Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 3404 Kant
Judgement Date : 25 September, 2021
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJENDRA BADAMIKAR
CRL.A.NO.2571 OF 2012
BETWEEN
BASANAGOUDA S/O. SHIVANAGOUDA KURAHATTI
AGE: 63 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. ANNIGERI, TQ: NAVALGUND,
DIST: GADAG.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. NAVEEN CHATRAD, ADVOCATE)
AND
IMAM HUSSAIN S/O. RAJESAB BETAGERI
AGE: 46 YEARS,
OCC: ATTENDER IN CANARA BANK,
GADAG BRANCH, GADAG.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. LINGESH KATTIMANI, AMICUS CURIAE)
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED U/S 378(4) R/W 401 OF
CR.P.C. SEEKING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGEMENT AND ORDER
DATED 09.01.2012 PASSED BY THE DISTRICT & SESSIONS
JUDGE, GADAG, IN CRL.A.NO.7/11 CONFIRMING THE
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER DATED 19.01.2011 PASSED BY THE
PRL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE & CJM, GADAG, IN C.C.NO.66/2005
AND CONSEQUENTLY CONVICT THE RESPONDENT/ACCUSED
FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 138 OF NI ACT.
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THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING THIS
DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
This appeal is filed by the appellant-complainant
against the judgment of acquittal passed in
C.C.No.66/2005 by the Principal Senior Civil Judge and
CJM, Gadag dated 19.01.2011 whereby the learned
Magistrate has acquitted the accused-respondent herein
for the offence punishable under section 138 of the N. I.
Act.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein
are referred with the original ranks occupied by them
before the Trial Court.
3. The brief factual matrix leading to the case are
that the complainant and accused are belonging to
Annigeri village and are well acquainted with each other
and developed friendship as well as relationship. That out
of the said friendship and confidence between them the
accused requested the complainant for hand loan for his
domestic purpose as well as construction of house and on
26.06.2003, the complainant has advanced hand loan of
Rs.1,32,000/- to the accused and the accused promised to
repay the said loan amount within three months. After
three months, the complainant requested the accused to
repay the said amount of Rs.1,32,000/- but the accused
went on postponing the same on one or the other pretext.
Ultimately, when the complainant insisted on 15.10.2003,
the accused has issued a post dated cheque for
Rs.1,32,000/- drawn on Canara Bank with request that the
cheque may be presented only after 31.10.2003.
Subsequently, again he went on requesting the
complainant for postponement of presentation of the
cheque and ultimately on 05.04.2004, the complainant
presented the said cheque for encashment. The said
cheque was dishonored for the reason "insufficient funds"
and same was communicated to the complainant on
19.04.2004. Then, the complainant issued a legal notice to
the accused on 23.04.2004 and on 24.04.2004 it was
served on him. The accused gave evasive and false reply
and he has failed to repay the amount. Hence, the
complainant was constrained to file a private complaint.
On the basis of the private complaint filed by the
complainant, the learned Magistrate after taking
cognizance has recorded the sworn statement of the
complainant and issued process against the accused. The
accused appeared before the learned Magistrate through
his counsel and was enlarged on bail. The accusation made
against him for the offence punishable under section 138
of the N. I. Act was denied by him. Then the complainant
got examined himself as PW1 and one witness was also
examined on his behalf as PW2. He has also placed
reliance on eight documents marked as per Ex.P1 to Ex.P8.
Thereafter, the statement of the accused under Section
313 of Cr.P.C., came to be recorded in order to explain the
incriminating evidence appearing against the accused. The
case of the accused is of total denial. The accused in his
statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. has
asserted that the cheque was handed over to one
Srishailappa in respect of loan availed by him and he did
not transact with the complainant. He also got examined
himself as DW1 and placed reliance on Ex.D1 to Ex.D3.
After having heard the arguments and perusing the
records, the learned Magistrate has acquitted the accused
of the charges leveled against him by setting him free.
4. Being aggrieved by this judgment, the
complainant initially preferred an appeal before the learned
District and Sessions Judge in Criminal Appeal No.7/2011
but the said appeal came to be dismissed on the ground
that it is not maintainable. Hence, he filed this appeal
subsequently, along with application for condonation of
delay. The application for condonation of delay was
allowed and appeal was admitted for hearing.
5. The respondent though served, did not choose
to appear before the Court and as such Sri. Lingesh
Kattimani was appointed as Amicus Curiae for representing
the respondent-accused to assist the Court.
6. Heard the arguments advanced by the learned
counsel for appellant and the learned Amicus Curiae. The
learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the
Trial Court has erred in acquitting the accused and has
failed to notice the fact that there is presumption in favour
of the complainant under section 139 of the N. I. Act and
burden is on the accused to rebut the said presumption.
