Shri C Palakshappa vs State Of Karnataka
2021 Latest Caselaw 5924 Kant

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

     DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2021

                      BEFORE

      THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE ASHOK S. KINAGI

     WRIT PETITION NO.39595 OF 2015 (SC-ST)

BETWEEN:

1.    SHRI C. PALAKSHAPPA
      S/O C.NANJAPPA,
      AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
      R/AT CHINNIKATTE VILLAGE,
      HONNALI TALUK,
      DAVANAGERE DISTRICT - 577225.

2.    SHRI C. NANJAPPA
      S/O MUDDAPPA,
      AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS,
      R/AT CHINNIKATTE VILLAGE,
      HONNALI TALUK,
      DAVANAGERE DISTRICT - 577 225.
                                         ...PETITIONERS

(BY SRI. RAVISHANKAR SHASTRY G., ADV.)

AND

1.    STATE OF KARNATAKA
      REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
      TO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
      M.S.BUILDING, DR.B.R. AMBEDKAR ROAD,
      BANGALORE - 560 001.
                           2




2.    DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
      DAVANAGERE DISTRICT,
      DAVANAGERE - 577 001.

3.    ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
      DAVANAGERE SUB DIVISION,
      DAVANAGERE DISTRICT - 577 001.

4.    SHRI GOPALA NAIKA
      S/O SOMLA NAIKA,
      MAJOR,
      R/AT BIDARAHALLI VILLAGE,
      CHINNIKATTE POST, HONNALI TALUK,
      DAVANAGERE DISTRICT - 577 225.

                                       ...RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. M. SANDESH KUMAR, HCGP FOR R1 TO R3
    SRI. S. SIDDALINGAIAH, ADV. RFOR R4)


    THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
QUASH THE ORDER DATED 31.7.2015 PASSED BY THE
DEPUTY  COMMISSIONER,     DAVANAGERE    DISTRICT,
DAVANAGERE VIDE ANN-A; AND ETC.

     THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING IN 'B' GROUP THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:

                      ORDER

Petitioners being aggrieved by the order dated

31.07.2015, passed by respondent No.2, have filed

this writ petition.

2. Brief facts leading rise to filing of this petition

are as under:

That one Jemla Naika purchased the land in

Sy.No.16/2 measuring 9 acres 32 guntas situated at

Beedrahalli of Honnali Taluk, Davangere District, on

23.02.1953. Said Jemla Naika and his son have

jointly sold the said land in favour of Renukappa on

13.06.1956. On 27.01.1992, wife of Renukappa,

namely Premamma had sold the said land in favour of

petitioners 1 and 2, under registered sale deed.

Respondent No.4 claiming to be the grandson of Jemla

Naika, filed an application on 04.10.2010 before

respondent No.3, invoking Section 5 of the Karnataka

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of

Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 ('the PTCL Act'

for short). Respondent No.3, after holding an enquiry,

rejected the application filed by respondent No.4 vide

order dated 05.06.2013. Respondent No.4 being

aggrieved by the order passed by respondent No.3,

preferred an appeal before respondent No.2.

Respondent No.2, vide order dated 31.07.2015,

allowed the appeal and directed for resumption of land

in favour of respondent No.4. Hence, the petitioners

being aggrieved by the order passed by respondent

No.2, have filed this writ petition.

3. Heard learned counsel for petitioners, learned

counsel for the respondent No.4 and learned HCGP.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits

that that Jemla Naika has purchased the land in

question under public auction and he submits that he

has produced a copy of order sheet in Darkhast file as

per Annexure-F. He submits that the said land is not

a granted land and provisions of the PTCL Act is not

applicable. He further submits that respondent No.4

claiming to be the grandson of Jemla Naika filed an

application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act on

04.10.2010. There is an inordinate delay in filing the

said application. In order to buttress his arguments,

he places reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble

Apex Court in the case of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI VS.

STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. [(2020) 14 SCC 232]

AND VIVEK M. HINDUJA & ORS. VS. M. ASHWATHA &

ORS. [(2020) 14 SCC 228]. He submits that

respondent No.2 has committed an error in passing

the impugned order. Hence, on these grounds, he

prays to allow the writ petition.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for the

respondent No.4 submits that the land was granted

under Darkhast rules and the said land falls within the

definition of granted land and the provisions of the

PTCL Act are applicable to the present case in hand.

He further submits that respondent No.2 was justified

in passing the impugned order. Hence, on these

grounds, he prays to dismiss the writ petition.

6. Learned HCGP supports the impugned order.

7. Perused the records and considered the

submissions made by learned counsel for the parties.

8. It is not in dispute that Jemla Naika was the

owner of land in Sy.No.16/2 measuring 9 acres 32

guntas as per Annexure-F. Said Jemla Naika and his

son have sold the said land in favour of Renukappa on

13.06.1956. Renukappa died leaving behind his wife

Premamma. Said Premamma had sold the said land

in favour of petitioners 1 and 2 under registered sale

deeds dated 27.01.1992. Respondent No.4 claiming

to be the grandson of Jemla Naika filed an application

invoking Section 5 of the PTCL Act on 04.10.2010.

The said application filed by respondent No.4, is

beyond reasonable time, i.e., 54 years from the date

of execution of first sale deed. The PTCL Act came

into force on 01.01.1079 and the application was filed

after a lapse of more than 30 years from the date of

the PTCL Act coming into force. Thus, there is an

inordinate delay in invoking Section 5 of the PTCL Act.

The respondent No.4 has not explained the delay in

filing an application at a belated stage.

9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases referred

above, has held as under:

(a) In the case of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI (SUPRA):

"8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of CHHEDI LAL YADAV & ORS. VS. HARI KISHORE YADAV (D) THR. LRS. & ORS., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and

also in the case of NINGAPPA VS. DY. COMMISSIONER & ORS. (C.A.NO.3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. RUDRAPPA VS. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, 2000 (1)

KARNATAKA LAW JOURNAL, 523, MADDURAPPA VS.

STATE OF KARNATAKA, 2006 (4) KARNATAKA LAW JOURNAL, 303 AND G. MAREGOUDA VS. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT, CHITRADURGA AND ORS, 2000(2) KR.L.J.SH. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly."

(b) In the case of VIVEK M. HINDUJA (SUPRA):

"10. In PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION V. STATE OF

MAHARASHTRA [(2007) 5 SCC 211] this court reproduced the following observations with regard to the declaration of orders beyond the period of limitation as invalid:

"39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the courts and referring to several cases, this court held that if the party aggrieved by invalidity of the order intends to approach the court for declaration that the order against him was inoperative, he must come before the court within the period prescribed by limitation. 'If the statutory time of limitation expires, the court cannot give the declaration sought for'."

10. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble

Apex Court, the applicant must make an application

under Section 5 of the PTCL Act, within a reasonable

time. The respondent No.4 has filed the application

54 years from the date of execution of registered sale

deed and 30 years from the Act coming into force.

The application filed is beyond reasonable time.

Respondent No.2 has committed an error in passing

the impugned order and same is contrary to the law

laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases

referred supra.

11. In view of the above discussion, I proceed

to pass the following:

ORDER

The writ petition is allowed.

The impugned order passed by respondent No.2 is hereby quashed and set aside.

          The   order   of    respondent   No.3   is
     maintained.



                                     SD/-
                                    JUDGE



RD