[Cites 23, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
Unknown vs The State Of Jharkhand Through Chief ... on 24 March, 2026
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 4597 of 2025
1. Akanksha Kumari, aged about 27 years, D/O Anand Raj, Resident
of Village: Nawadih, P.O. Behradih, PS. Domchanch and District
Koderma.
2. Arti Verma, aged about 37 years, W/O Sudhir Kumar Swarnkar,
Resident of Village: Bastacolla (Sonar Basti), P.O: Dhansar, P.S:
Jhariya and District: Dhanbad.
3. Khushbu Kumari, aged about 37 years, W/O Jai Prakash Nirala,
Resident of Village: 44, Degwa Tola, Lari, Near Panchayat Bhawan,
P.O: Lari Kalan, P.S: Rajrappa and District: Ramgarh.
4. Deepika Deep, aged about 32 years D/O Deonarayan Ram, Resident
of Village: Dari, P.O: Dari, P.S: Giddi(A) and District: Hazaribagh.
5. Kanchan Kumari, aged about 37 years, W/O Krishna Murari Turi,
Resident of Village: Mendhochaprkho, P.O: Lataki, P.S: Jamua and
District: Giridih.
6. Tanu Priya, aged about 27 years, D/O Shankar Mahto, Resident of
Village: Datma More Kuju, P.O: Kuju, P.S: Mandu and District:
Ramgarh.
7. Laxmi Kumari, aged about 26 years, D/O Arun Kumar Mehta,
Resident of Village: Kadwa, P.O: Kewal, P.S: Barhi and District:
Hazaribagh.
8. Pallawi Kumari, aged about 27 years, D/O Ranvijay Prasad Mehta,
Resident of Village: Gunja, P.O: Ichak, P.S: Ichak and District:
Hazaribagh.
9. Sitara Kumari, aged about 26 years, D/O Koushal Kumar Mehta,
Resident of Village: Gunja, P.O: Ichak, P.S: Ichak and District:
Hazaribagh.
10.Sangita Kumari, aged about 33 years, D/O Sudarshan Ram, Resident
of Village: Satahe, P.O: Patan, P.S: Patan and District: Palamu.
11.Anamika Kumari, aged about 29 years, D/O Rajendra Nayak,
Resident of Village: Tandwa, P.O: Tandwa, P.S: Tandwa and
District: Chatra.
12.Pushpa Kumari, aged about 43 years, W/O Ajit Kumar Choudhary,
Resident of Village: Kadma Market Farm Area, P.O: Jamshedpur,
P.S: Kadma and District: East Singhbhum.
Page 1 of 42
13.Bhawna Supriya, aged about 27 years, D/O Yadu Nath Mahto,
Resident of Village: Khalari, P.O: Ajaigarh, P.S: Silli and District:
Ranchi.
14.Anuja Lakra, aged about 29 years, D/O Parmeshwar Bhagat,
Resident of Village: Dunduria Lohardaga Road, P.O: Gumla, P.S:
Gumla and District: Gumla.
15.Sunita Kumari, aged about 36 years, D/O Maneshwar Baraik,
Resident of Village: Ghaghra, P.O: Ghaghra, P.S: Ghaghra and
District: Gumla.
16.Manisha Kumari, aged about 28 years, W/O Rajkiran Jaiswal,
Resident of Village: Mahagama, P.O: Mahagama, P.S: Mahagama
and District: Godda
17.Krity Agrawal, aged about 29 years, D/O Sheo Prasad Agrawal,
Resident of Village: Dibha Mohalla, P.O: Chatra, P.S: Chatra and
District: Chatra.
18.Bindu Kumari Ray, aged about 30 years, W/O Bhagirath Kumar
Ray, Resident of Village: Dakai, P.O: Manigarhi, P.S: Sarwan Dakai
and District: Deoghar.
19.Rekha Devi, aged about 36 years, W/O Sukhdev Prasad, Resident of
Village: Chedra, P.O: Bishnugarh, PS Bishnugarh and District:
Hazaribagh.
20.Sadhna Kumari, aged about 28 years, W/O Rajiv Ranjan, Resident
of Village: Kumhari, P.O: Narchahi, P.S: Mayurhand, and District:
Chatra.
21.Menka Kumari, aged about 31 years, C/O Chandan Choudhari,
Resident of Village: Jabra, P.O: Jabra, P.S: Simariya and District:
Chatra.
22.Anima Ebha Minj, aged about 35 years, D/O Joachim Minj,
Resident of Village: Q.No. DS-1-146-A Railway Colony,
P.O:B.S.City-10 Radhanagar, P.S: Balidih and District: Bokaro.
23.Bulli Rani Marandi, aged about 33 years, W/O Sandeep Hembrom,
Resident of Village: Panibaswa, P.O: Machhali, P.S: Bhelwaghati
Deori and District: Giridih.
24.Sudha Kumari, aged about 28 years, D/O Wakil Prasad Mehta,
Resident of Village: Churchu, P.O: Sindur, P.S: Korra and District:
Hazaribagh.
Page 2 of 42
25.Anita Kumari, aged about 30 years, D/O Dhananjay Pramanik,
Resident of Village: Tata Sijua 12 No Basti Kapuria, P.O:
Bhelatand, P.S: Jogta and District: Dhanbad.
26.Neha Kumari, aged about 27 years, D/O Suphal Ram Rajwar,
Resident of Village: Tand Balidih, P.O: Jainamore, P.S: Jaridih and
District: Bokaro.
27.Anuja Kumari, aged about 25 years, D/O Sunil Kumar Dubey,
Resident of Village: Salhana, P.O: Kutmu, P.S: Pandu and District:
Palamu.
28.Puja Kumari, aged about 27 years D/O Sunil Kumar Dubey,
Resident of Village: Salhana, P.O: Kutmu, P.S: Pandu and District:
Palamu.
29.Bandana Kumari, aged about 44 years, W/O Vijay Kumar, Resident
of Village: Ward 1 Rakhwan, P.O: Jamtara, P.S: Jamtara, and
District: Jamtara.
30.Ranjeeta Kumari, aged about 40 years, W/O Ranjeet Kumar Vimal,
Resident of Village: Jogidih, P.O: Nandudih, P.S: Satgawan and
District: Koderma.
31.Nushrat Bano, aged about 41 years, Wife of Md. Rahbar Alam,
Resident of Kurmitand, Brahmandiha, P.O., P.S. Dhanbad & District
Dhanbad.
32.Shazada Parween, aged about 34 years, Daughter of Shamsuddin
Ansari, Resident of Singhdih, P.O. Gomo, P.S. Gomo & District
Dhanbad.
33.Raginee Kumari, aged about 28 years, Daughter of Kunj Bihari
Mishra, Resident of Village Majhigawan, P.O., P.S. Manjhigawan &
District Jamshedpur.
... Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary, having it office at
Karamtoli, Morabadi, P.O., P.S. Morabadi & District Ranchi.
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Women, Child
Development and Social Security, Government of Jharkhand,
having its office at Project Bhawan, Dhurwa, P.O., P.S. Dhurwa &
District Ranchi.
3. The Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission through its Chairman,
having its office at Kali Nagar, Chai Bagan, P.O., P.S. Namkum &
District - Ranchi, Jharkhand
Page 3 of 42
4. The Secretary, Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission, having its
office at Kali Nagar, Chai Bagan, P.O., PS. Namkum & District -
Ranchi, Jharkhand
5. The Examination Controller, Jharkhand Staff Selection
Commission, having its office at Kali Nagar, Chai Bagan, P.O., P.S.
