Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 3109 Kant
Judgement Date : 23 February, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJENDRA BADAMIKAR
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.413/2019
BETWEEN:
SRI. A. RAVINDRA
S/O LATE B. ANILKUMAR
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS
RESIDING AT:NO.748
1ST FLOOR, 15TH MAIN
22ND CROSS, JUDICIAL LAYOUT
GKVK POST, YELAHANKA
BENGALURU-560 064
....APPELLANT
(BY SRI. MUKUNDA P., ADVOCATE)
AND:
SRI. AJITH S/O CHANNAPPA
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
RESIDING AT RAJAGHATTA VILLAGE AND POST
DODDABALLAPURA TALUK
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT
BENGALURU-561 203
.... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. AJITH KUMAR A.S., ADVOCATE)
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 378(4)
OF CR.P.C. PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT DATED
18.01.2019 PASSED BY THE XVIII A.C.M.M., BANGALORE IN
C.C.NO.15354/2017, ACQUITTING THE RESPONDENT/ACCUSED
FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 138 ON N.I.ACT.
2
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 16.02.2022, COMING ON FOR
'PRONOUNCEMENT JUDGMENT' THIS DAY, THE COURT
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
Though this appeal is listed for admission, with the
consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties on
both sides, the same is taken-up for disposal.
2. This is an appeal filed by the
complainant/appellant under Section 378(4) of Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 ('Cr.P.C.' for short) challenging the
judgment of acquittal dated 18.01.2019 passed by the
XVIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru
('trial Court' for short), whereby the learned Magistrate has
acquitted the accused/respondent herein for the offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 ( 'N.I. Act' for short).
3. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein
are referred with the original ranks occupied by them
before the trial Court.
4. The brief factual matrix of the case is that, the
complainant and accused are acquainted with each other
and accused is running the hotel business and he has
availed hand-loan of Rs.1,75,000/- from the complainant in
the month of October, 2016 for expansion of his hotel
business with a promise to return the same within six
months. Conceding his request, the complainant has
advanced the hand-loan of Rs.1,75,000/- by way of cash
and when the complainant repeatedly requested for
repayment of the said amount, the accused has issued a
cheque dated 15.04.2017 for a sum of Rs.1,75,000/-
towards repayment of the said hand-loan. But, when the
complainant presented the said cheque for encashment, it
was dishonoured on 17.04.2017 with an endorsement
'Funds Insufficient". Thereafter, the complainant has issued
a legal notice on 24.04.2017 calling upon the accused to
make payment of the cheque amount and though the notice
is served on the accused, he has neither replied nor paid
the amount. Hence, the complainant has filed a complaint.
5. The learned Magistrate, after recording the
sworn statement of the complainant, taken cognizance of
the said offence and has issued process against the
accused. The accused has appeared through his counsel
and was enlarged on bail. The plea was recorded and the
accused has denied the same.
6. The complainant-Sri. A. Ravindra was got
examined as PW.1 and he placed reliance on five
documents as Exs.P1 to P5. After conclusion of the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the statement of
accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. was recorded to
enable accused to explain the incriminating evidence
appearing against him, in the case of prosecution. His case
is of total denial and he got examined himself as DW.1.
7. After hearing arguments of the learned counsels
appearing for the parties on both sides and perusing the
material records, the learned Magistrate has come to a
conclusion that the complainant has failed to establish that
the cheque under Ex.P1 was issued towards legally
enforceable debt and as such, acquitted the accused in
respect of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the
N.I. Act. Being aggrieved by this judgment of acquittal, the
appellant/complainant has preferred this appeal.
8. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant/
complainant and learned counsel for the
respondent/accused. Perused the records.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend
that the judgment and order of acquittal is illegal and
contrary to law and evidence. He would further contend
that, admittedly, the cheque in question belongs to accused
and the accused admits his signature on the cheque.
Hence, the trial Court has failed to draw a presumption
under Section 139 of the N.I. Act in favour of the
complainant. Further, he would contend that, though the
trial Court comes to a conclusion that the presumption is
not rebutted, but erroneously observed that ingredients of
Section 138 of N.I. Act have not been established by the
complainant and the financial status of the complainant to
advance loan of Rs.1,75,000/- is not established. He would
further contend that the financial status of the complainant
was never challenged during cross-examination of PW.1
and the trial Court ought to have drawn a presumption and
when the accused has failed to rebut the presumption, the
trial Court ought to have convicted the accused. Hence, he
would seek for setting aside the impunged judgment of
acquittal and sought for convicting the accused/respondent
by allowing this appeal.
