Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 5171 Kant
Judgement Date : 1 December, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 01 S T DAY OF DECEMBER, 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.6538 OF 2020
BETWEEN:
1. M/s Concep t Horizon Infra Pvt. Ltd.,
No.8/13, 1 s t Floor,
Jangpura Extension,
New Delhi-110014.
Represented by
Director/Authorized Signatory
Jeevesh Sab harwal.
2. Jeevesh Sab harwal,
S/o Naresh Sabharwal,
Aged about 36 years,
Director,
M/s Concep t Horizon Infra Pvt. Ltd.,
No.8/13, 1 s t Floor, Jangpura Extension,
New Delhi-110014.
Both are also at:
No.F-63, Preet Vihar,
New Delhi-110092,
Having its Corporate Office at
No.B-131, Sector-2, Noid a,
Uttar Prad esh-201301.
...Petitioners
(By Sri Ajay J Nand alike, Advocate)
AND:
Ap arna Nagesh Prakash,
Aged about 55 years,
W/o Krishnamurthy Nagesh Prakash,
:: 2 ::
R/at No.P-12, Green Skies Blue Forest
Ap artment, Doresanip alya,
Krishnamraju Layout,
Bilekahalli, Beng aluru-560076,
Represented through her PA Holder,
Sri Krishnamurthy Nag esh Prakash.
...Respondent
(By Sri Akash V.T., Advocate)
This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482
of Cr.P.C., p raying to quash the entire proceed ings in
C.C.No.333/2018 against the petitioner herein p ending
before the Hon'b le XII Additional Small Causes Judge,
ACMM, (SCCH-8) Beng aluru.
This Criminal Petition coming on for admission
this d ay, the Court made the following:
ORDER
The petitioners being accused 1 and 2 in C.C.
333/2018 on the file of XII Additional Small
Causes Judge and ACMM (SCCH8), Bengaluru, have
invoked jurisdiction of this court under section 482
of Cr.P.C for quashing the proceedings.
2. Heard Sri Ajay J Nandalike for the
petitioners and Akash V.T for the respondent.
3. The material facts are that the respondent
has initiated criminal action against the petitioners :: 3 ::
under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act (for short hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
The first petitioner is a company and the second
petitioner is its director. The contention of the
petitioners is that since the complaint has not
been filed under section 141 of the Act, vicarious
liability cannot be fastened on the directors. In
para 3 of the complaint, it is just mentioned that
the first accused is the company represented by
its directors and that the accused 2 and 3 are
actively participating in the day-to-day activities
of the company. Learned counsel for the
petitioners has placed reliance on the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of S.M.S.
Pharmaceuticals Limited Company vs Neeta
Bhalla and Another [(2005) 8 SCC 89] to
substantiate his contention that in the absence of
complaint being filed under sections 141 and 138
of the Act, the directors cannot be held vicariously :: 4 ::
liable and for this reason the entire complaint is
not maintainable and it is to be quashed.
4. On the other hand, Sri Akash V.T
contended that the first accused is a company of
which accused 2 and 3 are the directors. The
cheques in question have been signed by accused
2 and 3 on behalf of the company and in this view
question of fastening vicarious liability on them
does not arise. The case on hand falls under the
scope of Section 141 (2) of the Act and he too
refers to S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals (supra) in
support of his argument.
5. It is undisputed that the cheques in
question have been signed by accused 2 and 3.
Here in this petition, first accused is petitioner
No.1 and the second accused is petitioner No.2.
Since the first petitioner is a legal entity, it has to
be represented by person or persons who are
responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the :: 5 ::
company on the day when the offence is
committed. That means even though there are
several directors of a company, all of them cannot
be arrayed as accused, only those who are in
charge of the affairs of the company on the day
when the offence is committed can be prosecuted.
It can also be said that in addition to prosecuting
the person who has signed the cheque on behalf of
the company, the other directors who have not
signed the cheque can be prosecuted if they are in
charge of the affairs of the company on the date of
commission of the offence. The scope of sub-
section (2) is that whenever an offence is
committed by a company and if proof is provided
that the offence has been committed with the
consent or connivance of, or the offence is
attributable to any neglect on the part of any
director, manager, secretary or other officer of the
company, they are deemed to be guilty of the
offence. The Supreme Court considered a :: 6 ::
reference made by two judge bench. Reference
(c) is extracted here : -
"(c) Even if it is held that specific averments are necessary, whether in the absence of such averments the signatory of the cheque and or the managing directors or joint managing director who admittedly would be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for conduct of its business could be proceeded against."
6. The answer to this reference is as below :
"19. (c) The answer to question (c) has to be in affirmative. The question notes that the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as Managing Director or Joint Managing Director, :: 7 ::
these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under Section 141. So far as signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141."
7. Therefore in view of the above principle,
the petitioner No.2 and another accused being
authorized signatories to the cheques in question,
are liable for prosecution for dishonour of cheques.
They get covered under section 141(2) of the Act.
8. It is not necessary that in a complaint
filed under section 200 Cr.P.C, in relation to
offence under section 138, very specifically a
reference must be there to section 141. This
section is just an enabling section for fastening
vicarious liability and what is required is to state
in the complaint that the directors who are made :: 8 ::
parties in the complaint are responsible for the
day-to-day affairs and business of the company on
the date of commission of offence. This averment
suffices requirement of section 141(1) of the Act.
But, here section 141(2) is applicable.
9. Therefore from the above discussion I
come to the conclusion that this petition is devoid
of merits and accordingly it is dismissed.
Consequently, I.A.1/2020 filed for stay is also
dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
ckl/-
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