He would also contend that the accused has taken
inconsistent defence and he was also a banker and his
evidence disclose that he has not discharged his burden of
rebuttal of presumption available in favour of the
complainant under section 118 and 139 of the N. I. Act. He
would contend that the judgment of acquittal passed by
the Trial Court is erroneous, arbitrary and capricious and it
has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Hence he would seek
for allowing the appeal by setting aside the impugned
judgment.
7. Per contra, the learned Amicus Curiae would
contend that the Trial Court has rightly acquitted the
accused by appreciating the oral and documentary
evidence. He would also contend that the complainant
being a banker has advanced such a huge amount without
any security and he has also not made any enquiry
regarding legal necessity of the accused. He would also
contend that by examining himself as DW1 and producing
Ex.D2 and Ex.D3 the accused has rebutted the
presumption available in favour of the complainant and
there is no material evidence to show that the cheque was
issued towards legally enforceable debt. Hence, he would
seek for dismissal of the appeal.
8. Having heard the arguments and perusing the
records, now the following point would arise for my
consideration:
"Whether the judgment of the trial court is erroneous, arbitrary and capricious so as to call for interference by this Court?"
9. As per the case of the prosecution, the accused
had availed hand loan of Rs.1,32,000/- from the
complainant on 26.06.2003. Further, it is the specific
assertion that in order to repay the said hand loan, he
issued a cheque dated 31.10.2003 and when the said
cheque was presented for collection, it was dishonored for
the reason "insufficient funds". The accused has not denied
that the cheque belongs to him. He has also not disputed
his signature on the cheque. But he has set up the defence
that cheque was issued to one Srishailappa, who was
relative of the complainant, as a security in respect of the
loan availed by him to the tune of Rs.60,000/- and the
said amount was repaid but cheque was not returned by
Srishailappa and the said cheque is being misused by the
complainant. This defence is set up during the course of
cross-examination by the accused. Even the same defence
is set up by him during his evidence, when he was
examined as DW1.
10. It is to be noted here that the complainant is
the holder of the cheque in due course. Ex.P1 is the
cheque and accused admits his signature. It is also to be
noted here that the accused is working in the bank
pertaining to which this Ex.P1 is issued and hence, he
knew the consequences of issuing the cheque. Section 139
of the N. I. Act draws a presumption in favour of the
holder of the cheque in due course. Section 139 of the N.
I. Act reads as under:
139. Presumption in favour of holder.--It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.
11. Hence the complainant being the holder of the
cheque in due course and as the accused has admitted his
signature on the cheque, now initial statutory presumption
under section 139 of the N. I. Act is in favour of the
complainant. It is for the accused to rebut the said
presumption by placing cogent material on the basis of
preponderance of probabilities. At the outset, admittedly,
the complainant was a retired bank employee and after his
retirement, he claims to be an agriculturist. Accused in his
cross-examination, admits that the family of the
complainant is a well to do family in the village, having
good financial reputation. The accused has nowhere denied
the financial capacity of the complainant to advance the
loan but very interestingly the Trial Court on its own
presumed and assumed certain aspects and gone to the
extent of considering the financial status of the
complainant which is not challenged by the accused. As
per the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Rangappa Vs Mohan reported in AIR 2010 SC 1898, it
is mandatory for the Courts to draw a presumption in
favour of the holder of the cheque in due course and the
