Jharkhand High Court
Bhim Munda vs Ranchi Municipal Corporation on 13 October, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:31612-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 310 of 2025
------
Bhim Munda, aged about 72 years, Son of Late Ship Charan
Munda, Resident of Opposite Nath hospital, P.O.- Kadru, P.S.
Argora, District- Ranchi (Jharkhand).
... ... Appellant/Petitioner
Versus
1. Ranchi Municipal Corporation, through Municipal
Commissioner, having its office at Near Kutchery Road, P.O.-
G.P.O., P.S. - Kotwali, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
2. Deputy Administrator, Ranchi Municipal Corporation, Near
Kutchery Road, P.O.- G.P.O., P.S. - Kotwali, District- Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
3. Dr. Nishi Kumari, Wife of Virendra Prakash, Resident of Q.
No. 23/R3, Harmu Housing Colony, P.O. & P.S. - Argora,
District - Ranchi.
... ... Respondents/Respondents
With
C. Rev. No. 33 of 2025
----
Bhim Munda, Aged about 72 years, son of Late Shiv Charan
Munda, Resident of Opposite Nath Hospital, P.O. - Kadru,
P.S. - Argora and District - Ranchi.
... ... Appellant/Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Deputy Commissioner -cum- Registrar, Government of
Jharkhand, Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Kutchary
Chowk, P.O. G.P.O. and P.S. Kotwali, District - Ranchi.
3. The District Sub-Registrar, P.O. G.P.O. & P.S. Kotwali, and
District Ranchi.
4. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, P.O. G.P.O., & P.S.
Kotwali, District Ranchi.
5. The Circle Officer, P.O. Doranda & P.S. Argora, Argora,
Ranchi.
6. A.G. Office Employees Co-Operative House Construction
Society, having its registered office at New A.G. Cooperative
Colony, Kadru, P.O. Kadru, P.S. Argora, District - Ranchi.
7. Dr. Nishi Kumari, Wife of Birendra Prakash, Resident of
Qtr. No. 23/R/3, Harmu Housing Colony, P.O. Kadru, P.S.
Argora, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
8. Ranchi Municipal Corporation, Near Kutchery Road, P.O.-
G.P.O., P.S.- Kotwali and District - Ranchi, Jharkhand.
... ... Respondents/Opp. Parties
1
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
------
For the Appellant : Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Advocate
: Mr. Nitin Kumar Pasari, Advocate
For the Respondent No.3 : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
: Mr. Sankalp Goswami, Advocate
For the Resp. RMC : Mr. Prashant Kr. Singh, Advocate
: Mr. Karbir, Advocate
[in LPA No. 310 of 2025]
For the State : Mr. Ranjan Kumar, AC to Sr. SC-I
[in C. Rev. No. 33 of 2025]
------
C.A.V. on 08.09.2025 Pronounced on 13.10.2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:
1. Both the matters have been tagged together as per the
order dated 05.08.2025 passed in Civil Review No.33 of 2025
and, therefore, both the matters have been heard together.
2. The instant Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.310 of
2025 is directed against the order/judgment dated 02.05.2025
passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.239
of 2025 whereby and whereunder the learned writ court has
refused to interfere with the order of demolition dated
12.05.2018 passed by the respondent No.1 in Unauthorized
Construction Case No.19 of 2018 as well as the notice dated
10.01.2025.
3. The Civil Review No.33 of 2025 has been preferred
seeking review of the order/judgment dated 26.06.2024 passed
by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.102 of 2024
wherein the Division Bench has dismissed the appeal which
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was filed against the dismissal of the writ petition in W.P.(C)
No. 1204 of 2018 by order dated 30.01.2024.
4. The subject matter of Civil Review No.33 of 2025 which
has been filed for review of judgment dated 26.06.2024 passed
in Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.102 of 2024, has been
filed in a factual situation which is identical to that of the
judgment dated 02.05.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No. 239 of 2025
against which the instant L.P.A. No.310 of 2025, has also been
filed, save and except the deed of registration is different but
the Khata Number, Plot Number and all other issues are
identical.
5. The learned counsel for the parties have submitted at
Bar that the judgment passed in W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025 which
is the subject matter of L.P.A. No.310 of 2025 will depend upon
the outcome of the Civil Review No.33 of 2025 by advancing
the argument that if the judgment sought to be reviewed in
Civil Review No.33 of 2025 will be reviewed, then certainly the
same will govern the fact of judgment impugned in L.P.A.
No.310 of 2025. Therefore, this Court thought it proper to first
hear Civil Review No.33 of 2025 in which judgment passed in
L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 has been sought to be reviewed.
Civil Rev. No. 33 of 2025 with I.A. No.4205 of 2025
6. The instant civil review is barred by limitation of 241
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days and for which the delay condonation application has been
filed by invoking the jurisdiction conferred to this Court under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, hence, the argument has
been advanced in the instant interlocutory application being
I.A. No.4205 of 2025 for consideration of the issue of
condonation of delay so that the matter may be heard on merit.
Submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the
review petitioner:
7. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
review petitioner, has submitted that there is delay of 241 days
in filing the instant review which has been caused due to the
reason beyond the control of the review petitioner as per the
statement made at paragraph-4 of the interlocutory
application.
8. It has been contended that the reason referred in
paragraph-4 may be considered to be sufficient cause
explaining the delay in filing the instant review petition.
Submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the
State respondent:
9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State has
submitted that the explanation so furnished and sought to be
accepted by this Court at paragraph-4 cannot be said to be
sufficient cause to condone the delay of 241 days.
10. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel, has submitted
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that although no Vakalatnama has been filed in the instant
review petition but the Vakalatnama has been filed in the
Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.310 of 2025 on being
called upon by this Court.
11. It has further been submitted that since due appearance
is there in the Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.310 of
2025 and, as such, he has also advanced argument in the
instant review petition by adopting the grounds taken on
behalf of the State.
Analysis
12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the averments made in the instant interlocutory
application.
13. Statement made in Paragraph-4 of the instant
interlocutory application is quoted herein below for ready
reference-
"That the order impugned before this Hon'ble Court
is dated 26.06.2024, as against which the
Appellant had preferred S.L.P Case No. 22971 of
2024 well within time, which was dismissed in
limine vide order dated 21.10.2024.
However, the cause of action for
filling the present civil review arose owing to
development that has taken place inasmuch as
taking aid of the order impugned for a property
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situated adjacent to the property in question in the
earlier writ petition as also the Letters Patent, the
Appellant has been facing demolition notices and
for which demolition notices have been challenged
in W.P.(C) No.239/2025."
14. This Court, after going through the explanation
furnished, needs to consider as to whether the fresh cause of
action as per the reason shown at paragraph-4 of the
interlocutory application can be said to be ground to review the
order which has already been barred by the Act of limitation?
15. This Court without going into merit of the instant
petition, is of the view that it would be relevant to refer herein
the settled proposition of law on the issue of civil review
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
16. It is settled position of law that the High Court is having
jurisdiction/power to rectify its error apparent on the face of
the order or any facts could not have been brought to the
notice of the Court in spite of due diligence. Reference in this
regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most
Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, [(1954) 2 SCC 42, particularly
at paragraph-32 which reads as under: --
"32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to
bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has
given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis
that the scope of an application for review is much more
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restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the
Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms
to Order XLVII, Rule I of our Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the
Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed
by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It
may allow a review on three specified, grounds, namely (i)
discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,
after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the
applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the
time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other
sufficient reason."
17. Likewise, in the case of Col. Avatar Singh
Sekhon v. Union of India, 1980 Supp SCC 562, the Hon'ble
Apex Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot
be done unless the court is satisfied that the material error
which is manifest on the face of the order, would result in
miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The
observations made are as under:
"12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to
hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party
has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our
earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on
the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in
miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh
Habib (1975) 1 SCC 674 this Court observed:
'A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort
to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake
or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. .....
The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an
earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."
18. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kamlesh
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Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320 has observed that
review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope
and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point
sought to be raised in the review application has already been
dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge
the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is
possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were
succinctly summarized as under:
"20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of
review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,
after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge
of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted
in Chajju Ram v. Neki, and approved by this Court in Moran
Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose
Athanasiusto mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least
analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles
have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese &
Iron Ores Ltd.,.
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: --
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to
reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original
hearing of the case.
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(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error,
manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness
or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for
patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be
a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be
an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the
domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be
advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at
the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived."
19. It is evident from the aforesaid proposition of law that
the jurisdiction of the Court who is to review the order, is very
limited and the same can only be exercised if there is error
apparent on the face of the order or any facts could not have
been brought to the notice of the Court in spite of due
diligence.
20. It is evident that while power of review may be inherent
in the High Court to review its own order passed in a writ
petition, the same has to be exercised on well-recognised and
established grounds on which judicial orders are reviewed.
Review can also be sought when the order discloses some
error apparent on the face of record or on grounds analogous
thereto. These are all grounds which find mention in various
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judicial pronouncements right from the earliest time as well
as in the Rules of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code as
permissible grounds of review.
21. The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very
connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the
record of the case and does not require detailed examination,
scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal
position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof
requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be
treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the
purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
22. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to
review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on
the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and
has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be
said to be an error apparent on the face of the record
justifying the court to exercise its power of review under
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous
decision to be "reheard and corrected‟. There is a clear
distinction between an erroneous decision and an error
apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be
corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be
corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review
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petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be
"an appeal in disguise".
23. In the very recent judgment in the case of Sanjay
Kumar Agarwal v. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr., reported
in (2024) 2 SCC 362, the Hon'ble Apex Court while
interpreting the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. the
proposition has been laid down to entertain the review, as
has been held at paragraph 16.1 to 16.7 which reads as
under:-
"16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a
mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and
departure from that principle is justified only when
circumstances of a substantial and compelling character
make it necessary to do so.
16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected
by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error
apparent on the face of record e justifying the court to exercise
its power of review.
16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1
CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be
"reheard and corrected".
16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be
allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".
16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be
permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have
already been addressed and decided.
16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error
which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should
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not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points
where there may conceivably be two opinions.--"
24. Since the present review petition is barred by limitation
therefore this Court has to see whether the sufficient cause is
available for condonation of delay in filing the instant petition.
25. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is
not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but
certainly if it has been filed after inordinate delay, then the
duty of the Court is to consider the application to condone the
delay before entering into the merit of the lis.
26. It requires to refer herein that the Law of Limitation is
enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy
must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has
been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court
in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors.,
(2014) 11 SCC 351.
27. In "P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala", (1997) 7
SCC 556, the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering a case of
condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation
much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for
condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as
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under:
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but
it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds."
28. While considering the similar issue, the Hon'ble Apex
Court in "Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy", (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as
under:
"21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate
the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating
to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken
into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that
the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice
in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be
given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters."
29. It is settled position of law that when a litigant does not
act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction
and laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the
case expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and
negligence are the vital factors which should be taken into
consideration while considering the question of condonation of
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delay.
30. The Hon'ble Apex Court in "Ramlal, Motilal and
Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.", (1962) 2 SCR 762,
has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made
out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the
appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph 12, it has been
held as hereunder:-
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The
proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by
Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has
to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be
dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown
then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it
should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally
introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at
this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall
for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while
exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is
shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the
court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as
to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available
to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations
of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant
when the court is dealing with applications made under
Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such
applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of
the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in
our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made
material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot
to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in
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dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under
Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case
there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be
exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the
general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence
during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced
against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned
Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for
condonation of delay only on the ground that it was
appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within
the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid
ground."
31. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay
condonation application, the Court of Law is required to
consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also
the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not
as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is
accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary
to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same
time, due to inaction and laches on its part. 35. It also requires
to refer herein that what is the meaning of 'sufficient cause'.
32. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient cause' has
been made in "Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition
Officer", [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the
Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could
not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word
"sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be
necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the
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word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides
a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish
the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing
in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause"
means that the party should not have acted in a negligent
manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of
the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained
inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case
must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any
"sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not
allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has
to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and
Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC
1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR
1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011)
2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah
v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a
"sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is
a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists
it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied
with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but
only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the
facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
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possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR
2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3
SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with
all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
"A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A
court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its operation." The
statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it
giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex
which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands
attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held
that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered
while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is
founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken
diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of
the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have
from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws
of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the
existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long
dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them,
(2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove
a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of
actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." An
unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance
or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity
and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost
by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat
and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510]
, Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR
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1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4
SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles
of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of
law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul 17 Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what
was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or
for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the
statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature."
33. Thus, it is evident that the facts and circumstances of
each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court
concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever
the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously.
34. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was
prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case,
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and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court
should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The
Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was
merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held
in "Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs.
Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors.", AIR 1964 SC 1336; "Lala
Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan", (1969) 2 SCC 770; "Parimal
Vrs. Veena @ Bharti", (2011) 3 SCC 545 and "Maniben
Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai", (2012) 5 SCC 157.
35. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that
the expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but
only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the
facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court Ram Nath Sao @ Ram
Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC
195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as
hereunder:-
"12. Thus, it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient
cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22
Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should
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receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is
imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation
furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be
dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a
straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation
furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing
is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency
of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition
by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive.
Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and
refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction
or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party.
On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts
should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps
within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the
other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning
delay in a routine like manner. However, by taking a pedantic
and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation
furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or
arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case,
causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party
against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction
and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the
decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have
to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is
going to pass upon the parties either way."
36. This Court from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements
has found that the delay can be condoned irrespective of period
of delay but the said consideration must be passed upon the
explanation if found to be sufficiently explained.
37. Moreover, herein it is also evident from the statement
made at paragraph-4 of the instant interlocutory application
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that the review petitioner himself has admitted that the same
is fresh cause of action and further it appears that only due to
that reason the writ petition has been preferred being W.P.(C)
No.239 of 2025 and against the order passed in the said writ
petition Intra-Court Appeal being LPA 330 of 2025 has been
preferred.
38. In the present case issue is answered against the review
petition reason being that the judgments on civil review
delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, as has been referred
hereinabove, do not stipulate that the fresh cause of action is
to be taken as a ground to review the order that too, the same
is in consequence of the judgment passed by this Court in writ
petition being W.P.(C) No.1204 of 2018, upheld in L.P.A. No.
102 of 2024 against which Special Leave Petition being S.L.P.
Case No. 22971/2024 has also been dismissed by the Hon'ble
Apex Court.
39. Hence, applying the position of law holding the field of
civil review, this Court is of the view that the fresh cause of
action is not to be taken as a ground to review the order and
the same is not sufficient ground to condone the delay. No,
ground has been made by the learned counsel for the
petitioner to hear this civil review application.
40. Accordingly, the I.A No. 4205 of 2025 and this civil
review application stands dismissed.
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41. The instant Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.310 of
2025 is directed against the order/judgment dated 02.05.2025
passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.239
of 2025 whereby and whereunder the learned writ court has
refused to interfere with the order of demolition dated
12.05.2018 passed by the respondent No.1 in Unauthorized
Construction Case No.19 of 2018 as well as the notice dated
10.01.2025.
42. The brief facts of the case as incorporated in the memo
of appeal and has also been referred in the impugned
judgment, need to be refer herein which reads as under:
(i) The writ petitioner (appellant herein) had
purchased two plots of lands vide two separate
Sale Deeds being Sale Deed No. 12269 dated
12.11.2002 in respect of plot no. 288/A ad-
measuring an area of 2 kathas 8 chhataks
(hereinafter to be referred as L1 plot) and Sale
Deed No. 17396 dated 05.11.2007 in respect of
Plot No. 288 (Part), ad-measuring an area of 3
kathas 8 chhataks, 36 Sq.ft. (hereinafter to be
referred as L2 plot).
(ii) Since 2002 and 2007 respectively, the appellant
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had been enjoying peaceful possession over the
same, although, the subject matter of the present
dispute is in relation of plot no. 288 (Part),
admeasuring an area of 3 katha 8 Chattaks
registered vide Sale Deed No. 17396.
(iii) The construction of residential premises was
carried out by the appellant in respect of plot ad-
measuring an area of 3 kathas 8 chhataks and
the appellant is living and enjoying peaceful
possession over the same.
(iv) So far as the other plot of the appellant is
concerned, a fraudulent registration case was
filed vide Fraudulent Registration Case No.
13/2017-18 challenging the registration of Sale
Deed No. 12269 of the year 2002, in respect of 2
kathas 8 chhataks of land registered in the name
of appellant. Based upon which an order was
passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi,
dated 02.02.2018, cancelling the registered sale
deed and directing the District Sub-Registrar,
Ranchi, to register an F.I.R also.
(v) Further, an F.I.R. was registered vide Kotwali
P.S. Case No. 56/2018 corresponding to G.R.
Case No. 1492/2018, in which the appellant
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being the purchaser was also made an accused.
(vi) Aggrieved by the order of cancellation, the
appellant challenged the same before this
Hon'ble Court in W.P.(C)No. 1204 of 2018.
(vii) In the said writ petition, the writ-petitioner
(appellant herein) had also challenged the order
passed by the Municipal corporation
(Respondent No.1) dated 12.05.2018 in Un-
authorized Construction Case No. 19/2018, by
filing independent Interlocutory Application,
being I.A. No. 4750 of 2018.
(viii) The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of vide
order 30.01.2024 inter alia setting aside the
order of Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, passed
in Fraudulent Registration Case No. 13/2017-18,
however, leaving the appellant to avail
appropriate remedy and the order of the
Municipal Commissioner, Ranchi, was not
interfered with.
(ix) Immediately after the writ petition was disposed
of, the possession of the land in question being
Plot No. 288 (Part) was forcibly entered into by
the claimant and the construction in full swing
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had begun and as on the date of filing of the
present writ application, the construction has
almost been completed.
(x) After the orders have been passed by the Writ
Court, the appellant filed a Recall Application
dated 23.04.2024 before the Respondent No.1.
(xi) Aggrieved of the F.I.R., the appellant had
challenged the same before this Court in Cr.M.P.
No. 214 of 2022, which was quashed by this
Court vide order dated 08.05.2024.
(xii) Being aggrieved of the order passed in the writ
petition, the appellant had challenged the order
dated 30.01.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1204 of
2018 before this Court in L.P.A. No. 102 of 2024
and the said appeal was dismissed vide order
26.06.2024.
(xiii) Aggrieved of the order passed by Division Bench
of this Court, the appellant had also preferred
Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 22971 of 2024,
which was dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court
vide order dated 21.10.2024.
(xiv) Further, so far the liberty given to the appellant
by the Writ Court is concerned, the appellant has
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already preferred a Title Suit vide Title Suit No.
411 of 2024, which is pending adjudication
before the Civil Court, Ranchi.
(xv) During the pendency of the Title Suit, the
appellant represented before the Municipal
Corporation informing therein that the appellant
has already preferred a title suit and till the title
suit is decided or adjudicated, no action be taken
pursuant to the earlier order dated 12.05.2018.
(xvi) The appellant was yet again served with the
notice of demolition pursuant to the orders of the
Hon'ble Apex Court vide letter dated 02.12.2024.
(xvii) On 10.01.2025, the appellant has been served
with a Notice of Demolition referring to earlier
order passed by Municipal Commissioner fixing
the date of demolition as on 19.01.2025,
although, in respect of the plot in which the
construction is sought to be demolished, has
already been in possession of the party who had
claimed earlier by Fraudulent Registration Case
No. 13/2017-18.
