Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 6042 Kant
Judgement Date : 14 December, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 14 T H DAY OF DECEMBER, 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO.20194 OF 2021(GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. Mr. B Arun
Aged about 34 years,
Income Tax Officer,
Income Tax Office,
C.R.Building, Queens Road ,
Beng aluru-560001
Presently Working as
Dep uty Commissioner
Of Income Tax-TDS,
Circle-1(1).
2. Mr. S Arun Kumar
Income Tax Officer,
Income Tax Office,
C.R.Building, Queens Road ,
Beng aluru-560001
Presently Working as
Dep uty Director
Of Income Tax-Inv,
Unit-1(1).
3. Mr. Rohit Sharma
Income Tax Officer,
Income Tax Office,
C.R.Building, Queens Road ,
Beng aluru-560001
:: 2 ::
Presently Working as
Income Tax Inspector-Inv
Unit-3(2) ...Petitioners
(By Sri M.B.Naragund, Addl. Solicitor General, for
Sri K.V.Aravind, Advocate)
AND:
1. Karnataka State Police,
Kodig ehalli Police Station,
3H5M+C5F,
BB Nag ar, Koti Hosahalli,
Beng aluru-560092.
2. Mr. Pawan Kumar Sachdeva
S/o Late Buta Ram
Aged about 49 years,
Residing at
No.2, Anand a Extension,
Vidyaranyapuram (P.O),
Beng aluru-560097.
...Respondents
(By Sri B.J.Rohith, HCGP for R1;
Sri K.Diwakara, Advocate for R2)
This Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India read with Section 482 of Criminal
Procedure Cod e, praying to quash the PCR
No.10270/2019, Annexure-W and consequential FIR
filed by the R1 in Cr.No.59/2021 dated 20.04.2021
pend ing on the file of VII ACMM, Bengaluru produced
as Annexure-T to the Writ Petition and etc.
This Writ Petition coming on for preliminary
hearing this day, the Court made the following:
:: 3 ::
ORDER
In this writ petition the petitioners have
sought a certiorari to quash the proceedings in
PCR 10270/2019 on the file of VII ACMM,
Bengaluru and the consequent FIR in Crime No.
59/2021 registered at Kodigehalli Police Station.
The facts necessary for disposal of this writ
petition are as follows:
2. The petitioners are all income tax officers.
In between the dates 7.8.2019 and 10.8.2019, a
raid was conducted by the office of the income tax
department at more than 20 places on the
premises of an industrial establishment namely A-
One Steels India Private Limited. In relation to
one such raid conducted in a premises situated at
Sahakarnagar, Bengaluru, the second respondent
herein made a complaint to the police alleging
excesses committed by the petitioners while
conducting the raid. The police did not take any :: 4 ::
action, rather issued non-cognizable offence report
(NCR). This prompted the second respondent to
approach the court of Magistrate with a complaint
under section 200 Cr.P.C to prosecute them in
relation to offences punishable under sections 324,
503, 506, 166, 120B read with 34 of IPC. The
learned Magistrate referred the matter to the
police for investigation under section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. Consequently, FIR in Crime No. 59/2021
came to be registered and the police issued
notices to the petitioners to appear for
investigation. Hence, this petition.
3. All the three petitioners herein along with
one Mr.Anand, Assistant Director of Income Tax,
on earlier occasion approached this court by filing
W.P.No.14567/2021. It was dismissed on
26.10.2021 as the writ petition was not verified by
the aggrieved party. Liberty was given to file a :: 5 ::
fresh writ petition and hence the petitioners are
again before this court.
4. I have heard Sri M.B.Nargund, learned
Additional Solicitor General, Sri K.Diwakara for
respondent No.2 and the Government Pleader for
respondent No.1.
5. Sri Nargund raised the following
contentions: -
(i) The raid was conducted at various
places by the officers of income tax
department in between 7.8.2019 and
10.8.2019. The petitioners exercised
their official duty being the officers of
the income tax department. Section
132 (4) of Income Tax Act empowers
the authorized officer to record
statement of any person who is found
to be in possession of books of :: 6 ::
accounts, money, bullion, etc., The
statement thus recorded during search
may be used during investigation. The
petitioners have produced copies of
the statements that they recorded
after examining the second respondent
at the time of search. Therefore this
shows that the petitioners did nothing
more than conducting a search in the
premises of the second respondent.
They exercised their official duty.
(ii) The second respondent approached the
Magistrate with a mala fide intention
to get over the information that the
petitioners extracted from him while
examining under section 132 of the
Income Tax Act.
(iii) The second respondent complains of
certain excesses committed by the
petitioners. He has stated that he was :: 7 ::
assaulted by the first petitioner and as
a result there was damage to his left
ear. It is found in the complaint that
he went to Bowring Hospital for
treatment, and if really the second
respondent had sustained such a kind
of injury as he has stated in the
complaint, the doctor who treated him
would have registered a medico-legal
case at that point of time. But, the
second respondent then went to
K.C.General Hospital for treatment and
thereafter went to the police station.
