Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 2840 Kant
Judgement Date : 21 February, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF FEBRUARY 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.102061/2021
BETWEEN
1. SHEKHAR S/O BALAKRISHNA NELAVADE,
AGE. 58 YEARS, OCC. HESCOME EMPLOYEE AND
CHAIRMAN OF GANDHIWADA CO-OPERATIVE
HOUSING SOCIETY LTD., HUBBALLI,
PRESENTLY-
R/O. PARASWADI KESHWAPUR,
HUBBALLI, DIST. DHARWAD.
2. SHRINIVAS S/O VENKATARAO CHARAKU,
AGE. 56 YEARS, OCC. RAILWAY EMPLOYEE
R/O. NEHRU NAGAR, HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD.
3. PRABHAKAR S/O RAMACHANDRA PAWAR,
AGE. 66 YEARS, OCC. SOCIAL WORKER
R/O. NEHRU NAGAR, HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD.
4. RAMESH S/O GOVINDSWAMI MODALIYAR,
AGE. 60 YEARS, OCC. PRIVATE SERVICE,
R/O. NEHRU NAGAR, HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD.
5. MURALIDHAR S/O. GOVINDAPPA RONAD,
AGE. 58 YEARS,
OCC. BUSINESS
2
R/O. NEHRU NAGAR, HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI SHRIHARSH A. NEELOPANT, ADVOCATE)
AND :
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY POLICE STATION
KESHWAPUR POLICE STATION
HUBLI, THROUGH PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD-580011.
2. CHANDRAKANT S/O KRISHNA YADAV
AGE. 52 YEARS, OCC. BUSINESS,
R/O. H.NO.368/1, 2ND CROSS,
RAM NAGAR, HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD-580020.
..RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI RAMESH CHIGARI, HCGP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S 482 OF CR.P.C
SEEKING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 21.09.2021
PASSED IN SPL.SC/ST. CASE NO.32/2018 ON THE FILE OF II
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS AND SPL. JUDGE,
DHARWAD AS PER ANNEXURE-A OR THE OFFENCES
PUNISHABLE U/S. 143, 147, 504, 506, 354 R/W SECTION 149
OF IPC R/W SECTION 3(1) (R) (S) AND 10 AND 11 OF SC/ST
(PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES ACT) AND ALLOW THE INTERIM
APPLICATION FILED U/S. 227 OF CR.P.C FILED BY THE
PETITIONERS AS PER ANNEXURE-N.
THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY,
THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
3
ORDER
The petitioners are before this Court calling in
question the proceedings in Special SC/ST Case
No.32/2018 registered for the offences punishable under
Sections 143, 147, 504, 506 and 354 read with Section
149 of IPC read with Section 3 (1)(R)(S) and 10 and 11 of
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
2. Heard Sri Shriharsh A.Neelopant, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners and Sri Ramesh Chigari,
learned HCGP appearing for respondent No.1-State.
3. Brief facts leading to filing of the present petition
as borne out from the pleadings are as follows :
The petitioners are members of Gandhiwada Co-
operative Housing Society Ltd., Hubballi. The 2nd
respondent runs a school as a tenant in the premise owned
by the Co-operative Society. Seeking eviction of the 2nd
respondent who ran the school in the place belonging to
the petitioners-co-operative Society had instituted civil
proceedings seeking such eviction. The said suit came to
be decreed. The result of the decree of the suit was
eviction of the 2nd respondent-complainant. On the
strength of the order of competent Court and also taking
Police protection, the petitioners broke open the lock of the
school, which by then belonged to the petitioners in view of
the decree granted by the Civil Court. Based upon the said
incident, the 2nd respondent, who had lost the case against
the petitioners before the Civil Court, registers a complaint
for the offences punishable under the provisions of the
atrocities Act alleging that the petitioners have hurled
abused against the complainant either in a public or in a
place of public view and have become violates of the
provisions of the Act. Therefore, the offence is publishable
thereunder.
4. The afore narrated facts are not in dispute. The
petitioners did not have themselves indulged in the act of
breaking open the lock of the school. But were executed
the lawful orders passed by the competent Court. The 2nd
respondent having lost the case of eviction against the
petitioners, in order to wreck vengeance without there
being any semblance in evidence for invocation of the
provisions of the Act registers the complaint. The
somewhat similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the case of Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand and
Another, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 710 has held as
follows :
"14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an
offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. :
This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:"Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view."] . The Court held as under :
"28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view" with the expression "public place". A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government
or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies."
(emphasis in original)
15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered "in any place within public view" is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge- sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] , it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.
16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject-matter of civil dispute between the parties as per Respondent 2 herself. Due to dispute, the appellant and others were not permitting Respondent 2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding
possession of property pending before the civil court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimidated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.
24. In view of the above facts, we find that the charges against the appellant under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act are not made out. Consequently, the charge-sheet to that extent is quashed. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms."
5. In the light of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex
Court considering the very provisions of the Act. The
backdrop as narrated herein above of the allegations
levelled cannot be burst aside. Therefore, the proceedings
instituted are without doubt one to wreck vengeance
against the petitioners. In these circumstances, if the trial
is permitted to continued that too for the offences alleged
against the petitioners, it would be an abuse of the process
of the law and result in miscarriage of justice.
6. The Trial Court which considered the discharge
application of the petitioners has not considered these facts
and has erred in law in rejecting the discharge application
of the petitioners. Therefore, the order of rejection of the
discharge application of the petitioners is erroneous and
unsustainable.
7. For the aforesaid reasons, the following :
ORDER
(i) The criminal petition is allowed.
(ii) The order rejecting the discharge application dated 21.09.2021 passed in Special SC/ST Case No.32/2018 by the II Additional District and Sessions and Special Judge, Dharwad stands quashed.
(iii)The entire proceedings initiated against the petitioners in Special SC/ST Case No.32/2018 by the II Additional District and Sessions and Special Judge, Dharwad stands quashed qua petitioners.
SD JUDGE CKK
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