Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 5450 Kant
Judgement Date : 4 December, 2021
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 4TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI MULIMANI
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.100848 OF 2018 (SP)
BETWEEN:
BOKKA VENKTESHWARA RAO,
S/O NAGANNA,
AGE:51 YEARS, OCC:AGRICULTURE,
R/O RAGHVENDRA COLONY,
SRIRAMANAGAR VILLAGE,
TQ:GANGAVATHI, DIST:KOPPAL - 583 227.
...APPELLANT
(BY SMT.PALLAVI S.PACHCHAPURE, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI.F.V.PATIL AND SRI NANDISH PATIL, ADVOCATES)
AND:
SMT.LINGAMMA
W/O LATE GALLI VEERESHAPPA,
AGE:41 YEARS, OCC:AGRICULTURE,
R/O MUSTUR VILLAGE,
TQ:GANGAVATHI, DIST:KOPPAL,
SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HER LRS.
1. SMT.M.BASAMMA
W/O MALLIKARJUNA,
AGE: 77 YEARS, OCC:HOUSEHOLD,
R/O ELINGANUR VILLAGE,
TQ:GANGAVATHI, DIST:KOPPAL - 583 229.
2. KUMARI ASHWINI @ GOURI
D/O LATE VEERESHAPPA,
2
AGE:21 YEARS, OCC:HOUSE HOLD,
R/O ELINGANUR VILLAGE,
TQ:GANGAVATHI, DIST:KOPPAL - 583 229.
...RESPONDENTS
(NOTICE TO R1 HELD SUFFICIENT;
R2 - SERVED)
THIS RSA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF THE CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908.
THIS RSA POSTED FOR FINAL HEARING THIS DAY; THE
COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
Smt.Pallavi S.Pachhapure learned counsel on behalf of
Sri.F.V.Patil and Sri.Nandish Patil for appellant has appeared
in person.
2. This is an appeal from the Court of Senior Civil
Jude and JMFC, Gangavathi.
3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are
referred to as per their rankings before the Trial Court.
4. The facts of the case are simply stated as
under:
It is stated that one Gali Veereshappa, the husband of
the defendant was the absolute owner and possessor of
land bearing Sy.No.112/A/4 measuring 20 Guntas situated
at Mushtur Village, Gangavathi Taluk. He had agreed to sell
the said property to the plaintiff for a consideration of
Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) for his family
necessity. He received earnest money of Rs.40,000/-
(Rupees Forty Thousand only) and executed agreement for
sale on 23.08.2004 in the presence of witnesses and agreed
to execute registered sale deed as and when called by the
plaintiff after securing necessary documents in respect of
the property.
However, Gali Veereshappa did not execute the sale
deed and went on postponing the same on one or the other
pretext. He died leaving behind his legal heirs. The plaintiff
approached his legal representatives - the defendants and
called upon them to execute the sale deed but in vain.
Hence, plaintiff issued notice and the same was duly served
on 18.03.2010. Despite the service of notice, the
defendants did not execute the sale deed.
It is averred that plaintiff is always ready to perform
his part of the contract and to get execute the sale deed by
tendering balance consideration amount. There is no breach
of contract by the plaintiff it is only the defendants who
have breached the contract.
Originally the suit was filed against the wife of Gali
Veereshappa who was defendant No.1. Thereafter, on the
basis of order on I.A.No.2, defendants 1(a) and (b), the
mother-in-law and the daughter of Gali Veereshappa were
impleaded. The Court summons was not served. On the
basis of order on I.A.No.1, substitute service by way of
paper publication was ordered which was duly published.
But defendants 1(a) and (b) failed to appear before the
Court. Accordingly, they were placed ex parte.
On the basis of the order on I.A.No.6, the Court
advocate guardian was appointed for defendant No.1(b)
who was minor. The guardian filed written statement on
behalf of minor defendant No.1(b). The plaint averments
were denied. It was specifically denied the transaction
between plaintiff and Gali Veereshappa. It was also
contended that the suit is barred by time. Accordingly, they
prayed for dismissal of the suit.
