Karnataka High Court
Wipro Limited vs The Joint Commissioner Of Income ... on 25 August, 2021
Author: Krishna S.Dixit
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
R
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF AUGUST 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KRISHNA S.DIXIT
WRIT PETITION NO.20040/2019 (T-IT)
BETWEEN:
WIPRO LIMITED,
DODDAKANNELLI, SARJAAPUR ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 035,
REP. BY ITS VICE PRESIDENT - TAXATION,
SRI BALASUBRAMANIAN K.,
SON OF SRI KRISHNAMURTHY,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS.
... PETITIONER
(BY SHRI S.GANESH, SR. COUNSEL
A/W. SHRI VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,
SPECIAL RANGE-7,
2ND FLOOR, INCOME TAX OFFICE,
BMTC BUILDING, 8 FEET ROAD,
KORAMANGALA, BANGALORE-560 095.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,
CIRCLE-7(1)(2),
7TH FLOOR, INCOME TAX OFFICE,
8 FEET ROAD, KORAMANGALA,
BANGALORE-560 095.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI K.V. ARAVIND, ADVOCATE)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 &
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH
THE DIRECTION IN THE ORDER MARKED AS ANNEXURE-A
PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.2, DATED 29.03.2019 AND
GRANTING ADDITIONAL INTEREST U/S.244A(1A) FROM THE
EXPIRY OF TIME PRESCRIBED R/S.153(5) OF THE ACT.
2
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDER, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE
FOLLOWING:
ORDER
The tone for this judgment may be set by quoting what
Richard Brinsley Sheridan, an acclaimed Irish dramatist of
18th century, on being asked by his tailor for at least the
interest of his bill had retorted:
"It is not my interest to pay the principal,
nor my principle to pay the interest".
2. Petitioner Assessee inter alia engaged in the
business of manufacture of computer software & providing IT
enabled services, is knocking at the doors of Writ Court for
assailing the order dated 29.03.2019, a copy whereof is at
Annexure-A whereby the second respondent-DCIT having
negatived its application dated 22.03.2019 filed u/s 244A(1A)
of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereafter '1961 Act') has
denied additional 3% interest on the allegedly delayed
refund of amount relatable to Assessment Year 2008-09.
3. The second respondent having contexted Section
244A(1A) of the Act has styled the operative portion of the
impugned order as under:
"In this case, the Hon'ble ITAT, Bengaluru
has remitted back the issue of Transfer Pricing to
the AO for fresh assessment/re-assessment as
per Para No. 5 & 6 of the ITAT order. Further,
fresh approval has been taken from the Hon'ble
Prl. CIT-7, Bengaluru for reference to the Transfer
Pricing Officer and the same has been referred.
The TPO re-computed the adjustments, based on
the directions of Hon'ble ITAT, and TP order was
passed on 31.10.2017.
As this is the case of fresh
assessment/re-assessment, an additional
interest u/s 244A(1A) will not be applicable in
this case."
4. After service of notice, the respondents having
entered appearance through their Panel Counsel resisted
the writ petition making submission in justification of the
impugned order and the reasons on which it has been
structured.
5. FACTS IN BRIEF:
(a) Petitioner's return of income for the Assessment
Year 2008-09 declaring a total income of Rs.588,08,04,584/-
having been selected for scrutiny u/s 143(2) of the Act, a
reference was made to the Transfer Pricing Officer (hereafter
'TPO') qua the international transactions; the TPO in exercise
of power u/s 92C(A) carried out an aggregate adjustment of
Rs.10,54,52,192/-; the first respondent-Joint Commissioner
of Income Tax (hereafter 'JCIT') had proposed a Draft
Assessment Order dated 28.12.2011 u/s 143(3) r/w 144C(1),
to which petitioner filed his Objections before the Dispute
Resolution Panel (hereafter 'DRP'); in terms of DRP order
dated 17.09.2012, the JCIT assessed the income at
Rs.2389,89,57,307/- against the original amount of
Rs.588,08,04,584/- supra.
(b) Both the Assessee and the Revenue having
appealed against the above, the Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal (hereafter 'ITAT') passed the order dated 4.1.2017
u/s 254 of the Act partly favouring the Assessee and remitted
the case to TPO with a direction for re-computation of the
Transfer Pricing Adjustment (hereafter 'TPA'); accordingly, the
TPO re-computed the said adjustment in terms of direction of
ITAT; the JCIT to give effect to the ITAT order, on 28.12.2017
determined the total income of the Assessee at
Rs.693,88,05,177/- and the tax payable thereon was
determined at Rs.206,69,34,730/-; however, the tax on book
profit was higher at Rs.316,85,23,810/-; the above
calculations eventually resulted in a refund of
Rs.1057,45,30,057/- which included interest payable u/s
244A amounting to Rs.267,54,62,251/-.
(c) The files of the Assessee were transferred to
another Assessing Officer i.e., second respondent-DCIT before
whom Rectification Application dated 18.01.2018 was moved
u/s 154; on a similar application being moved, the TPO made
rectification of the adjustment u/s 92C(A) of the Act; since
the Rectification Application dated 18.01.2018 was still
pending, further Rectification Applications were also filed,
followed by their summarization vide letters dated 17.05.2018
& 22.03.2019; the second respondent having considered the
same, passed the impugned order u/s 154 enhancing the
refund to Rs.1380,13,00,740/- which included an interest
amount of Rs.397,56,39,522/-; the Assessee grieves against
denial of 3% addl. interest envisaged u/s 244A(1A) for the
period between 28.12.2017 i.e., date of ITAT order and
4.5.2019 i.e., the date on which refund was finally granted;
this period being seventeen months, the Assessee quantifies
the interest amount at Rs.58.65 crore.
6. SUBMISSIONS CANVASSED ON BEHALF OF
THE ASSESSEE:
(a) Section 153(2A) of the Act prior to 2016
amendment encompassed within itself the power to make
fresh Assessment Order in terms of orders made in appeal;
if recomputation was required for giving effect to these
appellate orders, no time limit was prescribed since that
was covered by Section 153(6); however, a significant
change was brought in by amendment vide Finance Act,
2016 that contemplates two scenarios viz., (i) making of
fresh assessment orders pursuant to appellate orders that
have set aside or cancelled the assessment, under sub-
section (3) of section 153, & (ii) giving effect to appellate
orders other than those covered by fresh assessment orders
in terms of sub-section (5) of section 153; the 2016 Act
amended section 244A by introducing sub-section (1A)
providing for the grant of additional interest in cases falling
u/s 153(5).