Namkum & District - Ranchi, Jharkhand.
... Respondents
WITH
W.P. (S) No. 4667 of 2025
1. Rupa Kumari, aged about 35 years, Wife of Rahul Kumar, Resident
of at 710, Bhuchungdih Road, Jainamore Bandhdih, P.O.-Bandhdih,
P.S. - Jaridih, District Bokaro Jharkhand - 829301.
2. Monika Kumari, aged about 33 years, Daughter of Rajendra Singh,
Resident of Tara Nagar, P.O. & P.S. - Chas, District Bokaro,
Jharkhand - 827013.
3. Gitanjali Verma, aged about 32 years, Daughter of Dilip Verma,
Resident of Opposite Galaxia Mall, Kali Mandir Gali, Sukhdeo
Nagar, Ratu Road, P.O. & P.S.-Sukhdeonagar, District- Ranchi,
Jharkhand - 834005.
4. Sangita Rani Gupta, aged about 41 years, Wife of Manoj Kumar
Gupta, Daughter of Ashok Kumar Sahu, Resident of Makatpur
P.O.- Makatpur, P.S.--Giridih, Jharkhand- 815301
5. Deepa Kumari, aged about 31 years, Daughter of Bhola Mahato,
Resident of Village - Parasia, P.O. - Kusunda, P.S. Putki, District
Dhanbad, Jharkhand- 828116.
6. Pinky Kumari, aged about 28 years, Daughter of Dinesh Mahto,
Resident of Village - Nutandih, P.O. - TupKadih P.S.- Jaridih,
District - Bokaro, Jharkhand - 827010.
7. Swati Kumari, aged about 24 years, Daughter of Kuleshwar Saw,
Resident of Village - Banji, Barughutu, Uttari, Banji, P.O.- Banji,
P.S. - Mandu, District -Ramgarh, Jharkhand 825314.
8. Aparna Singh, aged about 45 years, Wife of Siteshwar Singh,
Resident of Village - Surju Gadi, P.O. - Gadi Nawdiha, P.S. -
Jamua, District - Giridih, Jharkhand - 815312.
9. Amirun Nisha, aged about 33 years, Wife of Md. Anwarul Ansari,
Resident of Village - Jamni Paharpur, P.O.- Jamni Paharpur, P.S.-
Godda, District-Godda, Jharkhand- 814133.
... Petitioners
Page 4 of 42
Versus
1. State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary, Government of
Jharkhand, having office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. -
Dhurwa, P.S. - Jagarnathpur, Ranchi.
2. Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and
Rajbhasa, Govt. of Jharkhand, having office at Project Building,
Dhurwa, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur, Ranchi.
3. Secretary, Department of Women Child Development & Social
Security, Government of Jharkhand, having office at Project
Building, Dhurwa, P.O.- Dhurwa, P.S.- Jagarnathpur, Ranchi.
4. Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission, through its Secretary,
having its office at Chaibagan Gali, Kali Nagar, P.O. & P.S. -
Namkum, Ranchi.
5. Controller of Examination, Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission,
having its office at Chaibagan Gali, Kali Nagar, P.O. & P.S. -
Namkum, Ranchi.
... Respondents
WITH
W.P. (S) No. 4703 of 2025
1. Anju Kumari, aged about 39 years, W/o Hari Shankar Kumar, R/o
377 Vidyapuri, P.O. Jhumri Telaiya, P.S. Telaiya and District -
Koderma.
2. Sushila Kumari, aged about 41 years, D/o Suresh Lal Barnwal, R/o
Adarsh Nagar, Near Cooperative Colony, NH- 33, P.O. Hazaribagh,
P.S. Bishnugarh and District - Hazaribagh.
3. Madhuri Kumari, aged about 34 years, W/o Dinesh Kumar Tiwari,
R/o Village Rajogari, P.O. Lesligang, P.S. Lesligang and District -
Palamau.
4. Shobha Kumari, aged about 35 years, D/o Radha Kant Mehra, R/o
Village Lougain, P.O. Lougain, P.S. Pathargama and District-
Godda.
5. Shweta Soren, aged about 31 years, D/o Mehilal Manjhi, R/o
Village Chainpur, P.O. Chainpur, P.S. Charhi and District
Hazaribagh.
6. Suchita Kumari, aged about 38 years, W/o Arvind Ram, R/o Village
Resuaa, P.O., P.S. Manjhiaon and District - Garhwa.
Page 5 of 42
7. Sarita Murmu, aged about 33 years, W/o Binod Hembrom, R/o
Village Gangta Govindpur, P.O. Motia, P.S. Godda & District
Godda.
8. Biva Kumari, aged about 42 years, D/o Devendra Nath Jha, R/o Dev
kunj, Mohalla Saket Puri, P.O., P.S. & District - Godda.
9. Ravina Rani, aged about 40 years, D/o Jay Narayan Sah, R/o
Namaste Road, Borio Bazar, P.O., P.S. Borio and District
Sahebganj.
... Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary, having it office at
Karamtoli, Morabadi, P.O., P.S. Morabadi & District Ranchi.
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Women, Child Development
and Social Security, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at
Project Bhawan, Dhurwa, P.O., P.S. Dhurwa & District Ranchi.
3. The Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission through its Chairman,
having its office at Kali Nagar, Chai Bagan, P.O., P.S. Namkum &
District - Ranchi, Jharkhand
4. The Secretary, Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission, having its
office at Kali Nagar, Chai Bagan, P.O., P.S. Namkum & District -
Ranchi, Jharkhand.
5. The Examination Controller, Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission,
having its office at Kali Nagar, Chai Bagan, P.O., P.S. Namkum &
District -- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
... Respondents
WITH
W.P. (S) No. 5290 of 2025
1. Laxmi Kumari, aged about 30 years, D/o Raju Mahto, R/o House No
32 U, Panderpala Mahto Tola, Bishunpur, PO B.Polytechnic, P.S.
Bank More & District- Dhanbad.
2. Sahin Khatun, aged about 27 years, D/o Md Sarfraj Khan, R/o
Village Barkatha, P.O., P.S. Barkatha & District-Hazaribagh.
3. Manila Kujur, aged about 29 years, D/o Sukra Oraon, R/o Khuti
Toli, Sons, P.O. Mandar, P.S. Chanho & District-Ranchi.
4. Soumya Kumari, aged about 28 years, D/o Satyendra Prasad Yadav,
R/o Village Ghagri, P.O. Birbal, P.S. Dhurki & District Garhwa.
... Petitioners
Versus
Page 6 of 42
1. The State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary, having its office at
1st Floor, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O, P.S - Dhurwa & District
Ranchi.
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Women, Child Development
and Social Security, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at
Project Bhawan, Dhurwa, P.O., P.S. Dhurwa & District Ranchi.
3. The Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission through its Chairman,
having its office at Kali Nagar, Chai Bagan, P.O., P.S. Namkum &
District - Ranchi, Jharkhand
4. The Secretary, Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission, having its
office at Kali Nagar, Chai Bagan, P.O., P.S. Namkum & District -
Ranchi, Jharkhand.
5. The Examination Controller, Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission,
having its office at Kali Nagar, Chai Bagan, P.O., P.S. Namkum &
District - Ranchi, Jharkhand.