10. Per contra, the learned counsel for the
respondent/accused would support the judgment of
acquittal passed by the trial Court. He would further
contend that the complainant has not established his
financial status to advance loan of Rs.1,75,000/-. He would
also contend that the cheque under Ex.P1 was issued to one
Balu as security in respect of purchase of chicken for
Rs.30,000/- and the same has been misused by the
complainant in collusion with the said Balu and there is no
financial transaction between the complainant and accused
at any point of time. Hence, he would contend that the trial
Court considered these aspects and has rightly acquitted
the accused. Hence, he would contend that the impugned
judgment of acquittal does not call for any interference and
as such, sought for dismissal of the appeal.
11. Having heard the arguments advanced by the
learned counsels appearing for the parties on both sides
and perusing the records, the following point would arise for
consideration:
"Whether the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court is perverse, capricious and arbitrary so as to call for interference by this Court ?"
12. It is the specific contention of the appellant that
the accused has availed loan of Rs.1,75,000/- in the month
of October, 2016 for expansion of his hotel business with a
promise to return the same within six months, but failed to
repay the same in time and when the complainant
demanded for repayment of the said amount, the accused
issued a cheque under Ex.P1 dated 15.04.2017 for
Rs.1,75,000/- It is also contended by the complainant
that, when the said cheque was presented to the Bank, it
was dishonoured with an endorsement 'Insufficient Funds"
and in spite of issuance of legal notice, the amount was not
paid and hence, the presumption is in favour of the
complainant under Section 139 of the N.I. Act.
13. It is to be noted here that the cheque under
Ex.P1 belongs to the account of accused and it bears the
signature of the accused are undisputed. The accused has
nowhere denied his signature on the cheque and further
admits that the cheque belongs to him. He has also
admitted that, he is running a Military Hotel. When the
cheque and signature have been admitted by accused, it is
mandatory on the part of the court to draw a presumption
in favour of the complainant under Section 139 of N.I. Act
regarding issuance of cheque towards discharge of legally
enforceable debt. Further, the said presumption is a
rebuttable presumption and it is for the accused to rebut
the presumption. But, for rebutting the presumption, mere
explanation or denial is not sufficient and the accused is
required to place some material evidence before the Court.
14. It is the contention of the accused that, he has
issued the cheque under Ex.P1 for Rs.30,000/- as security
to one Mr. Balu in respect of purchase of chicken, for his
hotel business. Further, it is contended that the said
cheque has been misused by the complainant, by colluding
with the said Balu. However, it is to be noted here that,
admittedly the accused has not issued any cheque for
Rs.30,000/-. If at all, he had issued the cheque as security
to one Balu, he could have endorsed the figure of
Rs.30,000/- on it. But, Ex.P1 discloses that, it is for
Rs.1,75,000/-. Further, it is in the name of the
complainant. Admittedly, the complainant is the holder of
the cheque in due course and presumption is in his favour
under Section 118 of the N.I. Act. Except a formal
statement that the cheque was issued to one Balu as
security for Rs.30,000/-, no other materials evidence is
placed by the accused.
15. It is also important to note here that the
complainant has issued notice to the accused after bouncing
of the cheque. Ex.P4 is the postal receipt for having sent
the notice by Registered Post Acknowledgement Due
('RPAD' for short) and Ex.P5 is the postal
acknowledgement. The accused has not denied receipt of
notice by him. In his cross-examination, he claims that, he
got information of misuse of the cheque when he received
notice. If that is so, nothing prevented him for issuing a
reply immediately. But, he has not issued any reply. Even
he admitted that he has not lodged any complaint regarding
misuse of the cheque. However, the accused asserts that
there were settlement negotiations. But, no material is
placed in this regard. Even after receipt of notice, the
accused has not replied the legal notice to deny the
transaction by putting forward his case. Only for the first
time during cross-examination of PW.1, he had put-up the
defence of issuance of cheque as security for Rs.30,000/- to
one Balu. He has not even produced any material evidence
to show that, he had any transaction with one Balu or the
said Balu was carrying on any business of dealing in
chicken. The material evidence in this regard is also
missing.
