Jharkhand High Court
Md. Akil Alam vs Tumpa Chakravarty on 6 October, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Rajesh Kumar, Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A.No.24 of 2024
Md. Akil Alam, aged about 31 years, son of Md. Salim, resident of
Makhdum Colony, Amarpur, PO & PS: Govindpur, District Dhanbad.
.... ... Petitioner/Appellant
Versus
Tumpa Chakravarty, aged about 30 years, wife of Md. Akil Alam,
daughter of Shambhu Nath Chakravarty, resident of Akshay Smriti,
Raj Narayan Bose Road, Ward No.9, Near Circuit House, Deoghar, PO
and PS: Deoghar, District: Deoghar .... ...Respondent/Respondent
-------
CORAM: HON'BLEMR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
-------
For the Appellant :Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Arvind Kumar Choudhary, Advocate
--------
Order No. 05/Dated: 6th October, 2025
1. The instant appeal has been filed on behalf of the appellant under Section
19(i) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 against the judgmentdated
28.11.2023 [decree signed on 11.12.2023] passed by the learned Principal
Judge, Family Court, Deogharin Original Suit No.137 of 2021, whereby
and whereunder, the Suit for restitution of conjugal right filed by the
petitioner husband (appellant herein) under section 22 of the Special
Marriage Act 1954 has been dismissed.
2. The brief facts of the case are referred herein as under:
The case of petitioner/appellant is that the respondent is the
legally wedded wife of the petitioner and their marriage was solemnized
on 04.08.2015. After marriage, both the petitioner and respondent had
been living together as husband and wife at Amarpur. After some days of
marriage, the respondent came to her parental house on 10.10.2015,
without any reasonable excuse and she has left society of the petitioner.
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
The petitioner requested the respondent to lead conjugal rights on several
occasions but the respondent always refused to accompany with the
petitioner and she had stated to the petitioner to leave his profession and
settle at the Deoghar, as Gharjamai. The petitioner is a Pathologist and he
works at Govindpur. The petitioner is ready and willing to maintain the
respondent with full dignity and honour and he has no alternative but to
take recourse of this no Court for restitution of his conjugal rights. The
cause of action for the suit arose on 27.12.2019, when the respondent
refused to live with the petitioner.
3. Notice was issued to the respondent who appeared and filed her written
statement stating therein that the instant suit is misconceived, unwarranted
and not maintainable either on facts or material available on record.
4. It has further been stated that the petitioner had suppressed the fact that he
was married since earlier and he had a child also from his first wife. The
petitioner had taken away the original sale deed of the land belonging to
the respondent's father and he was pressurizing the respondent and he
father to execute a Gift Deed of said land in his favour and when the said
demand of petitioner was refused by the respondent, he started to treat the
respondent with cruelty due to which the respondent had to file a petition
under section 125 Cr.P.C. being Original Maintenance Case No. 220 of
2018 which was allowed vide order dated 5.12.2019 directing the
petitioner to pay Rs. 8,000/- per month as maintenance to his wife.
5. It is further stated that there is threat of life of the respondent by the hands
of the petitioner and his first wife. The instant case has been filed by the
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
petitioner only to put undue pressure upon the respondent so that the
petitioner may escape from the liability of paying maintenance.
6. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, altogether four
issues have been framed by the learned Family Judge which are as
follows:
(i) Whether the suit as framed is maintainable for the relief claimed?
(ii) Whether the petitioner has valid cause of action for the suit?
(iii) Whether the opposite party/respondenthas deserted the petitioner
without any just cause?
(iv) Whether the petitioner is entitled to get the relief as claimed or any
other relief?
7. The evidences have been laid on behalf of both the parties. The petitioner
husband had examined three witnesses in support of his claim namely
P.W.1 Md. Akil Alam (petitioner/appellant), P.W.2 Sandeep Kumar and
P.W.3 Md. Iqbal Alam.
8. On behalf of the respondent wife two witnesses had been examined
namely RW.1 Manju Chakravarty and R.W.2 Tumpa Chakravarty
(respondent wife).
