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Hcpl-Mbpl (Jv) vs Rail India Technical And Economic ...
2026 Latest Caselaw 1580 Jhar

Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 1580 Jhar
Judgement Date : 27 February, 2026

[Cites 4, Cited by 0]

Jharkhand High Court

Hcpl-Mbpl (Jv) vs Rail India Technical And Economic ... on 27 February, 2026

                                                        (2026: JHHC: 5911)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
           Arbitration Application No. 51 of 2025

HCPL-MBPL (JV), a joint venture between Hardev Construction Private
Limited having its registered office Pod at 8/2A, Garcha 2nd Lane, P.O & PS:
Gariahat, Kolkata-19 and Mehrotra Buildcon Private Limited having its
registered office at 9, Industrial Estate, Rewa Road, P.O & P.S. Satna, Dist.
Satna, Madhya Pradesh- 485001 through their authorized person Mr. Avtar
Singh, aged 54 years, S/o late Hardev singh, Director, M/s Hardev
Construction Pvt. Ltd, R/o H. No- 1928, Sector-45, P.O + P.S. Jharsa, Dist.
Gurgaon, Haryana-A 122003                 ...   ...   ...         Applicant
                            Versus
1. Rail India Technical and Economic Service Ltd. (RITES Ltd.), a Central
   Public Sector Enterprise and a Company incorporated under the
   Companies Act and having its registered office at Shikhar, Plot no. 1,
   Sector 29, PO+PS Sector 29 Gurugram 122001, Haryana through its
   General Manager (C & PU Head), RITES Ltd., Project Unit Office at
   252/C, Road 1C Ashok pa 885 - Ashok Nagar Nagar, Ranchi-834002,
   Jharkhand.
2. Patratu Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd.; through its Chairman-cum-
   managing Director, a public sector enterprise company formed as a joint
   venture between NTPC Ltd. And Jharkhand Bijli Vitaran Nigam Ltd. and
   incorporated under Companies Act, having its registered office at PTPS,
   Patratu, PO Patratu PS Patratu Dist-Ramgarh 829119, Jharkhand
                                          ...     ...     ...       Respondents
                            ---------

CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

---------

For the Applicant:                Mr. Arjun Kumar De, Advocate
                                                    (through V.C)
                                  Mr. Manoj Kumar No. 2, Advocate
For the Respondent No. 1:         Ms. Diksha Dwivedi, Advocate
                                  Mr. Janak Kumar Mishra, Advocate
For the Respondent No. 2:         Mr. Prashant Pallav, ASGI
                                  Mr. Ayush, A.C to ASGI
                            ---------
04/Dated: 27.02.2026

1. Heard Mr De for the applicant, Ms Diksha Dwivedi for the 1 st

respondent, and Mr Prashant Pallav, learned ASGI for the 2nd Respondent.

2. This application seeks appointment of an Arbitrator to adjudicate the

disputes that have arisen between the parties in the context of the works

governed inter alia under the Letter of Acceptance No. RITES/RPO-

Ranchi/PVUNL-PKG-II (Civil)/2022/290 dated 08.04.2022 and Agreement

No. RITES/RPO-Ranchi/PVUNL-PKG-II(Civil)/2022/05 dated 21.10.2022.

3. The applicant had earlier instituted W.P. (C) No. 7281 of 2023

seeking some relief in the context of the disputes that had arisen between the

parties. This petition was dismissed inter alia on the ground that the contract

between the parties contained an arbitration clause and therefore, it would be

open to the applicant to invoke the same.

4. By this application, the applicant has invoked the arbitration clause

and sought the appointment of an arbitrator. Mr De has relied upon Perkins

Eastman Architects DPC and others. Vs. HSCC (India) Ltd1 to submit

that there is no question of allowing the Director (Projects) to appoint the

Arbitrator, and if the parties cannot mutually agree, then it is for the court to

appoint the Arbitrator.

5. Ms Dwivedi and Mr Prashant Pallav, learned counsel for the

Respondents, submit that in this case, the pre-arbitration conciliation process,

which was agreed to by and between the parties, was not complied with.

They submit that without going through this process, there was no question

of the applicant invoking the arbitration clause or seeking the appointment of

any Arbitrator.

6. Without prejudice to the above contention, Ms Dwivedi and Mr

Pallav submit that the arbitration clause does not apply where the total value

of all the contractor's claims exceeds Rs. 2.00 crores. Ms Dwivedi points out

that the scope of the contract was Rs. 89.00 crores, and a claim now raised

AIR 2020 SC 59

by the applicant is Rs. 323.00 crores. This, according to her, is yet another

ground why no arbitration is competent.