burden shifts on the accused to rebut the said
presumption. Further, it is alleged that the presumption is
in respect of issuance of cheque regarding legally
enforceable debt. The accused was examined himself as
DW1 and in his examination-in-chief he stick on to the
defence that he availed loan of Rs.60,000/- from
Srishailappa and he has returned it, claiming that at the
time of availing the loan he had issued a blank cheque by
executing a bond, which clearly establish that the accused
was in need of the amount. There is no material evidence
placed to show that he has returned the said amount to
Srishailappa. However there is no evidence forthcoming as
to why he has issued blank cheque in favour of
Srishailappa. Very interestingly the accused has issued
reply to the legal notice issued by the complainant and the
reply notice is marked at Ex.P5. In reply notice, accused
has nowhere asserted that he has transacted with
Srishailappa and cheque was issued to Srishailappa. On
the contrary, he made allegations against the complainant
in his reply notice stating that the complainant has
committed theft of the cheque from the house of the
accused and filed false complaint. This relevant portion of
the reply notice marked at Ex.P5 on page No.2 reads as
under:
"¤ªÀÄä £ÉÆÃn¹£À ¸ÀégÀÆ¥À ¢. £ÉUÆ
É Ã²AiÉÄç¯ï
E£ï¸ÀÆÖçªÉÄAmï DåPïÖ PÁAiÉÄÝAiÀÄ PÀ®A 138 gÀ CrAiÀÄ°è ºÁUÀÆ ¨sÁgÀwÃAiÀÄ zÀAqÀ ¸ÀA»vÉ PÀ®A 420 gÀ CrAiÀİè M¼ÀUÉÆ¼ÀÄîªÀ¢®è, ºÁUÀÆ ¸ÀªÄÀ xÀð¤ÃAiÀĪÁUÀĪÀÅ¢®è. ¤ªÀÄä ¥ÀPÀëUÁgÀ ºÁUÀÆ £ÀªÄÀ ä ¥ÀPëÀUÁgÀgÀ £ÀqÄÀ ªÉ AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà ºÀtPÁ¹£À ªÀéªÀºÁgÀ £ÀqÉ¢gÀĪÀ¢®è. £ÀªÄÀ ä ¥ÀPëÀUÁgÀ ºÁUÀÆ ¤ªÀÄä ¥ÀPÀëUÁgÀgÀ £ÀqÄÀ ªÉ ¸ÉßúÀªÅÀ 20-25 ªÀµÀð ¸ÉßúÀ,
¨ÁAzsÀªÀå, M¼ÉîAiÀÄ MqÀ£Ál ElÄÖPÆ É AqÀÄ §A¢zÀÄÝ EvÀÄÛ, ¸À£ï 2003 gÀ°è ¸ÀzÀjAiÀĪÀjªÀðgÀ ¸ÉßúÀzÀ°è ªÀÄ£À:¸ÁÜ¥ÀªÁV CzÀgÀ ¸ÉÃqÀÄ wÃj¹PÉÆ¼Àî¨ÉÃPÉ£ÄÀ ߪÀ EgÁzɬÄAzÀ £ÀªÀÄä ¥ÀPÀëUÁgÀgÀÄ vÀªÀÄä ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ §¼ÀPÉUÁV vÀªÄÀ ä SÁvɬÄgÀĪÀ ¸À» ªÀiÁrzÀ SÁ° ZÉPï£ÀÄß £ÀªÄÀ ä ¥ÀPëÀUÁgÀgÀ ªÀģɬÄAzÀ PÀ¼ÀĪÀÅ ªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ 7 wAUÀ¼À £ÀAvÀgÀ F jÃw ºÉzÀj¹ ¨ÁèPÀªÉÄÃ¯ï ªÀiÁr ¨ÉÃPÁAiÉÄÝòÃgÀ ºÀt ªÀ¸Æ À ° ªÀiÁqÀĪÀ vÀAvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß ¤ªÀÄä ¥ÀPÀëUÁgÀ §¼À¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉAzÀÄ ¸ÀàµÖÀªÁUÀÄvÀÛzÉ. 2003 jAzÀ ¤ªÀÄä ¥ÀPëÀUÁgÀgÀ AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉà jÃw¬ÄAzÀ ¸ÉßúÀ (ªÀ) ¸ÀA¥ÀPÀð ªÀUÉÊgÉ EgÀĪÀÅ¢®è."
12. The accused has placed a specific defence in
his reply notice and in the evidence during the course of
cross-examination of the complainant he has set up a new
defence of issuing cheque to one Srishailappa. But that
defence was not set up while issuing the reply. In the
cross-examination, DW1 i.e. accused admitted his
signature on Ex.P1 as Ex.P1(a) and admittedly, accused is
working in the bank and he should be knowing the
consequences of issuing a blank cheque. He has also
admitted that the family of the complainant is financially
sound and admittedly, complainant was a director of KCC
Bank, which is an undisputed fact and he retired later. He
claims that from July 1993 to 2004 he has worked in
Canara Bank. He has also admitted that when the cheque
under Ex.P1 came for encashment, he was working in the
same bank and he received information that his cheque is
presented for encashment and he has admitted that he did
not issue any instructions for stop payment or he did not
give any notice to the complainant in this regard. This part
of cross-examination of DW1 on page No.4 in Para No.2
reads as under:
"2. dįÉÊ 1993 jAzÀ 11.10.2004 gÀªÀgÉUÉ £Á£ÀÄ UÀzÀÄV£À PÉ£ÀgÁ ¨ÁåAQ£À°è PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁrzÉÝãÉ. ¤¦-1 ZÉPÀÄÌ £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀtPÁÌV ¨ÁåAQUÉ §AzÁUÀ £Á£ÀÄ CzÉà ±ÁSÉAiÀİè PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛzÉÝ J£ÀÄߪÀÅzÀÄ ¸Àj. D ZÉPÄÀ Ì £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀtPÁÌV §AzÁUÀ £ÀªÀÄä ¨ÁåAQ£À ªÀåªÀ¸ÁÜ¥ÀPÀgÄÀ F jÃw ZÉPÀÄÌ §A¢zÉ JAzÀÄ £À£ÀUÉ w½¹zÀÝgÀÄ. £ÁªÀÅ JA¥Áè¬Ä¸ï ZÉPï ¥ÀqÉAiÀÄ®Ä £ÀªÀÄä ªÉÄïÁ¢üPÁjUÀ½AzÀ ¥ÀgÀªÁ¤UÉ ¥ÀqÉ¢gÀÄvÉÛêÉ. £Á£ÀÄ F ZÉPÀÄÌ ¤ÃrzÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ £ÀªÀÄä ¨ÁåAQ£À ±ÁSÉAiÀİè F £ÀA§j£À ZÉPÀÄÌ £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀtPÉÌ §AzÀ°è £ÀU¢ÃPÀgÀtUÉÆ½¸À¨ÉÃr JAzÀÄ ¤zÉÃð±À£À ¤Ãr®è. ZÉPÄÀ Ì £ÀUÀ¢ÃPÀgÀtPÁÌV §AzÁUÀ £Á£ÀÄ