9. After appreciating the evidences, the Principal Judge, Family Court,
Deoghar vide judgment dated 28.11.2023 has dismissed the Suit with cost.
10. The appellant husband being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment dated 28.11.2023 [decree signed on 11.12.2023] passed in
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
Original Suit No. 137 of 2021 has filed the present First Appeal under
Section 19(i) of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
Arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant:
11. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the issues have not
been decided in proper manner. The learned Family court has also not
considered the depositions and the documents advanced on behalf of the
appellant and, as such, the judgment impugned is liable to be set aside.
12. It has been submitted that the court is failed to appreciate oral and
documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant and thus came
to a wrong conclusion. The court has also not considered that the appellant
has successfully substantiated the allegation that respondent has
withdrawn herself from his society without any reasonable excuse.
13. It has been submitted that the learned Family Judge ought to have
consider that the appellant is Muslim by faith and under the Mohammadan
Law at least four marriages are permissible and the respondent knowing
fully well about the previous marriage of the appellant, solemnized her
marriage with the appellant under the provisions of Special Marriage Act.
14. It is further stated that the learned Principal Judge has failed to consider
that respondent had pressurized the appellant to live as Gharjamai after
leaving his first wife. The learned court below has also not considered that
the respondent had knowledge about previous marriage of the appellant
and only on the basis of the fact that appellant has not stated in marriage
certificate that he was already married, the decree has been prepared.
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
15. Learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid ground, has
submitted that the judgment impugned suffers from perversity, as such,
not sustainable in the eyes of law.
Arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent:
16. Per contra, Mr. Arvind Kumar Choudhary, the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent-wife, while defending the impugned
judgment, has submitted that there is no error in the impugned judgment.
17. The learned Family Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the
respondent wife has not deserted the petitioner without any just cause
rather she has a valid cause for living separate from the petitioner and
therefore the suit filed by the petitioner has no valid cause of action and
thus it is not maintainable.
18. The learned court below has also rightly concluded that the respondent has
a valid cause to live separate from the petitioner as the petitioner was
already married with another girl and he had solemnized his marriage with
the respondent by concealing his previous marriage. There is threat to the
life of the respondent accompanying with the petitioner and, therefore, the
petitioner is not entitled to get a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.
19. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that
since the factum of living separately from the petitioner has been
sufficiently established, based upon which the decree has been granted, as
such, no interference is required in the order impugned.
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
Analysis:
20. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through
the findings recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned
judgment.
21. The case has been heard at length. The admitted fact herein is that the suit
for a decree of restitution of conjugal rights has been filed on the ground
of desertion, i.e., by filing an application under Section 22 of the Special
Marriage Act and, accordingly, issues have been framed by the learned
Family Court wherein primarily issue no.III pertains to desertion.
22. The evidence has been laid on behalf of both the parties.
23. For ready reference, the evidences laid on behalf of the husband are being
referred as under:
(i) PW-1 Md. Akil Alam is the appellant himself has stated that the
respondent is living in her parental house and she is declining to
lead her conjugal life with the appellant-husband without any valid
reason. The respondent-wife and her family members were
pressurizing the appellant to settle in Deoghar as Gharjamai. After
leaving her matrimonial house the respondent started to pressurize
the appellant for constructing a house and on his refusal the
respondent filed a maintenance case. Both the parties went for
mediation which was also successful but after some days the
respondent refused to live with the appellant in a rented house and
deserted him. In his cross-examination he has admitted that prior to
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
solemnization of marriage with the respondent, he was already
married having two daughters.
(ii) PW-2 Sandeep Kumar has deposed that he has a Lab in Jharia and
the petitioner has a Lab in Dhanbad and hence they are familiar to
each other. He has further deposed that the respondent left her
matrimonial house without any reason and she refused to lead her
conjugal life with the petitioner, however, the petitioner is ready to
keep his wife in Deoghar. In his cross-examination he has stated
that the petitioner had solemnized his marriage with another girl,
namely, Tabassum and has two daughters before marrying with the
respondent.