43. Aggrieved of the actions of the respondent, the petitioner
moved before this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(C)
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No.239 of 2025 which has been dismissed by impugned order
dated 02.05.2025 against which the present appeal has been
preferred.
Submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant
44. The leaned senior counsel has submitted that the
learned Single Judge has committed error in passing the
impugned judgment without taking into consideration the
issues.
45. He has further submitted that the Learned Single Judge
erred in invoking the doctrine of constructive res judicata to
hold that the petitioner's right over the L2 plot could not be
agitated since it was not raised earlier in W.P.(C) No. 1204 of
2018. The said writ pertained exclusively to L1 plot, whereas
L2 plot (covered under Sale Deed No. 17396 dated 05.11.2007)
is a distinct parcel of land. The cause of action for L2 arose
only upon the issuance of fresh demolition notice dated
10.01.2025, which was not the subject of previous
adjudication.
46. It has been contended that the Learned Single Judge
erred in holding that the demolition order dated 12.05.2018 in
UC Case No. 19/2018 was specifically in relation to the
construction made under Building Plan No. 80/2003 on L1
plot. The impugned judgment fails to appreciate that no
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sanctioned plan or demolition direction exists for L2 plot.
Hence, applying the 12.05.2018 demolition order to L2 plot is
manifestly illegal and without jurisdiction.
47. Learned senior counsel has further submitted that the
Learned Single Judge erred in not taking note of the fact that
the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity of hearing in
relation to the L2 plot either during the UC proceedings of
2018 or prior to issuance of the fresh notice dated 10.01.2025.
Demolition of construction over L2 plot without affording
specific hearing constitutes violation of principle of natural
justice.
48. It has been submitted that that the Learned Single
Judge failed to appreciate that the petitioner's title over L2 plot
is currently under adjudication in Original (Title) Suit No. 411
of 2024. Demolition during pendency of a civil suit without
adjudication on title rights undermines the authority of the
civil court and causes irreparable prejudice.
49. It has further been submitted that the impugned
judgment erroneously holds that since L1 plot's sale deed was
declared void, the subsequent sale deed for L2 plot must also
be void, despite the fact that L2 plot was not the subject of
prior demolition orders or adverse orders. Each sale deed must
be independently tested for validity. Also, this Hon'ble Court
has erred in deciding the validity of the sale deed and the title
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of the appellant in W.P.(C). No. 1204/2018.
50. Further, the Learned Single Judge erred in holding that
even if sale deed of L1 plot is void, it does not automatically
render L2 plot void unless specifically challenged and
adjudicated. The impugned judgment incorrectly applies a
blanket finding to distinct transactions, violating the principle
of severability of rights and transactions.
51. Learned senior counsel has contended that the Learned
Single Judge failed to take note that no independent inquiry or
report has been made to determine whether the construction
on L2 plot is unauthorized or whether it was ever covered
under the plan cancelled in 2018. The dismissal overlooks the
need for a fact-based inquiry before a drastic step like
demolition.
52. The further ground has been taken that the Learned
Single Judge failed to appreciate that applying a demolition
order passed in 2018 to a structure not covered under that
proceeding, in the absence of fresh findings of unauthorized
construction, is arbitrary, excessive, and contrary to the
principle of proportionality laid down in Olga Tellis v.
Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545.
53. Learned senior counsel has submitted that the learned
Judge has wrongly relied upon the judgment rendered in the
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case of Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal
reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129 without appreciating that
Section 24(2) of Land Acquisition Act, 2013, operates
differently when possession is with the petitioner and
compensation was not paid to his vendor. The petitioner's
uninterrupted possession since 2007 raises a genuine issue
under Section 24(2) which merits examination.
54. Learned senior counsel has further submitted that the
impugned judgment fails to appreciate the settled law that in
matters where long possession exists, equitable considerations
may override rigid technicalities.
55. It has also been submitted that the Learned Single Judge
has failed to appreciate that the RMC proceeded to execute a
demolition on the basis of an order passed in a different
context (i.e., construction over L1 plot). The application of such
an order to a different plot (L2), which was neither covered
under the original UC Case No. 19/2018 nor subject to
demolition notice earlier, amounts to jurisdictional overreach.
This violates the principle that administrative authorities must
act within the four corners of their statutory powers.
56. Learned senior counsel has taken the ground that the
Learned Single Judge erred in only taking note of the dismissal
of the injunction petition filed in the Original Title Suit
No.411/2024 and failed to take note of the pendency of the
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Original Title Suit No. 411/2024 before the Civil Court, any
administrative or coercive action affecting title or possession
over the disputed land ought to have been stayed. Failure to
consider the applicability of Section 52 of the Transfer of
Property Act (doctrine of lis pendens) is a patent error of law.
57. Learned senior counsel, based upon the aforesaid
grounds, has submitted that the impugned order needs
interference.
