[Cites 21, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
Bihar State Power Holding Company Ltd. ... vs The Chairman Cum Managing Director on 12 March, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2026:JHHC:6780-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.825 of 2025
------
Bihar State Power Holding Company Ltd. having its registered office
at Vidyut Bhawan Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Patna-800001 through
its Chairman-cum-Managing Director.
.... .... Appellant
(Petitioner in writ petition)
Versus
1. The Chairman cum Managing Director, Jharkhand Urja Vikas
Nigam Ltd., having its office at Nepal House Compound, P.O.-
Hinoo Town & Dist.-Ranchi, P.S.-Jagannathpur.
2. Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. through its Secretary, having its
office at Nepal House Compound, P.O.-Hinoo Ranchi, P.S.-
Jagannathpur.
3. Mr. Rajib Ranjan, Chairman Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd., at
present residing at Macon Guest House, Ranchi, P.O and P.S.-
Doranda
4. The Electricity Superintending Engineer, Electric Supply Circle,
Jamshedpur, P.O. and P.S.-Bistupur
5. The Electrical Executive Engineer, Adityapur, Jamshedpur, P.O. &
P.S.-Adityapur.
6. M/s Usha Martin limited, an existing company within the meaning
of the Companies Act 1956, having its registered office at 2A,
Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata-700071 (also having its office at
Tatiilwai-835103, Ranchi) through its General Manager and/or
Principal Officer Nand Kishore Patodia, resident of Deputy Para,
P.S. Lalpur, Ranchi
.... .... Respondents
With
L.P.A. No.828 of 2025
------
1. Bihar State Power Holding Company Ltd. having its registered
office at Vidyut Bhawan, Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, P.O-GPO &
P.S-Patliputra, Patna-800001 through its Chairman-cum-
1
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Managing Director.
2. Chairman cum Managing Director, Bihar State Power Holding
Company Ltd. having its registered office at Jawahar Lal Nehru
(Bailey Road), P.O.-GPO & P.S-Patliputra, Patna-800001.
.... .... Appellants
(Respondent Nos.1&2 in Writ petition)
Versus
1. M/s Usha Martin limited, an existing company within the meaning
of the Companies Act 1956, having its registered office at 2A,
Shakespeare Sarani, (also having its office at Tatiilwai-835103,
Ranchi) through its General Manager and/or Principal Officer
Nand Kishore Patodia, resident of Deputy Para, P.S. Lalpur, P.O.-
Lalpur, Ranchi
2. Nand Kishore Patodia, S/o Late R.D Patodia, residing at Deputy
Para, P.O-Lalpur, P.S. Lalpur, Ranchi.
.... .... Respondents
(Petitioner Nos.1&2 in Writ Petition)
3. Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. & Electricity Board within the
meaning of section 5 of Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 duly
constituted u/s 62 of the Bihar Re-organisation Act, having its
office at Nepal House Area, P.O-Doranda, P.S.-Doranda,
Doranda, Ranchi.
4. Secretary, JUVNL, having its office at Nepal House Area, P.O-
Doranda, P.S.-Doranda, Doranda, Ranchi.
.... .... Respondents
(Respondent Nos.3&4 in Writ Petition)
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
------
For the Appellants : Mr. Umesh Prasad Singh, Sr. Adv.
(Through V.C.)
: Mr. Manoj Tandon, Advocate
: Ms. Neha Bhardwaj, Advocate
(In Both the appeals)
2
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For Resp. No.6 : Mr. M.S. Mittal, Senior Advocate
Mr. Salona Mittal, Advocate
(In L.P.A. No.825 of 2025)
For the JUVNL : Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Advocate General
: Mr. Mrinal Kanti Roy, Sr. S.C.
Mr. Rishi Ranjan Vats, Advocate
Mr. Parul Parasar, Advocate
For Resp. Nos.1&2 : Mr. M.S. Mittal, Senior Advocate
Mr. Salona Mittal, Advocate
(In L.P.A. No.828 of 2025)
------
C.A.V. on 09.02.2026 Pronounced on 12/03/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer
1. Since both the appeals arising out of common order/judgment
dated 04.09.2025, as such, with the consent of learned counsel
for the parties, these cases are being taken up together and
are being disposed of by this common order/judgment.
2. Both these appeals, have been preferred under Clause-10 of
the Letters Patent, are directed against the common
order/judgment dated 04.09.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.5750
of 2001 (impugned in L.P.A. No.825 of 2025) and W.P.(C)
No.4374 of 2001 (impugned in L.P.A. No.828 of 2025),
whereby and whereunder, the writ petition being W.P.(C)
No.5750 of 2001 filed by the B.S.E.B. has been dismissed and
writ petition being W.P.(C) No.4374 of 2001 filed by the Usha
Martin Limited has been allowed, directing the B.S.E.B. to
refund the amount of Rs.5 Crore to the petitioner-Usha Martin
Ltd. with interest at the rate of 7.5 per cent per annum.
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Factual Matrix
3. Since the similar issues are involved in both the cases, as such,
for the sake of convenience, the brief facts of one of the cases,
are being referred hereinbelow.
4. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ
petition being W.P.(C) No.4374 of 2001, required to be
enumerated, which read as under: -
(i) It is the case of the writ petitioner (W.P.(C) No.4374 of
2001) that the writ petitioner-M/s Usha Martin Limited is a
company. The respondent Nos.1 and 3 to the writ petition are
Electricity Boards within the meaning of Section 5 of the
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. On or about 14th of January 2000,
the respondent no.1 has disconnected electricity supply to the
Steel Melting Shop at the factory premises of the writ petitioner at
Jamshedpur alleging that the petitioner no.1 to the writ petition,
i.e., M/s Usha Martin Limited, was pilfering electricity.