(iii) PW-3 Md. Iqbal Alam has deposed that the respondent was fully
aware of this fact that the petitioner is married and has children
also, even though, she voluntarily married with the petitioner. After
marriage they wereliving together as husband-wife but no child was
born from their wedlock. On 10.10.2015 she left the house of the
petitioner and went to her maike. The petitioner tried to bring her
back but she did not come with him and she was always trying to
extort money. The respondent and her family members were
pressurizing the appellant to live in Deoghar as Gharjamai and
construct a house in Deoghar. In his cross-examination he has
stated that the appellant has two daughters and one son from his
previous wife.
24. The respondent-wife has been examined as RW-2. For ready reference,
her evidence is being referred as under:
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
(i) RW-2 has stated in her examination-in-chief filed on affidavit
that she has admitted her marriage with the petitioner in the year
2015 at Dhanbad. She has further stated that the petitioner had not
disclosed that he is already married with another girl and he has two
daughters from his previous wife. She has filed a maintenance case
under section 125 Cr.P.C. vide Original Maintenancecase no. 220
of 2018 which was allowed on 5.12.2019, whereby the petitioner
was directed to pay Rs. 8,000/- per month to the respondent but he
is not paying regularly. She has further deposed that there is danger
of her life from the petitioner and his first wife due to which it is
impossible for her to live with the petitioner in Dhanbad.
(ii) The Examination- in- chief of another witness i.e. RW.1 who is the
mother of the respondent has been filed wherein similar statement
has been given.
25. The learned Family Judge has gone into the evidences laid on behalf of
the parties as also the submissions made in the pleadings, i.e., plaint and
written statement, has found that the defendant (respondent wife herein)
has able to establish that she has sufficient reason to live separately from
husband (appellant herein) and at present there is no chance of their
reunion. Accordingly, the learned Family Judge has dismissed the suit
filed by the appellant husband under Section 22 of the Act 1954 for
restitution of conjugal right.
26. On the basis of the aforesaid factual aspect, it would be apt to refer herein
Section 22 of Special Marriage Act 1954 (herein referred as Act 1954)
which pertains to restitution of conjugal right:
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
22. Restitution of conjugal rights.―When either the husband or
the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the
society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply by petition to
the district court for restitution of conjugal rights, and the court,
on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such
petition, and that there is no legal ground why the application
should not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights
accordingly.
[Explanation. ―Where a question arises whether there has
been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, the
burden of providing reasonable excuse shall be on the person
who has withdrawn from the society.]
27. It needs to refer herein that section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955
which also pertains to the restitution of the conjugal rights is Pari Materia
to Section 22 of the Act 1954. The object of restitution decree was to
bring about cohabitation between the estranged parties so that they could
live together in the matrimonial home in amity. The leading idea of
Section 22 of Act 1954 was to preserve the marriage.
28. From perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that if either the
husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the
society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, before the court
concerned, for restitution of conjugal rights and the court, on being
satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition and further
taking into consideration the legal ground that why the application should
not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly.
29. Further, in explanation part of the said provision, it has been prescribed
that when a question arises, whether there has been "reasonable excuse"
for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving "reasonable
excuse" shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the society.
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
30. It needs to refer herein that conjugal rights may be viewed in its proper
perspective by keeping in mind the dictionary meaning of the expression
"Conjugal" wherein the meaning of 'conjugal' as "of or pertaining to
marriage or to husband and wife in their relations to each other" is given
(Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd Edn. Vol. I page 371).
31. In the Dictionary of English Law, 1959 Edn. at page 453, Earl Jowitt
defines 'conjugal rights' thus:
"The right which husband and wife have to each other's society
and marital intercourse. The suit for restitution of conjugal
rights is a matrimonial suit, cognizable in the Divorce Court,
which is brought whenever either the husband or the wife lives
separate from the otherwithout any sufficient reason, in which
case the court will decree restitution of conjugal rights
(Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, s. 15), but will not enforce it by
attachment, substituting however for attachment, if the wife be
the petitioner, an order for periodicalpayments by the husband
to the wife (s.22). Conjugal rights cannot be enforced by the act
of either party, and a husband cannot seize and detain his wife
by force (R.V. Jackson [1891] 1 Q.B. 671)".
