Karnataka High Court
Sri.Doddapillappa vs The State Of Karnataka on 16 December, 2021
Bench: Ashok S.Kinagi
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK.S.KINAGI
WRIT PETITION NO.12284 OF 2014 (SC/ST)
BETWEEN:
SMT. NARAYANAMMA
W/O SRI. PILLANARAYANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
R/AT SOPPAHALLI VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI,
CHIKKABALLAPUR TALUK &
DISTRICT-562101.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. RAVISHANKAR S, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
M.S.BUILDING,
DR.AMBEDKAR VEEDI,
BANGALORE-560001.
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
CHIKKABALLAPUR,
CHIKKABALLAPUR DISTRICT - 562 101.
3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
CHIKKABALLAPUR SUB-DIVISION,
CHIKKABALLAPUR DISTRICT- 562 101.
2
4. SRI.S.D. NARASIMHAMURTHY,
S/O LATE A.K.NARASIMHAIAH,
@ DOOMONU @ DOOMAPPA,
MAJOR IN AGE,
R/A SOPPAHALLI VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI,
CHIKKABALLAPUR TALUK &
DISTRICT - 562 101.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. SANDESH KUMAR, HCGP FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. VISHWANATH R HEGDE, ADV. FOR R4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES
226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING
TO QUASH ANNX-H THE ORDER PASSED BY THE R-3
DT.18.3.2011 & ANNX-J THE ORDER PASSED BY THE R-
2 IN R.A.(SCST)59 /2010-11 DT.17.2.2014 IS ILLEGAL
& SET ASIDE THE SAME & DISMISS THE PETITION
FILED BY THE R-4 BY ALLOWING THIS W.P. AND ETC.,
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR
PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B' GROUP THIS DAY, THE
COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
The petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated
18.03.2011 passed by the respondent No.3 vide Annexure-
H and the order dated 17.02.2014 passed by respondent
No.2 at Annexure-J, has filed this writ petition.
2. Brief facts leading to filing of this writ petition
are that:
The land in Sy.No.101 was granted in favour of A.K.
Narasimhaiah on 01.06.1957. On the same day, land
bearing survey No.200 situated at Soppa Village, Kasaba
Hobli, Chikkaballapur Taluk was granted in favour of father
of respondent No.4 i.e., A.K. Narasimhaiah. Father of A.K.
Narasimhaiah had executed a registered sale deed dated
10.07.1968. Respondent No.4 filed an application Section
5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for
short 'the PTCL Act') alleging that sale deed dated
10.07.1968 is in violation of Section 4 of the PTCL Act and
sought for cancellation of sale deed and for restoration of
land. Respondent No.3, after holding an enquiry held that
sale deed is in violation of Section 4(1) of the PTCL Act,
allowed the application filed by the respondent No.4 and
declared the sale deed as null and void and ordered to
restore the land in favour of respondent No.4. The
petitioner being aggrieved by the order passed by
respondent No.3, preferred an appeal before respondent
No.2. Respondent No.2 after hearing the parties confirmed
the order passed by respondent No.3 and consequently
dismissed the appeal. The petitioner being aggrieved by
the orders passed by respondent No.2 & 3, has filed this
writ petition.
3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner,
learned HCGP for respondent Nos.1 to 3 and also learned
counsel for respondent No.4.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
the land in survey No.101/3 (new No.101/10) measuring 1
acre 32 guntas and survey No.101/8 measuring 1 acre 32
guntas was granted in favour of A.K. Narasimhaiah under
grant order dated 01.06.1957. Original grantee executed a
registered sale deed on 10.07.1968. Respondent No.4 filed
an application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act in the year
2007. He submits that there is a delay of 40 years in filing
an application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act. He submits
that there is inordinate delay in invoking Section 5 of the
PTCL Act. In support of his arguments, he places reliance
on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs State of Karnataka and
another reported in 2018(1) Kar.L.R 5 (SC) and in the
case of Vivek M. Hinduja and others vs M. Ashwatha
and others reported in 2018(1) Kar.L.R. 176 (SC). On
these grounds, he prays to allow the writ petition.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent
No.4 submits that land was granted in favour of father of
respondent No.4 and sale deed executed by father of
respondent No.4 is in violation of Section 4(1) of the PTCL
Act. He submits that respondent No.3 was justified in
allowing the application filed by respondent No.4. He
submits that the impugned orders passed by respondent
Nos.2 and 3 are just and proper and does not call for any
interference. Hence, on these grounds, he prays to dismiss
the writ petition.