(ii) On 17th January 2000 the respondent no.1 raised a
provisional compensatory bill upon the petitioner no.1 for a sum
of Rs.40,39,50,747/- under the provisions of clause 16.9 of the
Tariff. The petitioner craves leave to refer to a copy of the said
provisional compensatory bill dated 17th January 2000 at the
time of hearing of this petition, if necessary.
(iii) Further, challenging the disconnection electricity
effected on the 14th January 2000 and also challenging the said
provisional compensatory bill dated 17th January 2000 for
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Rs.40,39,50,747/- the petitioner no.1 (M/s Usha Martin Limited)
instituted a writ petition being CWJC No.223 of 2000 (R). The
said CWJC No.223 of 2000 (R) was disposed of vide order dated
27th January 2000 which inter alia provides as follows:-
"The impugned bill is, therefore, quashed giving
liberty to the respondent Board to raise a fresh
bill after giving opportunity of hearing to the
petitioners. The petitioners instead of waiting for
show cause notice, shall file a detailed
objection/representation to the inspection report
before the General Manager cum Chief Engineer,
Singhbhum Area, Jamshedpur within two weeks
from today."
"I am of the opinion that for the ends of justice it
would be proper for the Board to restore the
supply of electricity in the event the petitioner
deposit with the Board a sum of Rs.5 crore in
cash and bank guarantee for a sum of Rs.15
crore from Nationalised Bank. Accordingly I direct
the respondent Board to restore the supply of
electricity in the factory premises of the petitioner
within 24 hours from the date of such deposit. It is
needless to say that in the event any liability of
the petitioner is found for payment of additional
amount then the same shall be adjusted out of
the amount deposited by the petitioner and in the
event the petitioner is not found liable to pay any
additional amount to the Board then the amount
deposited in cash as well as bank guarantee shall
be refunded to the petitioner."
(iv) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order
dated 27th January 2000, the petitioner no.1 preferred LPA No.25
of 2000 (R) which was disposed vide order dated 3rd February
2000. In terms of the said order dated 27th January 2000 as
modified on 3rd February 2000 the petitioner no.1 duly made
payment of Rs.5 crores to the respondent no.1 whereupon
electricity connection to the said factory of the petitioner no.1 was
restored by the respondent. In terms of the said order dated 27th
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January 2000, the petitioner no.1 also furnished a bank
guarantee to the respondent no.1 for a sum of Rs.15 crores."
(v) The disputes between the petitioner no. 1 and the
respondent no.1 had been referred for adjudication by the
General Manager cum Chief Engineer, Singhbhum Area,
thereafter, petitioner duly made a representation before the said
General Manager cum Chief Engineer, Singhbhum Area of the
respondent no.1 and the adjudication proceedings before the said
General Manager cum chief Engineer duly commenced. The
petitioner no.1 instituted yet another writ petition being CWJC
No.1397 of 2000 (R).
(vi) The CWJC No.1397 of 2000 (R) was dismissed vide order
dated 14th July, 2000. Being aggrieved with the said order dated
14.07.2000 passed in CWJC No. 1397 of 2000 (R), the petitioner
preferred an appeal being LPA No.256 of 2000 (R).
(vii) While the said LPA No.256 of 2000 (R) was pending w.e.f
15th November 2000, a new State of Jharkhand was created by
virtue of the Bihar Reorganization Act. After the creation of the
new State of Jharkhand, the State Government has constituted
Jharkhand State Electricity Board, the respondent no.3 to the writ
petition by issuance of notification.
(viii) Thereafter, the Jharkhand State Electricity Board had
already came into existence while the said LPA No.256 of
2000(R) was pending. The order dated 21.03.2001 was passed
inter-alia adding the Jharkhand State Electricity Board as a party
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to the said LPA No.256 of 2000 (R).
(ix) The said LPA No.256 of 2000 (R) was disposed of vide
order dated 11th April 2001 by directing inter alia as follows:-
"The judgment of the learned Single Judge
dated 27-1-2000 passed in CWJC No.223 of
2000 (R) is modified only to the limited extent
that the adjudication, as ordered in paragraph
13 of that judgment, shall now be done by the
Chairman, Jharkhand State Electricity Board,
Ranchi, in place of the General Manager cum
Chief Engineer, Singhbhum Area,
Jamshedpur."
(x) In terms of the said order dated 11th April 2001 the
adjudication proceedings duly commenced before Sri Rajiv
Ranjan, Chairman, Jharkhand State Electricity Board. The
petitioner No.1 and the respondents nos.1 and 3 duly appeared
before the said Chairman, Electricity Board and made elaborate
submissions and representations. The Chairman, Jharkhand
State Electricity Board duly adjudicated upon the disputes
between the parties and made his order in respect thereof on 4th
August 2001. The said order dated 4th August 2001 inter alia
provides as follows:-
"I have carefully examined technical and analytical
part of the FIR, the Inspection Report, the
representations made by Usha Beltron, various
written submissions to the General Manager-cum-
Chief Engineer and to the undersigned and the
presentations, arguments and submissions made by
Bihar State Electricity Board and Jharkhand State
Electricity Board during the course of the hearing in
my office. I conclude as follows:
a) The allegations as contained in the Inspection
Reports and FIR of Bihar State Electricity Board
lack correct information, inadequate in
knowledge on technical matters in the area of
steel making, steel making equipments and
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distribution of load, demand etc. It cannot be
relied upon to prima facie make a case of alleged
theft or pilferage of electricity against Usha
Beltron.
b) In none of the Inspection Reports any allegation
has been made and only some observations of
subjective nature have been recorded. Inspection
Reports also do not mention detection of
unauthorized load during the course of
inspection. In the technical analysis of FIR, the
allegation was primarily based on determination
of undisclosed additional quantity billet
production allegedly with stolen power. BSEB
overlooked the need to take clarification from the
company if any billet has been purchased over
and above Usha Beltron's own production. The
conclusive proof of the fact that no undisclosed
additional steel billet has been produced shows
that allegation of pilferage of electricity is not
correct.
