Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand vs Kashi Prasad Gupta on 6 October, 2025
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2025:JHHC:30861-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 408 of 2025
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. The Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Project Bhawan,
P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
3. Principal Secretary, S.T./S.C. Minority and OBC Welfare
Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi at Project Bhawan,
P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
4. The Special Secretary, S.T./S.C. Minority and OBC Welfare
Department, Project Bhawan, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi at
Project Bhawan, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
5. The Deputy Director, South Chhotanagpur Division, Welfare
Department-cum-Proceeding Authority, Ranchi, P.O. G.P.O., P.S.
Kotwali, District-Ranchi.
... Respondents/Appellants
Versus
Kashi Prasad Gupta, aged about 59 years, Son of Late Nand Kishor
Prasad, Resident of Daltonganj, P.O. & P.S. Daltonganj, District-
Palamu, Jharkhand.
... Writ Petitioner/Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
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For the Appellants: Mr. Aditya Kumar, A.C. to Sr. S.C.-I
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02/Dated: 06.10.2025
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J.(Oral)
1. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants and for the
reasons stated in the present Interlocutory Application, we find
sufficient cause to condone the delay of 160 days that has crept into
filing the appeal.
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2. Accordingly, the present Interlocutory Application is allowed and
the delay of 160 days in filing the appeal is condoned.
3. This appeal is preferred by the appellants-State against the order
dated 24.09.2024 passed by the learned Writ Court in W.P. (S) No.
6763 of 2019.
4. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants-State.
5. The parties shall be referred to as they were before the learned
Writ Court.
6. The writ petitioner had approached the learned Writ Court for
setting aside Memo No. 1946 dated 10.06.2019 (Annexure 5)issued by
the Special Secretary, S.T./S.C. Minority and OBC Welfare
Department, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi (respondent No.4),
whereby the petitioner was dismissed from the post of Head Clerk. The
petitioner also prayed for quashing the appellate order dated 22.10.2019
(Annexure 6) passed by respondent No.2 i.e. the Chief Secretary,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, dismissing the appeal prayed for
quashing the entire departmental proceeding.
7. The case of the petitioner was that while he was posted as Head
Clerk at District Welfare Office, Chatra, embezzlement of
Rs.9,33,00,000/- (Rupees Nine Crore Thirty Three Lakh) was alleged to
have been committed by the employees of District Welfare Office,
Chatra.
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8. Accordingly, police case being Chatra P.S. Case No. 165 of 2018
corresponding to G.R. No. 945 of 2018 came to be registered for the
offence allegedly committed under Sections 467, 468, 469, 471, 420,
409, 406, 120-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act.
9. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was
submitted against the petitioner, pursuant to which he was taken into
custody and at the time of filing of the writ petition, the petitioner had
been enlarged on bail.
10. As regards the Department, it conducted a preliminary inquiry in
which the allegations against the petitioner prima facie were found to
be proved and accordingly, a regular departmental proceeding was
initiated against the petitioner.
11. It was the case of the petitioner before the learned Writ Court that
during the course of regular departmental proceeding, the respondents
led no oral evidence and the petitioner had been found guilty on the
basis of the findings recorded in the preliminary inquiry and
subsequently was ordered to be dismissed from service.
12. The learned Writ Court found the contentions of the petitioner to
be correct and accordingly, set aside both the impugned orders and
remanded the matter back to the respondents directing the respondents
to conduct a fresh departmental inquiry against the petitioner in
accordance with law.
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13. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Writ Court, the
State has filed the instant appeal and we are at the complete failure to
understand as to why the State has chosen to do so, as, it is more than
settled law that the evidence recorded in the preliminary inquiry cannot
be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it and
the opportunity to cross-examine persons examined in preliminary
inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of
principles of natural justice.
14. Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway [AIR 1960 SC 992],
held that the purpose of holding a preliminary inquiry in respect of
particular alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of finding a
particular fact and prima facie to know as to whether the alleged
misconduct has been committed and only on the basis of the finding
recorded in the preliminary inquiry, no order of punishment can be
passed.
15. In Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat and Another [(2013) 4
SCC 301], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under -
"42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalendu Ghosh v. North
Eastern Railway [AIR 1960 SC 992] , held that the purpose of holding a
preliminary inquiry in respect of a particular alleged misconduct is only
for the purpose of finding a particular fact and prima facie, to know as to
whether the alleged misconduct has been committed and on the basis of
the findings recorded in preliminary inquiry, no order of punishment can
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be passed. It may be used only to take a view as to whether a regular
disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent is required to be held.
43. Similarly in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India [AIR 1964
SC 1854] a Constitution Bench of this Court while taking a similar view
held that preliminary inquiry should not be confused with regular inquiry.