(b) The orders of the kind made u/s 244A(1A) can
be classified into two categories viz. (i) the ones where a
fresh assessment/re-assessment needs to be made, & (ii)
the others where only effect is to be given to the appellate
orders straightway sans any fresh assessment/re-
assessment; the direction of the ITAT to the TPO to re-
compute the transfer pricing adjustment would not fall
within the later category; even otherwise, effect had to be
given expeditiously to rest of the ITAT order which has
attained finality, regardless of contemplated transfer pricing
assessment;
(c) After all the transfer pricing adjustment would
account for a refund of a paltry sum of Rs.3.88 crore
compared to refund of Rs.978/- crore; to hold up the entire
refund of such a huge amount on the pretext of deciding a
small issue of TPA, offends the sense of fairness &
proportionality; the transfer pricing adjustment actually
was not determinative of the refund inasmuch as the tax
amount was paid based on book profit, as provided u/s
115JB; the entitlement of the assessee for interest u/s
244A(1A) is intended to bring parity in the converse
situation where the Revenue levies interest on delayed
payment of taxes as provided u/s 234B.
So arguing, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
assessee seeks allowing of the Writ Petition.
7. SUBMISSIONS MADE ON BEHALF OF REVENUE:
(a) A plain reading of the provisions of section
244A(1A) makes it clear that an assessee is entitled to an
additional interest only in cases where there is no
requirement of fresh assessment or re-assessment in terms
of appellate orders; assessment or re-assessment cannot by
their very nature be done in piecemeal or in a truncated
way; the total income of an assessee can be determined only
after the fresh assessment or re-assessment is
accomplished, consistently with section 4 of the Act r/w the
extant CBDT Explanatory Notes dated 20.1.2017; an
argument to the contrary amounts to asking the AO to
undertake the exercise even after he becomes functus officio
and therefore is unsustainable.
(b) Section 240 contemplates refund, only after the
accomplishment of the exercise mandated under the
appellate order; where the assessment is set aside and a
fresh assessment is directed, the question of granting
interest at once would not arise till after the ascertainment
of amount to be refunded, and that happens after the fresh
assessment/re-assessment is done in terms of the ITAT
order; the time limit of three months prescribed in Section
153(5) for passing 'giving effect to' orders is applicable only
in cases where no fresh assessment or re-assessment is
contemplated under the appellate orders; since the matter
was remitted to the TPO for fresh
assessment/re-assessment, case of the petitioner does not
fit into section 244A(1A);
(c) Section 240 provides that the refund on appeal
would arise where an order in appeal on assessment is set
aside or cancelled with a direction to undertake a fresh
assessment/re-assessment and such a direction is
accomplished; although, section 153(5) prescribes a time limit
of three months for giving effect to the orders passed under
any of the provisions i.e., Ss.250, 254, 260, 262, 263 or 264
of the Act by the Assessing Officer; however, an exception is
carved out in cases where a fresh assessment/re-assessment
is contemplated; the provisions of section 153(5) and section
244A(1A) employ the expression "wholly or partly" to mean a
fresh assessment/re-assessment to be made "wholly or
partly" and that the said expression does not qualify "the
order to give effect to the order on appeal"; the matter having
been remitted to the TPO and to the AO for a de novo
consideration though in certain aspects, the assessee is not
entitled to the grant of addl. interest u/s 244A(1A), till after
consideration takes place.
(d) The ITAT order is made by following the earlier
order in the appeal of the assessee for the Assessment Years
2003-04 & 2004-05; accordingly, the matter has been
remitted to the TPO to undertake a fresh exercise in terms of
directions given in the earlier order; this exercise warrants a
judicious approach since the matter merits re-examination of
the issue in the light of the orders of the Tribunal and
therefore, the case of the petitioner fits into second Proviso to
section 153(5) of the Act, which makes a period of nine
months availing to the AO.
So contending, learned Panel Counsel for the Revenue
seeks dismissal of Writ Petition.
8. Both the counsel for the Assessee and the Sr. Panel
Counsel for the Revenue have filed their Written Submissions
and have pressed into service a catena of decisions, relevant
of which have been adverted to; having heard the learned
counsel for the parties and having perused the Petition
Papers, this Court is inclined to grant indulgence in the
matter as under and for the following reasons:
I. Some legal principles & morals which are to
animate levy of tax and refund of un-taxable:
(i) A great Indian poet Kalidasa (500 CE) in his epic
poem "Raghuvamsham" (1-18) states: "The King Dilip collects
from his subjects only 1/6th of their income as tax for the
welfare of State, indeed like the sun taking earthly water
drops, only to indemnify her with multiples of rain-drops..."
Chanakya in his acclaimed work "Arthashastr" advises the
Rulers: "Collect taxes from the citizens as honeybees collect
nectar from the flowers, gently and without inflicting pain...";
(ii) A renowned jurist of yester-decades late Mr. Nani
Palkhivala, in the concluding paragraph of Preface to the
Eighth Edition of "The Law and Practice of Income Tax" said
"Every Government has a right to levy taxes. But no
Government has the right, in the process of extracting tax, to
cause misery and harassment to the taxpayer and the
gnawing feeling that he is made the victim of palpable
injustice."; the function of the Assessing Officer is to
administer the statute with solicitude for the Public
Exchequer with an inbuilt idea of fairness to tax payers; this
view finds expression in the decision of the Apex Court in
ACIT vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Ltd. (2007) 291
ITR 500 (SC).
(iii) Walton J. had observed in Vestey v. Inland Revenue
Commissioners [1979] Ch 177 (197 - 198) "I conceive it to be
in the national interest, in the interest not only of all individual
tax payers - which includes most of the nation - but also in the
interests of the Revenue authorities themselves, that the tax
system should be fair... One should be taxed by law, and not
be untaxed by concession ... A tax system which enshrines
obvious injustices is brought into disrepute with all tax-payers
accordingly, whereas one in which injustices, when discovered,
are put right (and with retrospective effect when necessary)
will command respect and support...".
