Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 5882 Kant
Judgement Date : 10 December, 2021
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
KALABURAGI BENCH
TH
R
DATED THIS THE 10 DAY OF DECEMBER 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
CRL.RP.No.200005/2014
BETWEEN:
SMT. GOURI W/O G. RAJA
AGE: 52 YEARS, OCC: TEACHER
R/O C/O C.A. SWAMI
SECTOR NO.14, PLOT NO.58
NAVA NAGAR
BAGALKOT
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI R.S.LAGALI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
DEVAN HOUSING FINANCE
CORPORATION LTD., (DHFL)
REP. BY SHRI. SHIVARADDI
S/O HANAMAARADDI BENTUR
AGE:33 YRS, OCC. BRANCH INCHARGE
POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER OF
DEVAN HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION LTD.,(DHFL)
S1 TO S6, 2ND FLOOR
MAHALAXMI COMPLEX
OPP. MADHALA MARUTI TEMPLE
MG ROAD, BIJAPUR
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI SHIVANAND V. PATTANSHETTI, ADVOCATE)
2
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 397 READ WITH SECTION 401 OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CODE, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT
AND ORDER OF CONVICTION DATED 10.12.2013 PASSED IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.29/2013 BY THE PRINCIPAL SESSIONS
JUDGE, BIJAPUR THEREBY CONFIRMING THE JUDGMENT AND
ORDER OF CONVICTION DATED 16.04.2013 PASSED BY THE
JMFC-I COURT, BIJAPUR IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.431/2012 AND
CONSEQUENTLY ACQUIT THE PETITIONER/ACCUSED.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD ON 17.11.2021
AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
ORDER
This revision petition is filed challenging the
judgment and order of conviction dated 10.12.2013 passed
in Criminal Appeal No.29/2013 by the Principal Sessions
Judge, Bijapur thereby confirming the judgment and order
of conviction dated 16.04.2013 passed by the JMFC-I
Court, Bijapur in Criminal Case No.431/2012 and prayed
this Court to acquit the petitioner/accused.
2. The factual matrix of the case is that the
complainant is the public limited company dealing in
housing finance. The complainant-Company has filed a
private complaint under section 200 of Cr.P.C., for the
offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act (hereinafter for brevity referred as 'the NI
Act') against the accused-petitioner herein alleging that
the accused had availed the housing loan of Rs.1,70,000/-
under LC No.B0001484 after executing loan agreement,
demand promissory note and other documents in favour of
the complainant agreeing to pay the said loan in equated
monthly installments and the said loan was sanctioned on
05.08.2003. The accused did not pay the amount within
the period and became defaulter. He was due for a sum of
Rs.2,67,054/- and for the said amount, the accused had
issued a cheque dated 18.05.2011 drawn on Corporation
Bank, Branch Bagalkot. When the complainant presented
the cheque, the same was returned with an endorsement
'funds insufficient'. The complainant has informed the said
fact to the accused by issuing legal notice dated
02.06.2011 and demanded to pay Rs.2,67,054/- and the
said notice was duly served on 04.06.2011, but the
accused failed to repay the amount. Hence, the complaint
was filed under section 200 of Cr.P.C. The trial Court after
considering the material on record, taken cognizance and
secured the accused and accused did not plead guilty and
claimed for trial. The complainant in order to prove its
case, examined one witness as P.W.1 and got marked
documents at Exs.P.1 to 10. The accused was examined
to give statement under section 313 of Cr.P.C., and
accused denied the incriminating evidence but not led any
defence evidence. The trial Court after considering both
oral and documentary evidence convicted the accused and
sentenced to pay an amount of Rs.2,97,000/- Being
aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and order of
payment of fine, the appeal is filed before the Principal
Sessions Judge and the same is numbered as Criminal
Appeal No.29/2013. The appellate Court also on
re-appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence
confirmed the judgment of the trial Court. Hence, the
present revision petition is filed by the accused.
