Jharkhand High Court
Kantu Kumar Thakur vs Central Mine Planning & Design ... on 15 July, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:19232-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 541 of 2024
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Kantu Kumar Thakur, aged about 28 years, son of Late Shiv Narayan
Thakur, resident of Village - Benti, P.O. - Behera, P.S. - Piparwar, District
- Chatra. ... Appellant/Writ Petitioner
Versus
1. Central Mine Planning & Design Institute Ltd. Through its Chairman-
cum-Managing Director, having its office at Gondwana Place, Kanke
Road, P.O. & P.S. - Kanke, District - Ranchi.
2. The Director (P & A1), Central Mine Planning & Design Institute Ltd.
Having its office at Gondwana Place, Kanke Road, P.O. & P.S. - Kanke,
District - Ranchi.
3. The General Manager (P &A1), Central Mine Planning & Design
Institute Ltd. having its office at Gondwana Place, Kanke Road, P.O. &
P.S. - Kanke, District - Ranchi.
... Respondents/Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
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For the Appellant : Mr. Abhijeet Kumar Singh, Advocate
: Mr. Kumar Harsh, Advocate
: Ms. Khushboo Kumari, Advocate
: Ms. Tejaswa Mohanta, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
: Mr. Vineet Sinha, Advocate
------
Order No. 06
CAV on 24th June, 2025 Pronounced on 15th July, 2025
1
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Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:
1. The instant appeal is under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against
the order dated 26.06.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of this
Court in writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3378 of 2023, whereby and
whereunder the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ
petition has declined to interfere with the decision taken by the
respondent-CCL by which the claim of compassionate appointment of
petitioner/appellant has been rejected on the ground that the
appellant has crossed the maximum age of 35 years on the basis of
the assessment made by the Medical Board.
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the petition
and in the memo of appeal needs to be refer herein which reads as
under:
The petitioner has claimed appointment on compassionate
ground after demise of his father, who was working as CAT-II Drill
Helper under respondent CCL. His father died in harness on
25.03.2020.
The petitioner being legal heir and son of the deceased employee
had applied for appointment on compassionate ground under the
provision of National Coal Wage Agreement on 12.11.2020.
After due consideration, the respondents have rejected the claim
of the petitioner vide order dated 10.06.2022 on the ground that the
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petitioner has crossed the age of appointment required for
compassionate appointment.
3. The appellant thereafter filed a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3378
of 2023, which was being rejected by the learned Single Judge of this
Court, against which the instant appeal is filed.
4. It is evident from the factual aspect that the appellant being
dependent of the deceased employee had made an application for
consideration of the appointment on compassionate ground.
5. The respondent authorities, while entertaining the said application,
has submitted the appellant to Medical Board for assessment of his
age in order to assess as to whether the appellant was within the age
of 35 years or more than 35 years.
6. The Medical Boad has assessed the age of the petitioner to be in
between the age of 35 to 40 years, hence coming to the mid-point in
between the age of 35 to 40 years, i.e., 37.5 years age of the appellant
has been assessed.
7. Vide order dated 10.06.2022, the respondent, on consideration of the
aforesaid assessment of the age of the appellant by the Medical
Board, has rejected the claim of the writ petitioner/appellant on the
ground that the appellant has crossed the age of 35 years on the date
of filing application for compassionate appointment.
8. The appellant-writ petitioner has challenged the said order by filing
writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3378 of 2023.
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9. The respondent CCL has appeared and contested the case and while
filing the counter-affidavit, the ground has been taken that there is no
error in the assessment made by the Medical Board and further if the
age of the petitioner will be taken into consideration i.e. 31.12.1982
which has been mentioned in the Aadhar card as available in the
paper book at Page No. 79, the age of the appellant will be more than
the age of 35 years.
10. The appellant/writ petitioner has taken the ground by relying upon
the judgment rendered in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL, 2021 SCC
OnLine Jhar 1301, has submitted that as per the aforesaid judgment
in case of age assessment by the medical board, lower age limit has to
be taken into consideration.
11. The learned writ Court, on consideration of the fact that the age of
the appellant has been assessed by the Medical Board to be 37.5
years, the mid-point in between the age of 35 to 40 years and
applying the order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Rajasthan Pradesh Vaidya Samiti, Sardarshahar & Anr. V. Union of
India & Ors. (2010) 12 SCC 609 has dismissed the writ petition,
which is the subject matter of the present appeal.
Arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant:
12. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner has
taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order passed
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by the learned Single Judge as also the order passed by the
respondent CCL rejecting the claim of the appellant:
(i) The Medical Board has assessed the age of 35 to 40 years, and
respondent authority by taking the mid-point in between 35 to
40 years i.e. 37.5 years has rejected the claim of the writ
petitioner and while rejecting the claim based upon the
aforesaid assessment of the Medical Board, the order passed by
this Court in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) has not
been taken into consideration wherein this Court has decided
that the mid-point which is to be taken on the basis of the
assessment of the age by the Medical Board cannot be allowed
to be taken, since the writ petitioner has not got the status of
an employee and, therefore, the decision of the respondent CCL
as contained in letter dated 07.07.1992 is not applicable in the
facts and circumstances of the instant case.
