Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand Through The ... vs Nawal Kishore Oraon on 28 July, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:21371-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 180 of 2025
With
I.A. No. 830 of 2025
------
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary,
Department of Higher, Technical Education and Skill
Development P.O. + P.S. - Dhurwa, Ranchi.
2. The Director, Higher Education, Department of
Higher, Technical Education and Skill Development,
Government of Jharkhand, P.O. + P.S.- Dhurwa,
Ranchi.
.... .... Appellants/Respondents
Versus
1. Nawal Kishore Oraon, Aged about 57 years, Son of
Late Somra Oraon, Resident of Village- Mariatoli,
P.O. Sosai, P.S. Mandar, District- Ranchi
(Jharkhand).
... ... Respondent/Petitioner
2. The Ranchi University, through its Registrar, P.O.
G.P.O., P.S. Sadar, Ranchi.
... ... Respondent/Respondent
-----
CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
------
For the Appellants : Mr. Manish Kumar, Sr. SC-II
: Mr. Ashwini Bhushan, AC to Sr. SC-II
For the Respondents : Mr. Anoop Kr. Mehta, Advocate
: Mr. Pratyush, Advocate
------
Order No.02/Dated 28th July, 2025
1. The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10
of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order
dated 10.04.2024 passed by learned Single Judge of
this Court in W.P. (S) No. 2914 of 2020 by which the
writ petition has been allowed.
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I.A. No. 830 of 2025:
2. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by
limitation since as per the office note dated
23.01.2025, there is delay of 256 days in preferring
the appeal, therefore, an application being I.A. No.
830 of 2025 has been filed for condoning such delay.
3. This Court, after taking into consideration the
fact that the instant intra-court appeal has been filed
after inordinate delay of 256 days, deems it fit and
proper, to first consider the delay condonation
application before going into the legality and
propriety of the impugned order on merit.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has
submitted that delay in preferring the appeal may be
condoned by allowing the Interlocutory Application
on the basis of grounds shown therein treating the
same to be sufficient.
5. The grounds for condoning the delay in
preferring the appeal, as has been mentioned in the
interlocutory application is that the impugned order
was passed on 10.04.2024 and the file was
forwarded to Legal Retainer on 25.06.2024 which
was received by him on 05.07.2024 and submitted
the grounds of appeal on 05.09.2024.
Then the file was sent for legal opinion through
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proper channel on 30.09.2024 which was submitted
on 01.10.2024 and the file was received in the
department on 04.10.2024 and put up before the
Secretary of the Department on the same day who
marked the file to the Director, Higher Education for
further action.
Thereafter, the file was received by Director,
Higher Education on 24.10.2024 and then it was
sent to the conducting lawyer, who received the same
on 18.11.2024.
The conducting lawyer asked for complete file
which was provided to him on 13.12.2024 and the
memo of appeal was drafted and sent for approval on
16.12.2024 and thereafter the appeal was filed after
the approval of the competent authority.
Therefore, the delay of 256 days has occurred in
filing the appeal.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the
appellants on delay condonation application and
before considering the same, this Court, deems it fit
and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has
been propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court with
respect to the approach of the Court in condoning
the inordinate delay.
7. There is no dispute about the fact that generally
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the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of
limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers
from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is
to consider the application to condone the delay
before entering into the merit of the lis.
8. It requires to refer herein that the Law of
limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general
welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the
parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy
must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of
time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors.
Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.
The Privy Council in General Accident Fire
and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed
Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the
writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932,
wherein, it has been said that:
"A Law of limitation and prescription may appear
to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular
case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to
be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a
particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable
grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law,
postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not
recognized by law."
In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala,
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(1997) 7 SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering
a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein
no explanation much less a reasonable or
satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had
been given, held at paragraph-6 as under:
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statute so prescribes and
the courts have no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds."
While considering the similar issue, this Court
in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been
held as under:
"21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a
party seeking condonation of delay is a
significant and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness
and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered
free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of
a party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration.
It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both parties and
the said principle cannot be given a total go-by
in the name of liberal approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive
delay as a non-serious matter and, hence,
lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a
nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters."
9. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant
does not act with bona fide motive and at the same
time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the
period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such
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lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence
are the vital factors which should be taken into
consideration while considering the question of
condonation of delay. Reference in this regard may
be made to the judgment rendered by the Division
Bench of Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat
through Secretary & Anr. Vrs. Kanubhai
Kantilal Rana, 2013 SCC Online Guj. 4202,
wherein, at pargraph-17, it has been held that "Law
having prescribed a fixed period of limitation of 30
days for preferring the appeal, the Government
cannot ignore the provisions of the period of
limitation as it was never the intention of the
legislature that there should be a different period of
limitation when the Government is the appellant."
In the case of Post Master General & Ors. Vrs.