3. In this revision petition, the accused/revision
petitioner's main contention is that both the Courts have
committed an error in convicting the accused and
sentencing her to pay fine amount. The learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend
that both the trial Court and appellate Court at Bijapur did
not have the territorial jurisdiction to try the case. It is
contended that the respondent Bank has branch at
Bagalkot and further it is not in dispute that the main loan
transaction has taken place at Bagalkot. The petitioner
has issued the cheque drawn on Corporation Bank,
Bagalkot Branch. Only fact that demand notice of dishonor
was issued from Bijapur would not give jurisdiction to the
trial Court at Bijapur. It is contended that the Court
derives jurisdiction only when the cause of action arose
within its jurisdiction. The same cannot be conferred by
any act of omission or commission on the part of the
accused. It is contended that distinction must be borne in
mind between the ingredients of an offence and
commission of a part of the offence. Hence, on that count
itself, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence
requires interference by this Court. The learned counsel
would also submit that on perusal of evidence of
P.W.1/complainant, it is clear that he has admitted in his
cross-examination regarding filing of the contents of the
cheque except the signature and further there is an
admission regarding change of ink. It is the specific
defence of the petitioner that while she was availing the
loan, the respondent has collected 21 signed cheque
leaves from the petitioner. In the light of the admissions
regarding the contents of cheque and change of ink, the
defence of the petitioner appears to be more probable and
these are the aspects not considered by the trial Court as
well as appellate Court. It is also the contention that the
cheque in question has been materially altered by the
respondent company without the express or implied
consent of the petitioner, the cheque only bears the
signature of the petitioner and rest of the contents namely
the amount has been filled by the respondent. It is
contended that the cheque in question never issued
towards legally enforceable debt. The trial Court ought to
have accepted the defence taken by the accused which is
reasonably appears to be probable and both the courts
have failed to take note of the said fact. The learned
counsel also would vehemently contend that both the
courts have failed to take note of the jurisdiction of the
Court as well as merits of the case and hence, it requires
interference by exercising revisional power.
4. The learned counsel in support of his argument
has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of
Maharashtra and another reported in (2014) 3 SCC
(Cri) 673, wherein the Court held that place of issuance
or delivery of the statutory notice or where the
complainant chooses to present the cheque for
encashment by his bank are not relevant for purposes of
determining territorial jurisdiction for filing of cheque
dishonour complaints.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the
complainant would vehemently contend that all
transactions have taken place at Bijapur and Ex.P.8 to 10
disclose that all transactions have taken place at Bijapur
and both the courts have given finding with regard to
jurisdiction also. It is also elicited in the evidence of P.W.1
that they were having only service station at Bagalkot and
not having any branch at Bagalkot. The loan availed at
Bijapur and letters are addressed to the Bijapur branch
and loan account is also maintained at Bijapur branch and
all correspondence between the complainant and this
petitioner taken place at Bijapur and cheque was also
delivered at Bijapur and apart from that cheque was also
presented at Bijapur and received the endorsement at
Bijapur that cheque was not honoured. Merely because
the petitioner herein having an account at Bagalkot cannot
confer any jurisdiction and hence, his contention cannot be
accepted.
6. Having heard the learned counsels appearing
for the petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for
the respondent-complainant, the points that arise for
consideration in this revision petition are:
a. Whether the Court in which the complaint is filed is having no jurisdiction to try the case as contended by the revisional petitioner?
b. Whether the Courts below have committed an
error in convicting and sentencing the
petitioner herein and it requires revisional jurisdiction with regard to legality and correctness of the judgment of respective courts?
c. What order? Point No.1
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the
revisional petitioner and also counsel appearing for
respondent/complainant it is not in dispute that the
complaint is filed before Bijapur Court and on perusal of
the complaint, it is evident that a specific averment is
made regarding transaction between the complainant and
the petitioner herein. In the complaint, a specific averment
is made that petitioner herein has approached to the
complainant for financial assistance and availed the
housing loan by executing the loan document and hence,
loan was sanctioned on 05.08.2003. But he failed to repay
the amount and complaint averment is specific that in
order to repay the amount, he has issued the cheque
belonging to Corporation Bank, Bagalkot branch and the
said cheque was dishonoured. The complainant in order to
substantiate his contention that having availing the loan
produced the documents Ex.P.1 to 10. Before considering
the grounds urged in this revision petition, this Court
would like to refer the documents which have been
marked. Ex.P.1 is the subject matter i.e., cheque in
question. Ex.P.2 is the endorsement issued by the
Corporation Bank, Bagalkot branch. Ex.P.3 is the legal
notice issued through an advocate of Bijapur. Exs.P.4 and
P.5 are postal receipt and postal acknowledgment. Ex.P.6
is the power of attorney. Ex.P.7 is the reply given by the
accused to the counsel of the complainant. Ex.P.8 is the
complainants' housing finance corporation limited account
with loan account is maintained at Bijapur. The bank
statement is clear that an amount of Rs.2,67,054/- was
due. Ex.P.9 is the document of loan application given by
the accused/petitioner herein addressing the said letter to
the Bijapur branch. Ex.P.10 is the letter addressed to the
Branch Manager, Bijapur Branch by revisional petitioner
herein seeking time to repay the loan amount.