(iv) A Welfare State like ours is constitutionally
expected to be fair & reasonable in dealing with the subjects
and it must avoid any harassment to the assessee public,
without causing any loss to the Exchequer (see Nokia
Corporation v. Director of Income-tax [2007] 292 ITR 22
(Delhi HC); the State as constitutionally ordained, needs to
conduct itself as a virtuous litigant and should meet honest
claims; this view finds resonance in the decision of the Apex
Court in State of U.P. v. Manohar [2005] 2 SCC 126; the
maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, i.e., an act of court
shall prejudice none, is equally applicable to the quasi-
judicial functions of Tax Authorities, as well.
(v) Article 265 of the Constitution of India mandates
that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of
law; if a tax has been paid in excess of the tax specified, the
same has to be refunded; in Tata Chemicals 363 ITR 658
(SC), the Apex Court reasoned out why State should pay
interest for holding tax payers' money; a "tax refund" is a
refund of taxes when the tax liability is less than the tax paid;
when the said amount is refunded, it should carry interest as
a matter of course, since it is a kind of recompense for the
'unauthorized use or retention' of money; refund due &
payable to an assessee is a debt owed; Parliament has
enacted this principle in Section 244A of the 1961 Act; in
Aluminium Corporation of India Ltd. v UOI 1978 (2) ELT 452
(SC) the Apex Court observed that a good government
involves not only diligent collection of taxes, but also ready
refunds of excess levies.
II. As to meaning of "assessment"; difference
between "assessment" & "assessment order"
(i) The DCIT has stated in the impugned order "... As
this is the case of fresh assessment/re-assessment, an
additional interest u/s. 244A(1A) will not be applicable ... ";
much has been argued on behalf of the assessee that his is
not a case of fresh assessment/re-assessment, and therefore
the impugned order is liable to be voided, whereas the
Revenue has contended to the contrary; therefore, it becomes
necessary to discuss these concepts. While juxtaposing
contextual construction qua literal interpretation of statutes,
Justice Krishna Iyer in CIT vs. ARAVIND REDDY, AIR 1980
SC 96 observed:
"The significance of a word of a plural semantic shades
may, in a given text depend on the pressure of the context or
other indicia. Absent such compelling mutation of sense, the
speech of the lay is also the language of the law ...";
Keeping inter alia the above observation in mind, one has
to ascertain the meaning of the above terms.
(ii) The 1961 Act has a Dictionary Clause in Sec.2;
Section 2(9) merely states that the assessment includes
reassessment; this does not throw much light on the debated
questions; in Sir Rajendranath Mukerjee v. CIT, (1934) 2 ITR
71 (PC), it has been held under the erstwhile Income Tax Act,
1922 that the word 'assessment' is not confined to the definite
act of making an order of assessment; in C.A. Abraham v. ITO
[1961] 41 ITR 425 (SC), in the context of section 44 of 1922
Act (similar to section 189 of the 1961 Act), it has been held
that the term 'assessment' employed therein not only referred
to computation of income but included the procedure for
declaration & imposition of tax liability and the machinery for
enforcement thereof;
(iii) It is pertinent to refer to what the Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed in Auto & Metal Engineers v. Union
of India [1998] 229 ITR 399 (SC):
"7. In the Act the provisions regarding procedure
for assessment are contained in Chapter XIV
(sections 139 to 158). Under the said provisions,
the process of assessment involves (i) filing of the
return of income u/s. 139 or u/s. 142 in response
to a notice issued u/s. 142(1); (ii) inquiry by the
Assessing Officer in accordance with the
provisions of sections 142 and 143; (iii) making of
the order of assessment by the Assessing Officer
u/s. 143(3) or section 144; and (iv) issuing of the
notice of demand u/s. 156 on the basis of the
order of assessment. The process of assessment,
thus, commences with the filing of the return or
where the return is not filed by the issuance by
the Assessing Officer of notice to file the return
u/s. 142(1) and it culminates with the issuance of
the notice of demand u/s. 156. The making of the
order of assessment is, therefore, an integral part
of the process of assessment..."
(iv) In CIT v. Purshottamdas T. Patel [1994] 209 ITR
52 (Guj), the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat has observed that
section 153 requires that the assessment should be
completed within the prescribed time limit and unless the
total income is ascertained & tax payable is determined, the
process of assessment cannot be said to be complete; it also
held that an 'order of assessment' is an order in writing
whereby the total income of the assessee is assessed and the
tax payable by him is determined; thus, the passing of an
assessment order is only an integral part of the process of
assessment and therefore, the word 'assessment' cannot be
confined to the act of making an order of assessment; there is
a certain legal difference between the terms 'assessment' &
'assessment order'; it can be stated that the use of the word
'assessment' would mean the whole process of determination
of income and the same should not be restricted to a mere
passing of an assessment order.
III. As to meaning of the term 'setting aside or
cancelling an assessment'
(i) Ordinarily, when an assessment is set aside or
cancelled, a fresh assessment follows; a perusal of the
following sections reveals that making of a fresh assessment
invariably precedes setting aside or cancelling an assessment:
• Section 153(2A) prior to substitution
by Finance Act, 2016 with effect from
01.06.2016.
• Section 153(3) post substitution by
Finance Act, 2016 with effect from
01.06.2016.
• Proviso (a) to Section 240;
• Explanation 1(iii) to section 245A(b)
• Section 251(1)(a) - words as omitted by
Finance Act, 2001 with effect from
01.06.2001.
It may be noted that Section 153 which is the subject matter
of interpretation herein, is entitled "Time limit for completion
of assessment, reassessment and recomputation; therefore it
is primarily concerned with laying down time limits which
have to be adhered to by the assessing officers.
(ii) In the light of the above, a question arises as to
whether the terms 'setting aside' or 'cancelling' an assessment
employed in the subject provisions, do mean setting aside or
cancellation of the entire assessment order or would it
include even setting aside or cancellation of only a part of the
assessment order [as with respect to particular issues, rest
having been left intact by the ITAT or the like]; the said
provisions cautiously employ the word 'assessment' and not
the term 'assessment order'; however, one will have to see the
setting in which these provisions actually occur. A summary
of the said provision is set out hereunder:
Sub- Nature of Proceedings Time limit Time limit
Section Assessment under section [from the [from the
end of the end of the
assessment Financial
year in Year
which
income was
first
assessable]
153(1) Regular To pass 21 months
Assessment assessment From AY
orders under 2018-19,
section 143(1) time limit
and 144. has been
amended to
18 months
From AY
2019-20,
time limit
has been
further
reduced to
12 months
153(2) Income To assess/re- NA 12 months
escapement assess/ from the end
assessment recompute of FY in
under section which notice
147 under
section 148
was served.