5. On the basis of the pleadings, the Trial Court
framed the following issues:
1. Does the plaintiff proves that the deceased Gali Veereshappa has executed the agreement of sale dated 23/08/2004 by receiving earnest money of Rs.40,000/-?
2. Does the plaintiff proves that he is ever ready and wiling to perform his part of contract?
3. Does the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation?
4. Does the plaintiff entitles the decree for Specific Performance of Contract?
5. What decree or order?
To prove his case, plaintiff examined himself as PW1
and two other witnesses as PW2 and PW3. They produced
five documents which were marked at Exs.P.1 to P5. On
behalf of defendants, they have not adduced any evidence
nor they produced any documents.
6. On the trial of the action, the Trail Court
declined to grant the relief of specific performance of
contract. However, the suit came to be decreed holding that
plaintiff is entitled for refund of earnest money of
Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand only) from defendant
No.1(b) together with interest at the rate of 6% from the
date of execution of sale agreement at Ex.P-1 till the date of
realization.
Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the plaintiff
preferred the appeal before the Appellate Court. There was
a delay in presenting the appeal. Hence, an application
under Sec.5 of Limitation Act was filed accompanying the
Memorandum of Appeal. The Appellate Court dismissed the
application and further proceeded to discuss the matter on
merits and consequently, dismissed the appeal also. Hence,
this Appeal is filed under Sec.100 of C.P.C.
7. Smt.Pallavi S.Pachhapure learned counsel for
appellant submits that the judgment and decree of both the
Courts below are contrary to the evidence on record and
unsustainable in law.
Next, she submitted that there was a delay of 54 days
in filing the regular appeal. The plaintiff has shown sufficient
cause for condonation of delay. However, the First Appellate
Court has erroneously proceeded to reject the application in
the absence of any objection from the other side.
A further submission was made that the First
Appellate Court has erred in recording the findings on
merits of the case, when the delay was not condoned.
Counsel vehemently urged that the consideration of
maintainability or merits will arise only after the delay is
condoned and the appeal is taken on record.
To support the contention, counsel relied upon the
decision reported in "MARIGOUDA CHANABASAPPA
MARIGOUDAR VS. SATTEPA VEERAPPA KOUJALAGI
AND OTHERS" reported in 2015 (1) KCCR 468.
Lastly, she submits that the judgment and decree of
the First Appellate Court lacks judicial reasoning.
Accordingly, she submits that the appeal may be allowed.
8. Heard, the contention urged on behalf of the
appellant and perused the records with care.
The facts have been sufficiently stated. The case
really falls within a small compass.
The plaintiff initiated action against the defendant
seeking the relief of specific performance. The Trial Court
refused to grant the relief of specific performance however,
ordered for refund of earnest money. The plaintiff preferred
regular appeal before the First Appellate Court. There was a
delay of 53 days in presenting the appeal. Hence, an
application for condonation of delay was filed under Section
5 of the Limitation Act was filed. The appellant filed an
affidavit explaining the reasons for the delay.
I have perused the affidavit with care. It is stated the
appeal ought to have been filed on or before 09.05.2016
but due to civil holidays he could not file the appeal. From
29.05.2016 to 20.06.2016 he was unwell and was under
treatment. Hence, there is delay of 53 days in filing the
appeal. It is also stated that he has every chance of
succeeding in the appeal and if the delay is not condoned
then he will be put to greater hardship. Accordingly, it was
prayed to condone the delay and to take the appeal on
board.
It is significant to note that the First Appellate Court
framed points for consideration. The first point relates to
condonation of delay and the other two points relates to the
merits of the case.
It is interesting to note that the First Appellate Court
has elaborately dealt with the matter on the merits of the
case. Learned Judge has not considered the application
independently. Ultimately appeal came to be dismissed by
holding that I.A.No.I filed under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act is liable to be dismissed. At the same time, learned
Judge has given findings with regard to the merits of the
case also.