... Respondents
WITH
W.P. (S) No. 5526 of 2025
Geeta Kumari, Aged About 29 Years, D/O: Chohan Mahto, R/O:
Banka, PS: Katkamsandi, P.O: Sultana, District: Hazaribagh,
Jharkhand- 825319
... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary, Government of
Jharkhand, Having Office At Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O.& P.S.-
Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
2. The Principal Secretary, Personnel, Administrative Reforms and
Rajbhasa Department, Govt. Of Jharkhand, Having Its Office At
Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O- Dhurwa, P.S Jagarnnathpur, District
Ranchi.
3. The Secretary, Department of School Education & Literacy,
Government of Jharkhand, Having Its Office at Project Building,
Dhurwa, P.O. & PS Dhurwa, District - Ranchi, Jharkhand.
4. The Secretary, Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission, Having its
Office at Kalinagar Chaibagan, PO & P.S Namkum, District Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
Page 7 of 42
5. Controller of Examination, Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission,
having its office at kalinagar chaibagan, P.O & P.S- Namkum,
District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
... Respondents
WITH
W.P. (S) No. 5622 of 2025
1. Sana Fatma, Aged About 32 Years, D/O: Mohammad Arman, R/O:
Arman Manzil, Dangal Para, Dumka, P.O+P.S- Dumka, District:
Dumka, Jharkhand- 814101
2. Nisha Kumari, Aged about 29 years, D/O: Sunil Kumar, R/O:
Tungaon, P.O- Jurdag, P.S- Karra Jurdag, District: Khunti,
Jharkhand-835210
3. Pushpa Kumari, Aged about 25 years, D/O: Prem Mahatha, R/O:
Kamaldih, P.O- Narayanpur, P.S- Narayanpur, District: Bokaro,
Jharkhand- 827013
4. Sonam Kumari, Aged about 35 years, D/O: Rajendra Prasad Saw,
R/O: Panchayat Kharagdiha Block Jamua, village Kharagdiha post
Kharagdiha, P.O- Kharagdiha, P.S- Jamua Khariodih, District: Deori
Giridih, Jharkhand- 815314.
... Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary, Government of
Jharkhand, Having Office At Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O.& P.S.-
Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
2. The Principal Secretary, Personnel, Administrative Reforms and
Rajbhasa Department, Govt. Of Jharkhand, Having Its Office At
Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O- Dhurwa, P.S Jagarnnathpur, District
Ranchi.
3. The Secretary, Department of School Education & Literacy,
Government of Jharkhand, Having Its Office at Project Building,
Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S Dhurwa, District -- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
4. The Secretary, Jharkhand staff Selection Commission, Having its
Office at Kalinagar Chaibagan, P.O& P.S Namkum, District Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
5. Controller of examination, Jharkhand staff selection commission,
having its office at kalinagar chaibagan, P.O & P.S- Namkum,
District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
Page 8 of 42
... Respondents
WITH
W.P. (S) No. 5629 of 2025
Vandana Kumari, aged about 37 years, Wife of Ranjit Kumar Yadav,
Resident of Village - Thengadih, P.O. - Sirsa, P.S. Pathrol,
DistrictDeoghar, Jharkhand - 815353
... Petitioners
Versus
1. State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary, Government of
Jharkhand, having office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O.-
Dhurwa, P.S. - Jagarnathpur, Ranchi.
2. Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and
Rajbhasa, Govt. of Jharkhand, having office at Project Building,
Dhurwa, P.O. - Dhurwa, PS. - Jagarnathpur, Ranchi.
3. Secretary, Department of Women Child Development & Social
Security, Government of Jharkhand, having office at Project
Building, Dhurwa, P.O.- Dhurwa, P.S. - Jagarnathpur, Ranchi.
4. Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission, through its Secretary,
having its office at Chaibagan Gali, Kali Nagar, P.O. & P.S. -
Namkum, Ranchi.
5. Controller of Examination, Jharkhand Staff Selection Commission,
having its office at Chaibagan Gali, Kali Nagar, P.O. & P.S. -
Namkum, Ranchi.
... Respondents
---------
CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
---------
For the Petitioners: Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Advocate
Ms. Tanya Singh, Advocate
Mr. Amritansh Vats, Advocate
Mr. Chanchal Jain, Advocate
Mr. Abhishek Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Anuj Kumar Trivedi, Advocate
Mr. Rohit Kumar Gupta, Advocate
Ms. Soniya Hansda, Advocate
Mr. Subham Pathak, Advocate
Mr. Amitesh Kumar Geasen, Advocate
Mr. Shubham Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Deepak Kumar Singh, Advocate
Page 9 of 42
Amicus Curiae: Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Advocate General
Mr. Sachin Kumar, AAG-II
Mr. Ashutosh Anand, AAG-III
Ms. Pinky Tiwary, AC to AG
Mr. Rahul Saboo, GP II
Mr. Abhilash Kumar, AC to GP II
Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Arpan Mishra, Advocate
Mr. Sanjoy Piprawall, Advocate
Mr. Rakesh Ranjan, Advocate
Mr. Prince Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Jay Prakash, Advocate
Mr. Shubham Mishra, Advocate
Mr. Kazi Asif Iqubal, Advocate
Mr. Gyandev Raj, Advocate
For the Interveners: Mr. Rajendra Krishna, Advocate
Mr. Ritesh Kumar Pathak, Advocate
---------
Reserved on: 19.03.2026 Pronounced on: 24/03/2026
Per M. S. Sonak, C.J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. By a fairly detailed order dated 19.12.2025, the learned Single
Judge of this Court (Ananda Sen, J.), opined that this batch of petitions
be listed before the Division Bench, with the approval of Hon'ble the
Chief Justice. Accordingly, by an administrative order dated 05.01.2026
made by the then Hon'ble the Chief Justice, this batch of petitions was
placed before DB-I, i.e., the Division Bench usually presided over by
the Hon'ble the Chief Justice.
3. In all these petitions, the woman applicants, for selection to the
posts of Lady Supervisors, have challenged the selection process inter
alia on the ground that, though they possess the requisite prescribed
qualifications, they were unjustly and illegally being excluded from
even the consideration for the advertised posts of Lady Supervisors.
4. Significantly, in none of these petitions, there was any challenge
to the constitutional validity of the Jharkhand Child Development Non-
Gazetted Employees (Lady Supervisor) Service Cadre (Appointment,
Promotion and Service Conditions) Rules, 2019 ('2019 Rules' for
short) on the ground that they purportedly provide 100% reservation to
women and that such reservation, being based only on "sex", would
violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
5. However, when the matters were taken for admission before the
learned Single Judge, an issue arose as to whether the reservation of
100% of the posts only for women was a permissible constitutional
exercise. Since the learned Single Judge appeared to be of the prima
facie opinion that this was a case of 100% reservation based only on
sex, the same might fall foul of the constitutional articles concerned
with equality and equality in matters of public employment.
6. Therefore, by order dated 28.08.2025, the learned Single Judge
posed such a question to the State Counsel, who applied for some time
to respond. By the same order, the learned Single Judge, while
adjourning the matters on 15.09.2025 and directing the State to file a
counter affidavit, directed that no appointment would be made to the
post of Lady Supervisor till the disposal of the writ petitions. The
learned Single Judge clarified that:-
"6. This stay order is being passed considering that 100%
reservation has been provided for the post of Lady
Supervisor."