Submission made on behalf of the Respondent No.3
58. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel
appearing for the Respondent No.3, has submitted that the
identical issue has already been decided by the learned Single
Judge of this Court in the judgment dated 30.01.2024 passed
in W.P.(C) No.1204 of 2018, upheld by the Division Bench vide
judgment dated 26.06.2024 passed in L.P.A. No.102 of 2024
against which the special leave petition has been preferred
being S.L.P. No.22971 of 2024 which has also been dismissed
vide order dated 21.10.2024.
59. It has been contended that since the issues are identical
to that of L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 arising out of W.P.(C) No.1204
of 2018 and the order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court
dismissing the Special Leave Petition being S.L.P. No.22971 of
2024, hence the matter may be decided in terms of the order
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already passed by this Court since the learned Single Judge
has also taken into consideration the aforesaid matter.
Analysis
60. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the pleadings made in the writ petition incorporated in
the memo of appeal as also the finding recorded by the learned
Single Judge in the impugned judgment.
61. This Court, in order to come to the conclusion whether
the factual aspects in both the cases are identical or not, needs
to refer herein the factual aspect separately, revolving around
L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 arising out of W.P.(C) No.1204 of 2018.
The factual aspect of the case as referred in judgment dated
30.01.2024 of W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018 is referred
hereinbelow-
(i) The case of the petitioner in brief is that the petitioner is a
member of Schedule Tribe and is ex-army personnel. He
purchased a land which was acquired by the Government
prior to his purchase from his vendor in the year 1961
without knowing that such acquisition made by the
Government of 2 ½ khata of land which roughly comes to
3.75 decimals.
(ii) Before purchase of the said land, the petitioner sought
necessary permission from the Deputy Commissioner,
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Ranchi as per Section 46 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act.
(iii) The petitioner came to learn by the order dated
02.02.2018 of the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Registrar,
Ranchi that the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Registrar,
Ranchi annulled the registered sale deed of the petitioner.
The petitioner only after that came to know that the land
in question along with other lands were acquired for the
AG Office Employees Co-operative Society in the year
1961 and on the basis of the application made by the
District Sub-Registrar for annulment of the registered
sale deed of the petitioner by the respondent no.7 over
which the petitioner has constructed his house for an
area admeasuring 10 decimals, recommendation was
made for carrying the proceeding of annulment.
62. The reference of these facts is being made in order to
come to the conclusion as to whether the factual aspect
involved in the instant Letters Patent Appeal is identical to that
of subject matter/issues of Civil Review No.33 of 2025 seeking
review of the order/judgment dated 26.06.2024 passed in
L.P.A. No.102 of 2024.
63. It is evident from the assessment of factual aspect that
the issue involved in the present Letters Patent Appeal is
identical to the factual aspect involved in W.P.(C) No.1204 of
2018, which has already been dismissed by the learned Writ
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Court and the same is upheld by the Division Bench vide
judgment dated 26.06.2024 passed in L.P.A. No.102 of 2024
and against which the special leave petition has been
preferred being S.L.P. No.22971 of 2024 and the same has also
been dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated
21.10.2024, save and except the deed of registration.
64. All other issues are identical as has been dealt with by
the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment dated
02.05.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025, as would be
evident from the reference of the factual aspect as referred in
the judgment aforesaid which is being referred herein: -
(i) The petitioner had purchased two plots of land vide Sale
Deed No. 12269 dated 12.11.2002 (with respect to plot
no. 288/A admeasuring an area of 2 kathas 8 chhataks)
(hereinafter to be referred as "L1 plot") and Sale Deed No.
17396 dated 05.11.2007 (with respect to Plot No. 288
(Part) ad-measuring an area of 3 kathas 8 chhataks, 36
Sq.ft.) (hereinafter to be referred as "L2 plot").
(ii) The construction of residential premises was carried out
by the petitioner over L2 plot and he has been still living
and enjoying peaceful possession over the same.
(iii) A fraudulent registration case was filed before the Deputy
Commissioner, Ranchi by the respondent no. 3 vide
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Fraudulent Registration Case No. 13 of 2017-18
challenging the registration of Sale Deed No. 12269 with
respect to L1 plot and the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi,
vide order dated 02.02.2018, cancelled the said sale deed.
(iv) The said order was challenged by the petitioner by filing a
writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018 which was
disposed of vide order dated 30.01.2024 setting aside the
order dated 02.02.2018 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, Ranchi, however I.A No. 4750 of 2018,
which was filed challenging the order dated 12.05.2018
passed by the respondent no. 1 in Un-authorized
Construction Case No. 19/2018, was dismissed. But, in
this writ petition liberty was given to the petitioner to
avail appropriate remedy.
(v) Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application dated
23.04.2024 before the respondent no. 1 for recall of the
order dated 12.05.2018 passed in U.C Case No. 19 of
2018. The petitioner also preferred L.P.A. No. 102 of 2024
against the order dated 30.01.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.