32. In India, it may be borne in mind that conjugal rights, i.e., right of the
husband or the wife to the society of the other spouse is not merely
creature of the statute, such a right is inherent in the very institution of
marriage itself. Thus, the restitution of conjugal rights is often regarded as
a matrimonial remedy. The remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is a
positive remedy that requires both parties to live together and cohabit.
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
33. Thus, the requirement of the provisions of restitution of conjugal rights
are as follows:
(i) The withdrawal by the respondent from the society of the petitioner.
(ii) The withdrawal is without any reasonable cause or excuse or lawful
ground.
(iii) There should be no other legal ground for refusal of the relief.
(iv) The court should be satisfied about the truth of the statement made in
the petition.
34. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the catena of judgments had discussed the
scope of restitution of the conjugal right, for sake of reference some of the
authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court are being
referred herein under:
35. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh,
(2017) 4 SCC 85 has categorically observed that when there is evidence
establishing that it was respondent husband who withdrew from
appellant's company without any reasonable cause, appellant is entitled to
get decree for restitution of conjugal rights. For ready reference the
relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under:
"24. In our considered view, as it appears to us from perusal of
the evidence that it is the respondent who withdrew from the
appellant's company without there being any reasonable cause
to do so. Now that we have held on facts that the respondent
failed to make out any case of cruelty against the appellant, it is
clear to us that it was the respondent who withdrew from the
company of the appellant without reasonable cause and not the
vice versa.
25. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals succeed and
are allowed. The impugned judgment [Suman Singh v. Sanjay
Singh, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 2138 : (2013) 136 DRJ 107] is set
aside. As a result, the petition filed by the respondent (husband)
under Section 13(1) of the Act seeking dissolution of marriage is
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
dismissed. As a consequence thereof, the marriage between the
parties is held to subsist whereas the petition filed by the
appellant against the respondent under Section 9 of the Act
seeking restitution of conjugal rights is allowed. A decree for
restitution of conjugal rights is, accordingly, passed against the
respondent.
26. We hope and trust that the parties would now realise their
duties and obligations against each other as also would realise
their joint obligations as mother and father towards their grown
up daughters. Both should, therefore, give a quiet burial to their
past deeds/acts and bitter experiences and start living together
and see that their daughters are well settled in their respective
lives. Such reunion, we feel, would be in the interest of all family
members in the long run and will bring peace, harmony and
happiness. We find that the respondent is working as a
"Caretaker" in the Government Department (see Para 4 of his
petition). He must, therefore, be the "Caretaker" of his own
family that being his first obligation and at the same time attend
to his government duties to maintain his family."
36. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid settled position of law, it is evident that the
court will grant a decree for restitution of conjugal rights when one spouse
has withdrawn from the other's society without reasonable excuse. This
means if a husband or wife leaves the marital home or refuses to live with
their spouse without a justifiable reason, the other spouse can file petition
before the court for its remedy. The court, if satisfied with the truth of the
petition and finding no legal barrier, may order the withdrawing spouse to
return and resume cohabitation.
37. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law, this Court is now
adverting to the material available on record and has revisited the order
impugned.
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
38. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the appellant is
Muslim by faith and under the Mohammadan Law at least four marriages
are permissible and the respondent knowing fully well about the previous
marriage of the appellant, solemnized her marriage with the appellant
under the provisions of Special Marriage Act.