From 1st
April 2019,
the above
time limit
has been
reduced to 9
months.
153(3) To make fresh NA 9 months
assessment from the
pursuant to date of
order u/s referred
254/263/264 order's
setting aside under this
or cancelling section (254,
assessment 263,264
received by the orders)
PCIT or CCIT Post
or the orders 01.04.2019,
passed by the If the order
PCIT or CCIT. is received
after
01.04.2019,
then in such
cases the
time limit
has been
increased to
12 months
153(4) Notwithstandi The period
ng sub-sec, as specified
(1), (2) & (3), in sub-
where a section (1)(2)
reference has & (3) shall
been made to be further
Transfer extended by
Pricing Officer 12 months.
during the
proceeding for
assessment,
reassessment
made.
153(5) To give effect To give effect Effect to the
to the order of to an order order to be
the higher passed by given within
authorities i.e. higher 3 months
CIT (A), ITAT, authorities from the end
HC and SC other than of the month
orders those orders in which
which require order is
fresh received.
assessment or
reassessment PCIT or CIT
and such may allow
order requires an
verification of additional
any issue by period of six
way of months.
submission of [subject to
any document certain
by the assesse conditions]
or an
opportunity is If the order
required to be which has to
provided to be given
the assessee. effect to
requires
verification
of any issue
then the time
limit of 9
months is
applicable.
153(6) Exceptions to Assessment, In 12 months
subject clause (1) and reassessment consequenc from the end
to (2) above. or e of or to of the
provision recomputation give effect to month in
made on
of any which order
assessee or any
section findings or is received .
person.
[153(3) directions
and (5)] contained in
order's
otherwise
than in
appeal.
Assessment of 12 months
partner from
order in the end of
consequence the
of month in
an which
assessment order in
made on the case of
firm under firm is
section 147 passed
153(7) To give effect AO to give Effect to be
to the order, effect to such given before
Applicabl finding or orders within 31.03.2017
e for the direction time specified
period referred to in u/s 153(5) &
prior to section 153(5) (6) and such
1.4.2016 & (6) orders are
passed/
received by
income-tax
authorities
before
1-6-2016
153(8) Revival of 1 month
order passed from the end
u/s. 153A(2) of month of
or 153(1) revival or
within 21
months
from the
date of
authorization
- for search
has been
issued -
whichever is
earlier.
Further, Explanation 1 below section 153 provides that in
computing the period of limitation, time taken for specified
processes, as listed therein, should be excluded.
Section 153 lays down the time limit to make assessment,
reassessment & recomputation under various scenarios;
section 153 is substituted by Finance Act, 2016; the brief
outline of this section is as under:
• Sub-section (1) deals with time-limit for making
assessment order under sections 143 or 144.
With the advancement of e-assessments, the time
limits for doing an assessment are progressively
going to be reduced.
• Sub-section (2) deals with time-limit for making
assessment order under section 147, Section 147
deals with re assessment orders.
• Sub-section(3) deals with time-limit for making
order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an
order under section 254 or section 264, by virtue
of which the original assessment is either set aside
or cancelled.
• Sub-section (4) states that where a reference
under section 92CA(1) is made during the course
of the proceeding for the assessment or
reassessment, the period available for completion
of assessment or reassessment, as the case may
be, under the said sub-sections (1),(2) and (3) shall
be extended by twelve months. This would apply
only when the reference is made in the course of
proceeding for assessment or reassessment and
not otherwise.
• Sub-section (5) deals with time-limit to give effect
to an order under section 250 or section 254 or
section 260 or section 262 or section 263 or
section 264, wholly or partly, otherwise than by
making a fresh assessment or reassessment.
• Sub-section (6) deals with time-limit for making
assessment, reassessment or recomputation in
consequence of or to give effect to any finding or
direction contained in an order under section 250,
Section 254, section 260, section 262, section
263, or section 264 or in an order of any court in a
proceeding otherwise than by way of appeal or
reference under the Act. The said sub section is
subject to subsection (3) and (5).
• Sub-sections 7 and 9 deal with transition
provisions as section 153 is substituted.
• Sub -section 8 deals with time-limit in case of
search based assessments.
A second proviso is added to sub-section (5) of section 153 by
the Finance Act, 2017. The said proviso states that where an
order under section 250 or section 254 or section 260 or
section 262 or section 263 or section 264 requires verification
of any issue by way of submission of any document by the
assessee or any other person or where an opportunity of
being heard is to be provided to the assessee, the Order
Giving Effect to the said order u/s.250 or sec.254 or sec.260
or sec.262 or sec.263 or sec.264 shall be made within the
time specified in sub-section (3). The dates specified in the
Table above shown as B would be relevant for this purpose.
IV. As to Order Giving Effect (OGE):
(i) The following general principles have relevance in
considering the Orders Giving Effect in the light of
Parliamentary amendments to the 1961 Act:
• It is a fundamental principle that income tax is
payable on real income, vide Apex Court decision
in Poona Electric Co. Vs. CIT (1965) 57 ITR 521.
• This real income can be brought to tax through
assessment contemplated under the Act.
• The basic principle is that ordinarily
assessments cannot be done piecemeal.
• There are a few exceptions to the rule of "no
piecemeal assessment' as in the case where
income has escaped assessment where re-
assessment powers do avail, as discussed by
Calcutta High Court in Karan Chand Thapar vs.
ACIT (2005) 276 ITR 105 para 13.