7. In the meantime, the State filed its counter affidavit, and the learned
Single Judge, upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties on the
issue of constitutionality, or, rather, on the queries and issues raised
vide order dated 28.08.2025, reserved the matters for order. The
learned Single Judge clarified that this order would be limited only
to the issues referred to and raised in the order dated 28.08.2025.
The order on the issues raised and referred to in the previous order
dated 28.08.2025 was pronounced on 19.12.2025, which, in a sense,
is a genesis of this matter being referred to the Division Bench.
8. In the referral order dated 19.12.2025, the learned Single Judge
acknowledged that in this batch of petitions, there was no challenge,
either to what the learned Single Judge described as "100% reservation"
or the rules which provided for "100% reservation", in favour of
women. However, the learned Single Judge reasoned that this Court,
being the Constitutional Court, it was the duty to address the question,
"as to whether an entire cadre can be fully reserved on the basis of
gender, even the said provision or law is not challenged, whether a
constitutional court can question the legality and validity of the said
law?"
9. The learned Single Judge, after relying upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case of Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar
Panchayat (Magadh Division) Vs. State of Bihar and Others1, held
that in exceptional cases of patent illegality or unconstitutionality, the
constitutional court is duty-bound to rule on the constitutional validity
of the provisions of law, i.e. rules, that fall for consideration before the
Court.
10. The learned Single Judge, after expressing some prima facie
opinion, posed the following questions at paragraph 13 of the referral
order dated 19.12.2025.
(i) Whether an entire cadre, by Rules, can be reserved for a
particular class, based on sex, caste etc.?
(ii) Whether Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India gives
special power to reserve posts in appointment for women?
(iii) Whether Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India operates
independently of Article 16 of the Constitution of India?
(iv) If it is held that Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India
and the powers of reservation under Article 16 of the
Constitution of India operate on different field and are
independent to each other, can the combined reservation
be 100% as done in the instant case?
(v) Whether Jharkhand Child Development Non-Gazetted
Employees (Lady Supervisor) Service Cadre (Appointment,
Promotion and Service Conditions) Rules, 2019, which
provides for 100% reservation of a particular cadre is
valid or not?
(vi) Any other question which may arise in course of adjudging
the above issues.
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1882
11. The learned Single Judge, after posing the above questions,
referred to Rule 34(2)(b) of the High Court of Jharkhand Rules, which
provides that a writ petition where the vires or validity of an Act of the
legislature or in subordinate legislation is under challenge must be
heard by a Division Bench. Further, Rule 34(3)(b) also provides that all
matters which are referred to a Division Bench are also to be heard by
the Division Bench.
12. Based upon these rules, the learned Single Judge expressed his
opinion that this matter involves a challenge to a subordinate legislation
and, therefore, needs to be heard by the Division Bench of this Court.
The learned Single Judge finally directed all these matters to be listed
before the Division Bench with the approval of the Hon'ble Chief
Justice.
13. Thus, the main issue before this Division in this batch of referred
writ petitions is - whether the 2019 Rules provide for 100% reservation
to women for the posts of Lady Supervisors and, if so, whether such
reservation is constitutionally permissible, given the provisions in
Articles 14, 15 and 16?
14. As noted earlier, the petitioners in all these petitions are women.
As such, they, possibly under the impression that they might not be
appropriate realtors to challenge rules that benefited them or
apprehending that the striking down of such a rule would give them no
benefit, have not in their writ petitions questioned the validity of the
rule which provides that only women will be considered for
appointment to the post of Lady Supervisor under the 2019 Rules.
15. Therefore, when the matters came before us on 11.02.2026, we
inquired of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners
whether any of them would present the view that the 2019 Rules
discriminated against men and thereby constituted discrimination solely
on the ground of sex. As the response was not particularly enthusiastic,
we found it appropriate to appoint Mr Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned
counsel practising before this Court, as the Amicus. As recorded in our
order dated 11.02.2026, Mr Mehta kindly agreed to assist the Court in
these matters.
16. These matters were heard on 18.03.2026 and 19.03.2026, on
which dates, the learned counsel for the various parties and the learned
Advocate General made their detailed submissions on the issue of
constitutionality of the provision in the 2019 Rules relating to
appointments of Lady Supervisors. The learned Amicus Curiae also
addressed us on this issue. Some of the learned counsel, including the
learned Advocate General and the learned Amicus Curiae, filed their
written notes of arguments along with a compilation of precedents that
they referred to and relied upon.
17. On 18.03.2026 and 19.03.2026, the learned counsel for the
petitioners and the respondents submitted that this Court confines itself
to the issue of constitutional validity, because under the High Court of
Jharkhand Rules, that would not be an issue, the learned Single Judge
would be able to address. They submitted that if the provisions are held
to be ultra vires or unconstitutional, these petitions may have to be
disposed of, as the selection process would proceed no further.
However, they submitted that if this Division Bench were to find that
there was no constitutional infirmity, the writ petitions may be remitted
to the learned Single Judge for deciding the issues of the non-
consideration of petitioners' candidatures, despite the petitioners' claim
that they were fully eligible to be so considered.
18. The learned Advocate General and the learned counsel on behalf
of some of the selected women candidates submitted that the results of
the selection were already published in respect of majority of the posts
and it was only at the stage when the verification of the documents of
the selected candidates was in progress, that the learned Single Judge
by his order dated 28.08.2025 restrained the State from making any
appointments to the posts of Lady Supervisors, after specifying that
such stay order was made "considering that 100% reservation has been
provided for the post of Lady Supervisor."
19. Accordingly, they submitted that, should this Court conclude that
this was not a case of reservation, or, in any event, a constitutionally
impermissible reservation, the stay order may be vacated. The learned
counsel for the petitioners, however, argued that the stay order should
continue until the writ petitions are disposed of, because, according to
them, the petitioners had been unjustly excluded from consideration,
even though they fulfilled the requisite qualifications prescribed under
the 2019 Rules.
20. After hearing detailed arguments on 18.03.2026 and 19.03.2026,
we reserved judgment on the constitutionality of the provisions in the
2019 Rules concerning appointments to the posts of Lady Supervisors.
Now, upon consideration of the rival contentions, pleadings, the
materials accompanying the pleadings, and precedents, we proceed to
do so.
21. The 2019 Rules have been enacted in pursuance of the proviso to
Article 309 of the Constitution. While they do not speak of a
reservation as such for the post of "Lady Supervisor", the post's
nomenclature leaves no doubt that only women were to be considered
for appointments to the posts of Lady Supervisors under the 2019
Rules. Apart from the nomenclature, these Rules contain intrinsic
material that supports the position that only women were to be
considered for appointments to the posts of Lady Supervisors.
22. Mr Mehta, the learned Amicus Curiae, mostly echoed the prima
facie reasoning of the learned Single Judge in the order dated
19.12.2025. He firstly submitted that, as per Bihar Rajya Dafadar
Chaukidar Panchayat (supra), it was the duty of the Constitutional
Court to guard against any breaches of fundamental rights. He
submitted that in a given case, if it was found that there had been an
egregious violation of fundamental rights, then it would be the duty of
the Constitutional Courts to interfere.
23. Mr Mehta submitted that the rules by rendering men ineligible
for being considered for appointments to the posts of Lady Supervisors
or the rules providing that only women would be considered for
appointments to the posts of Lady Supervisors, amounted to prescribing
100% reservation, and this was in violation of the constitutional
mandate under Articles 19 and 16(2). He relied on the Indra Swahney
Vs. Union of India2, (paragraphs 514 and 809).
