Karnataka High Court

Sri. Ramesh S/O Yallappa ... vs The State Of Karnataka on 1 February, 2022

Bench: M.Nagaprasannapresided Bymnpj

               IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
                       DHARWAD BENCH

           DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF FEBRUARY 2022

                             BEFORE

          THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

                   CRL.P NO 102174 OF 2018

BETWEEN
SRI. RAMESH S/O YALLAPPA DEVASHETTI
AGED ABOUT: 54 YEARS,OCC: HEAD POST MASTER,
R/AT: HEAD POST OFFICE,DHARWAD.
                                                 ...PETITIONER
(BY SRI.M B KANAVI, ADV.,)

AND
1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP BY THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
SUB-URBAN POLICE STATION,
DHARWAD,REP. BY ADDL. STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH, DHARWAD.

2 . SRI.MOHAMMAD ARSHAD
S/O ABDULKARIM NADAF,
AGED ABOUT: 26 YEARS,
OCC: BHARAT GAS DELIVERY BOY,
R/AT: MRUTYUNJAY NAGAR,
NADAF GALLI, DHARWAD.
                                                ...RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI.RAMESH CHIGARI, HCGP FPR R1;
      SRI.SHIVARAJ S BALLOLLI, ADV., FOR R2)

      THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY THE
SUB-URBAN POLICE STATION, DHARWAD AGAINST THE PETITIONER
BEFORE THE PRL.CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C. DHARWAD IN CRIME
NO.323/2016 U/SEC.304-AOF IPC AND TAKING COGNIZANCE BY THE
TRIAL COURT IN CC 507/2018, BY ALLOWING THE PRESENT
CRIMINAL PETITION.
                                2




       THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY, THE
  COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

                            ORDER

1. The Petitioner in this petition calls in question the

proceedings in cc. No. 507/2018 registered for the offence

punishable under Section 304-A of the IPC.

2. Heard Sri.M.B.Kanavi, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Sri.Ramesh Chigari, learned HCGP for the

respondent-State.

3. Facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows:

In furtherance of the scheme "Swachha Bharat Abhiyan"

on 21/12/2016 the Dharawad head post office also under

took the process of clearing its premises which was being

done at regular intervals. One A.K.Nadaf, G.D.S.Packer

working at the Dharwad head post office was in the process

of cleaning 1st floor of the post office while doing so falls

down and sustains grievous injuries. He was immediately

taken to the hospital but succumbed to the injuries.

4. Based upon this incident, the complainant-father of

the deceased registers a complaint before the jurisdictional

police pursuant to which an FIR is registered in Crime

No.323/2016 for the offences punishable under Section 304-

A of the IPC, alleging that R.Y.Devashetti, post master,

Dharwad was entrusting other work than what was to be

rendered by the deceased and on that ground holds the post

master responsible for the death of his son.

5. Pursuant to the investigation conducted, the police

also file a charge sheet against the petitioner for the offences

punishable under Section 304-A of IPC. It is these

proceedings that are called in question the subject petition.

This Court by its order dated 1/3/2021 directed the

respondent to produce evidence of compensation provided to

the family of the deceased apart from providing an

appointment on compassionate grounds. It is not in dispute

that compensation is given and compassionate appointment

is granted to the dependents of the deceased.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner

Sri.M.B.Kanavi submits that the petitioner who is the head

post master of Head Post office, Dharwad cannot be hauled

for offences punishable under Section 304-A as there is no

negligent act on the part of the petitioner. The deceased was

an employee who was undertaking the routine work and

unfortunately falls down and succumbed to the injuries, no

rash or negligent act can even be attributed to the petitioner.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel representing the

2nd respondent-Sri.Shivarja S Ballolli would vehemently

refute the submissions made and would contend that the job

of the petitioner was G.D.S.Packer and could not have been

entrusted with other duties and therefore the petitioner is

responsible for his death. The allegation of offence punishable

under Section 304-A of the IPC is correctly charged against

the petitioner.