(ii) It has been submitted that once the issue of age assessment by
the medical board has been decided in the order/judgment
passed by this Court in L.P.A. NO. 687 of 2019 Lilwa Bhuiyan V.
CCL (supra), wherein it has been observed by the Division
Bench of this Court that the lower age limit has to be taken into
consideration, the respondent CCL ought not to have assessed
the age by taking the mid-point of the age, but ignoring the said
judgment passed by this Court, hence the order passed by the
authorities is not sustainable in the eye of law, but the aforesaid
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aspect of the matter has also not been considered by the
learned Single Judge, rather by holding therein that the writ
petitioner since have been found to be more than of the age of
35 years and as such, there is no need to interfere with the
decision taken by the authorities in rejecting the claim for
appointment on compassionate ground.
(iii) The learned counsel has also taken the ground that since the
appointment is to be made on the National Coal Wage
Agreement, which is a beneficial piece of legislation and as
such, the same is liberally to be construed in favour of the
dependent of the deceased employee, but contrary to the said
principle, the approach has been taken by negating the claim
that too when the issue has been settled by this Court not to
come to the mid-point of the age assessed by the Medical
Board.
13. The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that the order passed by learned Single Judge therefore
suffers from an error and the same is not sustainable in the eye of
law, hence is fit to be quashed and set aside.
Arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for
respondent-CCL:
14. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent CCL, while defending the impugned judgment, has taken
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the following ground:
(i) The order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers
from no error, reason being that the assessment which
has been made by the Medical Board is in consonance
with the age available on record with the Aadhar
document, wherein the date of birth of the appellant if
taken into consideration, it will come to more than of the
age of 35 years. It has been contended that the
maximum age of appointment in the CCL is 35 years
hence rightly the claim of writ petitioner/appellant has
been rejected.
(ii) The learned Single Judge has considered the aforesaid
aspect of the matter and therefore the impugned order
of rejection of claim for appointment on compassionate
ground has rightly not been interfered with.
(iii) The submission has been made that so far as the
judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Lilwa
Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) is concerned, the same has been
considered by the learned Single Judge and on its
consideration, the fact as available in the present case,
the same has been found to be applicable since, in the
case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) also the judgment
has been passed by this Court that the assessment of age
by the Medical Board has been considered to be correct,
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based upon the document available on record.
(iv) It has been submitted that herein also the assessment of the
age of the writ petitioner made by the Medical Board in
between the age of 35 to 40 years and accordingly , the
mid-point has been taken as 37.5 years, which is in
corroboration with the age of the writ petitioner as
referred in Page 53 or Page 79 of the memo of the
instant appeal.Hence, it is incorrect on the part of the
appellant to take the ground that the judgment rendered
in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) has not
rightly been considered rather on its consideration, the
claim of the appellant-writ petitioner has been rejected.
(v) The learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment
rendered by this Court in the case of Ganesh Kumar V.
M/s Central Coalfields Limited & Ors., LPA No. 311 of
2021.
15. The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge,
suffers from no error.
Analysis
16. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through
the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned
judgment as also the factual aspect available on record along with the
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document available therein.
17. This Court, on consideration of the argument advanced on behalf of
the parties and after going through the finding recorded by the
learned Single Judge in the impugned order needs to consider the
applicability of the judgment passed in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V.
CCL (supra) and Ganesh Kumar V. M/s Central Coalfields Limited &
Ors.,, but for consideration of the said judgments, the factual aspects
of both the judgments needs to be refer herein.
18. The reference of the facts of the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra)
is being quoted herein which reads as under:
2. ----- The brief facts of the case which need to be enumerated
herein, read as under:--
The mother of the writ petitioner, namely, Laxmi Devi, was
appointed to the post of Ex-Wagon Loader on 18.12.1989, who died
in harness on 19.12.2013. The petitioner, being the legal heir,
approached the respondent authorities for consideration of his case
for appointment on compassionate ground under the provision of
Clause 9.3.0 of National Coal Wage Agreement (hereinafter to be
referred to as NCWA). His case for compassionate appointment was
forwarded for consideration. The writ petitioner had annexed copy
of Driving License, Aadhar Card, nomination form and L.T.C. form
with his application. His case was referred to the Medical Board for
assessment of the correct age. The Medical Board assessed the age of
the writ petitioner to be 371/2 years on the date of assessment and
taking into consideration the aforesaid age and keeping the fact into
consideration that maximum age for appointment is 35 years, his
case was rejected vide order dated 16.06.2015, aggrieved thereof
the writ petitioner has approached to this Court by filing writ
petition being W.P.(S) No. 2424 of 2019.
5. Learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the stand of
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the respondent C.C.L., has found no merit in the writ petition and
accordingly the writ petition has been dismissed which is the subject
matter of the instant intra- court appeal.
19. Following findings has been recorded in the said case by the Division
Bench of this Court which is being quoted as under:
18. We have considered the L.T.C. Form vis-a-vis PS-3 and PS-4
Forms which contain details about the family members wherefrom
we have found that in the L.T.C. Form-A the age of the writ petitioner
has been shown to be 15 years but it is very surprising that the said
L.T.C. Form is having no signature of the respondent authorities and
the same is without any date and as such, the age of the writ
petitioner finds mentioned therein as 15 years, but on what date, is
not being clarified from the said document and, therefore, according
to us, the said document cannot be said to be a proof of age of the
writ petitioner.
19. We have also perused the PS-3 Form which contains particulars
of family members wherein the age of the writ petitioner has been
shown to be 18 years and the said document is dated 28.05.1998.
20. It is further evident from the L.T.C. Form-A that the said
application does not contain any column for signature of the
employer rather it is the form to be furnished by way of self-
declaration of the concerned employee but the PS-3 Form i.e.,
particulars of family, contains the column for signature of the
employer. Likewise, PS-4 Form i.e., the nomination form, also
contains column for signature of the employer and as such, in
comparison in between the L.T.C. Form-A and PS-3 and PS-4 Forms,
so far as its authenticity is concerned, in absence of any signature of
the employer the same cannot prevail upon the details furnished
either in PS-3 or PS-4 Forms and, therefore, the authority, instead of
putting reliance upon L.T.C. Form-A so far as the age of the writ
petitioner is concerned, ought to have considered solely the details
furnished including the age of the writ petitioner on PS-3 or PS-4
Forms.
21. Therefore, reliance having been placed by the respondent CCL
on the L.T.C. Form-A cannot be said to be justified one since the age
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of 15 years mentioned therein cannot be said to be conclusive age in
absence of any date mentioned in L.T.C. Form-A as to on what date
and year the writ petitioner was of the age of 15 years.
22. So far as PS-3 Form is concerned, the age of the writ petitioner
has been mentioned as 18 years as on 28.05.1998 and, therefore, the
said document i.e., PS-3 Form, containing the particulars of family
members, can be said to be a valid document to assess the age of the
writ petitioner. Since herein the respondent CCL is placing reliance
upon these documents i.e., L.T.C. Form-A, PS-3 and PS-4 Forms but
reliance has been placed by the respondent CCL in L.T.C. Form where
the age of the writ petitioner has been shown to be 15 years while in
PS-3 and PS-4 Forms the age of the writ petitioner has been shown
to be 18 years which led the respondent CCL to come to the
conclusion about discrepancy in the age necessitating for
constituting a Medical Board but as we have already said
hereinabove that the age having mentioned in L.T.C. Form-A without
any date and year, cannot be relied and, therefore, the age
mentioned in PS-3 and PS-4 where the age of the writ petitioner has
been mentioned as 18 years on 28.05.1998 can only be said to be
valid document for assessment of age of the writ petitioner and as
such, there was no requirement to constitute a Medical Board.
23. The respondent CCL has not considered this aspect of the matter
even though an agreement has been entered into by way of National
Coal Wage Agreement which is a beneficial piece of agreement as
per provision of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to
make out provision for providing appointment in case of death of
bread earner by way of social security measures, meaning thereby,
the NCWA which is having a statutory fervor as because the
agreement has been entered in view of Section 18(1) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which confers statutory force to the
agreement and as such, the same ought to have been considered by
the respondent CCL taking into consideration the object and intent
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
24. It is settled position of law that benevolent provisions should be
construed taking into consideration the dominant purpose of the
statute, intention of the legislature and underlying policy as laid
down by Hon'ble Apex Court in National Textile Workers' Union etc.
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v. P.R. Ramakrishnan reported in (1983) 1 SCC 228 : AIR 1983 SC 75
and in Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Union of India reported in (1999)
6 SCC 459 wherein it has been held that it would be the duty of the
Court to interpret the provision, especially a beneficial provision,
liberally so as to give it a wider meaning rather than a restrictive
meaning which would negate the very object of the Rule.
25. It is admitted by the respondent CCL that the Medical Board is
constituted in case of discrepancy in the age. We are not disagreeing
with the said policy decision but the question is that while
constituting a Medical Board, there must be conscious decision by
the competent authority in the backdrop of the factual aspect but
we repeatedly asked the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent CCL to place on record any decision of the competent
authority to constitute a Medical Board to assess as to what led the
competent authority of the respondent CCL to constitute the Medical
Board but surprisingly no such decision has been produced,
however, a noting sheet has been produced by way of affidavit dated
09.02.2021 wherein a hand written script has been placed on record
under the signature of the General Manager (P & IR) referring
therein that due to discrepancy in the age of the writ petitioner
having been mentioned in L.T.C. Form, PS- 3 and PS-4, a decision was
taken to constitute a Medical Board but anything contained in the
noting sheet cannot be said to be a decision of the authority, rather
a decision will be said to be a decision in the eyes of law if the same
has been taken by the competent authority after deliberating upon
the issues and communicating to all concerned for its
execution/implementation and, therefore, we are left with no option
but to hold that the decision of the respondent CCL asking the writ
petitioner to go for the medical examination is in absence of any
decision of the competent authority.
26. We have already referred hereinabove about the validity of the
L.T.C. Form-A and further we have come to a conclusion that PS-3
and PS-4 Forms refer the age of the writ petitioner as 18 years as on
28.05.1998, the same being a piece of evidence to substantiate the
age of the writ petitioner available on record and which is sole piece
of evidence, there was no requirement to constitute a Medical Board
for assessment of the age of the writ petitioner as because the
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reason for constituting a Medical Board as has been admitted by the
learned counsel appearing for the respondent CCL that the same is
required to be assessed in case of nonavailability of any document
pertaining to age of the employee but herein official documents are
available by way of PS-3 and PS-4 Forms containing the age of the
writ petitioner as 18 years on 28.05.1998.
27. Even accepting the contention of the respondent CCL that there
was requirement to constitute a Medical Board and admittedly the
Medical Board has assessed the age of the writ petitioner in between
35 to 40 years and respondent authorities have considered the writ
petitioner to be the age of 371/2 years taking the midpoint of five
years but the question is why the midpoint and not 35 years.
28. We have already referred hereinabove about the principle to be
followed in a case of beneficial legislation which is to be interpreted
liberally so as to give it a wider meaning than a restrictive meaning
which would indicate the very object of the Rule and admittedly the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a beneficial legislation and as such,
the provisions contained therein may be construed taking the
dominant purpose of the statute, intention of the legislature and
underlying policy.
29. We have also referred hereinabove that the NCWA is by way of
providing social security measures by entering into an agreement
with the Union under the provision of Section 18(1) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and the same having the statutory fervor, the
object underlying therein is to be considered. The foremost object of
the said agreement is to act by way of providing social security
measures to the employees and its dependant for which various
provisions have been made to provide appointment in case of death
of the bread earner as under Clause 9.3.0 and 9.5.0 of the said
agreement and, therefore, when the underlying object of the said
agreement is to provide social security measures to the employees
and their dependants, the same is to be treated by the respondent
authorities in a way so that the object and intent of the agreement
be achieved.
30. The respondent CCL, however, failed to produce any decision of
the authority, in case of consideration of appointment on
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compassionate ground, to take the midpoint of the age assessed by
the Medical Board as has been done in the instant case, rather the
document dated 07.07.1992 has been produced to assess the age of
an employee by taking the midpoint of the age as has been assessed
by the Medical Board but since it is not a case of an employee rather
the case of a candidate who is seeking appointment on
compassionate ground and, therefore, the said circular will not be
applicable in the case of the writ petitioner and in that view of the
mutter, when the respondent authorities have asked the writ
petitioner to go for the medical examination wherein the age of the
writ petitioner has been assessed in between 35 to 40 years and
taking the midpoint the age of the writ petitioner has been assessed
as 371/2 years of age, cannot be said to be an action to achieve the
object and intent of the NCWA to provide social security measures to
the dependant of the deceased employee, rather the approach of the
respondent authorities ought to have been to consider the age of the
writ petitioner by taking its lower point so that the object and intent
of NCWA be achieved.
31. It requires to refer herein about the order passed by the
Coordinate Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 117 of 2010
dated 01.12.2010 which has been brought on record wherein also
the issue fell for consideration about judging the age of appellant on
medical opinion and therein it has been observed that if the
petitioner's claim that her age is 43 years and the respondents
considered that as per the medical evidence her age is 45 years then
there always possibility of errors of two years (plus)/ (minus) and in
that view of the matter the claim of the petitioner's mother could
not have been denied on compassionate ground.
32. It has been brought to the notice of this Court by the learned
counsel for the appellant that in pursuance to the order passed in
L.P.A. No. 117 of 2010 [Md. Rahim v. Project Officer, Kuju Colliery],
the appellant namely Md. Rahim has already been provided with the
appointment which fact has not been disputed by the learned
counsel appearing for the respondent CCL
33. Further, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the
judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case
of Jagdish v. Central Coalfields Limited in W.P.(S) No. 3339 of 2016
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wherein also the dispute about the age has been set at rest by the
opinion of the Medical Board after assessment of the age of the writ
petitioner in that writ petition which has been questioned by the
writ petitioner on the ground that when the age of the writ
petitioner is available in other records what is the necessity to go for
the Medical Board and in that view of the matter the writ petition
was allowed with a direction to appoint the writ petitioner of the
said writ petition on compassionate ground.
34. We are taking note of this order even though the same has been
passed by the learned Single Judge only due to the reason that the
respondent CCL, in pursuance to the said order, has acted upon by
providing appointment to the writ petitioner of the said case
without assailing the same before the higher forum and, therefore,
according to us, the approach of the respondent CCL, being the
machinery of the State, cannot be of pick and choose policy i.e., to
assail one order and accept another order on almost same set of
facts.
35. We, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, have gone
across the order passed by the learned Single Judge and found
therefrom that the learned Single Judge has simply gone across the
contention of the respondent CCL wherein the respondent CCL has
contended about the age of writ petitioner to be 371/2 years which
has been considered to be more than the maximum age of 35 years
and, therefore, writ petition has been dismissed but we, on the basis
of the discussion made hereinabove, are of the view that the learned
Single Judge has failed to appreciate the fact in entirety as per the
discussion made hereinabove and reached to a wrong conclusion by
approving the decision of the respondent CCL which according to us,
cannot be said to be sustainable in the eyes of law.
36. In view thereof, we find patent illegality in the impugned order.
Accordingly, the same is quashed and set aside. In the result, the
instant L.P.A. is allowed and the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2424
of 2019 is also allowed.
20. Likewise, the factual aspect involved in the case of Ganesh Kumar V.
M/s Central Coalfields Limited & Ors. (supra)., also required to be
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referred herein which is being quoted hereunder:
The instant intra-court appeal preferred under Clause-10 of Letters
Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 26.11.2020
passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.7727 of
2017, whereby and whereunder, the writ Court has refused to
interfere with the decision of the Administrative Authority as
contained in letter no.1487 dated 08.06.2017, by which, the case of
the writ petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground has
been rejected.
2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ
petition, required to be enumerated, are as hereunder:-
It is the case of the writ petitioner that his father was appointed
on 01.12.1975 with the respondent CCL and he was working in
Bhurkunda Colliery. In the service excerpt issued in favour of the writ
petitioner's father, the age of the writ petitioner was wrongly
mentioned as 11 years as on 01.04.1987. The writ petitioner has
produced the various documents showing his date of birth as
26.07.1985. The father of the writ petitioner died in harness on
19.02.2015. The writ petitioner has made an application for his
employment under the provision of Para 9.3.0 of the National Coal
Wage Agreement (N.C.W.A.).
The respondent-CCL in view of the discrepancy in the age of the
writ petitioner appearing in the service excerpt of the father of the
writ petitioner and his age appearing on the document furnished by
him, he was asked to appear before the Medical Board for assessment
of his age. The Medical Board has assessed the age of the writ
petitioner as 37 ½ years on the date of his application and as such,
the claim of the writ petitioner for appointment on compassionate
ground was rejected considering the maximum age of the writ
petitioner for appointment, as per the N.C.W.A. to be 35 years vide
decision, as contained in letter dated 08.06.2017.
The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the decision of the
Administrative Authority, has filed writ petition being W.P.(S)
No.7727 of 2017 taking the plea therein that the writ petitioner has
produced the Birth Certificate and School Leaving Certificate etc. to
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show that his age was below 35 years which has not been considered
by the respondent-CCL in the right perspective. The other issues have
also been agitated that in view of the provision of N.C.W.A., the case of
the writ petitioner is fit to be considered in right direction and the
writ petitioner was entitled for appointment on compassionate
ground.
The respondent-CCL has taken the plea that the case of the writ
petitioner has rightly been rejected by the competent authority on the
ground that the father of the writ petitioner, namely, Late Brij Lal
was designated as Store Keeper at Bhurkunda Colliery and he died in
harness on 19.02.2015. After the death of the employee, the mother of
the writ petitioner, namely, Smt. Ramsakhi Devi submitted a
representation on 26.03.2016 for appointment of the writ petitioner
on compassionate ground.
It has been submitted that as per the provision of N.C.W.A., the
maximum age limit of dependent for compassionate appointment is
not required to be more than 35 years. However, the age of the writ
petitioner was more than 35 years on the date of submission of
application for compassionate appointment, therefore, such claim has
been rejected.
It has further been stated that the Medical Board has assessed
the age of the writ petitioner to be in between 35 to 40 years as on
12.04.2017 and as such, the respondent-CCL, by taking into
consideration the decision contained in circular dated 07.07.1992, the
mid-point of the age of the writ petitioner has finally been assessed,
as per which, the writ petitioner has been found to be more than 35
years, therefore, the case of the writ petitioner has rightly been
rejected.
The learned Single Judge, after considering the rival submissions
advanced on behalf of the parties, has refused to interfere with the
decision of the Administrative Authority, against which, the present
intra-court appeal has been preferred.
21. The finding recorded therein also needs to be refer herein which
reads as under:
9. This Court, on consideration of the submission made on behalf of
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the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect about non-
applicability of the circular dated 07.07.1992, is of the view that the
said circular in the facts of the given case will not be applicable, as
has been held by us in LPA No.687 of 2019 dated 10.02.2021. But, this
Court is required to consider that even if, the said circular is not
applicable in the facts of the given case, can the writ petitioner be
held entitled for appointment on compassionate ground, on the basis
of the declaration furnished by his father at the time of availing the
benefit of LTC.
---------
---------
It is the further admitted fact that the said averment has not been
disputed by the writ petitioner, since, no rejoinder to the counter
affidavit has been filed. The aforesaid aspect of the matter
automatically compelled us to come to the conclusion that whatever
has been stated with respect to details of furnishing the age of the
writ petitioner by his deceased father, as has been stated in the
counter affidavit as under para 20 and 21 has been admitted. It is
evident from the aforesaid stand taken by the respondent-CCL that
admittedly as on the date of application dated 26.03.2016, the age of
the writ petitioner was more than 35 years.
20. This Court has also considered the case from different angel in
order to see about the assessment of the age by taking the mid-point
of the age in between 35 to 40 years i.e., 37 ½ years and has found the
age which has been disclosed by the father of the writ petitioner as
per the statement made in the counter affidavit as under para 20 and
21, as quoted and referred hereinabove, derives the conclusion about
the correctness of the assessment of the age of the writ petitioner by
taking the mid-point of the range of the age i.e., 37 ½ years.
11. This Court, therefore, is of the view that since, it is the self-
disclosure of the father of the writ petitioner about the age of the writ
petitioner and after taking into consideration the aforesaid age on
the date of application, admittedly, the writ petitioner has crossed the
minimum age of 35 years, therefore, the writ petitioner cannot be
held entitled for appointment on compassionate ground.
12. This Court, however, requires to refer herein the issue of the
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statement made in the counter affidavit as under para 20 and 21 has
not been referred in the impugned order, since, it is available in the
counter affidavit, therefore, the same has been taken into
consideration by this Court in order to arrive at the conclusion about
the outcome of the writ petition and basis upon which, we are of the
view that the outcome of the writ petition, since, is showing no
interference with the decision of the Administrative Authority, by
which, the appointment on compassionate ground has not been
provided, which cannot be said to suffer from an error.
22. It is evident from the judgment rendered in the case of Lilwa
Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) and consider that this Court has given a
specific finding not to assess the age by coming to the mid-point of
the age assessed by the Medical Board, such finding has been given
on the basis of the fact that the Coal India Limited has come out with
the document dated 07.07.1992 wherein it has been decided that on
assessment of age by the Medical Board, the mid-point is to be taken
into consideration but this court after going through the document
dated 07.07.1992 has come out with a conclusive finding that the
said decision is only applicable to the in-service employees and not
to the candidate who is to enter into service, the relevant paragraph
of the said judgment on the cost of repetition is quoted herein which
reads as under:
"30. The respondent CCL, however, failed to produce any decision of
the authority, in case of consideration of appointment on
compassionate ground, to take the midpoint of the age assessed by
the Medical Board as has been done in the instant case, rather the
document dated 07.07.1992 has been produced to assess the age of an
employee by taking the midpoint of the age as has been assessed by
the Medical Board but since it is not a case of an employee rather the
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case of a candidate who is seeking appointment on compassionate
ground and, therefore, the said circular will not be applicable in the
case of the writ petitioner and in that view of the mutter, when the
respondent authorities have asked the writ petitioner to go for the
medical examination wherein the age of the writ petitioner has been
assessed in between 35 to 40 years and taking the midpoint the age of
the writ petitioner has been assessed as 371/2 years of age, cannot be
said to be an action to achieve the object and intent of the NCWA to
provide social security measures to the dependant of the deceased
employee, rather the approach of the respondent authorities ought to
have been to consider the age of the writ petitioner by taking its
lower point so that the object and intent of NCWA be achieved.
23. Further this Court had given finding in the said case that the
reliance placed by the respondent CCL in L.T.C. Form where the age
of the writ petitioner has been shown to be 15 years but the age
having mentioned in L.T.C. Form-A without any date and year, cannot
be relied and, therefore, the age mentioned in PS-3 and PS-4 where
the age of the writ petitioner has been mentioned as 18 years on
28.05.1998 can only be said to be valid document for assessment of
age of the writ petitioner.
24. In the said case, this Court on the basis of the availability of
document, has criticized the assessment made by the Medical Board
and accepting the same, the mid-point of the age, has been assessed
for the purpose of consideration of appointment on compassionate
ground and in that view of the matter, we have come out with the
conclusion that the mid-point for the purpose of ascertaining the age,
based upon the age assessment made by the Medical Board cannot be
said to be proper approach and for coming to such conclusion, we
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have taken into consideration the document wherein also the age of
the petitioner of the said case has been found to be less than 35
years.
25. According to the factual aspect of the present case, herein the
respondent contrary to the judgment passed by this Court again,
since the respondent authorities are found some confusion in the age
of the writ petitioner, decided to send the appellant to the Medical
Board for his age assessment. The age was assessed by the medical
board in between the age of 35 to 40 years. Therefore, by taking the
mid-point, the age of the writ petitioner has been considered to be
37.5 years and further on date of filing application for compassionate
appointment i.e. on 12.11.2020 it has been taken as 36 years 01
month and 7 days.
26. The respondent, based upon the said assessment, has rejected the
claim as would be evident from the bare reading of the impugned
order dated 10.06.2022. For ready reference, the same is being
referred herein which reads as under:
"HEAD OF P& A DIVISION, CMPDI HO
Cmpdi
No.CMPDI/HQ/SE/9.4.0/NCWA-X/K,Thakur/22/e419078/f.-
100875
Date: 10.06.2022
To, Regd.
2025:JHHC:19232-DB
Post
Sri Kantu Kumar Thakur,
S/o- Late Shivnarayan Thakur, Ex- Rigman,
CMPDI, RI-III, Ranchi.
At.- Benti,
P.O- Bahera, P.S.- Piparwar
Distt.- Chatra (Jharkhand)- 825321
Dear Sir,
This has reference to your application dated 12.11.2020 for
compassionate employment under provision 9.3.0 of NCWA-X
consequent upon death of your father late Shivnarayan
Thakur, Ex- Rigman, CMPDI, RI- III, Ranchi on 25.03.2020,
Since, the date of application for compassionate employment
was treated as 12.11.2020.
There was a huge age difference of 10 years or so between the
age you had mentioned in your application (DOB. As
31.12.1994) and the age declared by Late Shivnarayan
Thakur during his service life time, which is indicated below-
Sl. No. Age/DOB of Sri Age of candidate
Name of the document Kantu Thakur as on the date of
on date application dt.
12.11.2020
1 Inclusion of Family Depdt Form dt. 16.02.1993. 08 yrs 35 yrs 08 months 26 days
35 yrs. 10 months 22
2. Service Excerpts From dt. 20.06.1995 10 1/5 yrs. days
37 yrs. 10 months 14
3. Aadhaar Card No. 686979631026 31.12.1982 days
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School Certificate issued by Prathmic Vidyalaya,
4. Veti, Tandwa. 31.12.1983 36 yrs 10 months 14 days
Accordingly, the was referred for age Accordingly, the matter
determination in the Medical Board on CCL.
The "Age Assessment Board of CCL" has assessed your age
range between 35-40 (Thirty five to forty) years as on
05.04.2022. As per guidelines of CIL, mid point of age range is
to be taken if there is no mention of age in different record. As
such, taking this into consideration, your age as on 05.04.2022
i.e medical board report will be 37½ yrs. (Middle point).
Hence you will be aged 36 years 01 month 07 days (i.e. above
35 years) as on the date of application dtd. 12.11.2020.
As per provision of NCWA for compassionate employment the
male dependent shold: not be more 35 (Thirty five) years of
age on the date of complete application.
In view of above, your claim for compassionate employment
can not be Accepted as you the over 35 (Thirty Five) years (36
yrs. 01 month 07 days) of age on the date of application
(12.11.2020) as per recommendation of Medical Board of CCL
dated 05.04.2022. hence your claim is hereby rejected.
Yours Faithfully
General Manager
Copy to:-
2025:JHHC:19232-DB
The Regional Director, CMPDI, RI-III, Ranchi. For kind
information please."
27. The ground has been taken in the impugned order passed by the
authority that since, as per the Medical Board, the age of the
appellant-writ petitioner has been assessed in between 35 to 40
years and by taking the mid-point, it is to be 37.5 years, which is
more than the age of 35 years, the maximum age for consideration of
the appointment under the respondent, hence the claim of the
appellant was rejected.
28. The said rejection, cannot be said to be in consonance with the
judgment passed by this Court in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL
(supra), wherein the specific consideration has been given that there
is no decision in assessing the age by taking the mid-point of the age
assessed by the Medical Board.
29. It is settled position of law that benevolent provisions should be
construed taking into consideration the dominant purpose of the
statute, intention of the legislature and underlying policy, reference
in this regard may be taken from the judgment rendered by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Edukanti Kistamma (Dead)
through LRs & Ors. Vrs. S. Venkatareddy (dead) through LRs. &
Ors (2010) 1 SCC 756. For ready reference the relevant paragraph is
being quoted as under:
"26. ....... Interpretation of a beneficial legislation with a narrow
pedantic approach is not justified. In case there is any doubt, the
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court should interpret a beneficial legislation in favour of the
beneficiaries and not otherwise as it would be against the legislative
intent. For the purpose of interpretation of a statute, the Act is to be
read in its entirety. The purport and object of the Act must be given
its full effect by applying the principles of purposive construction.