§¸À£ÀUËqÀæjUÉ ¤ªÉÆäA¢UÉ £Á£ÀÄ ªÀåªÀºÁgÀ ªÀiÁr®è ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ZÉPÀÌ£ÀÄß ¤Ãr®è JAzÀÄ DPÉëæ¹ £ÉÆÃn¸ÀÄ ¤Ãr®è. £Á£ÀÄ ¤ÃrgÀĪÀ £ÉÆÃn¸ÀÄ GvÀÛgÀzÀ°è §¸À£ÀUËqÀÄæ £À£Àß ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ §AzÀÄ ZÉPÀÌ£ÀÄß PÀ¼îÀvÀ£À ªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃVzÁÝgÉ JAzÀÄ §gɬĹ®è , DzÀgÉ CzÀ£ÄÀ ß ºÀÄZÀѪÀÄä£ÀªÀgÀ ªÀQîgÀÄ §gÉ¢zÁÝgÉ.
13. It is also important to note here that he did not
lodge any complaint against the complainant for having
stolen the cheque as referred in his reply notice. He has
also admitted in further cross-examination in para No.3
that he has not taken any action against the counsel for
having issued notice without his instructions. He claims
that he has not issued any instructions to his counsel for
issuing reply notice regarding commission of theft by
complainant. But he claims that he has not initiated any
action. Hence, it is evident that the accused is taking
inconsistent stands. His defence in reply notice is
completely contrary. Further he claimed that he had
transacted with one Srishailappa and returned his amount
in presence of three witnesses i.e. Hazarathsab, Chandsab
Yeligar and Abdulsab Ole but they were not examined.
Hence, it is evident that the accused is taking false defence
and his defence establishes that he has not rebutted the
presumption available in favour of the complainant under
Section 139 of N. I. Act. The accused is a banker and when
the cheque came for encashment in his own bank, it was
brought to his notice and he has not issued any notice to
the complainant in this regard or issue instruction for stop
payment on the ground that the cheque was not issued for
legally enforceable debt. The conduct of the accused itself
establishes that the he is blowing hot and cold
simultaneously and his defence is not sufficient to rebut
the presumption and he has failed to rebut the
presumption on the basis of preponderance of
probabilities. The Trial Court has unnecessarily considered
the financial status of the complainant when it is not in
issue and has gone to the extent of complainant making
enquiry regarding need of the accused and the provisions
of Income Tax Act etc., which are not the defences of the
accused. Looking to these facts and circumstances, it is
evident that the Trial Court has completely misread the
evidence and misinterpreted the provisions of law and the
judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is
erroneous and illegal and it is arbitrary as well as
capricious, which suffers from infirmities and it calls for
interference. The services rendered by the Amicus Curiae
in assisting the Court for hearing the matter are
appreciated. Hence, looking to these facts and
circumstances, I am compelled to answer the point under
consideration in the affirmative and proceed to pass the
following:
ORDER
The appeal is allowed.
The impugned judgment of acquittal dated 19.01.2011 in C.C.No.66/2005 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge and CJM, Gadag is hereby set aside and the accused is found guilty and he is convicted for the offence punishable under section 138 of the N. I. Act and sentenced to pay fine of Rs.2,00,000/-. In default to pay the fine amount, the accused
shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months.
The fine amount shall be deposited before the Trial Court within a period of six weeks from today.
Out of the fine amount, Rs.1,75,000/- is ordered to be released in favour of the complainant as compensation and Rs.25,000/- is ordered to be credited to the State Account.
Send back the Trial Court Records to the Trial Court with copy of this order with a direction to Trial Court to secure the accused/respondent for serving sentence.
The fees of the Amicus Curiae is fixed at Rs.5,000/-.
Sd/-
JUDGE
yan
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