(ii) OGE is not a regular assessment as held in the
case of Sundaram Finance 417 ITR 679 Mad; passing an
Appeal Effect Order is an implied obligation of every
authority to comply with the directions of his superior in
the hierarchy; this is an inherent aspect of adherence to
judicial discipline; OGE to an order on appeal or on
revision has to be passed in order to compute the total
income and to determine the tax payable by or refundable
to the assessee for the assessment year concerned, in the
light of additions/disallowances affirmed or varied at every
such stage; it may be noted that such OGE could either be
adverse or beneficial as it may either result in a tax payable
by or refundable to the assessee, as illustrated by the
following:
Cross Appeals before
Tribunal u/s. 254
4 issues
Revenue Appeal in Assessee's appeal
respect of 1 issue on three issues
held against clearly held in
assesseee favour of assessee
OGE to be passed u/s. 153(5) within 3 months
from the end of the month in which the order
of Tribunal u/s. 254 is received by PCCIT or
CCIT or PCIT or CIT. Where the order is
passed beyond such time limit, additional
interest u/s. 244A(1A) would be applicable
for the period beginning from the date
following the date of expiry of the time
allowed u/s. 153(5) to the date on which the
refund is granted.
(iii) It may be important to note that even before such
amendments were made, binding appellate orders used to be
given effect to by the Writ Courts on being moved by the
assesses grieving against denying or delaying of refund of tax,
The Parliament presumably having taken cognizance of the
difficulties faced by the prudent assesses has through the
amendment has obviated the principle of judicial discipline in
a hierarchical structure that, orders of the higher ups in the
hierarchy have to be unreservedly followed by the lower
authorities, as has been explained by the Apex Court in UOI
vs. KAMALAKSHI FINANCE CORPORATION, 1991 (55) ELT
433; the Parliament by the subject amendments has
prescribed a time limit for making refund of tax and has also
provided for the payment of interest on the delayed refunds.
V. Difference between 'assessment', 'reassessment'
or 'recomputation' and 'fresh assessment'
(i) The words 'assessment, 'reassessment' or
'recomputation' have been used in the following sections of
the 1961 Act:
Section 147 (prior to substitution vide
Finance Act, 2021 with effect from
01.04.2021) and section 147 (post
substitution vide Finance Act, 2021 with
effect from 01.04.2021)
Explanation to section 147 (post substitution
vide Finance Act, 2021 with effect from
01.04.2021)
Section 148 (prior to substitution vide
Finance Act, 2021 with effect from
01.04.2021) and section 148 (post
substitution vide Finance Act, 2021 with
effect from 01.04.2021)
Section 150
Section 153(3)(ii) [prior to substitution vide
Finance Act, 2016 with effect from
01.06.2016]
Section 153(6)(i) [post substitution vide
Finance Act, 2016 with effect from
01.06.2016]
From the above, it can be safely assumed that the word
'reassessment' has been used in cases where income has
escaped assessment.
(ii) On the other hand, the phrase 'fresh assessment'
has been used in the following sections:
• Proviso (a) to Section 240;
• Section 251(1)(a) -words omitted by
Finance Act, 2001 with effect from
01.06.2001.
• Explanation 1(iii) to section 245A(b).
• Section 153(2A) prior to substitution
by Finance Act, 2016 with effect from
01.06.2016.
• Section 153(3) post substitution by
Finance Act, 2016 with effect from
01.06.2016.
The term 'fresh assessment' as employed in the above
sections is accompanied by the term 'setting aside or
cancelling an assessment'; it may further be noted that
section 153(6) is subject to the provisions of sections 153(3) &
153(5); therefore, the 'assessment, reassessment or
recomputation' as referred to in sections 153(6) would not
include the 'fresh assessment' as contemplated in sections
153(3) & 153(5); the following table is illustrative:
Words used
Section Section Proviso (a) to Section 244(1A) - Section 153(6) -
153(3) - 153(5) - fresh Section 240 - fresh assessment assessment or
fresh assessment or fresh or reassessment reassessment
Or
assessme reassessment assessment or
recomputation
reassessment
(iii) The word 'reassessment' is used next to the term
'fresh assessment' in section 153(5), Proviso (a) to section 240
& section 244A(1A); the definition of the term 'assessment' as
contained in section 2(8) which merely provides that
assessment includes reassessment, shall not ipso facto be
applicable in all situations governed by various provisions of
the 1961 Act; if the fresh assessment included a fresh
reassessment, there was no need for the Parliament to employ
the two terms, simultaneously; Lord Hewart C.J. in Spillers
Limited Vs. Caradix Assessment Committee & Pritchard,
(1931) All E.R. 524 stated: "It ought to be the rule... that
words are used in an Act of Parliament correctly and exactly
and not loosely and not inexactly..."; section 2 i.e., the
Dictionary Clause of the Act employs the usual expression
'unless the context otherwise requires' and this itself
indicates that the words used in various provisions of the Act
may take their colour from their context and at times, in
variance with the statutory definitions; The maxim expressio
unius exclusio alterius with all its arguable limitations also
lends support to the above view to some extent; Maxwell on
"The Interpretation of Statutes" 12th Edition, LexisNexis at
page 293 explains this maxim as under:
"By the rule usually known in the form of this
Latin maxim, mention of one or more things of
a particular class may be regarded as silently
excluding all other members of the class:
expressum facit cessare tacitum. Further,
where a statute uses two words or
expressions, one of which generally includes
the other, the more general term is taken in a
sense excluding the less general one:
otherwise there would have been little point in
using the latter as well as the former."
(iv) It is pertinent to note that section 153(3) [post
substitution vide Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 01.06.2016] does
not use the word 'reassessment' alongside 'fresh assessment';
however, the said word has been used alongside 'fresh
assessment' in section 153(5) [post substitution vide Finance
Act, 2016; accordingly, reassessment is not envisaged u/s
153(3); such reassessment can only come u/s 153(2) or
Section 153(6) which deals with assessment, reassessment or
recomputation to give effect to any finding or direction
contained in the order of superior authority or court; thus if
an order of assessment is set aside in appeal with a direction
that a fresh reassessment be made, the same would be
covered by section 153(3); One may also note that section
2(40) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, Act defines the term
"regular assessment" to mean assessment under sub section
3 of section 143 or section 144; therefore these terminologies
have different import in different sections. In the light of
this discussion, it is clear that the term "assessment" is used
in section 153(1) to mean the entire process of assessment;
section 153(2) uses the words, 'assessment', 'reassessment' or
'recomputation' but in respect of section 147 which deals with
income escaping assessment; section 153(3) uses the term
"fresh assessment" in pursuance of the orders passed setting
aside or cancelling an assessment; therefore, this term "fresh
assessment", though not defined, contemplates a new
assessment consequent to the higher authorities cancelling or
setting aside the assessment; Section 153(5), talks of giving
effect to an order passed by the higher authorities, wholly or
partly, otherwise than by making a fresh assessment or
reassessment. The words "wholly or partly" obviously pertain
to giving effect to the order of the higher authorities which
would be done by the lower authority either in part or in
whole depending on the issues that are settled by the higher
authorities. However, such an exercise cannot be done within
the time limits specified in Section 153(5), where there is a
fresh assessment or reassessment and in such cases the
longer time limits specified in Section 153(3) would apply; a
harmonious construction of these provisions would mean as
under :
a. That in order to give effect to the order of the superior
authorities, either wholly or partly in terms of Section
153(5), it should not be a case of reassessment or
fresh assessment, which if they are, would otherwise
fall into Section 153(3);
b. That Section 153(3), when it uses the term 'fresh
assessment', would mean that the entire exercise of
assessment is to be done afresh as it is used along with
the terminology "setting aside or cancelling" which
would mean the whole order of assessment being set at
naught and not some issues comprised in the
assessment order; when the assessment order is set
aside on some issues only and confirmed on other, it is
not a case of 'setting aside or cancelling the
assessment'.
c. That Section 153(5) would apply where the assessing
officer has to give effect to the order of the higher
authorities in whole or in part provided that no fresh
assessment i u/s.153(3) or a reassessment u/s. 153(2)
relating to income escaping assessment, is to be
undertaken.
d. Therefore, if the orders to be given effect to are to be
made by following the principles already laid down by
the higher forum, it would not be a case pf fresh
assessment in terms of Section 153(3) or a
reassessment in terms of Section 153(2); it would simply
mean that the orders of the higher forum are to be
applied & followed by the assessing officer; . it may be
borne in mind that longer time limits are provided in
Section 153(3) & second proviso to Section 153(5)
because it may entail doing the entire process once over
or where detailed evidences may be required for
accomplishing the task; however where a shorter time
limit is prescribed u/s. 153(5), the legislative mandate
is to subserve the objectives of ensuring timely
compliance with the orders of the superior authorities.
(v) One more aspect needs to be stated here:
instructions were issued by the CBTD long before
Sec.244A(1A) was loaded to the statute book making the
right to interest on delayed refund a substantive right; the
relevant portion of instruction 7 of F.No.279/MISC/M-
42/2011-ITJ dated 24.05.2011 reads as under:
"iv. Appeal effect should be particularly monitored
by the CIT in the cases in which the ITAT has decided
certain issues in favour of the assessee and set aside-
remanded back other issues to the Assessing Officer.
The set-aside issues must be decided on priority".
The said practice & procedure are reflected by the following
observations of the ITAT in the case of Sanat Products Ltd. v.
DCIT [2006] 5 SOT 510 [ITAT - Del.]:
"No particular procedure has been given in the Act or the
Rules to carry out the appeal effect. Wherever no
particular procedure has been given in the Act or the
Rules, then naturally the authorities have to adopt a
procedure or practice, which is practical, adheres to the
well-settled legal principle and does not cause prejudice
to the assessee or the Government. One of the basic
principle in the administration of justice in India, where
hierarchy of courts is existing, is that it is mandatory on
the subordinate Tribunal or authorities to carry out the
directions given to them by the superior authorities or
Tribunals in exercise of appellate powers. Failure to do so
will result in chaos in the administration of justice.....
[vide Para 7]
Whenever an appellate authority passes an order,
there are three possibilities. Firstly, the appellate
authority may confirm the whole or part of the order
passed by the lower authority. Secondly, the whole or
part of the order may be quashed or additions may be
deleted. Thirdly, the whole or part of the issue raised
may be set aside for fresh examination with or without
any specific directions. Whenever some additions are
confirmed or deleted, the issues become final as far as
the Assessing Officer is concerned. Only course open to
him is to carry out the directions given by the
Commissioner (Appeals). Of course, if the assessing
authority is not satisfied with the order of the
Commissioner (Appeals), he can prefer an appeal before
the Tribunal but, at the same time, the appeal effect has
to be given. There is a practice that appeal effect orders
are passed under section 250, read with section 143(3),
and issues which have become final are dealt in such
order and accordingly, fresh demand, if any, is raised.
There is no bar in the Act for raising the demand and,
therefore, there is nothing wrong in this practice being
followed by the revenue authorities. [Para 8]
However, difficulties would arise only where some
of the additions are confirmed and/or deleted and some
issues are set aside for fresh examination by the
Assessing Officer, as in the instant case. [Para 9]
Piecemeal assessment is not possible under section
143(3), however, while giving appeal effect in the present
kind of situation, the Assessing Officer was performing
two functions, namely, carrying out the directions of the
appellate authority in respect of the issues which had
become final and secondly, re-examining the issues
which had been set aside to him. Each of these functions
seemed to be independent and there is no bar in the Act
to carry out these functions separately. There was no
infirmity in the practice being followed by the revenue
authority in passing the separate appeal effect order by
firstly giving appeal effect order in respect of issues
which had become final and passing the second order in
respect of those issues which had to be examined afresh.
Such kind of practice was more practical and convenient
to both the parties and there was no legal bar against
such a practice. [vide Para 10]"
VI. As to limitation period under the 1961 Act:
(i) The provisions of 1961 Act prescribe periods of
limitation for various acts & procedures of assessees and
assessing authorities; limitation is prescribed, inter alia, for
the issue of scrutiny notice u/s 143(2), issue of notice u/s
147, for completing assessment u/s 153, etc; limitation is
provided for acts of assessee as well ie., due date for filing of
returns u/ss 139(1)/(4)/(5); in Parashuram Pottery Works Col
Ltd. v. ITO [1977] 106 ITR 1 at p.10, it is stated: "At the
same time, we have to bear in mind that the policy of law is
that there must be a point of finality in all legal proceedings,
that stale issues should not be reactivated beyond a
particular stage and that lapse of time must induce repose in
and set at rest judicial and quasi-judicial controversies as it
must in other spheres of human activity"; arguably, limitation
may have arbitrariness in its fixation but has to be strictly
construed without equitable consideration vide R. Rudraiah v.
State of Karnataka (1998) 3 SCC 23; similarly, in C.
Ramaiah Reddy 339 ITR 210 Kar, a Bench of this court has
observed that if proceedings are not initiated within the time
prescribed, the remedy is lost and the assessee would acquire
an indefatigable right; such a right accruing by the lapse of
time cannot be at the mercy of the officials, who do not
discharge their duties within the prescribed period or a
reasonable time; in the matter of limitation, question of
prejudice does not arise vide M. Janardhana Rao Case 273
ITR 50 SC; if no action is taken within the prescribed time
limit, the authority in a sense becomes functus officio and
thus lacks jurisdiction to take the action in the concerned
matter.
(ii) The above principle would apply even to passing of
fresh assessment or OGEs where different time limits are
prescribed u/s. 153(3/(5)(6); in Freight Systems (India) Pvt.
Ltd [TS-143-HC-2021(MAD)-TP], the Hon'ble Madras High
Court quashed the final assessment order dated 29.10.2010
for AY 2006-07 as being barred by limitation u/s.153(2A)
[presently section 153(3)]; similar view is expressed by a
Bench of this Court in Paul Noel Rodrigues [2015] 57
taxmann.com 12 (Karnataka); an assessee may challenge an
adverse OGE as being barred by time; while the similar
principle applies to favourable OGE as well, the Department
cannot take advantage of its own lapse both on the first
principle of doctrine against unjust enrichment and on the
statutory mandate that it has to grant the refund to an
assessee as a functional consequence of an appellate order
even without the assessee having to make any claim [section
240]; the right to receive interest on the delayed refund does
not depend on the application of the assessee, but follows as
a natural corollary to the right to receive refund vide
NATIONAL HORTICULTURE vs. UNION OF INDIA, 253 ITR
12; this can be likened to centuries-old-principle that the
debtor should find the creditor and pay the debt.
VII. Payment of interest on delayed refunds u/s.
244A(1A):
(i) This provision has been brought on the statute
book vide Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 01.06.2016; entitlement of
an assessee to the interest on delayed refund as envisaged
under this provision to some extent brings a sort of parity in
the converse situation where he is liable to pay interest for
delayed payment of taxes in terms of section 234B; it may be
pertinent to note that it was inserted and brought into effect
from the same time as section 153 was substituted by
Finance Act, 2016; similarly, section 153(5) was substituted
by Finance Act, 2016 prescribing the time limit to give effect
to the orders passed under the sections mentioned therein,
wholly or partly, otherwise than by making a fresh
assessment or reassessment; prior to such amendment, no
time limit was prescribed for passing of OGE; it may be noted
that the requirement of paying interest u/s 244A(1A) has
been brought in for the cases covered u/s 153(5); this is for
the following reasons:
Both the sections have been enacted vide
Finance Act, 2016 and both they have been
brought into effect from 01.06.2016.
Both sections 153(5) and 244A(1A) deal with
giving effect to orders u/s. 250 or section 254
or section 260 or section 262 or section 264.
The said sections deal with giving effect to
orders passed under the sections mentioned
therein, either wholly or partly.
The said sections make exception to making of
fresh assessment or reassessment.
Section 244A(1A) provides for interest for the
period beginning from the date following the
date of expiry of the time allowed u/s. 153(5) to
the date on which the refund is granted.
(ii) The legislative intention in enacting section
244A(1A) can be discerned from the Memorandum explaining
the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2016, the relevant extract
of which reads as under:
"Payment of interest on refund
.......
It is also proposed to provide that where a
refund arises out of appeal effect being
delayed beyond the time prescribed under
sub-section (5) of section 153, the assessee
shall be entitled to receive, in addition to the
interest payable under sub-section (1) of
section 244A, an additional interest on such
refund amount calculated at the rate of
three per cent per annum, for the period
beginning from the date following the date of
expiry of the time allowed under sub-section
(5) of section 153 to the date on which the
refund is granted. It is clarified that in cases
where extension is granted by the Principal
Commissioner or Commissioner by invoking
proviso to sub-section (5) of section 153, the period
of additional interest, if any, shall begin from the
expiry of such extended period."
Similar legislative intent is forthcoming from the Notes on
Clauses to the Finance Bill, 2016 and paragraph 60.4 of the
Circular No. 3 of 2017 dated 20.01.2017.
(iii) Interest u/s 244A(1A) would not accrue in cases of
fresh assessment or reassessment; use of words 'wholly or
partly' therein would again indicate that the bar of interest
accrual is confined only to that part of the assessment that
are occasioned by remittance/remand and would not extend
to other concluded issues that give rise to refund u/s 153(5);
employment of identical language in section 153(5) and
section 244(1A) too supports this analogy; it is clear that
section 244A(1A) would apply to cases covered u/s 153(5);
thus where, in respect of certain issues, order giving effect to
be passed u/s 153(5), otherwise than by making a fresh
assessment or reassessment is passed beyond the prescribed
time-limit, interest u/s 244A(1A) has to be granted in respect
of refund arising on such issues that are concluded and that
the pendency of consideration on remitted issues does not
interdict the statutory accrual of interest; an argument to the
contrary cannot be countenanced without straining the text &
context of the provision.
VIII. Application of the above principles to facts of
the case:
(i) In the instant case, the following "title facts" are
not in dispute;
a) Assessment Year is 2008-09
b) ITAT order is dated 04.01.2017
c) TPO's OGE is dated 31.10.2017
d) AO's OGE is dated 28.12.2017
e) Assessee filed Rectification u/s 154
against OGEs of TPO and AO on
18.01.2018
f) TPO passed the Rectification Order on
26.03.2018
g) Assessee follows up his application dated
18.01.2008 u/s 154 before AO with:
i) Application u/s 154 dated 24.1.2018
ii) Application u/s 154 dated 3.4.2018
iii) Letter dated 17.5.2018
iv) Letter dated 22.3.2019
v) Impugned order 29.3.19
(ii) A careful analysis of the order of ITAT dated
4.1.2018 would reveal that the ITAT dealt with several issues
differently, some having been remitted for reconsideration and
the conclusions on other left intact; the same may be
summarised as follows:
On TP issue, following earlier order, issue was remitted to
the file of TPO to follow the directions given for earlier AYs
Sl.Nos:
1. On 14A issue, issue was set aside to the record of
AO to re-examine the same in the light of orders of
ITAT in assessee's own case for earlier assessment
years.
2. Issue of set off of loss was allowed in favour of
assessee.
3. Issue of depreciation of software was allowed in
favour of assessee.