The court must be strong against any construction which tends to
reduce a statute's utility. The provisions of the statute must be
construed so as to make it effective and operative and to further the
ends of justice and not to frustrate the same. The court has the duty
to construe the statute to promote the object of the statute and
serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and should not
efface its very purpose......"
30. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Madan Singh
Shekhawat v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 459 has observed which
reads as under:
15. It is the duty of the court to interpret a provision, especially a
beneficial provision, liberally so as to give it a wider meaning rather
than a restrictive meaning which would negate the very object of the
rule.
31. Herein, in the instant case, the age of the appellant has been assessed
to 37.5 years and when the said decision has been challenged by
filing writ petition in this regard, the plea was taken based upon
crossing of the age of 35 years.
32. The learned Single Judge has accepted the said stand of the
respondent-CCL and has refused to interfere with the order of
rejection and, in addition, has gone into the fact by putting reliance
upon the document as mentioned in Page 53 which also suggests that
the age of the appellant is more than the age of 35 years.
33. The learned counsel for the respondent CCL has defended the
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impugned judgment passed by learned Single Judge on the ground by
putting reliance upon Page 79 that contains the Aadhar document,
wherein from the date of birth, the appellant has been found to be
more than 35 years and to buttress his arguments, reliance has been
placed on the judgment rendered in the case of Ganesh Kumar V.
M/s Central Coalfields Limited & Ors. (supra).
34. But we have referred hereinabove by dealing with the factual aspect
and the finding recorded by this Court in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V.
CCL (supra) to the effect that the assessment by which by taking the
mid-point as the age has been assessed by the Medical Board, is not
proper to be accepted, rather, the minimum of age, herein 35 years, is
to be taken into consideration.
35. This Court, in order to fortify the same, has considered the document
as available in PS-3 and PS-4 for the purpose of consideration that
even if the said document as available in the service record suggest
that the age of the dependent of the said case is less than 35 years.
36. Admittedly, herein the age as referred in Page 53 is without any
specific date of birth rather the age has been referred in terms of
years which has been sought to be considered to establish the fact
that the age of the appellant-writ petitioner is more than the age of
35 years.
37. The question herein arises that when the document already available
and consciously the respondent-CCL has taken a decision to refer the
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issue of assessment of age of the appellant to the Medical Board and
the Medical Board has assessed the age in between the age of 35 to
40 years and thereafter the mid-point, i.e., 37.5 years has been
assessed, then will it be proper for the respondent CCL to go on the
document as available in Page 53, which has quoted and referred
hereinabove.
38. The answer of this Court is in Negative, reason being that once the
respondent authorities have gone into the issue of assessment of age
by subjecting the appellant to the Medical Board, then the
respondent CCL cannot be allowed to again take the aid of the
document already available as available in Page 53.
39. If the reliance was already there on the document as mentioned in
Page 53 of the paper book, then the respondent ought not to have
subjected the appellant to the Medical Board.
40. The respondent CCL once subjected the appellant to the Medical
Board, then it is the bounden duty of the respondent to go by the
assessment made by the Medical Board and there is no denial of the
fact that once the Medical Board assess the age of one or the other,
the same requires no corroboration with the document as is being
sought to be done herein by the respondent CCL.
41. This Court, therefore, is of the view that once the Medical Board is
taken recourse for the purpose of assessment of the age, then it is not
available for the respondent to go into the other document available.
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42. Since, this Court has already come up with the finding in the case of
Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra) by deprecating the stand of the
respondent CCL to take the mid-point of the age as has been assessed
by the Medical Board, herein 37.5 years, since the age of the
appellant has been assessed to be in between the age of 35 to 40
years. Hence the action of the respondent CCL cannot be said to be
just and proper, rather, the respondent CCL based upon the finding
recorded by this Court in the case of Lilwa Bhuiyan V. CCL (supra)
on the issue of taking mid-point, based upon the decision dated
10.06.2022 ought to consider the age of the appellant to 35 years.
43. This Court after having discussed the aforesaid factual as well as legal
aspect and adverting to the judgment passed by the learned Single
Judge, has found that the learned Single Judge has not considered the
important aspect of the matter regarding the decision already taken
by the Division Bench of this Court that the consideration of mid-
point of the age cannot be said to be just and proper.
44. The learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact that once the
Medical Board has been constituted, then it was not available for the
respondent CCL to go to the age as referred in the document as said
to be available in the service profile of the appellant.
45. This Court, therefore based upon the aforesaid finding, is of the view
that the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from an
error, hence the same requires interference.
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46. In the result, the instant appeal needs to be allowed, accordingly, the
instant appeal being L.P.A. No. 541 of 2024 is allowed.
47. The order passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby quashed and
set aside.
48. The respondent authority is directed to consider the case of the
appellant-writ petitioner.
49. Accordingly, the writ petition also stands allowed.
50. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I agree,
(Rajesh Kumar, J.) (Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Samarth/A.F.R.