c) While the FIR it has not been mentioned but later
on written submission has been made regarding
using bamboo poles for hooking 33 KV line,
which in the opinion of General Manager cum
Chief Engineer is not technically feasible in the
present case. No prima facie case of the theft or
pilferage electricity is made on this ground.
d) The consumption of electrical energy recorded by
the metering equipment at the premises of the
Steel Plant of Usha Beltron also tallies with the
record maintained at the Gamharia substation
during the allegation period and this is
considered as a technically sound proof of the
fact that there has been no pilferage of electricity
by Usha Beltron.
e) The 12 months record post reconnection and
switching over to 132 KV system and
incoporating calibrated double electronic meters
at the Steel plant end as well as Gamharia
substation end clearly shows that both in terms of
energy consumption norm an demand it is
consistent with the allegation period. This is also
conclusive technical evidence that neither there
has been a pilferage of unmetered energy nor
there has been any unauthorised demand
increase.
Thus, in my considered opinion, the allegation of
theft or and or pilferage of electricity and or
unauthorized increase in load by Usha Beltron
Limited has been wrongly made.
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I thus conclude that no fresh bill under clause
16.9 is to be raised for the reasons as mentioned
above. Hon'ble Justice M.Y. Eqbal of the Patna
High Court Ranchi Bench vide his order in CWJC
No.223 of 2000 (R) had directed that if the
petitioner is not found liable to pay, then the
amount deposited by the petitioner in cash as
well as Bank Guarantee shall be refunded to the
petitioner.
Since the petitioner has not been found liable, I
direct Bihar State Electricity Board to refund Rs.5
crores (Rupees Five Crores) deposited with them
in cash to Usha Beltron Ltd., within 10 days from
the date of this order.
I am also permitting Usha Beltron Ltd., vide this
order, to cancel the Bank Guarantee of Rs.15
crores submitted to Bihar State Electricity Board."
Before passing of the said order on 4th August 2001 an
application had been filed by the Chairman, Jharkhand State
Electricity Board in LPA No. 256 of 2000 (R) for extension of time
to make his order. The said application was disposed of vide
order dated 07.08.2001 by extending and regularising the making
of the order dated 4th August 2001 beyond the time stipulated by
this Court. By the said order dated 4th August 2001 the
Chairman, Jharkhand State Electricity Board has categorically
and repeatedly held that the allegation of pilferage made by the
respondent no.1 was "wrongly made".
By the said order dated, Bihar State Electricity Board was
also directed to refund the sum of Rs.5 crores within ten days
from the date of the said order.
(xi) In spite of the said order dated 4th August 2001 and
although a period of ten days from the date thereof had expired
the respondent No.1 failed and neglected to make payment of the
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said sum of Rs.5 crores and to refund the same to the petitioner
no.1. By the letter dated 20th August, 2001 the petitioner no.1
has called upon the respondent no.1 to make payment of the said
sum of Rs.5 crores in terms of the order dated 04.08.2001
passed by the adjudicator. By the said letter the petitioner No. 1
also demanded from the Respondent No. 1 also demanded
interest from Respondent No. 1 @ 18% per annum to be
calculated with effect from 03.02.2000 till realisation. Although the
said letter dated 20.08.2001 was duly received by Respondent
No. 1, the Respondent No. 1 sat tight over the matter of making
refund of the said sum of Rs. 5 crores to the petitioner No. 1 and
as such the petitioner No. 1 again vide its Registered Letter dated
31.08.2001 demanded from the Respondent No. 1 the refund of
the said sum of Rs. 5 crores with interest @ 18 % per annum, but
the said refund has not been made to the petitioner No. 1 by the
Respondent No. 1.
(xii) It is the case of the petitioner no.1 that the respondent no.1
had wrongfully and illegally disconnected the electricity
connection of the petitioner no.1 and the petitioner No.1 in the
process was compelled, inter alia, to make payment of the said
sum of Rs.5 crores as a condition precedent for obtaining
restoration of electricity supply. Even after it had been established
and held that there was no pilferage of electricity by the petitioner
No. 1 and although the said order dated 4th August 2001
specifically directs the respondent no.1 to refund the said sum of
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Rs.5 crores to the petitioner no.1 the respondent no.1 has
wrongfully, illegally and with a malafide motive and intention failed
to refund the said sum of Rs.5 crores to the petitioner no.1.
(xiii) The respondent no. 1 has reaped the benefit of the
said sum of Rs.5 crores deposited with it on 03.02.2000 in terms
of the orders dated 27th January 2000 as modified on 3rd
February 2000. Inasmuch as it has now been decided and
adjudicated that the respondent no.1 had wrongfully
disconnected electricity to the factory premises of the petitioner
No. 1 on 14th January 2000 and it is just proper and necessary
that the respondent no.1 be directed to pay interest on the said
sum of Rs.5 crores to the petitioner no.1 calculated from the date
03.02.2000 till the date of refund.
(xiv) Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order 04.08.2001, writ
petition being W.P.(C) No.5750/2001 was filed by the B.S.E.B. to
quash the order dated 04.08.2001 and W.P.(C) No.4374/2001 has
been filed by the M/s Usha Martin Limited Company to direct
respondent B.S.E.B. to comply with the order dated 04.08.2001
and to refund the amount of 5 crores.
(xv) The learned Single Judge vide order dated 04.09.2025
dismissed the writ petition filed by the B.S.E.B., i.e., W.P.(C)
No.5750 of 2001 and allowed the writ petition filed by the M/s
Usha Martin Limited, i.e., W.P.(C) No.4374 of 2001, which is the
subject matter of the instant appeals.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the Appellants-
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B.S.P.H.C.L.
5. Mr. Umesh Prasad Singh, learned senior counsel for the
appellants, in both the appeals, has taken the following grounds
in assailing the impugned judgment:-
(i) Learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact
that the principle of natural justice has grossly been
violated by the adjudicator.
(ii) The enquiry committee was constituted by the
order passed by this Court, vide order dated 11.04.2001
passed in LPA No.256/2000(R) but later on, an order
was passed in WP(C) No.2434 of 2001, by which, it has
been directed that committee constituted shall not
function but the learned adjudicator has acted upon the
report of one of the member of the said committee,
namely, S.N. Dwivedi and has passed the order but the
copy of said report has not been supplied to the
appellant at the evidence/argument stage and as such,
serious prejudice has been caused, since, the said
report could not have been gone through and in that
way, no rebuttal has been pointed out before the
adjudicator.
(iii) The aforesaid specific ground has been raised
before the learned Single Judge but the same has not
been considered in right perspective, rather, only on the
issue that the appellant is to show the prejudice if any
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caused due to non-supply of the said report order
impugned has been passed, by which, writ petition filed
by the appellant has been dismissed.
(iv) It has been contended that the learned Single
Judge has also not appreciated the fact properly that the
said report of S.N. Dwivedi, which has been taken into
consideration by the adjudicator, and based upon that,
the order dated 04.08.2001 was passed, hence, non-
supply of the said report at the argument/evidence stage
has seriously prejudiced the case of the appellants.
(v) The contention has been raised that even
otherwise also, it is the principle of Audi alteram partem,
i.e., if any document is being taken by any adjudicator or
the quasi-judicial functionary or the Court of law, then,
the same is to be provided to the other side on the
principle that the person cannot be condemned without
providing an adequate and sufficient opportunity. But
due to non-supply of the said report, the order has been
passed by the adjudicator, hence, the order passed by
the adjudicator cannot be said to be proper but the
aforesaid fact having not been taken into consideration
by the learned Single Judge and as such, the order
passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from an
error and hence, is fit to be set aside.
(vi) Reliance upon the following judgments rendered
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by the Hon'ble Apex Court on the issue of compliance of
the principle of natural justice, has been made:
(i) A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC
262;
(ii) Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, (1970) 2 SCC 458;
(iii) St. Anthony's College v. Rev. Fr. Paul Petta,
1988 Supp. SCC 676;
(iv) Uma Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., (2009) 12
SCC 40;
(v) SBI v. Rajesh Agarwal, (2023) 6 SCC 1
Submissions of the learned counsel for the Respondent-writ
petitioner
6. Per contra, Mr. M.S. Mittal, learned senior counsel for the
respondent-writ petitioner (Usha Martin Ltd.) has taken the
following grounds in defending the impugned judgment: -
(i) The consideration has been given by the learned
Single Judge of causing prejudice due to non-supply of
the enquiry report and by holding therein that the
appellant has not raised any issue of causing prejudice
due to non-supply of the enquiry report and as such,
merely because the enquiry report has not been
submitted, the order passed by the adjudicator, cannot
be said to suffer from an error, which fact has been
taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge,
while dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.
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(ii) The learned Single Judge has not committed any
error while passing the impugned judgment, since, the
enquiry report has not at all has been taken into
consideration by the adjudicator, rather, the adjudicator
has applied its own independent mind, as would be
evident from the face of the order passed by the
adjudicator (impugned before the learned Single Judge)
and as such, taking the ground that the copy of the
enquiry report since has not been supplied to the
appellant, a serious prejudice has been caused, is not
proper to be accepted.
(iii) Learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the
judgments in order to strengthen the argument that in a
case, if the documents have not been supplied, then, a
prejudice is shown to be there, which is to be shown by
the litigant concerned, the appellant herein.
(iv) It has been contended that merely reference to a
document, without placing any much reliance thereupon
does not attract the requirement of mandatory disclosure
and in the absence of demonstrated prejudice, the plea
of violation of natural justice is misconceived.
(v) In order to fortify this limb of argument the learned
counsel for respondent has relied upon the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State
of Uttar Pradesh Vrs. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19
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SCC 706 and Shadi Lal Gupta Vs. State of Punjab,
(1973) 1 SCC 680.
Submission of the learned counsel for the JUVNL
7. JUVNL is also the respondent, who is being represented by Mr.
Rajiv Ranjan, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. Mrinal Kanti
Roy, Advocate.
8. It has been submitted by him that it is contest in between the
appellant and the respondent-writ petitioner and as such, he is to
say nothing but so far as the prayer made in the instant appeals
that in case of any adverse order of refund, the amount which has
been deposited in the coffers of the appellant is required to be
refunded.
9. Learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that the same is
not acceptable, since, as per the MoU in between the appellant
and the respondent-writ petitioner, both are the parties relevant to
the proceeding and once the amount has been accepted by the
appellant in case of direction for refund, the same will be the
liability of the appellant.
Analysis
10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, gone through
the pleadings and the finding recorded by the learned Single
Judge in the impugned judgment as also the documents available
on records.
11. This Court, needs to first consider the following issues;
(i) Whether due to non-supply of the report of SN.
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Dwivedi on the basis of which the adjudicator passed
the order dated 04.08.2001, can be said to be in the
teeth of the principle of Audi alteram partem.
(ii) Whether non-supply of the said report having not been
supplied in favour of the appellant, then, will it not be
said that the order passed by this Court has been
defied.
(iii) Whether accepting the plea taken by the respondent
showing the issue of prejudice due to non-supply of
the said report, will it not amount to frustrating the
order passed by the High Court for just and proper of
the adjudication, the enquiry committee was
constituted that to with the consent of the parties,
since, both the parties have accepted the order.
(iv) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the prejudice is not available on the face of the order if
the document which has not been supplied to the
appellant, is prevail upon in the matter of decision
making by the adjudicator.
12. Since all the issues are interlinked and as such, the same are
being taken up together.
13. This Court, before considering the aforesaid issues, thought it
proper to refer the underlying principle of the observance of
principle of nature justice.
14. We need to bear in mind that the principles of natural justice are
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not mere legal formalities. They constitute substantive obligations
that need to be followed by decision-making and adjudicating
authorities. The principles of natural justice act as a guarantee
against arbitrary action, both in terms of procedure and
substance, by judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative
authorities.
15. Two fundamental principles of natural justice are entrenched in
Indian jurisprudence : (i) nemo judex in causa sua, which means
that no person should be a Judge in their own cause; and (ii) audi
alteram partem, which means that a person affected by
administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial action must be heard
before a decision is taken.
16. The courts generally favour interpretation of a statutory provision
consistent with the principles of natural justice because it is
presumed that the statutory authorities do not intend to
contravene fundamental rights. Application of the said principles
depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, express
language and basic scheme of the statute under which the
administrative power is exercised, the nature and purpose for
which the power is conferred, and the final effect of the exercise
of that power, reference in this regard be made to judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court Union of India v. J.N. Sinha
(supra) .
17. It needs to refer herein that before casting liability upon one or
the other, the requirement is to provide effective opportunity of
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hearing to the party concerned before taking any adverse
decision which leads to civil consequence.
18. Further, the law has been laid down that even though, there is no
stipulation of observance of principle of natural justice in the
statutory provision, but it will be said to be string to the statutory
provision for the reason that if any decision is being taken which
leads to civil consequence, then the mandatory requirement to
follow the cardinal principles of natural justice, as has been held
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, relevant paragraph of the aforesaid
judgment is being quoted as under:
"221. It is well established that even where there is no
specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for
showing cause against action proposed to be taken against
an individual, which affects the rights of that individual, the
duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be
implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the
authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging
action. This principle was laid down by this Court in the State
of Orissa v. Dr (Miss) Binapani Dei [AIR 1967 SC 1269, 1271
: (1967) 2 SCR 625 : (1967) 2 LLJ 266] in the following
words: "The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is
intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to
judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with
authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil
consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our
constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against
exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty
to act judicially would, therefore arise from the very nature of
the function intended to be performed: it need not be shown
to be superadded. If there is power to decide and determine
to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in
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the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be
ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made,
the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law
and importance thereof transcends the significance of a
decision in any particular case."
19. Further, in the case of Rajesh Kumar v. CIT, (2007) 2 SCC 181
the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed which is being quoted as
under:
"30. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC
664] Chinnappa Reddy, J., in his dissenting judgment
summarised the legal position in the following terms: (SCC
pp. 712-13, para 106)
"106. The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in
the judicial conscience of our people, nurtured by Binapani
[(1967) 2 SCR 625 : AIR 1967 SC 1269] , Kraipak [A.K.
Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262] , Mohinder
Singh Gill [Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr.,
(1978) 1 SCC 405] , Maneka Gandhi [Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] . They are now considered
so fundamental as to be 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' and, therefore, implicit in every decision-making
function, call it judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where
authority functions under a statute and the statute provides
for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a
particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in
that manner and in no other. No wider right than that
provided by statute can be claimed nor can the right be
narrowed. Where the statute is silent about the observance
of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is
taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural
justice. The implication of natural justice being presumptive it
may be excluded by express words of statute or by
necessary intendment. Where the conflict is between the
public interest and the private interest, the presumption must
necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily
displaced."
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20. Further from the date of rendering the judgment in the case of
Maneka Gandhi Vrs. Union of India and Anr. (supra), the
concept of the 'principle of natural justice' has become
broadened by way of consideration made by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the subsequent judgments holding therein that even if
the reason is not there in the decision taken by the adjudicator,
the same will amount to violation of principle of natural justice,
since, reason has been said to be the soul of the order,
reference in this regard may be made to the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Raj
Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, (2003) 11 SCC 519, wherein, it
has been held at paragraph-19 as under:
"... ... ...Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion.
Without the same, it becomes lifeless. ... ..."
21. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kranti
Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC
496, wherein, at paragraph- 47, it has been held as under:
"47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record
reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions
affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of
its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the
wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it
must also appear to be done as well.
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(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on
any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or
even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the
decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a
component of a decision-making process as observing
principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even
by administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior
courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule
of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned
decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood
of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is
the soul of justice..... ...... ....."
22. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also dealt with the issue
that there is no straight-jacket formula in observing the
principle of natural justice, rather, it is to be tested on the basis
of the facts involved in any individual cases.
23. The principle of natural justice is not to be followed in a case
where there is no chance of change in the final outcome even
if the opportunity would have been given to the person
concerned on the principle of empty formality and futile
exercise and in such circumstances, the principle of natural
justice is not to be followed, reference in this regard may be
made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon
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Division, Nainital, U.P. & Others, [(2004) 4 SCC 281]
wherein, at paragraph-64 it has been observed which is
quoted hereunder:-
"64. ... ... Rules of natural justice are to be followed for doing
substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of
hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of
the case on merits. In view of the legal position explained by
us above, we, therefore, refrain from remanding these cases
in exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India."
24. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v.
Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors. [(2015) 8
SCC 519] has taken similar view at paragraph-45 which reads as
under: -
"45. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles in mind, even
when we find that there is an infraction of principles of natural
justice, we have to address a further question as to whether
any purpose would be served in remitting the case to the
authority to make fresh demand of amount recoverable, only
after issuing notice to show cause to the appellant. In the
facts of the present case, we find that such an exercise
would be totally futile having regard to the law laid down by
this Court in R.C. Tobacco [(2005) 7 SCC 725]."
25. The reference of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vrs. Mohd.
Ramzan Khan, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 is to be taken into
consideration. Although, the judgment rendered in the case of
Md. Ramzan (supra) was based upon the factual aspects in
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the case of departmental proceeding on the fact that due to
non-supply of 2nd show cause notice, the entire departmental
proceedings will be vitiated. But the said proposition has been
diluted by the Hon'ble Apex in the judgment rendered in the
case of Managing Director ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. Vrs.
B. Karunakar and Ors., reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727,
wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the issue of
prejudice that due to non-supply of the show cause notice, the
prejudice is required to be shown by the delinquent employee,
then, only the Departmental proceeding will be vitiated in the
eye of law.
26. The factual aspect of the Managing Director ECIL, Hydrabad Vs.
B. Karunakar (supra) which was the consideration made by the
Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court after having been
referred for consideration of the judgment rendered in the case of
Union of India Ors Vs. Mohd. Ramzan (supra) has laid down the
proposition, in which circumstances, due to non-supply of enquiry
report and non-issuance of second show cause notice the
departmental proceeding will be vitiated. The relevant consideration
has been made at paragraph 31 of the said judgment, which reads
as under:
"31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is
not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary
proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy
of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he
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has not already secured it before coming to the
Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show
how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-
supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the
Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of
the report would have made no difference to the ultimate
findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should
not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal
should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment
on the ground that the report was not furnished as is
regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid
resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which
will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their
reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of
punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional
authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles
of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It
is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the
report would have made a difference to the result in the case
that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after
following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside
the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be
granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty
to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by
placing the employee under suspension and continuing the
inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The
question whether the employee would be entitled to the back
wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to
the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should
invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned
according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings
and depending on the final outcome. If the employee
succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated,
the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law
how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the
reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of
the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a
result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish
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the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the
purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of
furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry
is held. That will also be the correct position in law."
27. After having referred the judgment as hereinabove, which is
relevant for appreciation of the argument advanced on behalf
of the parties, this Court, again needs to refer herein the
certain admitted facts for better appreciation of the factual
aspect.
28. The dispute with respect to exaggerated billing for a sum of
Rs.40,39,50,747/- under the provisions of clause 16.9 of the
Tariff on the allegation of theft of electricity by the respondent-
writ petitioner, is the subject matter.
29. It is evident that inspection was carried out in the premises of
consumer M/s. Usha Beltron Limited (now Usha Martin Limited) (writ
petitioner of 4374 of 2001) at the Adityapur Industrial Area,
Jamshedpur by the B.S.E.B on 04/12/1999 and 13/01/2000. It was
alleged that there was unauthorized use of theft and consequently
FIR was lodged being FIR No. 2/2000 at Gamharia PS. The Line
was disconnected on 13.01.2000. The Bihar State Electricity Board
raised a provisional compensatory bill on 17.01.2000 for a sum of
Rs.40.39,50,747.00 under Clause 16.9 of the Tariff.
30. The respondent-writ petitioner has approached to this Court
challenging the bill by filing series of litigations.
31. The consumer M/s. Usha Beltron Limited (now Usha Martin Limited)
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filed a writ petition being CWJC No. 223/2000 (R) and this Court,
vide order dated 27.01.2000 had set aside the impugned bill of
Rs.40.39,50,747.00 primarily on the reason that no opportunity was
given to the petitioner prior to raising of the bill to show cause as to
why it should not be saddled with the liability of the aforesaid
amount on account of theft of electricity and liberty was given to the
Respondent Board (appellant herein) to raise a fresh bill after giving
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner(respondent herein).
32. The petitioner (respondent Usha Martin herein) filed a LPA against
this order being LPA No. 25/2000 and vide order dated 03.02.2000
the order under appeal was modified to the extent that a sum of
Rs.5.00 crore shall be deposited on the very next date and on such
deposit, the electricity line was to be restored within 12 hours and
the Bank Guarantee was to be deposited by 11.02.2000 and it has
further been observed that if the Bank Guarantee is not deposited
within the fixed time, then the amount of Rs.5.00 crores, so
deposited by the appellants, shall be adjusted against the future
bills.
33. In pursuant to the said order Petitioner filed a detailed
Representation before the General Manager cum Chief Engineer,
Bihar State Electricity Board, Singhbhum Area, Jamshedpur and
requested to pass a reasoned Order after giving an opportunity of
hearing to the Writ Petitioner (Usha Martin Limited).
34. The petitioner (respondent company herein) again filed a writ
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petition being CWJC No. 1397/2000 (R) for revoking the authority of
the General Manager cum Chief Engineer to adjudicate the dispute
raised by the petitioner mainly on the ground that he had denied to
follow the principles of natural justice, however, the Hon'ble Court
did not entertain the writ petition and dispose of the same, vide
order dated 14.07.2000.
35. The Division Bench of this court in LPA No. 256/2000 (R) vide order
dated 11.04.2001 directed that the Chairman of Jharkhand State
Electricity Board to adjudicate upon the dispute and pass order
accordingly, for ready reference, the relevant portion is quoted
herein below :-
"The Learned Counsel for the parties submit and agree that
instead of the General Manager cum Chief Engineer,
Singhbhum Area, Jamshedpur as was directed by the
learned Single Judge, the adjudication of the dispute should
be taken place with the Chairman, Jharkhand State
Electricity Board. The appellants will not have any objection
to the Chairman, Jharkhand State Electricity Board,
adjudicating upon the dispute forming the subject matter of
CWJC No. 223 of 2000 (R)."
36. Simultaneously, this Court has further passed an order that the
Chairman, J.S.E.B. to take assistance of the technical person
who shall be of the rank of General Manager-cum-Chief
Engineer.
37. It is a case of the appellant that the adjudicator (Chairman of
the J.S.E.B.) has privately availed the service of one S.N.
Dwivedi, General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer and on the
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basis of report submitted by him, adjudicator passed order
dated 04.08.2001.