This itself is enough to show that if
really the second respondent had
suffered injury, in the first instance
the doctor at Bowring Hospital would
have passed on the information to the
police. Very interestingly the second
respondent went to Kodigehalli Police :: 8 ::
Station on 14.8.2019 and that the
police issued NCR opining that there
was no case for investigation. This
itself is enough to demonstrate
falsehood in the case of the second
respondent.
(iv) The complaint dated 13.8.2019
addressed to the Inspector of Police,
Kodigehalli Police Station, very clearly
shows that the other three persons
namely Pawan Kumar Jindal, Pankaj
Kumar Gidra and Sachin Dhanuka have
not signed it though their names are
typed. Only the second respondent
had signed it. That means the others
did not join for the reason that the
contents of the said complaint are not
correct. If it is read, there are
averments which show that Pawan
Kumar Jindal, Sachin Dhanuka were :: 9 ::
also tortured by the income tax
officers. The very fact that the others
did not come forward to sign is itself
sufficient to doubt the veracity of the
allegations made by the second
respondent in his private complaint
made before the court.
(v) One of the Directors of A-One Steel
and Alloys Limited made a report to
the police on 13.8.2019 alleging that
income tax officer by name Suresh
subjected Chand Pasha, Shamshuddin,
Ashif, Naveen Kumar to harassment
while conducting raid at Munirabad.
But the police filed 'B' report on that
FIR. This shows that the Directors of
A-One Steel and Alloys Limited
instigated their employees to make
false complaints against the officers of
the income tax department, in order to :: 10 ::
get over the information that the
officers collected while conducting
raid. This shows malafide intention.
(vi) When the complaint was filed before
the Magistrate, the affidavit required
to be filed in accordance with the ratio
in Priyanka Srivastava and Another
vs State of Uttar Pradesh and
others [(2015) 6 SCC 287], had not
been filed. According to the
respondent No.2, the affidavit has
been now submitted, but it does not
cure the legal requirement. The
proceedings do not get ratified.
(vii) Section 293 of the Income Tax Act
bars any proceedings either Civil or
Criminal against the officers of the
income tax department. In this view,
private complaint is not maintainable.
:: 11 ::
(viii) The complaint has been filed without
obtaining sanction as required under
Section 197 of Cr.P.C. Sanction is a
must because all the allegations
aspersed against the petitioners are in
connection with their discharging
official duties. Since now sanction was
obtained, the complaint should have
been dismissed by the Magistrate,
without taking cognizance.
6. Learned counsel for respondent No.2, Sri
Diwakara K, made the following submissions:
(i) Sanction is not necessary, because, in
the private complaint, one of the
offences alleged is under Section 166 of
IPC which deals with excesses committed
by the public servants while discharging
their official duty. If Section 353 IPC
deals with taking action against the :: 12 ::
persons who cause obstruction to the
performance of official duty by the public
servants, section 166 of IPC provides for
taking action against the public servants.
In this view, sanction is not necessary.
(ii) The petitioners have been issued with
notice under Section 41A of Cr.P.C., to
appear for interrogation. It is the duty
of everyone to appear for investigation
whenever the police issues notice. It
cannot be called harassment. The
petitioners have challenged this notice
and in this view, writ of certiorari cannot
be issued.
(iii) Even if sanction is necessary, it can be
obtained at any time, in accordance with
Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C.
(iv) The petitioners were under the wrong
impression that a verifying affidavit filed
along with the complaint would meet the :: 13 ::
requirement of the dictum of the
Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava.
Now that an affidavit has been filed, it
cures the defect. If according to the
petitioners, the Magistrate should not
have accepted the affidavit, the
petitioners should have challenged it
before this Court and that issue cannot
be raised now.
(v) The incident that has been complained of
in the complaint cannot be co-related
with the raid conducted at Munirabad.
The allegations made in the complaint
clearly show as to how the second
respondent was brutally harassed by the
petitioners. There is damage to the left
ear of the second respondent. This
shows that the petitioners exceeded their
limits in the guise of conducting raid. In
this view, the investigation has to go on :: 14 ::
and there cannot be interference by this
Court with the investigation process.
Hence this writ petition is to be
dismissed.
7. I have considered the arguments.
Before dealing with the main issues, one
argument of Sri Naragund in regard to non-
compliance of the mandate of Supreme Court in
the case of Priyanka Srivastava may be
considered. It is submitted by Sri Diwakara that
affidavit has been filed now. According to Sri
Naragund subsequent filing of affidavit does not
cure the requirement. What is held in the case
of Priyanka Srivastava is that if an affidavit is
filed along with the complaint in which a
reference to police under section 156(3) Cr.P.C
is sought, it makes the complainant more
responsible. It has been observed by the
Supreme Court that since the complaints are :: 15 ::
being filed in a routine manner without taking
any responsibility whatsoever in order to harass
certain persons, if the contents of the affidavit
are found to be false, the complainant can be
prosecuted for swearing to a false affidavit. It
is also necessary that the complainant must
state in the affidavit that before approaching
the court, he approached the police station and
then the Superintendent of Police. If these
ingredients are found in the complaint as also in
the affidavit, it enables the Magistrate to take
cognizance. Therefore though filing of affidavit
is made mandatory, in case it is not filed, it may
be cured by filing an affidavit at a subsequent
stage. It is a curable mandatory requirement.