8. Having considered these documents, it is clear
that the complainant is having a branch at Bijapur and the
revisional petitioner by giving application to the branch at
Bijapur had availed the loan from Bijapur branch and also
letter is addressed seeking repayment of loan to the
Bijapur address and all transactions were taken place at
Bijapur, except the cheque which pertains to the Bagalkot
branch. It is also specific in the complaint averment that
when the cheque was presented in the bank of
complainant, the same was returned with an endorsement
of the payer bank in terms of Ex.P.2. Having taken note of
all these material available on record when all the
transactions have taken place at Bijapur i.e., application
was given to the Bijapur branch, loan was availed from
Bijapur branch and loan application was also given to the
Bijapur branch and letter was addressed to the Bijapur
branch seeking further time to pay the balance amount
Exs.P.8 to P.10 substantiate that the transactions were
taken place at Bijapur only. It is also not in dispute that
the cheque was delivered at Bijapur and also presented
from the bank of complainant and endorsement was issued
in terms of Ex.P.2 communicating the same to the Axis
Bank wherein, the cheque was presented i.e., at Bijapur.
When such being the case, the very contention of the
revisional petitioner cannot be accepted. The judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dasharath Rupsingh
Rathod referred supra relied upon by the petitioner's
counsel is not applicable to the facts on hand in view of all
transactions were taken place in Bijapur. Apart from this,
the Court would also like to refer the provisions of the NI
Act i.e., under section 142 (as amended by II Ordinance
2015) and also under section 142A (as inserted by II
ordinance, 2015). This Court would like to refer the
judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Bridgestone India Private Limited vs. Inderpal Singh
reported in 2016 (1) AKR 207, wherein the Hon'ble Apex
Court discussed the earlier judgment passed by the said
Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case which I have
referred above. Referring the said judgment, the Hon'ble
Apex Court in Bridgestone India Private Limited case
observed that in view of effect of amendment of section
142 and insertion of section 142A(1) vide 2015 II
Ordinance, the Court held that the courts at places where
the cheque is delivered for collection has territorial
jurisdiction entertaining the complaint also section
142(a)(i) gives retrospectivity to the provision. The
Hon'ble Apex Court in this judgment discussed section 177
of Cr.P.C., as discussed in Dasharath Rupsingh
Rathod's case and having considered the amendment
particularly the paragraph Nos.58 to 58.7 of Dashrath
Rupsingh Rathod's case supra and extracting section
142 of NI Act i.e., in the principal Act and also insertion of
Sections 1 and 2 in respect of section 142 and so also
explanation and also section 142(A) in detail discussed in
paragraph Nos.11, 12, 13, which I would like to extract as
follows:
"11. It is, however, imperative for the present controversy, that the appellant overcomes the legal position declared by this Court, as well as, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, a reference may be made to Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, whereby Section 142A was inserted into the Negotiable Instruments Act. A perusal of Sub-
section (1) thereof leaves no room for any doubt, that insofar as the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned, on the issue of jurisdiction, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, would have to give way to the provisions of the instant enactment on account of the non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) of
Section 142A. Likewise, any judgment, decree, order or direction issued by a Court would have no effect insofar as the territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned. In the above view of the matter, we are satisfied, that the judgment rendered by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case would also not non-suit the appellant for the relief claimed.
12. We are in complete agreement with the contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant. We are satisfied, that Section 142(2)(a), amended through the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, vests jurisdiction for initiating proceedings for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, inter alia in the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, where the cheque is delivered for collection (through an account of the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course maintains an account). We are also satisfied, based on Section 142A(1) to the effect, that the judgment rendered by this
Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case, would not stand in the way of the appellant, insofar as the territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings emerging from the dishonor of the cheque in the present case arises.
13. Since cheque No.1950, in the sum of Rs.26,958/-, drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh, dated 02.05.2006, was presented for encashment at the IDBI Bank, Indore, which intimated its dishonor to the appellant on 04.08.2006, we are of the view that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, would have the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceedings initiated by the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, after the promulgation of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015. The words "...as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times..." used with reference to Section 142(2), in Section 142A(1) gives retrospectivity to the provision."
9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in this judgment has
categorically held that it is imperative for the present
controversy, that the appellant overcomes the legal
position declared by this Court, as well as, the provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also a reference was
made to Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments
(Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, whereby Section
142A was inserted into the Negotiable Instruments Act as
proviso and comes to the conclusion that in view of the
said amendment any judgment, decree, order or direction
issued by a Court would have no effect insofar as the
territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is
concerned. Whether cheque is delivered for collection
(through the account of the branch of the bank where
payee or holder in due course maintains an account). It is
also held that based on section 142(1)(a) to the effect that
the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case, would not stand in the
way of the appellant. Insofar as territorial jurisdiction for
initiating proceedings emerges from the dishonor of the
cheque in the present case.