7. Mr. De contested the above contentions by pointing out that in the

Arbitration Clause No. 25 issued along with the tender documents in 2021-

2022, there was no ceiling that arbitration would be restricted only in respect

of claims that do not exceed Rs. 2.00 crores. Further, he pointed out Clause

3.3-xiv to submit that parties were under no obligation to refer a dispute to

conciliation as a precondition for invoking the arbitration clause. He further

submitted that, should there be any dispute between Clause 25 enclosed

along with the LOA or the tender documents, and a similar clause in the

2019 tender documents, which were also stated to be part of the contract, the

former would prevail and not the referred 2019 clause.

8. The rival contentions now fall for my determination.

9. At the outset, it is necessary to note that the scope of the present

proceedings is quite limited. In SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. versus

Krish Spinning2, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the scope of such

proceedings is ordinarily confined to the existence of an arbitration

agreement based upon Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996

(said Act). Even the examination of the validity of the arbitration agreement

is limited to the formal requirements, such as the requirement that agreement

is agreement be in writing. The use of the term "examination" under section

11 (6-A) as distinguished from the use of the term "rule" under section 16

implies that the scope of enquiry under Section 11 (6-A) is limited to a prima

facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration agreement, and does not

2 ( 2024) 12 SCC 1

include contested or laborious enquiry, which is left for the Arbitral Tribunal

to rule under Section 16 of the said Act. Further, the referral court's prima

facie view on the existence of the arbitration agreement does not bind either

the Arbitral Tribunal or the court enforcing the Arbitral Award.

10. The court clarified that by referring disputes to arbitration and

appointing an Arbitrator under Section 11, the court exercises its powers.

The referral court upholds and gives effect to the original understanding of

the contracting parties that a specified dispute shall be resolved by

arbitration. However, mere appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal does not in

any way mean that the referral court is diluting the sanctity of the contractual

terms. On the contrary, it ensures that the principle of arbitral autonomy is

upheld and the legislative intent to minimize judicial interference in arbitral

proceedings is given full effect. Once the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, it

is always open to the respondents to raise all permissible issues or urge that

only after its objections are rejected by the Arbitral Tribunal, can the claims

raised by the applicant be adjudicated. Appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal

at the stage of Section 11 petition also does not mean that the referring courts

forgo any scope of judicial review of adjudication done by the Arbitral

Tribunal. The said Act vests the national courts with the power of a

subsequent review, by which an award rendered by the Arbitrator may be

challenged by any party to the arbitration.

11. Upon consideration of the rival contentions in the context of the

scope of such proceedings, as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the case of SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. (Supra), I am satisfied that, at

least prima facie, there exists an arbitration agreement in the contract that

governs the relationship between the parties. Such a contract is in writing and

is contained as an Annexure to the LOA and other contractual documents,

which the parties rely upon.

12. The scope of such an arbitration clause, including the issue as to

whether there is any contradiction between the two arbitral clauses or

whether the arbitration clause would apply only to a dispute in which the

claim is less than Rs. 2.00 crores, are all matters that can always be raised

before the Arbitral Tribunal. Such disputes, however, cannot be gone into at

this stage while deciding the issue of the appointment of an Arbitral

Tribunal.

13. Therefore, the objections now raised by Ms Dwivedi and Mr Pallav

cannot be entertained at this stage. However, it is clarified that the

respondents would be entitled to raise such objections before the Arbitral

Tribunal once it is constituted, and the Arbitral Tribunal will have to rule on

such objections in accordance with the law. The mere fact that this Court is

now appointing or constituting an Arbitral Tribunal or that the previous

petition was dismissed due to the alternate remedy does not mean that the

objections now raised have been adjudicated upon or rejected by this Court.

Such objections are explicitly kept open to be raised before the Arbitral

Tribunal in accordance with the law. Such objections, however, cannot

detain this Court from proceeding to appoint or constitute an Arbitral

Tribunal because, at least prima facie, there exists an arbitration agreement

and disputes have obviously arisen between the parties.

14. Therefore, Mr Ambuj Nath, former judge of this Court, residing at

Flat No. 201, Block- B, Shivam Heights, Ghaghra, Namkum, Ranchi, is

appointed as Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties.

15. The appointment, as aforesaid, is subject to the Ld Arbitrator not

affected by the disabilities as contemplated under the Seventh Schedule of

the said Act and his furnishing a declaration to that effect before entering

upon the reference. The fees of the learned Arbitrator shall be in accordance

with the fourth Schedule to the said Act and shall be equally borne by all the

parties. The learned Arbitrator should endeavour to conclude the proceedings

expeditiously, having regard to the mandate of the legislature under Section

29A of the Said Act.

16. As noted earlier, all contentions of the respondents referred to above

or otherwise are left open to be decided in accordance with the law. In fact,

all contentions of all parties on preliminary objections, merits, etc., are left

open for decision by the learned Arbitrator in accordance with law.

17. The arbitration application is disposed of in the above terms without

any order for costs.

18. All concerned are to act on an authenticated copy of this order.

(M. S. Sonak, C.J.) February 27, 2026 N.A.F.R. Ranjeet/R.Kr./Cp.2 Uploaded on 01.03.2026

 
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