The State of

Karnataka, Urban Development Department and

another reported in ILR 2012 KAR 3298 and

Vaijayanti Vs. The State of Karnataka, rep., by its

Secretary, Urban Development Department and

Another and another reported in ILR 2014 KAR

4648. In both the decisions, the coordinate bench

has exercised the jurisdiction of Article 226 of

Constitution of India which is an extraordinary and

discretionary jurisdiction vested with the Court,

whereas, in the present case we are dealing with the

statutory appeal provided under the Act. The opinion

expressed by the coordinate bench in condoning the

delay and laches in writ petition cannot be made

applicable to the present set of facts, more

particularly, for the following reasons:

6. Respondents no.1 and 3 in the original

proceedings had filed a consolidated statement of

objections before the trial Court. We have requested

the learned counsel appearing for the appellant to

point out whether the ground now canvassed before

this Court, in as much as, no documents said to

have been signed by this appellant, was taken. The

answer is in negative. It transpires that the appellant

including other respondents in the original

proceedings, after filing statement of objections, have

not made any attempt to adduce evidence. Further,

on dismissal of the application, seeking for recalling

the order to adduce evidence, an order dated

20.08.2011 was passed by the trial Court, but, no

attempt was made to challenge the said order.

7. As discerned from the material available

on record, placed in this appeal proceedings by the

appellant, the appellant has slept over the matter

after suffering an order dated 13.02.2015. Sleeping

over the matter for nearly 4½ years, is nothing but

the callous and gross negligence on the part of the

appellant. It is trite that the courts can come to the

rescue of the litigants who are vigilant about their

rights but not to an indolent.

8. Viewed from any angle, we find no

satisfactory ground to condone the delay of 1630

days. Hence, I.A.No.1/2019 stands dismissed.

Consequently, Miscellaneous First Appeal stands

dismissed.

9. However, we make it clear that the

dismissal of this appeal will not come in the way of

the appellant to seek any settlement with the

Corporation or in any matter pending for

adjudication.

In view of the disposal of the main appeal, all

the pending I.As stand disposed of.

Sd/-

JUDGE

Sd/-

JUDGE

BVK