10. Having taken note of the principles laid down
in the judgments and also considering the facts and
circumstances of the case and as I have already pointed
out that all transactions were taken place at Bijapur i.e.,
giving application for loan to the branch of Bijapur, loan
was availed from Bijapur, and bank loan account was also
maintained in the bank of Bijapur and letters are also
addressed by the revisional petitioner to the Bijapur
branch and cheque was also delivered for collection
through the account of the branch of the bank where payer
availed the loan and payee also having the branch at
Bijapur and also holder in due course maintains account at
Bijapur, the very contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that the Court at Bijapur is not having
jurisdiction cannot be accepted. This Court also
subsequent to the judgment in the case of Bridgestone
India Private Limited referring the said judgment and
also referring the judgment in the case of Dashrath
Rupsingh Rathod's considering the issue involved with
regard to the jurisdiction, in the judgment of Gopal
Krishna S/o Srinivasa vs. Abdul Bakai S/o Hussain
Basha reported in 2019 (4) KLJ 401, discussed the
scope of section 138, 142, 142-A of the NI Act and also
scope of section 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C., and held that
place of territorial jurisdiction of the Court to try the said
offence and also taken note of effect of amended
provisions and applicability of the said amendment came
to the conclusion that proviso and Amendment Act of 2015
is aptly applicable and the very contention of respondent in
that case that both of them were residing at Sandur and
cheque is presented at Hospet is not acceptable. This
Court having considered the principles enunciated in
Bridgestone India Private Limited case ordered to
present the cheque at Hospet. In the case on hand also,
having considered the amended provisions as well as the
principles laid down in the judgment referred supra
particularly in Bridgestone India Private Limited, the
very contention of the revisional petitioner that Court at
Bijapur is not having jurisdiction cannot be accepted. The
proviso of section 142(2) is very clear that offence under
section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a Court
within whose local jurisdiction, a) if the cheque is delivered
for collection through an account, the branch of the bank
where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may
be, maintains the account, is situated; or b) if the cheque
is presented for payment by the payee or holder in due
course, otherwise through an account, the branch of the
drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is
situated and also explanation is clear that where a cheque
is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of
payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be
deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank
in which the payee or holder in due course, as the case
may be, maintains the account. When such amendment
was brought in 2015 and inserted section 142(2) of the NI
Act, the very contention of the petitioner that the Bijapur
Court is not having jurisdiction to try the complaint filed
for the offence under section 138 of NI Act, cannot be
accepted.
11. I have already pointed out that all transactions
have taken place at Bijapur and loan was availed at
Bijapur and loan application was given at Bijapur,
correspondences were made at Bijapur and cheque was
delivered at Bijapur and loan account was maintained by
the payee at Bijapur, no doubt, the learned counsel for the
petitioner brought to the notice of this Court the answer
elicited in the mouth of P.W.1 regarding having the service
branch at Bagalkot, but it is clear that they were having
only this service center at Bagalkot and he categorically
admits that they were not having any branch at Bagalkot
and only one officer by name Nagaraj Pattar is incharge
officer at Bagalkot. No doubt, the accused is residing at
Bagalkot and the same will not confer any jurisdiction and
also merely because the accused is having Corporation
Bank account at Bagalkot, the same will not confer any
jurisdiction.
12. P.W.1 also categorically given admission that
cheque was presented at Bijapur Axis Bank and also
endorsement was given by the bank of the petitioner in
respect of Axis Bank in terms of Ex.P.2. It is suggested
that he has falsely deposed that cheque is presented at
Axis Bank and the same was categorically denied. Hence,
having taken note of all these materials available on
record, the very contention of the petitioner cannot be
accepted. Hence, I answer point No.1 in negative.
Point No.2
13. Regarding exercising of revisional power by the
Court is concerned, the same is also limited, the Court has
to exercise revisional power only if the judgment of
conviction and sentence which is affirmed by the appellate
Court is not in conformity with the legality and correctness
of the judgment and both the orders suffer from illegality
and correctness of the order, only then the Court can
exercise revisional jurisdiction. I do not find such illegality
committed by both the courts and having considered
Exs.P.1 to P.10 and evidence, it is not in dispute regarding
availing of loan and only contention was taken that the
contents of the cheque at Ex.P.1 signature and hand
writing made in Ex.P.1 are in different ink. The said
contention also cannot be accepted. Recently the Hon'ble
Apex Court held that once signed cheque is delivered, the
contention of the accused cannot be accepted and he has
to rebut the case of the complainant. In the case on hand,
the accused has not rebutted the evidence of complainant
by leading any defence evidence. No doubt, the accused
cross examined the witness P.W.1 to rebut his evidence by
way of cross-examination of P.W.1 and the same is also
not done with regard to transaction is concerned and the
counsel mainly has concentrated with regard to jurisdiction
while cross-examining P.W.1. When such being the facts
and circumstances of the case, I do not find any reason to
exercise revisional jurisdiction and hence, I do not find any
merit in the revision petition.
Point No.3
14. In view of the observations made above, I pass
the following:
ORDER
The revision petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
VNR
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