Jharkhand High Court
Smt. Rachita Choudhary vs The State Of Jharkhand on 10 March, 2025
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No. 417 of 2025
Smt. Rachita Choudhary ..... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Divisional Commissioner, Kolhan Division, Chaibasa, Singhbhum West
3. The Deputy Commissioner, Chaibasa, Singhbhum West
4. The Sub-Divisional Officer-cum-House Rent Controller, Podahat,
Chakradharpur, Singhbhum West
5. Gopal Krishna
6. Dr. Vinay Krishna
7. Vijay Krishna ..... Respondents
-----
CORAM
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
-----
For the Petitioner: Mr. Ravi Bhushan Sinha
For the State: Mr. Subham Gautam, A.C to A.A.G-V
-----
05/10.03.2025 The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated
21.12.2023 (Annexure-13 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent No.2 in
J.B.R.C. Revision No. 6 of 2023 whereby the said revision filed by the petitioner
has been dismissed upholding the order dated 14.02.2023 passed by the
respondent No.3 in J.B.R.C. Appeal No. 1 of 2021 (Annexure-9 to the writ
petition) as well as the order dated 14.2.2020 passed by the respondent No.4 in
J.B.R.C. Case No. 82 of 2017 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition). Further prayer
has been made for quashing the order as contained in memo No. 146 dated
31.3.2023 issued by the respondent No.4 (Annexure-9/1 to the writ petition)
whereby the petitioner has been directed to vacate the tenanted premises. It is
also prayed for directing the respondent No.4 to pass a fresh order in this
regard in accordance with law and till then, not to take any coercive step
against the petitioner.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a 'Khaparposh'
house/residential premises standing over the land measuring an area of 950 sq.
ft. under Khata No. 253, Plot No. 140, Holding No. 13/43, Chakradharpur
Municipality, besides Central Bank, Chakradharpur-Chaibasa Road, P.O.+P.S.
Chakradharpur, District-Singhbhum West (hereinafter referred to as 'the said
land/premises') belonged to one Parbati Devi-mother of the respondent Nos. 5,
6 & 7, who had let-out the said premises to the grandfather-in-law of the
petitioner in the year 1950. The petitioner along with her family members had
been peacefully residing in the said premises on payment of monthly rent to the
landlord till the lifetime of said Parbati Devi, who died on 27.08.2015. After her
death, the petitioner used to pay the monthly rent to her successors.
3. It is further submitted that the respondent Nos. 5 to 7 filed an eviction
suit i.e. J.B.R.C. Case No. 82 of 2017 under Sections 19(1) (c) & (d) read with
Sections 21 & 27 of the Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control
Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 2011') before the respondent No.4
for eviction of the petitioner from the said premises. The petitioner filed written
statement in the said case stating inter-alia that she was the tenant over the
said land on payment of monthly rent of Rs.432/-, which was duly received by
the private respondents themselves or through their duly authorized agent.
During pendency of the eviction suit, the private respondents and the petitioner
had filed a joint compromise petition in J.B.R.C Case No. 82 of 2017 wherein the
private respondents had agreed to give 10% discount to the petitioner on
purchase of a flat in the proposed housing complex to be constructed over the
said land, however, they had failed to execute any agreement to that effect and
hence the petitioner did not vacate the said premises.
4. It is also submitted that the respondent No.4, without providing any
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, passed the order dated 14.2.2020
directing her to vacate the tenanted premises. It was further observed in the
said order that in case of not vacating the said tenanted premises by the
petitioner within one month, the private respondents might evict her by
adopting legal procedure.
5. It is further submitted that the other tenants have vacated the rented
premises after execution of an agreement regarding 10% rebate on purchase of
a flat in the proposed residential complex. The petitioner thereafter filed an
appeal before the respondent No.3 along with the application for condonation of
delay in filing the same, however, the respondent No.3 dismissed the said
appeal vide order dated 14.02.2023. Subsequently, the respondent No.4 passed
the impugned order as contained in memo No. 146 dated 31.3.2023 by which
the petitioner was directed to vacate the said premises and to hand over
peaceful possession of the same to the private respondents within one month.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed J.B.R.C. Revision No. 6 of 2023 before the
respondent No.2, however, the said revision was also dismissed vide the
impugned order dated 21.12.2023 in most mechanical manner without any
application of mind.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that Section 21 of the Act,
2011 cannot be invoked for eviction of a rented residential premises on the
ground of default in payment of rent as well as recovery of alleged arrear of
rent. The petitioner cannot be evicted from the said premises without following
the procedure under Section 33 of the Act, 2011. Moreover, the respondent
No.4 did not consider the petition dated 5.11.2019 filed by the petitioner
wherein it was stated that in absence of any agreement executed by the private
respondents, the petitioner by way of an affidavit dated 27.9.2019 had denied
any such consent to vacate the said land. It is further submitted that the
respondent No.4 passed the order of eviction dated 14.2.2020 in J.B.R.C. Case
No. 82 of 2017 without providing any opportunity to the petitioner to adduce
evidence and hence the same is liable to be set aside on that score also.
7. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that the
concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the respondent Nos. 2, 3 & 4 may not be
interfered by this Court in exercise of the power under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. It is further submitted that in the joint compromise
petition filed by the plaintiffs/private respondents, the petitioner had agreed to
vacate the premises in question, however, she subsequently failed to comply
the same and as such there was no question of giving rebate of 10% on
purchasing a flat in the proposed residential complex.
8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant materials
available on record. Thrust of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner
is that the private respondents had assured to provide 10% rebate to the other
tenants on purchasing flats in the proposed residential complex by executing
agreement with them, however, they had failed to execute any agreement with
the petitioner to that effect and as such she did not vacate the said premises.
9. Before coming to the merit of the petitioner's contention, it would be
appropriate to refer few judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with
the scope of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
10. In the case of Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. Mustaqim & Ors. reported in
(1983) 4 SCC 566, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
''7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High
Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited
"to seeing that an inferior court or tribunal functions
within the limits of its authority", and not to correct
an error apparent on the face of the record, much less
an error of law. In this case there was, in our opinion,
no error of law much less an error apparent on the
face of the record. There was no failure on the part of
the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction
nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural
justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in
consonance with the procedure established by law. In
exercising the supervisory power under Article 227,
the High Court does not act as an appellate court or
tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence
upon which the determination of the inferior court or
tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of
law in the decision.''
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Venkatlal G. Pittie & Anr.
Vs. Bright Bros. (P) Ltd. reported in (1987) 3 SCC 558, has held thus:
''27. Interference by the High Courts under Article
227 of the Constitution must be within limits. This
question has been considered by this Court from time
to time and principles laid down. This Court in Ganpat
Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde [(1978) 2 SCC 573]
expressed the view that the High Court commits a
gross error in interfering with what was a just and
proper exercise of discretion by the Court of Small
Causes, in exercise of its power under Article 227 of
the Constitution. This was unwarranted. The High
Court under Article 227 has a limited jurisdiction. It
was held in that case that a finding as to whether
circumstances justified the exercise of discretion or
not, unless clearly perverse and patently
unreasonable, was, after all a finding of fact and it
could not be interfered with either under Article 226
or 227 of the Constitution. If a proper court has come
to the conclusion on the examination of the nature of
the structure, the nature of the duration of structure,
the annexation and other relevant factors that the
structures were permanent in nature which were
violative of Section 13(1)(b) of the Rent Act as well as
Section 108 clause (p) of Transfer of Property Act and
such a finding, is possible, it cannot be considered to
be perverse. In such a situation, the High Court could
not have and should not have interfered.
28. In India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M.A.
Baker [(1977) 4 SCC 587] this Court reiterated that
the limitation of the court while exercising power
under Article 227 of the Constitution is well settled.
Power under Article 227 is one of judicial
superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset the
conclusions of facts, however erroneous these may
be. It is possible that another court may be able to
take a different view of the matter by appreciating
the evidence in a different manner, if it determinedly
chooses to do so. That will not be justice administered
according to law to which courts are committed
notwithstanding dissertation in season and out of
season, about philosophies. In that case, the court
found that the High Court had arrogated to itself the
powers of the appellate court.''
12. It is well settled that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred to the High
Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is primarily to see that
Court or tribunal functions within the bounds of its authority and it must be
exercised sparingly. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the
High Court should not act as an appellate Court or tribunal. The High Court is
not supposed to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination
of the Court below or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in
the decision. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
should not assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or
wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and
flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice
would be done unless the High Court interferes. Where the statute bans the
exercise of revisional powers, it would require very exceptional circumstances to
warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the
power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. The
jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be exercised as the cloak of an appeal in
disguise.
13. In the present case, the petitioner has not denied the tenant-landlord
relationship between her and the private respondents. In the eviction suit, the
petitioner had also agreed to vacate the said premises, however, she was
claiming rebate of 10% on purchase of a flat in the proposed residential
complex contending that the other tenants were assured to provide such rebate
on purchase of flats.
14. The respondent No.4 in the order dated 14.02.2020 has clearly observed
that the plaintiffs were ready to give 10% rebate to the petitioner on purchase
of a flat, however, for getting the said rebate, the petitioner was required to
vacate the said premises and as such she was directed to vacate the same.
15. On bare perusal of the joint compromise petition filed by the petitioner
and the private respondents before the respondent No.4, it transpires that the
petitioner had agreed to vacate the said premises on or before 30.10.2019 and
the private respondents had agreed to give 10% rebate to the petitioner on
purchase of a flat. Thus, the petitioner was to vacate the said premises as a
pre-condition for getting 10% rebate on purchase of a flat. In the joint
compromise petition, it was however not agreed that an agreement would be
executed before eviction of the said premises by the petitioner and thus I find
no substance in her contention that since no agreement was executed by the
private respondents, she did not vacate the said premises.
16. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I find no error in the
impugned orders passed by the respondent Nos. 2, 3 & 4 so as to make any
interference with the same.
17. The present writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
18. Consequently, I.A No. 853 of 2025 also stands dismissed.
Satish/AFR (RAJESH SHANKAR, J)