38. It is evident that the various orders have been passed by the
High Court from time to time, wherein, the issue of constitution
of committee has also been taken note. The adjudicator, while
deciding the issue, has also considered the finding recorded
by Mr. S.N. Dwivedi, as would be evident from the part of the
order of the adjudicator, as available at page-66 & 67 to the
writ petition being W.P.(C) No.4374 of 2001, for ready
reference, the relevant part being (b) and (e) of the order dated
04.08.2001, is being referred as under:-
b) Keeping in consideration the Hon'ble High Court, Ranchi
Bench's Order in CWJC 223 of 2000 (R) and LPA No. 256 of
2000 (R) which authorized me to devise my own procedure
for conducting the proceedings in commence with the
principles of natural justice and taking into consideration the
technical complexity involved in the matter referred to me for
adjudication, vide orders No. 26 and 33 dated 7th May, 2001
and 11th May, 2001, I had constituted a committee consisting
of the following:
i. Mr. S.N. Dwivedi, General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer,
transmission Zone-1, Jharkhand State Electricity Board,
Ranchi as the Chairman.
ii. Mr. K.N. Choudhury, OSD to Chairman, Jharkhand State
Electricity Board.
iii.Mr. Kripal Singh, Assistant General Manager of MECON,
Ranchi
iv. Mr. S. V. Singh, Senior Manager (Electrical) of MECON,
Ranchi
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e) Consequent to the above order, I did not allow the
committee members to join the proceedings. However, as
directed by the Hon'ble High Court, in LPA No. 256 of 2000
(R), I have taken the assistance of Mr. S.N. Dwivedi, General
Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, Transmission Zone-1,
Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi to assist me in
technical matter related to this case.
I have followed the principles of natural justice during the
hearing and the parties were fully satisfied the way the
proceedings were conducted. All parties also agreed that I
can take the help of Mr. S.N. Dwivedi, General Manager-
cum-Chief Engineer, Transmission Zone-1, Jharkhand State
Electricity Board, Ranchi to assist me to come to a logical
conclusion in this case.
39. Thus, the fact about making reference of the said report on the
issue of theft of electricity cannot be disputed by the
respondent writ petitioner and has not been disputed, since,
the reference of finding of the enquiry report with respect to the
issue of theft has been taken note by the adjudicator and
based upon that, the conclusion has been arrived at that it is
not a case of theft and the consequential order was passed
saying that the bill is not proper.
40. The appellant has carried the said order by challenging it
before the writ Court, wherein, the specific ground has been
taken that due to non-supply of copy of the said report, a
serious prejudice has been caused and not only that, it is in
violation to the principle of natural justice.
41. The learned Single Judge has not agreed to such submission
by making an observation in the impugned judgment that the
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adjudicator has not taken into consideration the content of the
enquiry report and further, the prejudice could not have been
shown by the appellant, hence, merely because the copy of the
said report has not been supplied, the order passed by the
adjudicator, cannot be said to suffer from an error, which is the
subject matter of the present appeals.
42. We are now proceeding to consider the issues as have been
formulated hereinabove based upon the arguments advanced on
behalf of the parties and the settled position of law, as has been
enumerated in the judgments referred hereinabove.
43. The issue, i.e., due to non-supply of the copy of the report of S.N.
Dwivedi, no prejudice has been caused to the appellant is
concerned, this Court is of the view that if such contention will be
accepted, then, what will be the significance/implication of the
order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court and the
Coordinate Benches of this Court by relegating the matter to be
decided by the adjudicator and for his assistance, it has further
been directed that with respect to any technical aspect, it shall be
open for adjudicator to take help but such technical persons
should not be below the rank of the General Manager in the
Electricity Board.
44. The question of prejudice is to be taken into consideration if there
is no such direction passed by the Court of law but when the
Court of law has passed an order that too the High Court, here in
the present case directing the Chairman-cum-Managing Director
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to act as an adjudicator and for his assistance, a technical
person was directed to be consulted which itself clarifies that
this Court has also considered the seriousness of the issue and
more particularly, the proper adjudication of the issue based
upon the factual appreciation and on consideration of the
aforesaid aspect of the matter, the adjudicator was appointed .
45. The said technical person (S.N. Dwivedi) has also submitted a
report to the adjudicator but why the adjudicator has not
supplied the copy of the said report to the contesting party at
particular stage is not understandable that too, when the said
arrangement was made in pursuant to the order passed by this
Court.
46. The adjudicator once has been conferred with the power in
exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, then, it was the bounden duty to comply
with the order in entirety and not in piecemeal as he has acted
while passing an order, since, on the one hand, he has passed
an order in the capacity of adjudicator by adjudicating the issue
by acting on the report given by the technical person, while, on
the other hand, has not supplied the copy of the said report in
favour of the contesting party, the appellant herein.
47. Therefore, this Court is of the view that it cannot be said that
only because no prejudice has been caused, the copy of the
said report is not to be supplied to the contesting party,
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otherwise, the same will amounts to sitting upon the order
passed by the Division Bench of this Court, which is not
permissible.
48. Further, the question of prejudice is to be assessed from the
face of the order.
49. This Court, in order to assess the same, has gone through the
order passed by the adjudicator and found that the reference of
the said report has been made and not only that in the
conclusion part the most of thing has been concluded on the
basis of the said enquiry report.
50. Thus, the order passed by the adjudicator, is based upon the
finding of the said report, since, in the conclusion part, the
adjudicator has come to the conclusion based upon the finding
of the said report and has observed that it is not a case of theft
and basis upon that, all the consequential decision taken by
the licensee, the appellant herein, has been quashed and set
aside.
51. This Court, therefore, is of the view that if the prejudice is
apparent from the face of the order, then, there is no
requirement to consider with respect to the issue of raising the
prejudice as is being argued on behalf of the learned counsel
for the respondent-writ petitioner.