16. The learned Magistrate has made observation
that the complainant has not proved his financial status.
But, the entire cross-examination of PW.1 disclose that the
financial status of the complainant was not at all
challenged. When the financial status of the complainant
was not challenged by the accused, it was mandatory for
the trial Court to draw a presumption under Section 139 of
the N.I. Act in favour of the complainant. But, the
judgment of the trial Court discloses that the trial Court has
given unnecessary importance to irrelevant factors and
gone to the extent of observing that the accused has
denied the source of income and capacity of the
complainant. But, on perusal of cross-examination of PW.1,
the source of income and capacity of the complainant was
not at all challenged by the accused. Hence, the trial Court
was misconceived the evidence and observed that the
source of income and existence of debt is not proved by the
complainant, without considering the presumption under
Section 139 of the N.I. Act. No doubt, PW.1 was cross-
examined regarding non-production of document to show
that, he was possessing Rs.1,75,000/- in October, 2016 and
non-execution of any document, but, the financial status
was not denied. Under such circumstances, the trial Court
has erred in making observation that, accused has
challenged the financial status of the complainant. In this
context, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed
reliance on a decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
in Criminal Appeal No.2109/2017 [V.R. Shresti Vs.
Bhaskar P.] dated 15.10.2019 and the facts and
circumstances of the said case are directly applicable to the
case on hand. In the instant case also, the accused has
not given any reply to the notice and in cross-examination,
he admits that the cheque belongs to him and also the
receipt of notice, but did not take any steps. As such, in
the absence of any rebuttal evidence, the presumption
under Section 139 of N.I. Act would be in favour of the
complainant.
17. Learned counsel for the appellant has further
placed reliance on a decision reported in AIR 2019 SC
2446 [Bir Singh Vs. Mukesh Kumar], wherein the
Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under (Head Note: C &
E):
"(C) Negotiable Instruments Act ( 26 of 1881), S.
138, S. 139- Evidence Act (1 of 1872), S.4- Presumption u/S.139- Is presumption of law, distinguished from presumption of facts - Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with presumption of innocence, which requires prosecution to prove case against accused - Obligation on prosecution may be discharged with help of presumptions of law and presumptions of fact unless accused adduces evidence showing reasonable possibility of non-existence of presumed fact.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
(E) Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881),
S.138, S.139 - Dishonour of cheque -
Presumption as to legally enforceable debt -
Rebuttal - Onus to rebut presumption that cheque issued in discharge of debt or liability is on accused."
Hence, it is evident that, it is mandatory for drawing
presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act regarding
existence of legally enforceable debt and onus to rebut the
same is on the accused. But, admittedly, in the instant
case, except giving some explanation, no attempt has been
made by accused to rebut the said presumption. Further,
admittedly accused has admitted his signature on the
cheque and that the cheque belongs to him. His defence
regarding cheque issued towards security to one Balu is not
established. Under these circumstances, the ingredients of
Section 138 of N.I. Act have been established by the
complainant. The learned Magistrate was carried-away by
making unnecessary observation without there being any
specific defence and hence approach of the learned
Magistrate is perverse, erroneous and arbitrary, and it has
led to miscarriage of justice. The learned Magistrate has
not considered the materials placed before the Court
properly, while acquitting the accused and has also not
considered the statutory presumption in favour of the
complainant under Sections 118 and 139 of N.I. Act. As
such, the trial Court has erred in acquitting the accused and
the same requires to be interfered by this Court. Hence,
this is a fit case to reverse the finding of the trial Court and
set aside the judgment of the trial Court. Accordingly, the
point under consideration is answered in the affirmative.
18. In view of the discussion made above, I proceed
to pass the following:-
i) The appeal is allowed.
ii) The judgment of acquittal dated 18.01.2019
passed by the trial Court viz., the XVIII
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Bengaluru, in CC No.15354/2017 for the offence
punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is set aside.
iii) The accused is convicted for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and he is sentenced to pay fine of Rs.3,00,000/- and in default, to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of one year.
iv) Out of fine amount so recovered, Rs.2,50,000/-
shall be paid to the complainant/appellant herein by way of compensation and balance of Rs.50,000/- shall be credited to the State.
Sd/-
JUDGE
KGR*
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