Living Media India Limited & Anr., [(2012) 3 SCC
563], it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at
paragraphs 27 to 29 as under:
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with
the issues involved including the prescribed
period of limitation for taking up the matter by
way of filing a special leave petition in this
Court. They cannot claim that they have a
separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent
persons familiar with court proceedings. In the
absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the
delay is to be condoned mechanically merely
because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
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28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in
a matter of condonation of delay when there
was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction
or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has
to be adopted to advance substantial justice,
we are of the view that in the facts and
circumstances, the Department cannot take
advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery and
inherited bureaucratic methodology of making
several notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and available.
The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all
the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bona fide effort, there is
no need to accept the usual explanation that
the file was kept pending for several
months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process. The
government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their
duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and
should not be used as an anticipated benefit
for the government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and
should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."
Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of
Madhya Pradesh & Anr. Vrs. Chaitram Maywade,
[(2020) 10 SCC 667], after referring to the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Post Master
General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Limited
& Anr. (supra,) has held at paragraphs 1 to 5 as
hereunder:
"1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do
the same thing again and again and the conduct
seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition
has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had
an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed
filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh
in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of
M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our
order dated 15-10-2020.
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2. We have penned down a detailed order in that
case and we see no purpose in repeating the same
reasoning again except to record what are stated to
be the facts on which the delay is sought to be
condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the
Government Advocate was approached in respect
of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram
Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP
1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of
the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020.
Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17
months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be
filed or not. What greater certificate of
incompetence would there be for the Legal
Department.
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief
Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look
into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department
as it appears that the Department is unable to file
appeals within any reasonable period of time much
less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as
already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no
more admissible in view of the judgment
in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
4. We have also expressed our concern that these
kinds of the cases are only "certificate cases" to
obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme
Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to
save the skin of officers who may be in default. We
have also recorded the irony of the situation where
no action is taken against the officers who sit on
these files and do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual
manner in which the application has been worded,
the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose
costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be
deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation
Project Committee. The amount be deposited within
four weeks. The amount be recovered from the
officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and
sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the
said amount be also filed in this Court within the
said period of time. We have put to Deputy
Advocate General to caution that for any successive
matters of this kind the costs will keep on going
up."
The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal
and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2
SCR 762, has held that merely because sufficient
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cause has been made out in the facts of the given
case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay
condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as
hereunder:-
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that
even after sufficient cause has been shown a party
is not entitled to the condonation of delay in
question as a matter of right. The proof of a
sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in
the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not
proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be
dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause
is shown then the court has to enquire whether in
its discretion it should condone the delay. This
aspect of the matter naturally introduces the
consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this
stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides
may fall for consideration; but the scope of the
enquiry while exercising the discretionary power
after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be
limited only to such facts as the court may regard
as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why
the party was sitting idle during all the time
available to it. In this connection we may point out
that considerations of bona fides or due diligence
are always material and relevant when the court is
dealing with applications made under Section 14 of
the Limitation Act. In dealing with such
applications the court is called upon to consider the
effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and
14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which
have been expressly made material and relevant
by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same
extent and in the same manner be invoked in
dealing with applications which fall to be decided
only under Section 5 without reference to Section
14. In the present case there is no difficulty in
holding that the discretion should be exercised in
favour of the appellant because apart from the
general criticism made against the appellant's lack
of diligence during the period of limitation no other
fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we
have already pointed out, the learned Judicial
Commissioner rejected the appellant's application
for condonation of delay only on the ground that it
was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as
possible within the period prescribed, and that, in
our opinion, is not a valid ground.
Thus, it is evident that while considering the
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delay condonation application, the Court of Law is
required to consider the sufficient cause for
condonation of delay as also the approach of the
litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as
because after expiry of the period of limitation, a
right is accrued in favour of the other side and as
such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive
of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction
and laches on its part.
It also requires to refer herein that what is the
meaning of 'sufficient cause'. The consideration of
meaning of 'sufficient cause' has been made in
Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition
Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been
held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to
15 hereunder:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The
meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or
"enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
"sufficient" embraces no more than that which
provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the
facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly
examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context,
"sufficient cause" means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has "not acted diligently" or
"remained inactive". However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
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judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court
that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court
should not allow the application for condonation of
delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to
cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and
Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR
1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969)
2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953]
, Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2
SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 :
AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964
SC 993] this Court explained the difference
between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause"
and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a
good cause and vice versa. However, if any
difference exists it can only be that the requirement
of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree
of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be
given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be
decided on the facts of a particular case and no
straitjacket formula is possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 :
AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR
2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but
it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation." The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice but to
enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal
maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is
hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a
situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
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community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse
of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws
of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts
have expressed at least three differing reasons
supporting the existence of statutes of limitations
namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of
cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant
might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale
claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of
actions should pursue them with reasonable
diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense
of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore,
limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of
what may have been acquired in equity and justice
by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a
party's own inaction, negligence or laches.
(See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff
Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa
Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537]
and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that
judicially engrafting principles of limitation
amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of
law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the
court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the "sufficient
cause" which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the
facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning such
an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In case there
was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature."