8. I have given my anxious consideration to the

submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and

perused the material on record.

9. The aforenarrated facts not being in dispute are not

reiterated. What requires to be considered is whether the trial

can be permitted to be continued against the petitioner for

the offence punishable under 304-A in the teeth of the

aforenarrated facts.

10. Section 304-A reads as follows:

              304A.        Causing        death      by

              negligence.--Whoever         causes     the

              death of any person by doing any

rash or negligent act not amounting

to culpable homicide, shall be

punished with imprisonment of

either description for a term which

may extend to two years, or with

fine, or with both.

11. Section 304-A reads into two parts first part

relates to causing death of any person by any rash act of the

accused and the second part comes into operation when

death is caused due to a negligent act. Therefore offence

under Section 304-A of IPC is committed either by a rash act

or negligent act. It is on the touchstone of the aforesaid

principles, the case at hand will have to be noticed.

12. Petitioner is an employee of the head post

office. In terms of "Swachha Bharath Abhiyan " movement all

the staff working in the head post office were on rotation

undertaking the work of cleaning the post office. Though it is

unfortunate that the deceased fell down and succumbed the

injuries during the performance of the duties, neither a rash

act causing the death or negligent act causing the death can

be attributed to the petitioner who is the head post master of

the head post office. It is germane to notice the judgment of

the Apex Court in the case of Ambalal D Bhat V/s. State of

Gujarat reported in (1972) 3 SCC 525, the Apex Court has

held as follows:

10. It appears to us that in a prosecution for an offence under Section 304-A, the mere fact that an accused contravenes certain rules or regulations in the doing of an act which causes death of another, does not establish that the death was the result of a rash or negligent act or that any such act was the proximate and efficient cause of the death. If that were so, the acquittal of the appellant for contravention of the provisions of the Act and the Rules would itself have been an answer and we would have then examined to what extent additional evidence of his acquittal would have to be allowed, but since that is not the criteria, we have to determine whether the appellant's act in giving only one batch number to all the four lots manufactured on November 12, 1962, in preparing Batch No. 211105, was the cause of deaths and whether those deaths were a direct consequence of the appellants' act, that is, whether the appellants' act is the direct result of a rash and negligent act and

that act was the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another's negligence. As observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap [(1902) 4 Bom LR 679] the act causing the deaths "must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the cause sine qua non". This view has been adopted by this Court in several decisions. In Kurban Hussein Mohammedali Rangwala v. State of Maharashtra [(1965) 2 SCR 622] the accused who had manufactured wet paints without a licence was acquitted of the charge under Section 304-A because it was held that the mere fact that he allowed the burners to be used in the same room in which varnish and turpentine were stored, even though it would be a negligent act, would not be enough to make the accused responsible for the fire which broke out. The cause of the fire was not merely the presence of the burners within the room in which varnish and turpentine were stored, though this circumstance was indirectly responsible for the fire which broke out, but was also due to the overflowing of froth out of the barrels. In Suleman Rehiman Mulani v. State of

Maharashtra [(1968) 2 SCR 515] the accused who was driving a car only with a learner's licence without a trainer by his side, had injured a person. It was held that that by itself was not sufficient to warrant a conviction under Section 304-A. It would be different if it can be established as in the case of Bhalchandra alias Bapu v. State of Maharashtra [(1968) 3 SCR 766] that deaths and injuries caused by the contravention of a prohibition in respect of the substances which are highly dangerous as in the case of explosives in a cracker factory which are considered to be of a highly hazardous and dangerous nature having sensitive composition where even friction or percussion could cause an explosion, that contravention would be the causa causans.

13. In the light of the afforenarrated facts and the

law laid down by the Apex Court (supra) this is a fit case

where this court has to exercise its inherent jurisdiction

under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. More so in the light of the

first postulate laid down by the Apex Court in the case of

State of Haryana V/s. Bhajanlal reported in 1992 Supp

(1) SCC 335, the first postulate reads as follows:

102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

14. For the aforesaid reasons the following: