[Cites 5, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
M/S. Sri Gopikrishna Infrastructure ... vs Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited on 24 March, 2026
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2026:JHHC:8284-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No. 1896 of 2026
M/s. Sri Gopikrishna Infrastructure Private Limited, having its
registered office at 30/B Vengal Rao Nagar, PO & PS- S.R. Nagar,
District-Hyderabad, through its Authorized Signatory-cum-Manager
(Accounts), Mr. Shamshad Ali, S/o Late Md. Shafiullah, R/o Raza
Colony, Kanta Toli, Ranchi ... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, through its Chairman-cum-
Managing Director, having its office at Engineering Building,
HEC, Dhurwa, Ranchi
2. General Manager (R-APRDRP), Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam
Limited, having its office at Engineering Building, HEC, Dhurwa,
Ranchi
3. Electrical Superintending Engineer, Electric Supply Circle,
Jharkhand Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited, Hazaribagh
... ... Respondents
-----
CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
For the Petitioner : Mr. M.S. Mittal, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Salona Mittal, Advocate
Mrs. Lavanya Gadodia Mittal, Advocate
Mr. Yashdeep Kanhai, Advocate
Mr. Arya Vardhan Singh, Advocate
Ms. Divya Choudhary, Advocate
Mr. Sourav K. Jha, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Ajit Kumar, AC to
Mr. J.F. Toppo, Advocate
-----
Order No. 02 Dated: 24.03.2026
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Learned counsel for the parties agree that the issue raised in this
petition stands covered by our order dated 17.03.2026, disposing of
W.P.(C) No. 1601 of 2026 and connected matters.
3. The petitioner seeks an appropriate writ upon the respondents for
quashing and setting aside the letter issued by the respondents
directing the deduction of certain amounts on account of highly
quoted items.
4. The petitioner argues that such deduction was inconsistent with and
in fact contrary to the terms of the contract between the parties.
2026:JHHC:8284-DB
The petitioner has urged that such deduction was made despite the
fact that the variation in contract price due to change in quantity
was within the prescribed limits and further, the same, was at the
instance of the respondents themselves.
5. Based on the above contention, the petitioner, seeks a writ of
mandamus upon the respondents to refund the deducted amount of
Rs.3,14,97,728/- along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum
because according to the petitioner, such deduction was unilateral,
illegal and in violation of the terms of the contract.
6. The issue raised in this petition is almost identical to the issue
involved in W.P.(C) Nos.5303, 6007 and 2583 of 2025 which were
disposed of by a common judgment and order dated 22 nd January,
2026. There, this Court noted that the dispute, similar to the
dispute raised in this petition, was a purely contractual dispute and
any resolution of such dispute would involve adjudication into highly
disputed question of facts with regard to excess quantities, if any,
the rates that would apply to such excess quantities, whether the
variation was within the permissible limits or not and which of the
parties was indeed responsible for the variation.
7. The resolution of the above-referred disputes would undoubtedly
involve adjudication into highly disputed questions of fact. Such an
exercise cannot be ordinarily undertaken when exercising the
summary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. This is especially so when the petitioner has
undisputedly agreed to resort to arbitration to resolve the said
dispute.
2026:JHHC:8284-DB
8. Mr. Mittal, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, pointed out that
arbitration clauses are to be found in the agreement which is the
subject matter of the present writ petition.
9. The presence or absence of an arbitration clause is not crucial. The
crucial issue is that the dispute raised in this petition arises from
allegations and counter-allegations of breaches of the contract
between the parties. Further, any resolution of such dispute would
involve adjudication into highly disputed questions of fact, some of
which are referred to hereinabove.
10. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to attempt to resolve such
disputes in our summary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. This is more so in cases where the
parties have themselves agreed to resolve such disputes through
arbitration.
11. As noted earlier, in almost identical circumstances, this Court, by its
common judgment and order dated 22nd January, 2026, disposing of
W.P.(C) Nos. 5303, 6007 and 2583 of 2025, declined to entertain
writ petitions but relegated the parties to arbitration. In those
cases, since the parties agreed upon the appointment of an Arbitral
Tribunal, with the express consent of the parties, this Court
proceeded to appoint the Arbitral Tribunal so that the disputes could
be resolved expeditiously. The reasoning in our order of 22 nd
January, 2026, will equally apply in the present case.
12. In Kulchhinder Singh Vs. Hardayal Singh Brar, (1976) 3 SCC
828, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a writ petition is
unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract. The fact that the
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respondent was a "State" is not sufficient and an enquiry should be
whether what is sought to be enforced is a statutory duty or
sovereign obligation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, speaking through
Krishna Iyer, J observed as follows:-
"The writ petition, stripped of embroidery and
legalistics, stands naked as a simple contract
between the staff and the society agreeing upon
a certain percentage of promotions to various
posts or an omnibus, all-embracing promise to
give a quota to the existing employees. At its
best, the writ petition seeks enforcement of a
binding contract but the neat and necessary
repellant is that the remedy of Article 226 is
unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract.
We fail to see how a supplier of chalk to a
government school or cheese to a government
hospital can ask for a constitutional remedy
under Article 226 in the event of a breach of a
contract, bypassing the normal channels of civil
litigation. ........... Private law may involve a
State, a statutory body, or a public body in
contractual or tortious actions. But they cannot
be siphoned off into the writ jurisdiction
(emphasis supplied)".
13. In Divl. Forest Officer Vs. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., (1981) 3
SCC 238, the petitioner tried to enforce through writ petition the
right to remove timber under a contract. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court did not allow this by observing that ordinarily where a breach
of contract is complained of, a party complaining of such breach
may sue for specific performance of the contract if the contract is
capable of being specifically performed or the party may sue for
damages. Such a suit would ordinarily be cognizable by civil court.
2026:JHHC:8284-DB
The High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction would not entertain a
petition either for specific performance of contract or for recovering
damages.
14. In LIC Vs. Asha Goel, (2001) 2 SCC 160, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of
law that in no case, the High Court can entertain a writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce a claim under a
contract for life insurance. The Hon'ble Supreme Court that the
determination of the question depends upon consideration of
several factors like, whether a writ petitioner is merely attempting
to enforce his/her contractual rights or the case raises important
questions of law and constitutional issues, the nature of dispute
raised, the nature of enquiry necessary for determination of the
dispute, etc. While the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be denied
altogether, Courts must bear in mind the self-imposed restriction
consistently followed by the High Courts all these years after the
constitutional power came into existence in not entertaining writ
petitions filed for enforcement of purely contractual rights and
obligations which involved disputed questions of facts. The Courts
have consistently taken the view that in case where for the
determination of the dispute raised, it is necessary to enquire into
facts for determination of which it may become necessary to record
oral evidence a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution is
not the appropriate forum. The position is also well settled that if
the contract entered between the parties provide an alternate forum
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for resolution of disputes arising from the contract, then the parties
should approach the forum agreed by them and the High Court in
writ jurisdiction should not permit them to bypass the agreed forum
of dispute resolution.
15. In State of Bihar Vs. Jain Plastics & Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1
SCC 216, the petitioner questioned the deduction of an amount
from the final bill to be paid to the petitioner-contractor by alleging
breach of contract by him. The High Court allowed the petition.
However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reversing the High Court's
order, held that even if it is possible to decide the question raised in
the petition, based on affidavits and counter-affidavits, it would not
be proper to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution in cases of alleged breach of contract.
16. As noted above, this is a matter where no public law element is
shown to be involved. Notwithstanding the language used in the
present petition alleging unfairness or arbitrariness, this matter
involves alleged breach of non-statutory contract. A resolution of
the dispute would involve adjudication of highly disputed questions
of fact. Admittedly, in the present matter, the agreement contains
an arbitration clause. Therefore, upon cumulative consideration of
all these factors, we are satisfied that this is not a matter where we
should entertain writ petition or exercise our extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
17. For the above reasons, we decline to entertain this petition.
However, we grant the petitioner liberty to invoke the arbitration
clauses, if any, in its agreement or to resort to the ordinary civil
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remedies before the Civil Court for resolution of their disputes, as
has been raised in this petition.
18. Since this Court has not adjudicated upon the rival disputes on
merits, all contentions of all parties on the merits of the disputes
are left explicitly open to be decided through arbitration and/or the
ordinary civil remedies before the Civil Courts.
19. The writ petition is disposed of with liberty in the above terms. No
costs.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
March 24, 2026
Manish/Ritesh
Uploaded on 26.03.2026