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Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause
means that the party should not have acted in a
negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on
its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a
case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not
acted deliberately" or "remained inactive". However,
the facts and circumstances of each case must afford
sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the
Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court
that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from
prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory
explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow
the application for condonation of delay. The Court
has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or
was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as
has been held in Manindra Land and Building
Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors.,
AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A.
Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs.
Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben
Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of
Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
It has further been held in the aforesaid
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judgments that the expression 'sufficient cause'
should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure
that substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided
on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket
formula is possible, reference in this regard may be
made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors.
Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195,
wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as
hereunder:-
"12. Thus, it becomes plain that the expression
"sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5
of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any
other similar provision should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice
when no negligence or inaction or want of bona
fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case
whether explanation furnished would constitute
"sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon
facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket
formula for accepting or rejecting explanation
furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But
one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed
with the tendency of finding fault with the cause
shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in
over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of
explanation furnished should be the rule and
refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence
or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to
the defaulting party. On the other hand, while
considering the matter the courts should not lose
sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the
time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the
other party which should not be lightly defeated by
condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However,
by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of
the matter the explanation furnished should not be
rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable
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points of facts and law are involved in the case,
causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the
party against whom the lis terminates, either by
default or inaction and defeating valuable right of
such a party to have the decision on merit. While
considering the matter, courts have to strike a
balance between resultant effect of the order it is
going to pass upon the parties either way."
10. It is evident from the judgments referred
hereinabove, wherein, expression 'sufficient cause'
has been dealt with which means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there
was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the
facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be
alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or
"remained inactive".
11. This Court, after considering the aforesaid
proposition and the explanation furnished in the
delay condonation application to condone the
inordinate delay of 256 days, is proceeding to
examine as to whether the explanation furnished can
be said to be sufficient explanation for condoning the
delay.
12. As would appear from the explanation
furnished, wherein, it has been stated the file was
forwarded to Legal Retainer on 25.06.2024 which
was received by him on 05.07.2024 and submitted
the grounds of appeal on 05.09.2024.
Then the file was sent for legal opinion through
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proper channel on 30.09.2024 which was submitted
on 01.10.2024 and the file was received in the
department on 04.10.2024 and put up before the
Secretary of the Department on the same day who
marked the file to the Director, Higher Education for
further action.
Thereafter, the file was received by Director,
Higher Education on 24.10.2024 and then it was
sent to the conducting lawyer, who received the same
on 18.11.2024.
The conducting lawyer asked for complete file
which was provided to him on 13.12.2024 and the
memo of appeal was drafted and sent for approval on
16.12.2024 and thereafter the appeal was filed after
the approval of the competent authority.
Therefore, the delay of 256 days has occurred in
filing the appeal.
13. It appears from the stated grounds in the delay
condonation application that the cause has been
tried to be shown of movement of file from one
department to another and no sufficient cause has
been explained to condone the delay of 256 days
occurred in preferring the appeal.
14. This Court, therefore, is of the view that in such
circumstances as per the reference made
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hereinabove about the conduct of the State-
appellant, the same cannot be said to be sufficient
cause to condone the delay of 256 days.
15. The coordinate Bench of this Court has passed
an order in L.P.A. No.86 of 2021 on 05.01.2022
rejecting the delay condonation application since the
appeal was filed after delay of about 687 days
without any sufficient cause to condone the delay.
16. The reference of another case is required to be
made herein of an order passed by the coordinate
Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.835 of 2019,
wherein, the issue of condoning the delay of 568
days was under consideration.
The coordinate Bench of this Court has not
found the reason furnished by the State appellants
therein to be sufficient cause on the ground of
movement of file from one table to another by putting
reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble
Apex as referred hereinabove.
17. The State appellant has travelled to the Hon'ble
Apex Court by filing the SLP being SLP No.7755 of
2022 and has challenged the order passed in L.P.A.
No.835 of 2019 but the said SLP No.7755 of 2022
has been dismissed as would appear from the order
dated 13.05.2022.
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The Hon'ble Apex Court has also dismissed one
Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.8378-8379/2023 on
28th April, 2023 filed by the State of Jharkhand
which was filed against the order passed by this
Court in L.P.A. No.99 of 2021, wherein the
coordinate Bench of this Court dismissed the said
appeal on the basis of delay of 534 days in filing of
the appeal.
18. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also
dismissed S.L.P.(C) Diary No.(S) No.3188 of 2024 on
02.02.2024 filed by the State of Jharkhand against
the order dated 14.08.2023 passed by this Court in
L.P.A. No.401 of 2022, wherein, the delay of 259
days was not condoned.
19. This Court, after taking into consideration the
ratio laid by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
judgments referred hereinabove as also the
explanation furnished in the delay condonation
application, is of the view that no sufficient cause
has been shown to condone inordinate delay of 256
days in filing the appeal.
20. Accordingly, the delay condonation application
being I.A. No. 830 of 2025 is hereby dismissed.
21. In consequence thereof, the instant appeal also
stands dismissed.
2025:JHHC:21371-DB
22. In consequence of dismissal of appeal, pending
interlocutory applications, if any, also stand
dismissed.
(Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J.)
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
Samarth/ A.F.R.