52. Further, this Court is of the view that our judicial system is
based upon the principle of fairness and transparency wherein
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it is utmost require that each and every document is to be
provided to the parties so as to mandatory disclosure of all the
factual aspects be made to the contesting respondents,
reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tea Takano Vrs.
Securities and Exchange Board of India, reported in (2022)
8 SCC 162, wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has affirmed that
quasi-judicial authorities must disclose all materials relied upon
during adjudication.
53. It cannot be disputed that keeping the party unaware of the
information influencing a decision undermines the transparency
of the judicial process. The Hon'ble Apex Court once has come
out the proposition in the case of Maneka Gandhi (Supra)
making the principle of natural justice in built and as such, the
ground of prejudice as is being taken is become irrelevant, in the
facts of the present scenario.
54. The only question is that once the High Court has directed to
have a constitution of the Committee for the purpose to arrive at
just and proper fact finding, which is to be considered by the
adjudicator, then, without any here and there, the copy of the said
report ought to have been supplied to the parties concerned, so
as to follow the principle of fairness and transparency in the
adjudicatory process.
55. The matter would have been different if the said report would not
have been taken into consideration but that can also not be
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possible in view of the direction already passed by this Court in
aid to the adjudicator that he can take assistance of technical
person and once the report has been submitted by the said
technical person which has been followed by the adjudicator, and
non-supply thereof amounts to violation of principle of natural
justice and contrary to the principle of fairness and transparency.
56. The well settled principle is that the justice must be the actual
justice and Justice must not only be done, but must also be seen
to be done. The transparency in the judicial functioning has also
been taken into consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Swapnil Tripathy Vrs. Supreme Court of India, (2018)
10 SCC 639, wherein, it has been laid down that the right to know
is the facets of Article 19(1)(a).
57. Here in the instant case also, adjudicator has relied upon the
report of the technical person which would be evident from part of
the order dated 04.08.2001 as quoted and referred hereinabove
but the said report was not supplied to contesting party at
relevant stage is contrary to the facets of Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution of India.
58. We have also considered the principle of Nemo judex in causa
sua which is integral part of Article 14, demanding impartiality and
non-supply of the document in the present case, cannot be
termed to be correct endeavour taken by the Chairman of the
Board, the adjudicator.
59. This Court, based upon the aforesaid reasoning, is hereby
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answering the issues as formulated and referred hereinabove.
60. Coming across the order passed by the learned Single Judge,
this Court has found that the learned Single Judge has admitted
the fact of the said report and its significance by making
reference of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court
but came to the conclusion that the content of the said report has
not been taken into consideration by the adjudicator and as such,
no prejudice has been caused.
61. But, this Court is of the view based upon the observation made
by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment that fact
about the reference of the said report as has been taken by the
adjudicator in the order passed has been referred in detail and
the conclusion of the adjudicator is also based upon the finding
recorded by the enquiry committee, this Court, therefore, is of the
view that the learned Single Judge while coming to the
conclusion since has come out with the view that no prejudice
has been caused, since, the content of the report has not been
taken into consideration, is contrary to the record.
62. The learned Single Judge has also not appreciated the fact
properly since it has been referred in paragraph-11 of the
impugned order that the copy of the said report was supplied
before the adjudicator after closure of the hearing.
63. The learned Single Judge has not gone into the extent that why
the adjudicator in the capacity of exercising the power of quasi-
judicial functionary in absence of the other side has relied upon
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the said report by taking note of the content in the order dated
04.08.2001 which was passed for the purpose of adjudicating the
matter.
64. The order passed by the learned Single Judge, therefore, needs
interference.
65. Accordingly, the order dated 04.09.2025 passed in W.P.(C)
No.5750 of 2001 and W.P.(C) No.4374 of 2001 is, hereby,
quashed and set aside.
66. The question remains that the matter now again needs to be
adjudicated.
67. The adjudicator has been appointed by the order passed by this
Court dated 11.04.2001 passed in LPA No.256 of 2000(R), this
Court, therefore, is of the view that order passed by the
adjudicator is to be seen on the principle that if any error has
been committed said to be incurable, then, in order to rectify the
error, the matter is to be remitted from the aforesaid stage only.
68. Here in the instant case, the adjudicatory process of the
adjudicator itself has been found to be not proper being in
violation of the principle of natural justice due to non-supply of
copy of the report of technical person S.N. Dwivedi as has been
discussed hereinabove and as such, this Court, is of the view that
the order passed by the adjudicator dated 04.08.2001 needs
interference.
69. Accordingly, the order dated 04.08.2001, is also hereby, quashed
and set aside.
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70. Since, the Division Bench of this Court has already taken a view
by appointing Chairman of the then licensee to act as adjudicator
and as such, this Court is of the view that by following the
principle of binding precedence of the order passed by the
Coordinate Bench, the Chairman of the licensee again needs to
be appointed as an adjudicator.
71. Accordingly, the Chairman J.S.E.B., is being appointed as an
adjudicator.
72. The adjudicator is directed to decide the issue on the basis of
material already available on record including the report of Mr.
S.N. Dwivedi within the period of three months from the date of
receipt of copy of this order.
73. The authority concerned is directed to ensure the supply of the
copy of the said report (Mr. S.N. Dwivedi) and other relevant
documents upon which reliance if being placed.
74. So far as the argument advanced on behalf of Mr. Rajiv Ranjan,
learned senior counsel, the same is not to be considered at this
stage, since, whatever has been submitted is not available in the
pleading as also no cause of action, is available. Hence, making
any order on this issue, will not be proper and as such, this Court
has thought it proper to leave this issue open for its adjudication
in case of any cause of action, if will arise.
75. With the aforesaid observations/directions, the instant appeals
stand disposed of.
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76. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree.
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
12/03/2026
Rohit/-A.F.R.
Uploaded on 13.03.2026