1204 of 2018, however the learned Division Bench of this
Court, vide order 26.06.2024, dismissed the said appeal.
Subsequently, the Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 22971
of 2024 filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 21.10.2024.
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(vi) The petitioner has preferred Original (Title) Suit No. 411
of 2024 claiming title over L1 & L2 plots which is pending
adjudication before the Civil Court, Ranchi and during
the pendency of the said title suit, the petitioner has
represented the Ranchi Municipal Corporation requesting
inter alia not to take any action pursuant to the earlier
order dated 12.05.2018, however vide letter dated
02.12.2024, the petitioner has been served a notice for
removal of unauthorized construction. The petitioner has
also been served a notice of demolition dated 10.01.2025,
referring to earlier order passed by the respondent no. 1
fixing the date of demolition as on 19.01.2025.
65. For comparison, the reference of the factual aspect in the
impugned judgment, the factual aspect of L.P.A. No.102 of
2024 [subject matter of Civil Review No.33 of 2025], is also
being referred herein: -
(i) Appellant had purchased 2 ½ khata and 8 Chattak of
land(in short, subject property) through registered sale
deed dated 12th November 2002 from Manual Oraon, Bijla
Oraon and Anand Oraon, who are legal heirs and
successors of Budhwa Oraon.
(ii) On application by respondent no. 7 (respondent no. 3
herein) to the District Sub-Registrar alleging fraudulent
transfer made in favour of appellant, Fraudulent
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Registration Case No. 13/2017-18 was registered.
(iii) In the said proceeding, the Deputy Commissioner,
Ranchi, passed an order on 2nd February 2018, holding
that Anand Oraon by misrepresenting himself as owner
fraudulently transferred the subject property through sale
deed No. 12269 of 2002 and therefore, annulled the said
sale deed and directed the District Sub-Registrar to lodge
a First Information Report.
(iv) The Ranchi Municipal Corporation instituted UC Case
No.19 of 2018 and in the said proceeding the appellant
was called upon to show case why the construction made
over the subject property be not demolished.
(v) Thereafter, Municipal Commissioner passed an order on
12th May 2018 for demolition of the residential building
constructed over the subject property.
66. It is evident from the comparative analysis of the factual
aspect of the cases refereed hereinabove i.e. W.P.(C) No.1204
of 2018 and L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 (arising out of W.P.(C)
No.1204 of 2018), as also the consideration so made by this
Court in the order passed by the learned Single Judge vide
judgment dated 30.01.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.1204 of
2018, upheld vide judgment dated 26.06.2024 passed in L.P.A.
No.102 of 2024, is identical to that of the judgment passed by
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the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.239 of
2025 dated 02.05.2025, which is the subject matter of the
present appeal.
67. Learned Senior for the appellant has submitted that the
learned Single Judge erred in invoking the doctrine of
constructive res judicata to hold that the petitioner's right over
the L2 plot (Deed No. 17396 dated 05.11.2007) could not be
agitated since it was not raised earlier in W.P.(C) No. 1204 of
2018.
68. But, ongoing through the record, we find that firstly, in
W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018, the order of demolition dated
12.05.2018 passed in U.C Case No. 19/2018 was challenged
by filling I.A. No. 4750 of 2018. This court by judgment dated
30.01.2024 had dismissed the said I.A. No. 4750 of 2018 and
held at paragraph-13 that sale deed no. 12269 of 2002 being
void as the vendor was not having any title at the time of
executing the sale deed. Paragraph-13 of judgment dated
30.01.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018, is quoted
herein below for ready reference-
"13. So far as the I.A. No. 4750 of 2018 is concerned, as this
Court has already held that even without the order of the
Deputy Commissioner passed in the said Fraudulent
Registration Case No. 13/2017-18 dated 02.02.2018
otherwise also, the sale deed no. 12269 of 2002 being a void
one as the vendor was not having any title at the time of
executing the sale deed certainly, the petitioner is not
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entitled to any relief against the respondent no. 8 as prayed
for in I.A. No. 4750 of 2018 hence, I.A. No. 4750 of 2018
being without any merit is dismissed."
69. Thereafter, again in second round of litigation in W.P.(C)
No.239 of 2025, which is subject matter of present Letters
Patent Appeal, the same demolition order dated 12.05.2018 was
challenged, but, this time subject matter was Sale Deed
No.17396 dated 05.11.2007. The writ court dismissed the
prayer holding that issue cannot be permitted to be raised in
this proceeding in the light of the doctrine of constructive res
judicata.