39. In the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein that Section 4 of
the Special Marriage Act prescribes the conditions for solemnizing a
special marriage. Section 4 starts with a nonobstante clause that
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being
in force relating to solemnization of marriages", a marriage between any
two persons may be solemnized under this Act, if at the time of the
marriage, the conditions contained in the said Section are fulfilled. For
ready reference the Section 4 is being quoted as under:
Section 4 - Conditions relating to solemnization of special
marriages.-
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time
being in force relating to the solemnization of marriages, a marriage
between any two persons may be solemnized under this Act, if at the
time of the marriage the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:--
(a) neither party has a spouse living;
(b) neither party-
(i) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of
unsoundness of mind; or
(ii) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from
mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for
marriage and the procreation of children; or
(iii) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity;
(c) the male has completed the age of twenty-one years and the female
the age of eighteen years;
(d) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship:--
Provided that where a custom governing at least one of the parties
permits of a marriage between them, such marriage may be
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
solemnized, notwithstanding that they are within the degrees of
prohibited relationship; and
(e) where the marriage is solemnized in the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, both parties are citizens of India domiciled In the territories
to which this Act extends.
Explanation.-In this section, "custom", in relation to a person
belonging to any tribe, community, group or family, means any rule
which the State Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf as applicable to members of that tribe,
community, group or family:
Provided that no such notification shall be issued in relation to the
members of any tribe, community, group or family, unless the State
Government is satisfied-
(i) that such rule has been continuously and uniformly observed for a
long time among those members;
(ii) that such rule is certain and not unreasonable or opposed to
public policy; and
(iii) that such rule, if applicable only to a family, has not been
discontinued by the family."
40. From the aforesaid conditions it is evident that Section 4 enables two
persons belonging to different or same religions to enter into a valid
marriage as long as they fulfill conditions contained in the said Section
such as neither party is having a spouse living, the parties are not within
the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the customs governing at-
least one of them permit such marriage, etc. Personal religious laws of
different religions would obviously not recognize inter-religion marriages
unless of course one party to such marriage is prepared to renounce
his/her religion and accept conversion to the religion of the spouse and
such conversion is recognized by such religion.
41. Further, it would be apt to refer herein the authoritative pronouncement in
this regard that when a person solemnizes marriage under Special
Marriage Act 1954, then the marriage is not governed by personal laws
but by the Special Marriage Act itself.
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
42. In the case of Anwar Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1989 All LJ 303,
the applicant solemnized his first marriage under Mohammadan law and
he contracted his second marriage under Special Marriage Act. The
Allahabad High Court held that the second marriage under
the Special Marriage Act is an offence punishable under Section 494 IPC
notwithstanding that the Personal Law permits Muslim male to contract
four marriages. Relevant portion of the said judgment is as under:
"...Notwithstanding the fact that personal law permits a Muslim male to
contract four marriages, if a second marriage is contracted under
the Special Marriage Act 1954 vis-à-vis the fact that a muslim male has a
legally wedded wife who has been married to him under the
Mohammedan Law, Section 494, I.P.C. has to claw at the erring male.
The applicant cannot take refuge behind the fallacious contention that he
had contracted the second marriage with a Muslim woman by virtue of
the exceptions enshrined in Mohammedan Law. Mohammedan Law does
not claim precedence over Special Marriage Act, 1954 keeping in view
that the applicant solemenised his first marriage under Mohammedan
law and he contracted his second marriage under Special Marriage Act.
There being no saving clause for the applicant to purge him of the
charges u/s 494, L.P.C. I feel that the applicant is liable to be punished
u/s 494, I.P.C."
43. In the case of Suman Kundra v. Sanjeev Kundra, AIR 2015 Del 124, the
parties were married as per Hindu rites and ceremonies on 29th October,
1986. However, their love marriage did not continue very long and the
marriage dissolved by a decree of divorce on 02nd June, 1988. The parties
re-married for the second time before the Marriage Officer
under Special Marriage Act on 03rd May, 1990. However, the parties
could not reconcile their inherent differences and the husband filed a
petition for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1)(a) and (b) of
Hindu Marriage Act on 21st July, 2005. The wife challenged the
maintainability of the petition. The Delhi High Court held that since the
parties were married under the Special Marriage Act, their conduct
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
with regard to grant of divorce or relationship would be covered
under the Special Marriage Act only.