The preliminary inquiry is not governed by the provisions of Article 311(2)
of the Constitution of India. Preliminary inquiry may be held ex parte, for
it is merely for the satisfaction of the Government though usually for the
sake of fairness, an explanation may be sought from the government
servant even at such an inquiry. But at that stage, he has no right to be
heard as the inquiry is merely for the satisfaction of the Government as to
whether a regular inquiry must be held. The Court further held as under :
(AIR p. 1862, para 12)
"12. ... There must therefore be no confusion between the two
enquiries and it is only when the government proceeds to hold a
departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting on the government
servant one of the three major punishments indicated in Article 311
that the government servant is entitled to the protection of that
article [, nor prior to that]."
(emphasis added)
(See also Govt. of India v. Tarak Nath Ghosh [(1971) 1 SCC 734 :
44. In Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of
Maharashtra [(1997) 1 SCC 299 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 152 : AIR 1997 SC
2148] this Court dealt with the issue and held as under:
"... a preliminary inquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry
conducted after issue of charge-sheet. The preliminary enquiry is
only to find out whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated
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against the delinquent. Once regular enquiry is held under the
Rules, the preliminary enquiry loses its importance and, whether
preliminary enquiry was held strictly in accordance with law or by
observing principles of natural justice of (sic) nor, remains of no
consequence."
(emphasis added)
46. In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra [(2013) 4
SCC 465 : AIR 2013 SC 58] this Court while placing reliance upon a large
number of earlier judgments held that cross-examination is an integral
part of the principles of natural justice, and a statement recorded behind
back of a person wherein the delinquent had no opportunity to cross-
examine such persons, the same cannot be relied upon.
47. The preliminary enquiry may be useful only to take a prima facie view,
as to whether there can be some substance in the allegation made against
an employee which may warrant a regular enquiry."
16. Guided by the law declared in the aforesaid decisions, we can
safely conclude that inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer in a
manner not authorised by law could not have been formed the basis of
the order of punishment and has rightly been set aside by the learned
Writ Court.
17. In addition to that, it has also been observed that the respondents
during the course of inquiry had not examined any witness to prove the
preliminary inquiry report, whereas, it is more than settled that the
application of principle of natural justice does not imply that what is not
evidence can be acted upon. On the other hand, what it means is that no
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materials can be relied upon to establish a contested fact which are not
spoken to by person who are competent to speak about them and are
subjected to cross-examination by the party against whom they are
sought to be used. When a document is produced before an Inquiry
Officer, the question that naturally arises is, is it a genuine document,
what are its contents and are the statements contained therein true. Even
in such circumstances, mere production of the document does not
amount to proof of it or of the truth of the contents therein. If these
documents are challenged, the Opposite Party must prove each of such
documents and an opportunity has to be afforded to the party who
challenges this fact. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made
to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Bareilly
Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen and Others [(1971) 2
SCC 617].
18. In Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Others
[(2009) 2 SCC 570], it was held that an officer conducting inquiry has a
duty to arrive at a finding in respect of the charges upon taking into
consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. It has also
been held therein that any evidence collected during investigation by
the investigating officer against the accused by itself could not be
treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceedings.
19. Thus, what can be taken to be settled and what applies to the
facts of the instant case is that the materials brought on record by the
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parties to which consideration has to be confined, would mean only
such materials which have been brought on record in a manner
prescribed by the law. Only such materials can be considered to be
'legal evidence' which can be acted upon.
20. This is not to suggest that the provisions of Indian Evidence Act,
1872 could be strictly applicable to the departmental inquiry, as these
are not judicial proceedings, nevertheless, the principles flowing
therefrom can be applied in specific cases. Evidence tendered by
witnesses must be recorded in the presence of the delinquent employee,
he should be given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and no
document should be relied on by the prosecution without giving copy
thereof to the delinquent - all these basic principles of fair play have
their root in such Act.
21. Accordingly, this Court has no difficulty in concluding that the
documents referred to in the list of documents forming part of
annexures of the charge-sheet, on which the Department seeks to rely
on in the inquiry, cannot be treated as legal evidence worthy of forming
the basis for a finding of guilt if the contents of such documents are not
spoken to by persons competent to speak about them. A document does
not prove itself in the inquiry, therefore, the contents of the relied-upon
documents have to be provided by examining a witness having
knowledge of the contents of such document and who can depose as
regards its authenticity. In the instant case, no such exercise was
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admittedly undertaken by the respondents (appellants herein) by
producing any evidence and, therefore, the learned Writ Court has
rightly set aside the impugned orders and at the same time, kept the
right of the appellants herein intact for conducting a fresh departmental
proceeding against the petitioner in accordance with law. However, it is
made clear that since the petitioner has been charge-sheeted and has
filed his reply to the same, the inquiry shall proceed from that stage
onwards.
22. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the instant appeal
stands dismissed.
23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand closed.
(Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
October 06, 2025
A.F.R.
Manoj/Pramanik/Cp.2