70. At paragraph-33 of the impugned judgment dated
02.05.2025, writ court held that in previous proceedings i.e. in
W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018 and in U.C Case No. 19/2018,
petitioner did not disclose the fact about purchase of L2 plot
(Sale Deed No. 17396 dated 05.11.2007) apart from L1 Plot
(Sale Deed No. 12269 dated 12.11.2002) and any construction
made over the said plot and the petitioner concealed the said
fact till the order of demolition was passed by the respondent
No.1 which attained finality upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Hence, writ court held that such an issue cannot be permitted
to be raised in these proceedings in the light of doctrine of
"constructive res judicata". Paragraph-33 of order dated
02.05.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025, is being quoted
herein below-
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"33. Moreover, it was open to the petitioner in previous
proceedings i.e., W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018 and U.C Case
No. 19 of 2018 to disclose the fact about purchase of L2
plot apart from L1 plot and any construction made over
the said plot, however the petitioner concealed the said
fact till the order of demolition was passed by the
respondent no. 1 which attained finality upto the
Hon'ble Supreme Court. Had the said fact been
disclosed by the petitioner in earlier proceedings, there
would have been determination on the said point as
well. No reasonable explanation has been offered by the
petitioner as to why he had not earlier raised the said
issue. Therefore, I am of the view that such an issue
cannot be permitted to be raised in this proceeding in
the light of the doctrine of "constructive res judicata"."
71. Hence, the common issue between both the writ petitions
i.e. W.P.(C) No. 1204 of 2018 and W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025, is the
order of demolition dated 12.05.2018 passed in U.C Case
No.19/2018 and in both these writ petitions, the learned writ
Court has refused to interfere with the order of demolition dated
12.05.2018 passed in U.C Case No. 19/2018.
72. Therefore, in the subsequent writ petition, the learned
writ court by the impugned order dated 02.05.2025 passed in
W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025 had rightly concluded that such issue
cannot be permitted to be raised in the light of doctrine of
constructive res judicata.
73. Here, it would be pertinent to mention the case of M.
Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 408,
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wherein Hon'ble Apex Court was hearing the appeal filed by the
appellant challenging the acquisition proceedings.
74. In this case Hon'ble Apex Court has noted the litigative
adventure by the appellant was clearly against the principles of
res judicata as well as principles of constructive res judicata
and principles analogous thereto. Appellant therein
disregarding the clear finding of the Hon'ble Apex Court, on
identical issues, further filed a new writ petition out of which
the appeal arose before the Apex Court. The writ petition, was
rejected both by the learned Single Judge and by the Division
Bench in clear terms. In this case Hon'ble Apex Court laid down
that principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle
of public policy. In the absence of such principle great
oppression might result under the colour and pretence of law
inasmuch as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and
malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing his opponent
by repetitive suits and actions. The relevant paragraphs of M.
Nagabhushana (supra), case is quoted herein below for ready
reference-
"11. We find that disregarding the aforesaid clear finding of
this Court, the appellant, on identical issues, further filed a
new writ petition out of which the present appeal arises. That
writ petition, as noted above, was rejected both by the
learned Single Judge and by the Division Bench in clear
terms. It is obvious that such a litigative adventure by the
present appellant is clearly against the principles of res
2025:JHHC:31612-DB
judicata as well as principles of constructive res judicata and
principles analogous thereto.
12. The principles of res judicata are of universal application
as they are based on two age-old principles, namely, interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means that it is in the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation
and the other principle is nemo debet bis vexari, si constat
curiae quod sit pro una et eademn causa meaning thereby
that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it
appears to the court that it is for one and the same cause.
This doctrine of res judicata is common to all civilised system
of jurisprudence to the extent that a judgment after a proper
trial by a court of competent jurisdiction should be regarded
as final and conclusive determination of the questions
litigated and should for ever set the controversy at rest.
13. That principle of finality of litigation is based on high
principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle
great oppression might result under the colour and pretence
of law inasmuch as there will be no end of litigation and a
rich and malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing
his opponent by repetitive suits and actions. This may
compel the weaker party to relinquish his right. The doctrine
of res judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy.
That is why it is perceived that the plea of res judicata is not
a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which
sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation. This
principle seeks to promote honesty and a fair administration
of justice and to prevent abuse in the matter of accessing
court for agitating on issues which have become final
between the parties."
75. The matter since is identical and the claim of the writ
petitioner has already been rejected by the learned Single
Judge vide judgment dated 30.01.2024 passed in W.P.(C)
No.1204 of 2018, upheld by the Division Bench vide judgment
2025:JHHC:31612-DB
dated 26.06.2024 passed in L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 against
which Special Leave Petition being Special Leave to Appeal(C)
No. 22971/2024 has also been dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex
Court and the Civil Review No.33 of 2025 against the judgment
dated 26.06.2024 passed in L.P.A. No.102 of 2024 has already
been dismissed as hereinabove, hence, there is no reason to
take distinct view in the present appeal.
76. Consequently, this Court is of the view that no
interference is required in the judgment passed by the learned
Single Judge dated 02.05.2025 in W.P.(C) No.239 of 2025
impugned in the present appeal.
77. The instant Letters Patent Appeal is hereby dismissed.
78. Both the matters, i.e., Civil Review No.33 of 2025 and
L.P.A. No.310 of 2025, stand dismissed.
79. Interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Dated : 13 October, 2025
Birendra/A.F.R.
Uploaded on 14.10.2025