Now, in this case it is stated that it is filed. The
procedural mandate appears to have been
complied with and therefore the argument of Sri
Naragund on this score is not sustainable.
:: 16 ::
8. Now coming to the main point, the
petitioners have sought to quash the
proceedings against them on the ground that
they have been falsely implicated to wreak
vengeance as they conducted search in the
premises of the company in which the
respondent No.2 is employed. Even if the
allegations made in the complaint are taken to
be true on their face value, so far as sanction is
concerned, what section 197 Cr.P.C. envisages
is that the court cannot take cognizance without
obtaining sanction. Sanction is absolutely
essential if the act amounting to an offence has
reasonable nexus with performance or discharge
of official duty. In D.Devaraja Vs. Owais
Sabeer Hussain - (2020) 7 SCC 695, the
position is made clear in the following
paragraphs.
"68. If in doing an official duty a policeman has acted in excess of :: 17 ::
duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the fact that the act alleged is in excess of duty will not be ground enough to deprive the policeman of the protection of government sanction for initiation of criminal action against him.
69. The language and tenor of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act makes it absolutely clear that sanction is required not only for acts done in discharge of official duty, it is also required for an act purported to be done in discharge of official duty and/or act done under colour of or in excess of such duty or authority."
(underlining by me)
9. Explanation to section 197 Cr.P.C. states
that sanction is not necessary if a public servant is
accused of committing offences under section :: 18 ::
166A, section 166B, section 354, sections 354A to
354D, section 370, section 375, section 376,
section 376A, section 376AB, section 376C, section
376D, section 376DA, section 376DB and section
509. Section 166 IPC is not there in the
explanation part, that means sanction is necessary
for the offence under section 166 IPC. Question is
at what stage sanction is to be obtained. The
answer to this question is found in the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of
D.T.Virupakshappa Vs. C. Subash (2015) 12
SCC 231. It is held
"5. The question, whether sanction is necessary or not, may arise at any stage of the proceedings, and in a given case, it may arise at the stage of inception as held by this Court in Om Prakash and others v. State of Jharkhand [(2012) 12 SCC 72]. To quote:
"41. The upshot of this discussion is that whether sanction is :: 19 ::
necessary or not has to be decided from stage to stage. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. In a given case, it may arise at the inception. There may be unassailable and unimpeachable circumstances on record which may establish at the outset that the police officer or public servant was acting in performance of his official duty and is entitled to protection given under Section 197 of the Code. It is not possible for us to hold that in such a case, the court cannot look into any documents produced by the accused or the public servant concerned at the inception. The nature of the complaint may have to be kept in mind. It must be remembered that previous sanction is a precondition for taking cognizance of the offence and, therefore, there is no requirement that the accused must wait till the charges are framed to raise this plea. ..."
:: 20 ::
10. Therefore, the question of obtaining
sanction may arise at any stage, and moreover, it
is for taking cognizance only. Production of
sanction is not necessary when a reference to
police under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is sought. The
complainant's only grievance in his application
under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is that the police did
not initiate any action when he approached the
police, and therefore seeks intervention of court
for the purpose of investigation. If the Magistrate
or the court decides to refer the case for
investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., it does
not amount to taking cognizance; and only if the
investigating officer is able to collect evidence
showing commission of offence, he must apply for
sanction and obtain it for the purpose of
submitting charge sheet to the court. That means,
at the stage of taking cognizance sanction order
from the concerned government as envisaged in :: 21 ::
clauses (a) and (b) of Section 197(1) of Cr.P.C.
must be made available.
11. In the case on hand, cognizance is not yet
taken; the Magistrate has just ordered for
investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. It is
too early to expect production of sanction order.
It may be seen that in the case of
D.T.Virupakshappa, the issue as regards sanction
emerged after the Magistrate took cognizance.
12. Then with regard to section 293 of Income
Tax Act, what is to be stated is that, though this
section bars suits or prosecution against the
government or any officer of the government, it
applies when anything is done in good faith. This
is a question of fact; it is not possible to draw any
inference at the inception whether act alleged
against the petitioners were done in good faith or
not. As of now, the petitioners have received
notice under section 41A Cr.P.C., that means they :: 22 ::
can explain the situation to the investigating
officer, and also produce all the materials
available with them, so that the investigating
officer can take a proper decision for preparing
final report. Though the jurisdiction under section
482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised for quashing FIR, it
is settled principle that such a power has to be
sparingly exercised. In the case on hand, since
there is scope for investigation, FIR cannot be
quashed. In the result the writ petition is
dismissed, but the Magistrate is hereby directed to
pass fresh orders as regards referring the case for
investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C in view
of affidavit being filed by the respondent.
Sd/-
JUDGE
ckl/-
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!