24. Mr. Mehta submitted that while Articles 14 and 15 may deal with
the general concept of the State not denying equality or equal protection
of law, Article 16 is specific and prohibits denial of equality or practice
of discrimination based only on religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place
of birth, residence or any of them, in matters of public employment. He,
therefore, submitted that when it comes to any facets of public
employment, the same would be governed by Article 16 and not so
much by the general provisions of Articles 14 or 15.
25. Mr Mehta submitted that the provisions in Article 15(3), which
allow the State or rather do not prevent the State from making special
provision for women and children, will not apply to matters relating to
public employment in general and, reservations in public employment,
in particular. He relied upon Abhay Kumar Kispotta Vs. State of
Chhattisgarh3 to support this contention.
26. Mr. Mehta referred us to some literature concerning the
Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS), under which the
(1992) Supp (3) SCC 217
23 Live Law (Chh) 10 (DB)
appointments to the posts of Lady Supervisors were being made. He
submitted that ICDS contemplates a 3-tier scheme, i.e. Village Level,
Cluster Level, and Block Level. He submitted that ICDS does not
differentiate between men and women insofar as the supervisory posts
are concerned. Further, he pointed out that Supervisors function at the
cluster level and not at the village level.
27. Mr Mehta submitted that from the nature of the works they are
expected to perform or the duties Supervisors are expected to discharge,
there is absolutely nothing to indicate that such works or duties cannot
be performed or discharged by men or that such works and duties need
to be exclusively performed or discharged by women. Therefore, he
submitted that excluding men even from being considered for the posts
of Lady Supervisors would amount to blatant discrimination based only
on their sex. He submitted that such discrimination in public
employment is precisely what is prohibited under Article 16 of the
Constitution.
28. Mr Mehta also submitted that providing for reservations of more
than 50% for any category would violate the equality mandate under
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. He submitted that this was a case
of 100% reservation favouring women and, therefore, the same should
not be allowed to pass the constitutional muster, given the
constitutional provisions in Articles 14 and 16(2).
29. The learned counsel for the petitioners were naturally ambivalent
in their submissions. Some of the counsel did express that providing of
100% reservation in favour of women for appointments to the posts of
Lady Supervisors would be unconstitutional and ultra vires. Others,
realising that they were representing women petitioners and that the
striking down of such rules would offer such petitioners no relief
whatsoever, were quite guarded in their submissions. Yet others
submitted that, since such a constitutional issue was not raised by them
in their petitions, the same may not be considered by the Court in this
batch of petitions.
30. Learned Advocate General and some of the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the selected candidates, however, submitted in
unison that these were not matters where the learned Single Judge
should have, suo motu, raised the issue of constitutional validity of the
2019 Rules and then referred the matters to the Division Bench for its
decision. In any event, they submitted that the 2019 Rules relating to
appointments to the posts of Lady Supervisors under the ICDS were
intra vires and constitutional, and there was no egregious violation of
any fundamental right to attract the proposition laid down in
Chaukidar (supra).
31. Mr. Indrajit Sinha submitted that Chaukidar's case (supra)
concerns reservation based solely on "descent" and such reservations
had already been struck down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
context of identical rules. He referred para-33 of the Chaukidar (supra)
to emphasise that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that, "Should, in
a given case, it be found that there has been an egregious violation of a
Fundamental Right as a result of operation of a subordinate legislation
and the issue is concluded by a binding decision of this Court, we
consider it the duty of the writ courts to deliver justice by declaring the
subordinate legislation void to safeguard rights of others who might not
still have been affected thereby. We reiterate, it can only be done rarely
and in cases which stand out from the ordinary."
32. The learned Advocate General relied on Kerala State Toddy
Shop Contractors Association Vs. T.N. Prathapan, MLA &
Others4, Union of India Vs. Majurani Routray and Others5 and
Union of India Vs. E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd6 to submit that any suo
motu assumption of jurisdiction to quash legislation or subordinate
rules was totally uncalled for, particularly in the absence of any
pleadings.
33. Without prejudice, the learned Advocate General and some of the
learned counsel for the petitioners appearing on behalf of the selected
candidates submitted that this was not a case of reservation at all, but,
rather, this was a case where the rules makers reflected the Executive's
policy decision to create posts of "Lady Supervisor" and to appoint
ladies to such posts, given the peculiar nature of duties and works they
were expected to discharge or undertake under the ICDS.
34. The learned Advocate General and some of the learned counsel
for the petitioners appearing on behalf of the selected candidates made
detailed references to the ICDS literature and the nature of works and
(2014) 15 SCC 466
(2023) 9 SCC 144
(2000) 2 SCC 223
duties expected of the workforce engaged to effectively implement the
ICDS. They submitted that the scheme was itself a measure relatable to
Article 15(3) of the Constitution, because it was aimed at ameliorating
the condition of women and small children who are the target group of
this nationwide scheme. They submitted that Lady Supervisors, given
the nature of their work and functions, are to deal with pregnant and
lactating mothers and small children aged below 06 years.
35. The learned Advocate General and some of the learned counsel
for the petitioners appearing on behalf of the selected candidates
submitted that the social structure of a State like Jharkhand was also a
relevant factor considered by the rule-makers. They argued that the
creation of posts for Lady Supervisors and their appointment of women
to such positions were policy decisions connected to the work profile
and aimed at supporting the interests and objectives of the target group,
namely, improving conditions for women and small children. They
contended that this policy decision, as reflected in the statutory rule,
was neither arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, nor
unconstitutional.
36. Learned Advocate General and other counsel appearing on behalf
of some of the selected candidates submitted that the view taken by the
Chhattisgarh High Court in Abhay Kumar Kispotta (supra) was
contrary to several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in which it
was held that there was no unconstitutionality involved in making
special provisions for women and children in terms of Article 15(3)
and, further, Article 15(3) was not controlled by Article 16(2) or 16(4)
of the Constitution. Further, they submitted that Article 15(3) could not
be excluded in matters of public employment, as was contended by the
learned Amicus Curiae or held by the Chhattisgarh High Court in
Abhay Kumar Kispotta (supra). They relied on Vijay Lakshmi Vs.
Punjab University and Others7, Government of A.P. Vs. P.B.
Vijayakumar and Another8.
37. Learned Advocate General and learned counsel appearing for
some of the selected candidates submitted that the ceiling of 50% in
reservations applied only to the vertical reservations under Article 16(4)
of the Constitution. They submitted that this was not a case of
reservation per se, but a case where the State or the rule makers, as a
policy, felt that only women would be best suited for the posts of Lady
Supervisors, given the nature of duties and functions assigned to these
posts and the target groups that such appointees were expected to work
for. In any event, they submitted that the 50% rules would not apply,
since this was not a case of reservation under Article 16(4) of the
Constitution. They relied on Toguru Sudhakar Reddy and Another
Vs. Government of A.P. and Others9 and Arshnoor Kaur and
Another Vs. The Union of India and Others10.
38. For all the above reasons, the learned Advocate General and the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of some of the selected candidates
(2003) 8 SCC 440
(1995) 4 SCC 520
1993 Supp (4) SCC 439
2025 LiveLaw (SC) 788 (Paragraph 72)
submitted that this was not a fit case to go into the issue of
constitutional validity suo motu. In any event, there was nothing
unconstitutional or discriminatory in either creating the posts of Lady
Supervisors or considering the candidatures of only women for filling
up such posts.