4. Issue of allocation of corporate expenses between
eligible and non eligible units was allowed in favour of
assessee.
5. Issue of computation of profits of overseas
development centre (ODC), was remitted to the record
of AO and assessee was directed to file relevant details
as required by AO so that AO can ascertain the market
value of goods and services transferred.
6. Issue of eligibility of interest income, rental income
and other income u/s. 10A was remitted to AO by
following earlier decision in assessee's own case. In
earlier decision, issue of scrap sales and issue of
interest were decided in favour of assessee and issue
of other income was remitted as no details were
available. While issue of interest is clearly in favour of
assessee and issue of other income is a case of set
aside for further verification, and it is not clear as
regards guidelines to AO on rental income.
7. Issue of taxability of interest received u/s. 244A was
remitted to the record of AO for limited purpose of
computation of interest.
8. Issue of deemed export turnover for purpose of
section 10A was held against the assessee.
9. Issue of exclusion of VAT/GST from export turnover
was held against the assessee.
10. Issue of exclusion of communication charges and
other reimbursement of expenses from export
turnover, it was held that the same shall be reduced
from the total turnover as well.
11. Issue of denial of section 10A relief in respect of
amount of export turnover not remitted into India
within six months was held in favour of the assessee.
12. Issue of denial of section 10A relief in respect of
undertaking established prior to 1993 was held in
favour of the assessee but to the extent of extended
capacity. The matter was remitted to AO to verify the
same if necessary.
13. Issue of allocation of corporate overhead to section
80IB unit beyond what was already allocated by the
assessee was held in favour of the assessee.
14. Issue of denial of deduction u/s. 80IB in respect of
trading of monitory and printer was held in favour of
the assessee.
15. Issue of allocation of corporate overhead to section
80IC unit beyond what was already allocated by the
assessee was held in favour of the assessee.
16. Issue of eligibility of other income for deduction
u/s. 80IC was held against the assessee.
17. Issue of allocation of corporate overhead to section
80IAB beyond what was already allocated by the
assessee was held in favour of the assessee.
18. Issue of eligibility of other income for deduction
u/s. 80IB was held against the assessee.
19. Issue of foreign tax credit was held in favour of the
assessee.
(iii) In para 50 of the ITAT order, it is stated that the
appeal is partly allowed; it is not stated that the appeal is
allowed for "statistical purposes"; thus, it is a case where the
ITAT has held some issues definitively, and on some other, it
had remitted the matter to the AO/TPO for a limited
consideration afresh; in respect of issues in Sl.Nos.1, 2 & 7 in
the above summary, there is virtually a direction warranting
OGE; it is quiet clear from the facts of the case that the
respondents have not undertaken any fresh assessment or
reassessment; the ITAT has not directed assessment or
reassessment at all, but it only asked the TPO to follow its
directions in the earlier year; in respect of other issues
definitive answers having been given, it cannot be a case of
setting aside entire assessment; it is a case of setting aside
an assessment only on specific issues; as already discussed
above, in respect of issues where there is a definitive holding,
section 153(5) would apply and the AO has to pass OGE
within the time specified thereunder read with II Proviso
thereto; in respect of issues which are set aside [ie., Sl.Nos. 1,
2 & 7],the AO had to pass OGE following the principles
already settled; accordingly, it has to be held that the AO was
required to pass OGE within the time specified u/s. 153(5);
in respect of issues which are set aside (i.e., Sl.Nos.1, 2 & 7
above), the AO ought to have passed an assessment order u/s
153(5) following the principles already laid down by the
superior forum.
IX. As to Revenue's other contention being
unsustainable:
(i) Even according to the argued case of the Revenue,
regardless of its sustainability only that part of the order
giving effect to ITAT order which relates to the Transfer
Pricing Adjustment constitutes a fresh assessment; as a
corollary of that, the balance portion of the order which
otherwise warranted giving effect to the ITAT order, does not
amount to a fresh assessment or reassessment; both the TPA
and the other substantial portion of giving effect were
completed by one order giving effect to ITAT, dated
28.12.2017; if refund was granted immediately thereafter, the
claim for additional interest in terms of section 244A(1A)
would not have arisen, as rightly argued by the assessee; the
actual refund having been made only on 04.05.2019, even
when the assessment in respect of one issue of TPA as early
as 28.12.2017, delay has been brooked in granting refund.
(ii) The above apart, case of the assessee becomes
stronger since his book profit is far greater than its profit as
per the normal provisions and that the refund arises only
because tax paid by the assessee was more than the tax
payable on the book profit; therefore, it can be safely stated
that no part of the refund payable arose because of the
reduction in the TPA; added to this, the demand attributable
to the TPA as finally made is miniscule ie., Rs.25 lakh or so,
as compared to the total refund including interest of over
Rs.1,380/- crore admittedly made over to the assessee; the
contention of the Revenue militates against the rule of
proportionality and the fairness standards which the Tax
Authorities are expected to adhere.
(iii) The vehement contention of the Revenue essentially
structured on the text of section 4 of the 1961 Act that any
order giving effect to the order of the ITAT will result in re-
determination of the assessee's total income and therefore will
constitute a fresh assessment, if accepted, would inexorably
lead to the result that the Revenue can invariably retain the
refund determined, without the liability to pay the additional
interest in terms of Sec.244A(1A) for the delayed period; that
would also lead to an absurd conclusion that every OGE has
to be considered as a fresh assessment or reassessment and
therefore would be outside the purview of Sec.153(5) and
consequently any delay in granting actual refund would also
be outside the ambit of Sec.244A(1A); this would defeat the
very object for which this provision has been brought on the
statute book.
In the above circumstances, this writ petition succeeds
in part;
i) A Writ of Certiorari issues quashing the impugned
order; petitioner-Assessee is permitted to submit the fresh
claim for additional interest at the rate of 3% per annum for
the period envisaged in section 153(5) r/w section 244A(1A),
within eight weeks.
ii) A Writ of Mandamus issues to the respondents to
compute the interest amount till date and pay it to the
petitioner- Assessee within eight weeks next following.
iii) If delay is brooked in complying the above direction,
the Revenue shall pay to the petitioner - Assessee an extra
interest, at the rate of 1.5 % per month and this amount,
after payment, may be recovered personally from the erring
officials of the Department.
Now, no costs.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Snb/cbc/Bsv