44. Further from perusal of the object of the Act 1954 it is evident that
the Special Marriage Act, 1954 provides a special form of marriage, its
registration and divorce. A marriage between any two persons belonging
to any religion or creed may be solemnized under this Act. Being a secular
Act, it plays a key role in liberating individuals from the traditional
requirements of marriage. It provides for a civil law of marriage that
would enable individuals to get married outside of their respective
community mandates.
45. The Special Marriage Act 1954 is not concerned with the religion of the
parties to an intended marriage. Under the Act any person, whichever
religion he or she professes, may marry either within his or her
community or in a community other than his or her own, provided that the
intended marriage in either case is in accord with the conditions for
marriage laid down in the Act.
46. No religious rituals or ceremonies are required from the marriage to be
completed under the Special Marriage Act. It is up to the parties to decide
whether they want to do marriage rituals or not.
The Special Marriage Act provides an option of turning an existing
religious marriage solemnized in any other form under any other law into
a civil marriage by registering it under its provisions, provided that it is in
accord with the condition for marriage laid down under the Act. This
provision of subsequent registration enables parties to avail secular and
uniform remedies despite the solemnization of marriage through
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
performance of religious ceremonies under one's own personal laws. This
aids them in overcoming the constraints or discrimination faced in their
own personal laws.
47. Thus, from the aforesaid discussion it is considered view of this Court that
when a person solemnizes marriage under this law (Act 1954) then the
marriage is not governed by personal laws but by Special Marriage Act.
The rights and duties arising out of marriage are governed by
the Special Marriage Act and not by the personal laws.
48. Accordingly in the light of aforesaid settled position, this Court is of the
view that the contention of the learned counsel that being a Muslim his
marriage life will be governed by the personal laws even he had
solemnized his marriage under Special Marriage Act 1954, is not tenable
herein.
49. Now coming to factual aspect of the instant case that it is evident from the
testimonies and evidence available on record that the wife (respondent
herein) since beginning always tried her best to lead happy conjugal life
but due to compelling circumstances, the respondent wife unwillingly had
left matrimonial house.
50. It has come in the testimony of R.W.2 respondent that Petitioner husband
has already married with another girl namely Tabassum Alam and he has
child from his previous wife. Respondent has further deposed that there is
danger of her life from the petitioner and his first wife due to which it is
impossible for her to live with the petitioner in Dhanbad.
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
51. Further, from perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the learned
Family Judge has also taken into consideration the aforesaid factual aspect
as well as settled proposition of law related to the restitution of conjugal
right, which would be evident from some paragraphs of the impugned
judgment, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being quoted as
under:
"Thus, on scrutinizing the aforesaid oral testimony of the witnesses as
a whole, this Court finds that it has come on record sufficiently from
the evidence of the petitioner's witnesses as well as the witnesses of
the opposite party also that the petitioner Akil Alam had a living
spouse at the time of his marriage with the re-spondentTumpa
Chakravarty and further, he had two children from his said spouse
also. The petitioner has claimed that the factum of his previous
marriage and birth of children from the said previous marriage was
well within the knowledge of respondent and she had entered into
marriage with the petitioner inspite of being fully aware about it. But,
when the petitioner Akil Alam (P.W.1) has been cross-examined on
this point, he has admitted in para-15 of his cross-examination that:-
"मैने धनबाद के रिज ी ऑिफस म टुं पा से शादी की थी, लेिकन म अपनी
पहली शादी के बारे म नहीं िलखा था। लेिकन इस बात की जानकारी टुं पा
को बतलाई थी।"
This statement of petitioner Akil Alam (P.W.1) itself goes to falsify his
claim of disclosing about his previous marriage to the respondent
while solemnizing marriage with her otherwise there was no reason to
conceal the said fact before the Marriage Registrar by the petitioner.
Furthermore, the respondent has filed the certified copy of the order
passed in Original Maintenance Case No. 220/2018 (Exhibit-A),
which goes to show that the petitioner (O.P. of the said Maintenance
Case No. 220/2018) Akil Alam had taken a plea in the said case that
his marriage with the respondent Tumpa Chakravarty is an irregular
marriage and hence, she is not entitled to get maintenance from him.