39. The rival contentions now fall for our determination.
40. In the present batch of petitions, none of the petitioners, who are
themselves women, challenged any provision of the 2019 Rules on the
ground that they provide for 100% reservation in favour of women for
appointments to the posts of Lady Supervisors. Accordingly, there are
no pleadings or grounds in support of such a challenge in any of the
petitions.
41. However, the learned Single Judge, who was considering these
petitions, felt that this was a case of 100% reservation in favour of
women and consequently, such 100% reservation breached two
important constitutional principles: -
(i) That the complete exclusion of men to even be considered
for appointments to the posts of "Lady Supervisor"
amounted to discrimination in public employment only on
the grounds of "sex", which was expressly prohibited
under Article 16(2) of the Constitution;
(ii) Reservation in any post cannot exceed 50%, given the
constitutional scheme concerning equality and precedents
on the subject.
42. Therefore, the learned Single Judge, by heavily relying upon
Chaukidar (supra), deemed it appropriate to suo motu examine the
issue of constitutionality. After prima facie opining that the position
which involved a complete exclusion of men from even being
considered for the post of Lady Supervisor, was constitutionally
vulnerable, the learned Single Judge, in deference to Rules 34(2)(b) and
34(3)(b) of the High Court of Jharkhand Rules, referred to the matters
to the Division Bench for examining the issue of constitutional validity.
43. Rule 34(2)(b) provides that a writ petition where the vires or
validity of an Act of legislation or any subordinate legislation is
questioned, such a petition must be necessarily heard by the Division
Bench.
44. Chaukidar (supra) was a case where the Hon'ble Supreme Court
was concerned with the constitutional validity of a practice in the State
of Bihar for appointing Village Chaukidars for a lifetime and upon such
a chaukidar's expiry or his becoming infirm, his family member
nominated by him would take up the functions of the Chaukidar, though
the post was not strictly hereditary. [See Surender Paswan Vs. State
of Bihar (2010) 6 SCC 680].
45. Though, there was no challenge to proviso (a) of sub-rule (7) of
Rule 5 of the BCC(A) Rules ordaining any person working in the cadre
of Chaukidar to be at liberty, a month prior to his retirement, to
nominate his dependent/kin for appointment in his place as Chaukidar,
a Division Bench of the Patna High Court proceeded to hold the
offending proviso to be contrary to Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution and consequently struck it down.
46. The Trade Union, claiming to represent members who could
benefit from the striking down of the proviso, challenged the Division
Bench's decision before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It contended that
the Division Bench exceeded its jurisdiction by striking down the
proviso without any challenge to it in the writ petition. The Trade
Union also argued that the proviso was constitutionally valid and,
therefore, should not have been struck down. Furthermore, it submitted
that the decision of the Division Bench violated the principles of natural
justice because the beneficiaries of the proviso, including its members,
were neither notified nor given any opportunity before the proviso was
suo motu struck down by the Division Bench.
47. Therefore, one of the issues which fell for consideration of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether there was any bar to a
Constitutional Court suo motu examining the issue of constitutional
validity of the provision which arose for its consideration, even though
there was no challenge to the constitutional validity of such a provision
by any of the parties before it.
48. The Hon'ble Supreme Court firstly noted that there were several
precedents emanating from the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself holding
that any reservation of post or allowing the filling up of public post
only on the hereditary principle would fall foul of the constitutional
mandate for equality. The precedents also state that such provisions
would amount to discrimination against other eligible candidates
patiently waiting for public employment, only on the ground of
"descent", which was specifically prohibited by Article 16(2).
49. The Hon'ble Supreme Court then noted that the petitioner before
the High Court had petitioned to secure the benefit under the proviso (a)
of sub-rule (7) of Rule 1 of BCC(A) Rules, held that such a petitioner
would never challenge the constitutionality or the proviso under which
he was seeking benefit. It could be imprudent for him to do so.
Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court, after noting that the
proviso in question was "so obtrusively unconstitutional" that,
notwithstanding the absence of a specific challenge thereto, such a
proviso deserves to be declared as void.
50. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had already noted that a similar
provision had already been struck down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
itself as offending Article 16(2). In this context, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that there was no illegality in the approach of the Division
Bench of the High Court, because the Division Bench must be
presumed to be aware of the law on the subject that appointment cannot
be claimed as a hereditary right.
51. However, in para-33, the Hon'ble Supreme Court sounded a note
of caution in matters of suo motu exercise of powers to strike down the
subordinate legislation even in the absence of any challenge thereto by
any of the parties. Para-33 of the Chaukidar (supra) is, therefore,
transcribed below for the convenience of its reference: -
"33. However, a caution needs to be sounded. While not
suggesting for a moment that the course of action which the
Division Bench adopted in this case can routinely be adopted, we
see no reason as to why the power to suo motu declare a
subordinate legislation invalid, on the ground of its being
manifestly contrary to a Fundamental Right read with binding
precedents in terms of Article 141, should not be conceded to be
within the vast reserve of powers of the Constitutional Courts.
Though exercise of powers, suo motu, in an appropriate case in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
cannot be doubted, it is indubitable that such power has to be
exercised sparingly and with due care, caution and
circumspection. We are minded and do hold that, a writ court,
when it finds its conscience to be pricked in a rare and very
exceptional case by the patent unconstitutionality of a
subordinate legislation connected with the issue it is seized of,
may, upon grant of full opportunity to the State to defend the
subordinate legislation and after hearing it, grant a declaration
as to unconstitutionality and/or invalidity of such legislation.
After all, as the sentinel on the qui vive, it is not only the duty of
the writ courts in the country to enforce Fundamental Rights of
individuals, who approach them, but it is equally the duty of the
writ courts to guard against breach of Fundamental Rights of
others by the three organs of the State. This power is a plenary
power resident in all the Constitutional Courts. Should, in a
given case, it be found that there has been an egregious
violation of a Fundamental Right as a result of operation of a
subordinate legislation and the issue is concluded by a binding
decision of this Court, we consider it the duty of the writ courts
to deliver justice by declaring the subordinate legislation void to
safeguard rights of others who might not still have been
affected thereby. We reiterate, it can only be done rarely and in
cases which stand out from the ordinary."
52. In the present case, the fact scenario is not very much comparable
to the facts and circumstances in which Chaukidar (supra) came to be
decided by the Hon'ble High Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
53. This is not an exceptional case where, despite the patent
unconstitutionality, the petitioner sought to enforce the unconstitutional
provision and to seek a benefit under the same. Secondly, this is also
not a case where the provision in question could be described as "so
obtrusively unconstitutional or involving some egregious violation of
fundamental rights. Furthermore, this is certainly not a case where the
issue in question could be said to have been concluded by a binding
decision of either a Larger Bench of this Court or the Hon'ble Supreme
Court. Therefore, we do not agree with the learned Amicus Curaie's
submission that the Chaukidar (Supra) principle needs to be invoked in
the present batch of matters.
54. The precedents in Kerala State Toddy Shop Contractors
Association (Supra), Majurani Routray (Supra), and Union of India
Vs. E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd (Supra) suggest that the Courts should
not, in the absence of any challenge or proper pleadings, proceed to suo
motu quash legislation or subordinate rules. However, even if we go
entirely by the law laid down in Chaukidar (Supra), we are satisfied
that this was not the type of case as envisaged in Chaukidar, where the
rules could be struck down as unconstitutional and ultra vires in the
absence of any challenge or pleadings, suo moto.