6. Learned HCGP adopts the arguments of
respondent No.4.
7. Heard and perused the records and considered
the submissions of learned counsel for the parties.
8. The land in question was granted in favour of
father of the respondent No.4 under grant order dated
01.06.1957. Original grantee executed a registered sale
deed on 10.07.1968 prior to PTCL Act came into force i.e.
on 01.01.1979. Thereafter, respondent No.4 filed an
application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act for declaring
registered sale deed executed by original grantee dated
10.07.1968 as null and void and for restoration of land.
Respondent No.3 after holding an enquiry held that sale
transaction is in violation of Section 4 of the PTCL Act and
consequently allowed the application filed by the
respondent No.4 and declared the registered sale deeds as
null and void and ordered for restoration of land in favour
of respondent No.4. The said order was confirmed by
respondent No.2. From perusal of records, it is clear that
original grantee executed a registered sale deed on
10.07.1968. The respondent No.4 has filed an application
under Section 5 of the PTCL Act in the year 2007 i.e., after
lapse of more than 40 years from the date of execution of
registered sale deed and also more than 25 years from the
PTCL Act came into force. Thus, there is inordinate delay in
filing an application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act.
Respondent No.4 has not explained the delay in filing the
said application. Thus, the application filed by the
respondent No.4 is beyond reasonable time.
9. In view of the law laid by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), it
is observed in para No.8 which reads as under:
"8. However, the question that arises is with
regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which
enables any interested person to make an
application for having the transfer annulled as void
under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not
prescribe any period within which such an
application can be made. Neither does it prescribe
the period within which suo motu action may be
taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav
& Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. &
Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of
Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A.
No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011)
reiterated a settled position in law that whether
Statute provided for a period of limitation,
provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a
reasonable time. It is held that action whether on
an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be
taken within a reasonable time. That action arose
under the provisions of a similar Act which provided
for restoration of certain lands to farmers which
were sold for arrears of rent or from which they
were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January,
1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was
granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi
River which make agricultural operations
impossible. An application for restoration was made
after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that
background that this Court upheld that it was
unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in
upholding that the present application for
restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa
was made after an unreasonably long period and
was liable to be dismissed on that ground.
Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High
Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy
Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal,
523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006
(4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda
vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District,
Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B
holding that there is no limitation provided by
Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application
can be made at any time, are overruled. Order
accordingly."
10. In view of the law laid by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Vivek M. Hinduja (supra), it is
observed in para No.10 which reads as under:
"10. We are in respectful agreement with the
aforesaid observations. It is, however, necessary to
add that where limitation is not prescribed, the
party ought to approach the competent Court or
authority within reasonable time, beyond which no
relief can be granted. As decided earlier, this
principle would apply even motuactions."
11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Nekkanti Rama
Lakshmi's (supra) case held that application under Section
5 of PTCL Act must be invoked within a reasonable time.
Though statutory provide no limitation for invoking
provisions, it has to be filed within a reasonable time.
Thus, as observed above, respondent No.4 has invoked
provision of PTCL Act after more than 25 years from the
date the PTCL Act came into force and more than 45 years
from the date of execution of registered sale deed. Thus,
there is inordinate delay in filing an application.
Respondent Nos.2 & 3 without examining the said aspect
have proceeded to pass the impugned orders. Thus, the
impugned orders passed by respondent Nos.2 and 3 are
arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law of laid down
by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Hence, the impugned orders
passed by respondent Nos.2 & 3 are liable to be set aside.
In view of the above discussions, , I proceed to pass the
following:-
::ORDER::
Writ Petition is allowed.
Impugned order dated 18.03.2011 passed
by the respondent No.3 vide Annexure-H and
the order dated 17.02.2014 passed by
respondent No.2 at Annexure-J are hereby
quashed and set aside.
In view of disposal of writ petition, I.A.No.1/2020
does not survive for consideration.
SD/-
JUDGE
nms