This conduct of petitioner Akil Alam clearly goes to show that he
himself is not firm on his relation with the respondent Tumpa
Chakravarty and he is changinghis statement from time to time.
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
Keeping of a mistress or contract-ing a second marriage by a husband
is a sufficient ground for a wife to deny from accompanying with her
husband and thus, in view of the said matter, this Court finds that in
the instant case the respondent has sufficient ground to live separate
from the petitioner and the petitioner cannot be allowed to take
advantage of his own wrong. The respondent Tumpa Chakravarty
(R.W.2) has deposed before the Court that the petitioner has
solemnized marriage with her by concealing his previous marriage
and there is danger of her life in the hands of petitioner and his
previous wife in going to Dhanbad and this apprehension of
respondent seems to be quite rea-sonable in the facts and
circumstances of this case.
Therefore, on the basis of aforesaid discussion, this Court finds that
the respondent/opposite party has not deserted the petitioner without
any just cause rather she has a valid cause for living separate from
the petitioner. Accordingly, this issue is being decided negatively
against the petitioner
52. Thus, from the aforesaid paragraphs of the impugned order it is evident
that the learned Family Court while passing the order impugned has taken
care of the evidence of both the parties and further the learned court has
also taken note of the core of section 22 of the Act 1954.
53. The learned Family Court after considering all these aspects has inferred
that the petitioner has solemnized marriage with her by concealing his
previous marriage and there is danger of her life in the hands of petitioner
and his previous wife in going to Dhanbad and this apprehension of
respondent seems to be quite rea-sonable in the facts and circumstances of
this case.
54. Herein the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner has argued that
since the learned Family Court has not properly appreciated the evidences
available on record as also has not properly considered the testimony of
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
the witnesses and has passed the order impugned without taking into
consideration the mandate of the Section 22 of the Act 1954 and, as such,
the impugned judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in
the eyes of law.
55. This Court, while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the
appellant on the issue of perversity needs to refer herein the interpretation
of the word "perverse" as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court,
which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the
evidence.
56. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by
the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately
discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a
finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or
by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so
outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality
incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm
in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said
judgment, read as under:
"24. The expression "perverse" has been dealt with in a
number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1
SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression "perverse"
means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not
supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against
the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd.
[AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that "perverse finding"
means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence
but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber &
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341]
the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said
that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or
that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have
arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58]
the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation
of pleading and law is a perverse order.
In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed
that a "perverse verdict" may probably be defined as one that is
not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against
the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court
defined "perverse" as turned the wrong way, not right;
distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is
right, proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English,
6th Edn.
"Perverse.--Showing deliberate determination to behave in a
way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or
unreasonable."
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International
Edn.
Perverse.--Deliberately departing from what is normal and
reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.--Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or
the direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)
Perverse.--Purposely deviating from accepted or expected
behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or
petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
"Perverse.--A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one
that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence."
2025:JHHC:30782-DB
57. This Court has already observed in preceding paragraphs that learned
Family Court while passing the order impugned has taken care of the
evidence of both the parties and further the learned court has also taken
note of the fact that the petitioner has solemnized marriage with
respondent wife by concealing his previous marriage and there is danger
of her life in the hands of petitioner and his previous wife and this
apprehension of respondent seems to be quite rea-sonable in the facts and
circumstances of this case, as such, the contention of the learned counsel
for the appellant that there is element of perversity in the impugned order
is totally fallacious.
58. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussions, is of the view that the
appellant has failed to establish the element of perversity in the impugned
judgment as per the discussions made hereinabove, as such, the instant
appeal deserves to be dismissed.
59. Thus, on the basis of the discussions made hereinabove, this Court,
therefore, is of the view that the judgment dated 28.11.2023 [decree
signed on 11.12.2023] passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family
Court, Deoghar in Original Suit No. 137 of 2021requires no interference.
60. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.
61. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Jharkhand High Court
06.10.2025
KNR/A.F.R.
Uploaded on 9th October, 2025.