55. Therefore, we agree with the learned Advocate General that this
was not a suitable case for exercising suo motu powers to question or
declare the impugned provision as unconstitutional, ultra vires, null and
void. Therefore, we do not think it would be entirely appropriate for us
to conclusively decide on the issue of the constitutionality or otherwise
of the portion of the 2019 Rules dealing with appointments to the posts
of Lady Supervisors.
56.The learned Single Judge in this case did not actually declare any
provisions unconstitutional, ultra vires, or null and void, but merely
expressed a prima facie opinion to that effect and stayed the issue of
any appointment orders in the meantime. However, since, the
learned Single Judge has expressed a prima facie opinion on the
issue of constitutionality, and, further, based upon such prima facie
opinion, stayed the selection process which had reached an advanced
stage, we think it appropriate to express our prima facie opinion on
this issue so that we can effectively consider the relief of either
confirming or vacating the interim relief granted by the learned
Single Judge staying the recruitment process after it had reached a
fairly advanced stage.
57. At least, prima facie, this seems to be a case where the State, as
part of its Executive policy, believed that appointing only women to fill
the posts of Lady Supervisors would best meet the job requirements or
profile under the ICDS, a national scheme aimed at improving
conditions for women and small children. Therefore, rather than
viewing the impugned provision as offering a 100% reservation for
women, it reflects the State's Executive policy that such a position is
best filled by women, given the nature of the work, the job profile, and
the target group of ICDS, which includes women and small
children. This is more a case of reasonable classification based upon an
intelligible differentia, and such a differentia having a reasonable nexus
with the object of enacting such a rule.
58. On the directions of the learned Single Judge, the State, through
its Under Secretary, Women, Child Development and Social Welfare
Department, has filed a detailed affidavit. The affidavit, after referring
to ICDS notifications and literature, first points out that beneficiaries
under the ICDS are primarily women, including pregnant women,
lactating mothers, and children aged 0 to 6. They constitute the primary
target group for which the ICDS was envisaged and is being
implemented.
59. The counter affidavit refers to the beneficiaries of the target
groups as infants, children, adolescent girls, pregnant women and
lactating mothers, whose conditions the ICDS is expected to ameliorate.
The scheme envisages provision for immunisation, nutrition, health
education, pre-primary education, health check-up and such other
activities.
60. In para-19 of the counter affidavit, there is a reference to several
activities undertaken under the ICDS, including, but not limited to,
ensuring the health and welfare needs of adolescent girls, promoting the
use of sanitary pads for hygiene, and counselling. The scheme
envisages regular ANC check-ups for pregnant women and counselling.
The scheme also envisages attention to the nutritional needs of women
and infants.
61. The counter affidavit also provides a chart indicating that various
States have opted to appoint only women, not only as Anganwadi
workers at the village level, but also as Lady Supervisors at the cluster
level. The Learned Advocate General explained that Anganwadi
workers are essentially and invariably women who function at the
village level. The Lady Supervisor is usually in Charge of about 20
Anganwadi workers and therefore functions at the cluster level. Lady
Supervisors are the first-level supervisors, qua Anganwadi workers who
are also women.
62. The learned Advocate General pointed out that in the State of
Jharkhand, Child Development Project Officers or District Social
Welfare Officers, who are hierarchically superior to Lady Supervisors,
can be either men or women without any distinction. He, however,
referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Orissa High Court in the case of
State of Orissa Vs. Shankar Gena11, in which the Division Bench of
the Orissa High Court held that there was no unconstitutionality
involved in the policy of the State Government to create an all-women
cadre of Child Development Project Officers, in the interest of women
and children. The rules reflecting this policy decision were held not to
violate any of the constitutional provisions, including Articles 14, 15,
and 16.
63. The learned Advocate General and the learned Amicus Curiae
referred to some literature detailing the functions of Lady Supervisors.
These functions include not only supervising the work of Anganwadi
workers remotely, but the job profile of the Lady Supervisors also
involves extensive fieldwork with Anganwadi workers, thereby
interacting, often quite intimately, with women and children,
particularly in rural areas and from rural backgrounds.
64. Therefore, based on the materials placed by the State, at least
prima facie, we cannot say that the requirement of filling the posts of
the Lady Supervisors with only women has no nexus or no reasonable
nexus with the job requirement or the job profile. Such a provision,
which is essentially in the nature of policy, does not appear to be
egregiously violative of any constitutional provision, let alone any
binding precedents. The learned Advocate General submitted that the
decision of the Chhattisgarh High Court in Abhay Kumar Kispotta
(supra), with respect, does not appreciate the legal provision correctly
2006(2) LLN 725
and, in any event, cannot be regarded as a binding precedent. He
submitted that, in fact, this decision is contrary to some binding
precedents emanating from the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
65. The ICDS is held to be a measure related to Article 15(3), which
provides that nothing in Article 15 shall prevent the State from making
any special provision for women and children. Appointments under the
ICDS, therefore, cannot be de hors from the protective umbrella of
Article 15(3). At this stage, we also refer to the expression "only" in
Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India. At least prima facie, this
is not a case of discrimination "only on the ground of sex," given the
material placed on record by the State showing the nexus with the
consideration of only women for appointment to the posts of Lady
Supervisors, the functions or job profile of a Lady Supervisor and the
target group the ICDS is expected to cater to.
66. The broader proposition in Abhay Kumar Kispotta (supra) that
under Article 15 can ever be attracted to matters relating to public
employment, at least prima facie, does not appeal to us. Such a
conclusion, with respect, appears to be premised on reading out of
context a stray line from paragraph 514 of Indra Swahney (supra).
67. In P.B. Vijayakumar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held that Article 15(3) contemplates reservation as well as affirmative
action. It comprehends the State's power to provide reservations for
women in employment under it. This power is not affected under
Article 16. Article 15 should be read in harmony with Article 16. To
eliminate the socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower
them in a manner that would bring about equality between men and
women, Clause (3) is included in Article 15. Its object is to strengthen
and improve women's status. An important limb of this concept of
gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. Making special
provision for women in respect of employment or posts under the State
is integral to Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3), is
not whittled down in any manner by Article 16.
68. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that Article 15(2) deals
with every kind of State action in relation to the citizens of this country.
Every sphere of the activity of the State is controlled by Article 15(1).
There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit of Article 15(1)
employment under the State. At the same time, Article 15(3) permits
special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3) go
together. Therefore, in dealing with employment under the State, one
has to bear in mind both Articles 15 and 16 - the former being a more
general provision and the latter, a more specific provision. Since Article
16 does not touch upon any special provision for women being made by
the State, it cannot in any manner derogate from the power conferred
upon the State in this connection under Article 15(3).
69. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that this power conferred by
Article 15(3) is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity,
including employment under the State. This "special provision", which
the State may make to improve women's participation in all activities
under the State's supervision and control, may take the form of either
affirmative action or reservation. Both reservation and affirmative
action are permissible under Article 15(3) in connection with
employment or posts under the State. Both Articles 15 and 16 are
designed to achieve the same purpose: creating an egalitarian society.
Therefore, Article 15(3) should be read harmoniously with Article 16 to
achieve the purpose for which these articles have been framed.