I may extract the operative portion of the order
passed in R.A.No.29/2016 which reads as follows:
ORDER
The Regular Appeal is dismissed with costs.
The Judgment and Decree passed by the
Prl. Civil Judge and JMFC, Gangavathi in
O.S.No.208/2010 dated:31-3-2016 is hereby
set aside.
The suit of the Plaintiff in O.S.No.208/2010
is hereby dismissed with cost.
I.A.No.I filed by the Appellant is hereby
dismissed.
Return the LCR along with the copy of this
judgment to the trial court forthwith.
Draw up the decree accordingly.
The final order dated:24.08.2018 passed by the Court
of Senior Civil Judge, Gagavathi is called in question on
various grounds as set out in the appeal memo.
After perusing the order of the First Appellate Court, it
is evident that though the application I.A.No.I for
condonation of delay has been dismissed, learned Judge has
considered the appeal and has dealt with the merits of the
case and dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and
decree of the Trial Court. In my considered view, the
approach of learned Judge in dealing with the merits of the
case is not justified.
It is perhaps well to observe that whenever an
application is filed under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act for
condonation of delay in filing of the appeal, the Court has to
show whether the cause shown for condonation of delay is
acceptable or not. Considering the question of
maintainability or merits will arise only after the delay is
condoned and the appeal is taken on file. The Court will not
get jurisdiction to give its findings on the maintainability of
an appeal or about the merits, unless the appeal is taken on
file by condoning the delay.
In the instant case, the Appellate Court has not only
dismissed the application filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act on the ground that the appellant has not
made out any good grounds to condone the delay, but also
has proceeded to record findings on the merits of the case .
While addressing arguments, learned counsel
Smt.Pallavi strenuously urged that the First Appellate Court
is not justified in rejecting the application for condonation of
delay. There is a delay of 53 days. The First Appellate Court
has not exercised the discretionary powers properly.
Counsel therefore, submitted that the delay may be
condoned.
I have heard the contention urged on behalf of
appellant with utmost care. In the present case, the Trial
Court passed the judgment and decree on 31.03.2016. The
appeal came to be filed on 24.06.2016. In the affidavit, it is
stated that the appeal ought to have been filed on or before
09.05.2016 but due to civil holidays he could not file the
appeal. From 29.05.2016 to 20.06.2016 he was unwell and
was under treatment. Hence, there is a delay of 53 days in
filing the appeal.
It is also stated that he has every chance of
succeeding the appeal and if the delay is not condoned then
he will be put to greater hardship. However, the First
Appellate Court refused to condone the delay stating that no
grounds are made out to allow the application.
I find myself unable to accept the said reason.
It is significant to note that the Hon'ble Apex Court in
number of cases has held that the primary function of a
Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and
to advance substantial justice. Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to
see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek
their remedy promptly.
A Court knows that refusal to condone the delay
would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his
cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching
the Court is always deliberate. The word 'sufficient Cause'
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice.
The Apex Court has also held that in every case of
delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant
concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea
and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does
not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a
dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration
to the suitor.
As already noted above, there is delay of 53 days in
filing the appeal. In my considered view, the explanation
offered in the affidavit to condone the delay is sufficient to
exercise the discretionary powers of the Court to condone
the delay. The First Appellate Court has not exercised the
discretionary powers properly. Taking note of the reasons
accorded in the affidavit I am of the view that the delay
may be condoned.
Therefore, exercising the discretionary powers, delay
of 53 days in filing the appeal is condoned and appeal is
restored to the Registry and the matter is remitted to the
Appellate Court. Accordingly, the findings recorded by the
Appellate Court is set-aside.
Accordingly, substantial questions of law are
answered.
The Appellate Court is hereby directed to decide the
appeal on the merits of the case and dispose off in
accordance with law.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment
and decree dated:24.08.2018 passed by the Court of Senior
Civil Judge, Gangavathi in R.A.No.29/2016 is set-aside.
Parties to bear their own costs.
Sd/-
JUDGE
TKN
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