70. In Vijay Lakshmi Vs. Punjab University and Others (supra),
the rule which provided that only women will be appointed to the posts
of "Principal", "lady teacher", "lady doctor" or a "superintendent of a
lady hostel" was held to be intra vires and constitutional. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the college in question was a women's college.
Therefore, this rule of restricting appointments only to women was a
policy decision of the State, warranting no judicial review.
71. The Hon'ble Supreme Court noted that reservation of certain
posts in a women's college and hostel, if it is a preventive or
precautionary measure against possible subjection of girl students to
exploitation, is a question to be decided by the State, and the court
cannot sit in appeal against the policy decision taken by the
Government in that regard.
72. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that Article 15(3) is not
restricted by Article 16. Therefore, reservation in appointment for posts
in women's college for women only would not violate Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Court held that the relevant rules,
which were impugned, cannot be held to be violative of either Article
14 or 16 of the Constitution, because classification is reasonable and it
has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. In addition, the State
Government is empowered to make such special provisions under
Article 15(3) of the Constitution. This power under Article 15(3) was
not restricted in any manner by Article 16.
73. Considering the law on the subject, and applying the same to the
facts in the present batch of matters, we find it difficult to agree with
the view expressed by Chhattisgarh High Court in Abhay Kumar
Kispotta (supra) to the effect that Article 15 would not apply to public
employment, because there is nothing in Article 15 that refers to public
employment, or, because, Article 16 was a specific article dealing with
issues of equality in public employment.
74. Additionally, we observe that the Chhattisgarh High Court was
concerned with the posts of Assistant Professors (Nursing) and
Demonstrators in Nursing Colleges. These positions are not comparable
to those of lady supervisors in the implementation of the ICDS. The
record demonstrated that both boys and girls could be admitted to
Nursing Colleges to study nursing courses. Therefore, the Court
concluded that reserving posts of Assistant Professor or Demonstrator
solely for women would be constitutionally impermissible. While there
is no difficulty with this view, considering the nature and duties of such
posts, the broad assertions about Articles 15 and 16 operating
exclusively in separate spheres, or that Article 15 does not apply to
public employment, are views with which we respectfully dissent.
75. At least, prima facie, we do not agree that the ceiling of 50%
would be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
Paragraph 514 of Indra Swahney (supra) has to be read contextually.
The sentence that "Article 15(3) cannot save the situation since all
reservations in the services under the State can only be made under
Article 16" was made in the context of the apprehension that women
from advanced classes will secure all the posts, leaving those from
backward classes without any. The Court noted that this could amount
to indirectly providing a statutory reservation for the advanced classes
as such, which was impermissible under any of the provisions of Article
16.
76. In this paragraph itself, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that
there was no doubt that women are a vulnerable section of society,
whatever the strata to which they belong. They are more disadvantaged
than men in their own social class. Hence, reservations for them on that
ground would be fully justified if they are kept in the quota of the
respective class, as for other categories of persons, as explained above.
Besides, paragraph 812 of Indra Swahney (supra) clarified that the
rule of 50% applies only to reservations in favour of backward classes
made under Article 16(4). The Hon'ble Court, after explaining the
concept of vertical and horizontal reservations, held that this rule of
50% is primarily relatable to reservations in favour of backward classes
made under Article 16(4).
77. For all the above reasons, we hold that this was not a fit case for
the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity
of the provision under the 2019 Rules, either in creating the posts of
Lady Supervisors or in requiring that such posts be filled only by
women. In any event, at least, prima facie, we do not think that such a
provision violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, either
because it discriminates only based on sex or because it purports to
exceed the 50% reservation limit.
78. As noted earlier, the learned counsel for the parties argued that
we should consider the issue of confirmation or vacation of the interim
relief granted by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 28.08.2025.
This order, as noted earlier, states that the same was being made
"considering that 100% reserved has been provided for the post of
Lady Supervisor". There is no other reason reflected in the order dated
28.08.2025. There is also no discussion on the balance of convenience
or irreparable loss. The prima facie view on unconstitutionality, though
not reflected in this order, could be said to be reflected in the later order
dated 19.12.2025.
79. The record bears out that the selection process was substantially
advanced. Most of the results were already declared. A select list was
also prepared. The stay order was issued at the stage when
certificates/documents of selected candidates were being verified.
Normally, unless a very strong case of unconstitutionality is made out
and further the balance of convenience and irreparable loss tests are
evaluated, a substantially advanced recruitment process is not stayed.
80. The posts of Lady Supervisors are important for the operation of
ICDS. Keeping such posts vacant would not be in the interest of
ameliorating the condition of women and small children, for whom the
ICDS is designed. If, ultimately, the petitions are dismissed, not only
would the selected candidates have been deprived of the appointments
to which they were legitimately entitled, but public interest would also
suffer in the meantime.
81. If, however, the petitions succeed, appropriate orders can always
be made to reconsider the petitioners' candidatures, and if they are
deemed more meritorious than the selected and appointed candidates,
the appointments already made can be displaced if necessary.
Therefore, even the balance of convenience supports the lifting of the
blanket stay and specifying that the appointments shall be subject to the
outcome of the petitions, so that the appointees cannot claim any
equities. With this, there would be no question of any irreparable loss to
the petitioners.
82. Considering the view we have now adopted that this was not a
suitable case for the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction, and the prima
facie view on the issue of constitutionality, we see no grounds or
justification for the stay order on the making of further appointments.
As noted earlier, the stay was issued only because the Learned Single
Judge felt that allowing only women to be considered for appointments
to the posts of lady supervisors to implement ICDS was constitutionally
vulnerable. Now, there is a distinct variation of circumstance, given our
prima facie view on this issue. The balance-of-convenience and
irreparable-loss tests also do not support the grant or continuance of
such a stay order. Only since the other issues raised by the petitioner
need to be examined by the learned Single Judge, can a direction be
issued to make the appointments subject to the outcome of the petitions,
so that the appointees have no claim to any equity.
83. Accordingly, for all the above reasons, we pass the following
orders: -
(a) We hold that in the facts and circumstances of the present
matters, this was not a fit case for the exercise of suo motu
powers to go into the issues of constitutional validity of the
provisions in the 2019 Rules, either in creating the posts of
Lady Supervisors or considering the candidatures of only
women to fill up such posts.
(b) In any event, we hold that the above-referred provision under
the 2019 Rules is not prima facie, ultra vires or violative of
any Constitutional provisions, including Articles 14 and 16.
(c) The interim order granted on 28.08.2025 restraining the
making of appointments to the posts of Lady Supervisors is
hereby vacated. However, we direct that the appointments, if
any, shall be subject to the outcome of the writ petitions and
that this be clearly stated in the appointment orders to be
issued to the appointees, so that there are no claims for
equities based upon such appointments.
84. These petitions are now returned to the learned Single Judge for a
decision on the issues raised by the petitioners regarding their exclusion
from consideration for the posts of Lady Supervisors. We clarify that
we have not considered this issue at the request of the learned counsel
for the parties and, therefore, all contentions of all parties in this regard
are left open to be decided by the learned Single Judge.
85. We express gratitude to the learned Amicus Curiae and the
learned counsel who appeared and assisted the Court in this matter.
86. The Registry to immediately place the case papers in these
petitions before the learned Single Judge.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
March 24, 2026
A.F.R.
Manoj/Sharda/Cp.2
Uploaded on 24.03.2026
